Jaspal Singh, J. ( 1 ) THE Delhi Pollution Control Committee (hereinafter called the Committee) has issued a direction to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to seal the industrial unit of the petitioner. The writ petition, seeks the quashing of that direction. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a private limited Company engaged in multifarious business activities and it is claimed that casting of iron components in the Cupola Furnace, which is the subject matter of the impugned order is only a small part of petitioner/s business activities being run from a premises residential in nature. On July 3, 1996 directions were received by the petitioner under Section 31a of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter called the Act) for closure of the Unit on the grounds, namely, (1) the Unit was being operated without consent under Section 21 of the Act, (2) the Unit had a Cupola Furnace with air pollution potential, and that (3) the Unit was being operated in non-conforming area under the Master Plan of Delhi-2001. Aggrieved by the said direction, the petitioner Company preferred TO an appeal. On July 3, 1996 the Appellate Authority remanded the matter to the Committee "to examine and take a decision on the grant of consent on the basis of fresh inspection/monitoring of the unit. " ( 3 ) THE grievance of the petitioner is that without ever monitoring its Unit in terms of the order of the Appellate Authority, and acting beyond its powers, the Committee has directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to seal the Unit. ( 4 ) THE question is Could the Committee issue such a direction? ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection. He submits that the impugned direction to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate being appealable, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. It is also argued that the Unit was monitored on two dates and that in any case, the impugned direction suffers from no illegality. ( 6 ) A few provisions of the Act need to be noticed before commenting upon the rival co. ( 7 ) ( 8 ) SECTION 31a of the Act invests the Board with power to give certain directions and since the question raised in this writ petitioner hovers around this provision, I feel tempted to reproduce the same. It runs as under: 31a. ( 7 ) ( 8 ) SECTION 31a of the Act invests the Board with power to give certain directions and since the question raised in this writ petitioner hovers around this provision, I feel tempted to reproduce the same. It runs as under: 31a. Power to give directions.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions. Explanation : For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power to issue directions under this Section includes the power to direct-- (a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or (b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service. ( 9 ) WHAT if someone fails to comply with the provisions of Section 21 or Section 22 or the directions issued under Section 31a? Section 37 of the Act deals with such an eventuality. It says: "37. Failure to comply with the provisions of Section 21 or Section 22 or with the directions issued under Section 31a.- (1) Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of Section 21 or Section 22 or directions issued under Section 31a, shall, in respect of each such failure, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and six months but which may extend to six years and with fine, and in case the failure continues, with an additional fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which such failure continues after the conviction for the first such failure. (2) If the failure REFERRED TO to in Sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend in seven years and with fine. (2) If the failure REFERRED TO to in Sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend in seven years and with fine. " ( 10 ) SINCE the learned Counsel for the respondent has challenged the maintainability of the petition on the ground that remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner, I may as well notice Section 31 which provides the remedy of appeal. It lays down: "31. Appeals.- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Board under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to such authority (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Appellate Authority) as the State Government may think fit to constitute: Provided that the Appellate Authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if such authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) The Appellate Authority shall consist of a single person or three persons as the State Government may think fit to be appointed by the State Government. (3) The form and the manner in which an appeal may be preferred TO under Sub-section (1), the fees payable for such appeal and the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority shall be such as may be prescribed. (4) On receipt of an appeal preferred TO under Sub-section (1), the Appellate Authority shall, after giving the appellant and the State Board an opportunity of being heard, dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. " ( 11 ) HAVING surveyed the relevant provisions of the Act, it is time to proceed ahead. ( 12 ) I need not go into the question as to whether the Unit is in any air pollution control area or not. Admittedly, it is. I also need not go into the question as to whether any consent has been obtained for, admittedly again, no such consent has been obtained so far. ( 12 ) I need not go into the question as to whether the Unit is in any air pollution control area or not. Admittedly, it is. I also need not go into the question as to whether any consent has been obtained for, admittedly again, no such consent has been obtained so far. As already noticed, the Committee purporting to act under Section 31a of the Act directed the closure of the Unit but in appeal that order was set aside with the following observations: ORDER After hearing the parties on 27. 9. 