H. L. DATTU, J. ( 1 ) THESE two connected petitions raise a common question of construction of Rule 51 (3) of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service rules ('the Rules' for short ). ( 2 ) MOST of the facts are not in dispute. Basing on the findings of the enquiry officer, who had enquired into certain allegations made against the petitioner in the charge memo dated 21-4-1986, the disciplinary authority by his order dated 7-5-1987, had dismissed the petitioner from the services of the respondent-Bank. On an appeal filed by the delinquent, the appellate authority modified the order of the disciplinary authority by his order dated 8-10-1987, which was communicated to the petitioner on 21-9-1988. On a request made by the disciplinary authority, the reviewing authority of the respondent-Bank, in its meeting held on 25-8-1988 passes a resolution and the same is as under: "order of the appellate authority is liable to review and the order is stayed. Petitioner is asked to show cause why the orders of the disciplinary authority should not be restored". ( 3 ) PURSUANT to the resolution made, a notice dated 10-9-1988 came to be issued to the petitioner to show cause on the proposal of the review committee. It was replied by the delinquent. Among others, a specific contention had been raised in the reply that the action initiated by the review committee is wholly time barred, therefore without jurisdiction and illegal. The review committee after adverting to the contentions raised by delinquent in Ms reply statement, was pleased to set aside the orders made by the agpellate authority and was further pleased to restore the orders framed by the disciplinary authority. Disturbed by this action, the delinquent officer takes exception to the orders passed by review committee in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 4 ) SRI P. S. Rajagopal learned Counsel for petitioner, primarily questions the legality or otherwise of the orders passed by the reviewing committee on the ground that the proceedings to review the appellate order had not been initiated by the review committee within a period of six months from the date of the order and, therefore, the order is bad, illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. In support of that contention, the learned Counsel strongly relies upon the observations made by Andhra pradesh High Court in the case of Shoukat Khan v Director of Postal services , L. V. V. R. Patrudu v The Reviewing Committee, State Bank of india, Bombay and Others , M. M. Srivastava v Union of India and others and the unreported decision of Madras High Court in the case of r. Alageshan v The Chief General Manager, State Bank of India and another. ( 5 ) SRI M. Subba Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that since the records were already before the review committee, the question of calling for the records for the purpose of review would not arise at all and therefore, the orders passed by the review committee is well within time and even otherwise the review committee can extend the time specified under sub-rule (3) for good and sufficient cause shown. Therefore the learned Counsel contends that the orders passed by the reviewing committee is not only justified but also valid. ( 6 ) THIS is the only contention urged before me by the learned Counsels for the parties to the lis and it alone needs to be considered in these petitions. ( 7 ) BEFORE I consider the issue, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the rules. The power of review is granted by Rule 51 (3) of the Service Rules of the Bank, which reads as under:"not withstanding anything contained in this section, the reviewing authority may call for the record of the case within six months from the date of the order and, after reviewing the case, pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit". ( 8 ) IN my view, the object of this provision seems to vest supervisory jurisdiction in the reviewing authority to review those orders passed by its subordinates which according to them are erroneous. The words of the rule are that "call for the records of the case within six months from the date of the order". ( 8 ) IN my view, the object of this provision seems to vest supervisory jurisdiction in the reviewing authority to review those orders passed by its subordinates which according to them are erroneous. The words of the rule are that "call for the records of the case within six months from the date of the order". A reading of the rule shows that it confers power on the reviewing authority to call for the record of the case without indicating at whose instance such power has to be exercised This power evidently could be exercised by the reviewing authority on receiving the information which in its opinion calls for exercise of such power. This information may come from the department or from the delinquent. Even in the absence of such information from either of the parties, the reviewing authority may also call for the records of the case to ensure proper administration of the service rules of the Bank. The rule obligates and mandates for the reviewing authority to call for the records of the case within six months from the date of the order which requires to be reviewed. The purpose of calling for the records of the case by the reviewing authority is to examine them and not for any other purpose. The act of examination requires a positive action of discharging its function by the reviewing authority. Just because the records are already before the reviewing authority, it cannot be construed that the limitation prescribed in the rules would not apply. In my view, even if the records are already before the reviewing authority and even if they are not called for by the reviewing authority for initiating action under the sub-rule, some positive action including application of mind to the records of the case requires to be made by the reviewing authority within the time prescribed under the sub-rule, otherwise the entire