JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. (Oral) 1. This order shall dispose of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant papers. 3. The petitioner has prayed for condonation of delay (19 days) in filing the appeal on the ground that the delay occurred on account of bonafide belief that the applicants will be given concession for filing the appeal for the period of winter vacations during which the Honble High Court remains closed and that it was applicant No. 1 who has been dealing with the case throughout and is aged about 76 years and that the delay in filing the appeal was not deliberate and intentional. 4. The application has been opposed on the grounds that the reason assigned for delay is not plausible. It is also not disclosed as to who advised the applicants about the deduction of the period of winter vacations and in the absence of non disclosure of the name of adviser, it cannot be presumed that the applicants were entertaining any bonafide belief in this regard. 5. There cannot be any dispute that this Court remains closed for winter vacations, and Notification about such vacations is invariably issued under the authority of the High Court. The relevant winter vacations, this year, commenced from January 11, 1999 till February 20, 1999. 21st February, 1999 being Sunday, the Court was to reopen on February 22, 1999. A Notification about this vacation was also issued by the High Court and in the Notification it was specified that limitation will not run during vacations and gazetted holidays. Since it is a Notification issued by this Court, therefore, judicial notice of its contents can be taken. The contents of this Notification to the effect that the limitation will not run during vacations and gazetted holidays may convey to the person concerned that the vacation period will not be counted for the purpose of limitation because the contents of the Notification say that "limitation will not run during vacation". Though, legally speaking it may not be so because once the limitation has started running, it will not come to a stop or halt but only the vacation period can be excluded from being computed for the purpose of limitation if the limitations expires during the vacations. Though, legally speaking it may not be so because once the limitation has started running, it will not come to a stop or halt but only the vacation period can be excluded from being computed for the purpose of limitation if the limitations expires during the vacations. But this is the legal interpretation, for a common man, if the limitation will not run during this period, evidently he may presume that period of limitation during the vacation will not be in the process of running. Against this background, the impression of the applicants that the vacation period will be deducted in computing the period of limitation cannot be said to be without any basis or a malafide averment. Otherwise, there is nothing in the relevant papers which may suggest that the delay in filing the appeal was deliberance or as a result of gross negligence on the part of the appellants. The explanation given for delay in filing the appeal is, thus, quite probable and I reasonable. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent while submitting that the delay in filing the appeal has not been satisfactorily explained and there is no sufficient cause for condonation thereof, has relied upon P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (AIR 1998 SC 2276) wherein it has been held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute se prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In this case, the delay sought to be condoned was of 565 days in filing the appeal and while condoning the delay the Court so condoning had not recorded its satisfaction that the explanation for delay was either reasonable or satisfactory which was essential pre-requisite to condone the delay nor the explanation given was found satisfactory by the Honble Supreme Court. 7. While dealing with the question as to what constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the Honble Sjjpreme Court in Balakrishnan v. M, Krishnamurthv (1998) 7 SCC 123 has held as follows "10... The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the.expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the.expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dialatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy, unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicau up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly, the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclsoing s suiter from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntla Devi Jain v. Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366 : AIR 1972 SC 749." 8. In view of the above proposition, the applicants having offered reasonable explanation for delay in filing the appeal, I am of the view that the delay in filing the appeal must be condoned. Accordingly, this application is allowed and the delay of 19 days in filing the appeal is condorred. -