96 and considering the material available on record, the matter is remanded to the Delhi Pollution Control Committee to examine and take a decision on the grant of consent on the basis of fresh inspection/monitoring of the unit and information available with them. The question of the unit operating in non-conformity with the Master Plan of Delhi, 2001 is subjudice in the Hon ble Supreme Court in IA No. 22 of W. P. 4677 of 1985 - M. C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others and the Supreme Court is monitoring the progress, the orders of the Supreme Court from time to time will be binding on the industries also. Ordered accordingly. " ( 13 ) ALTHOUGH it is claimed by the Committee that after the order of remand there was monitoring of the Unit and that the petitioner had adopted no measures to control air pollution and although the petitioner has denied these allegations, let us assume for argument s sake, that what the Committee is asserting is correct. The question still remains: Could the Committee give the direction to the Sub Divisional Magistrate to "seal the Unit forthwith"? Mr. Kashyap appearing for the Committee says the Board could and in support relies upon Section 31a of the Act but then Mr. Govil who appears for the petitioner is equally vehement in denying any such power with the Committee and he too, in support, swears by the same provision, that is, Section 31a. ( 14 ) I have already reproduced above Section 31a of the Act. It undoubtedly invests the Board to issue "any directions" to "any person" subject, however, to the satisfaction of two requirements. ( 14 ) I have already reproduced above Section 31a of the Act. It undoubtedly invests the Board to issue "any directions" to "any person" subject, however, to the satisfaction of two requirements. Firstly, the direction so issued must be "in the exercise of its powers" under the Act and secondly it must also be in the "performance of its functions under this Act". But then Section 31a has an Explanation too and for avoidance of doubts, it declares that the power to issue directions under the Section "includes" the power to direct "the closure, prohibition or regulation" of any industry, operation or process. ( 15 ) MR. KASHYAP submits that "closure" in synonymous with "sealing" of any industry, operation or process and that, in any case, only the interpretation suggested by him would help achieve the purpose of the enactment as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. ( 16 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, while interpreting a provision the Court has to keep in view the attempted objective of the enactment and has to adopt a constructive approach, but then, it is also true that no violence is to be done to the language of the provision. What is of significance in Section 31a is that the main part itself is very wide. Subject to certain conditions the Board in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act, may issue "any" directions. The word "any" is significant and is of wide amplitude. It means one or same or all and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every". But then does the use of the word "any" in the context it has been used in the main part of Section 31a indicate that it has been used in the wider sense extending from one to all? If it was clearly so, where was the need for the Explanation to say: "for the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power to issue directions under this Section includes the power to direct" the closure etc. ? Obviously, the need for the Explanation was felt because the meaning of the wider word "any" was felt in the context, to be not clear and free from ambiguity. When the main part uses the expression of wide amplitude like "any" indicating its wide sweep, what is the significance of the word "includes" in the Explanation? ? Obviously, the need for the Explanation was felt because the meaning of the wider word "any" was felt in the context, to be not clear and free from ambiguity. When the main part uses the expression of wide amplitude like "any" indicating its wide sweep, what is the significance of the word "includes" in the Explanation? Now, as we all know, the word "includes" is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the Statute. (Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 A. C. 99) (See also Regl. Director, ESIC v. High Land Cofee Works, (1991) 3 SCC 617 at p. 620 ). If we read the Explanation in the light of what has been noticed above, it would be difficult to hold that the power can extend to the giving of a direction much more harsh and stringent than the direction of the closure, of the industry, operation or process. ( 17 ) BUT then, as noticed above, the contention of Mr. Kashyap is that "sealing" and "closure" are inter-changeable and, in effect signify the same end result. ( 18 ) IS it so? ( 19 ) AS I see it, a closure order is an order prohibiting the use of the premises as respects which an order is made for any purpose which violates the provisions of the Act and would not operate to close such user as is not found offending the provisions of the Act. Closure of the industry, operation or process would thus imply closure of only manufacturing or other such activity which is found offending the provisions of the Act though the management and/or the workers of such Unit and even others like customers etc. may still have easy or regulated in gress or egress from such a Unit. Closure here would thus mean discontinuance of the objectionable activity. An order to seal the industry would lead to consequences much harsher than closure. Sealing would prevent access to and egress from (an area or space), and thus close (entrances) for this purpose. Sealing means to fasten with or as with seal; to close (an aperture, etc.) securely be placing a coating of wax, cement, or lead over the orfice, or, in wider sense, by any kind of fastening that must be broken before access can be obtained. Sealing means to fasten with or as with seal; to close (an aperture, etc.) securely be placing a coating of wax, cement, or lead over the orfice, or, in wider sense, by any kind of fastening that must be broken before access can be obtained. And if that be so, what happens to the other non-offending activities of the petitioner? Closing down all industrial activity is neither the purpose nor the object of the Act. Prevention of pollution is. If one particular component is the cause of pollution, the Board may well, subject to the provisions of the Act, direct its closure but it cannot seal the entire Unit bringing thereby even unoffending activities to a standstill. ( 20 ) IT was said that the Committee had to direct sealing of the Unit as the direction of closure had not been acted upon. I feel this argument itself goes to show that closure is not synonymous with "sealing" and that though sealing implies closure, it also, in effect, means much more than mere closure. In any case, if the Committee found its direction of closure having not been acted upon it could take recourse to Section 37 of the Act. ( 21 ) AS for Mr. Kashyap s objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, I need say no more than this that as the direction to seal the Unit is not authorised by the Act, and is thus beyond the powers of the Committee, the writ would lie. ( 22 ) FOR the reasons recorded above, the impugned direction of sealing the Unit of the petitioner is quashed. However, no order is made as to costs.