proceedings would be time barred. ( 9 ) THE only question is whether the time-limit under sub-rule (3) of rule 51 for review has expired and the contention is that this time marks out the commencement of the proceedings. ( 9 ) THE only question is whether the time-limit under sub-rule (3) of rule 51 for review has expired and the contention is that this time marks out the commencement of the proceedings. In my opinion the reviewing authority must call for the records within six months from the date of the final order and if the records are already before them, then some positive action requires to be taken by the reviewing authority which may include the application of mind by the reviewing authority to the records of the case and a formality of sending a notice to the delinquent. In the present case the reviewing authority was informed by the disciplinary authority to review the orders made by the appellate authority dated 8-10-1987 which was communicated to the petitioner only on 21-9-1988 and the reviewing authority for first time met only on 25-8-1988 and was pleased to pass a resolution to the effect "that the order of the appellate authority is liable to review and the order is stayed. Petitioner was asked to show-cause why the order of the disciplinary authority should not be restored". This resolution was passed nearly after one year from the date of the order of the appellate authority. If for any reason the said resolution was made by the reviewing authority within six months from the date of the order of appellate authority, I do not think that just because a show-cause notice had not been issued within the time prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 51 of the Rules, the action of the reviewing authority could not have been assailed as wholly time barred or one without jurisdiction. In the instant case the reviewing authority for the first time examines the records of the appellate authority in its meeting held on 25-8-1988 and is of the opinion that the orders made by the appellate authority requires to be reviewed and therefore issues an order of interim stay of the said order but by then the time limit prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 51 of the rules had expired. The reviewing authority infact accepts this position but relies upon sub-rule (5) of Rule 51 of the Rules. In my view the said reliance is wholly misplaced for the reason that the said rule applies to filing of appeals and not for reviewing the orders made by subordinate authorities. The reviewing authority infact accepts this position but relies upon sub-rule (5) of Rule 51 of the Rules. In my view the said reliance is wholly misplaced for the reason that the said rule applies to filing of appeals and not for reviewing the orders made by subordinate authorities. I may also mention in this behalf that there are certain observations in the decision of learned Judge of Madras High Court in r. Alaheshan's case, supra, which goes to support my conclusions. The following observations are relevant and they are extracted: in these circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the reviewing authority has no jurisdiction to issue notice after six months. This view of mine is supported by the decision in Shoukat khan's case, supra, wherein a Division Bench of the Andhra pradesh High Court has held that mere calling for records without anything more can certainly not be equated with initiation of a proceeding for review. It is only when the authority competent to review decide upon proceeding further and issues a notice to the delinquent officer calling upon him to show cause why the punishment meted out to him should not be enhanced that proceedings for review can reasonably be said to have been commenced. In the present case before me, it cannot be disputed that though the records were sent by the Disciplinary Authority to the reviewing authority in March 1988, notice has been issued only in August, 1988, which is after six months beyond the period prescribed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 51". ( 10 ) I may also derive support to come to my conclusions from the observations made by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Srivastav, supra,. It is held therein: the calling for the record of the case of the proposal or intention to review the case would not be deemed to be a fulfilment of the requirement as provided in Rule 29 (l) (v) of the said rules. The object of calling for the record would clearly show that the appellate authority intend to examine afresh the whole case wherever it considered or felt necessary. The mere act of calling for the records without anything more can certainly not be equated with the initiation of the proceedings for reviewing the order passed by the disciplinary authority. The object of calling for the record would clearly show that the appellate authority intend to examine afresh the whole case wherever it considered or felt necessary. The mere act of calling for the records without anything more can certainly not be equated with the initiation of the proceedings for reviewing the order passed by the disciplinary authority. It is only after the authority competent to review has decided for proceeding further and issuing a notice to the delinquent officer calling upon him to show cause why the order passed by the disciplinary authority be not reviewed that the proceedings for review can reasonable be said to have been commenced. The authority reviewing the matter may not conclude the enquiry within six months but it is imperatively necessary that the order for review of the case should be passed indicating for the commencement of the proceeding before the expiry of six months from the date of the order sought to be reviewed". ( 11 ) IN L. V. V. R. Patrudu's case, supra, the Andhra Pradesh Court was pleased to observe as under: sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 51 provide for appeal and its procedure and also prescribe a period of 45 days for filing the appeal. Sub-rule (3), which provides for suo motu exercise of the power of review against any final order and begins with the non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in this section". Apparently, the use of the word 'section' is a mistake for 'rule'. Again, coming to sub-rule (5), which confers the power of condoning delay, we find that it opens with the words "save as otherwise expressly provided in the rules in this section". Both these provisions read together, lead to the conclusion that sub-rule (5) will not apply to the exercise of suo motu power under sub-rule (3 ). Apart from the language, it is clear that it will be incongruous for an authority exercising a suo motu power, to extend the time specified or to condone the delay in its own action. Normally, a power of condoning delay will be in the action of the others and not for the authorities' own default. The suo motu exercise of power is conferred to keep a supervision over various authorities. Normally, a power of condoning delay will be in the action of the others and not for the authorities' own default. The suo motu exercise of power is conferred to keep a supervision over various authorities. For this purpose an outer limit of six months is fixed so that me employees do not have a threat of reviewing the disciplinary proceedings even after a lapse of six months. I am not able to agree with the contention of Sri Srinivasa Murthy that different considerations will apply, when the disciplinary authority has itself moved the reviewing authority within six months by writing a letter or the fact that the record was already sent by the disciplinary authority within six months. If these were so, the very purpose of fixing of six months will be defeated by the disciplinary authority sending the record of every case where appeal is allowed, to the Reviewing Committee. Para 4 of the circular of the Head Office, extracted in Point No. 2, clearly indicates that it is for the Reviewing Committee to take a decision as to whether a particular review petition is to be admitted in the exercise of its suo motu power i. e. , it must be a decision by the committee after exercising its mind whether to invoke the suo motu power and this must be within six months from the date of the appellate order in this case. The impugned proceedings disclose that the appellate order was passed on 21-3-1988, while the review petition was taken up for consideration by the committee only on 22-12-1988 and it took a decision in its meeting on 4-2-1989, which was communicated by the proceedings dated 17-2-1989 treating it as an appeal is filed by the disciplinary authority. The Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Court Act and the decisions under the same holding that unless the Court takes cognizance within a period of one year of the alleged contempt, contempt proceedings become barred by time. Therefore, by the time the Reviewing Committee met to consider this case for the exercise of the suo motu power, the period of six months had expired. Therefore, by the time the Reviewing Committee met to consider this case for the exercise of the suo motu power, the period of six months had expired. It matters little, whether the disciplinary authority had requested for review or any employee made such request ultimately it is only the decision to exercise the suo motu power, which is important. If it is not taken within the period prescribed namely six months and as it is already held that the power to condone delay under sub-clause (5) does not apply to the exercise of the suo motu power of review, any decision beyond six months to initiate or admitting the review petition, will not be legal. In this case, as the suo motu power was exercised after a lapse of six months, there is no useful purpose in allowing the impugned proceedings, though at the show-cause notice stage, to continue. The charges framed and found to be established by the disciplinary authority are as follows:" ( 12 ) AN ancillary question that arises for consideration is whether the reviewing authority could have condoned its own delay while initiating review proceedings by resorting to sub-rule (5) of Rule 51 of the Rules. This question need not detain me for a long, since the Madras High court in Alageshan's case, supra, was pleased to observe:"the next question that arises for consideration is, whether under sub-rule (5) of Rule 51, the reviewing authority can condone its own delay? In my view, it cannot be done. A reading of the entire Rule 51, in my view, shows that the power given under sub-rule (2) has to be exercised by the appellate authority since limitation of 45 days is prescribed for filing of the appeal and if the appeal is preferred beyond that time, sub-rule (5) cannot come into play. I do not think that sub-rule (5) will apply to a case which arises under sub-rule (3) where the reviewing authority calls for the records". ( 13 ) IN my view this is the only interpretation that is possible on sub-rule (5) of Rule 51. Respectfully following the observations made in the aforesaid decision I hold that Rule 51 (5) will apply to cases which arises under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51 of the Rules. ( 14 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. Respectfully following the observations made in the aforesaid decision I hold that Rule 51 (5) will apply to cases which arises under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51 of the Rules. ( 14 ) IN the result the petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. The order of the reviewing authority is set aside. A direction is issued to the respondent-Bank to implement the orders passed by the appellate authority dated 8-10-1987 within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Court's order. It is further declared that the petitioner is entitled for all the benefits which he may be entitled in view of the setting aside the orders of the reviewing authority. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .