Judgment :- AR. Lakshmanan, J. Heard both sides. 2. Petitioner is a firm and an assessee on the file of the Agricultural Income Tax office, Kozhikode for the assessment year 1978-79 year ending S1.3.1978). Petitioner's assessment was completed under S.18(3) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act (for short'the Act') by order dated 27.3.1984. The assessment order and the demand notice were despatched and were served on the petitioner only on 20.7.1984, that is, long thereafter. A copy of the said order is produced as Ext. P1. Petitioner preferred an appeal against Ext. P1 proceedings contending that the disallowance of certain expenses were not proper. The Appellate Authority modified Ext. P1 by his order dated 3.10.1985. Thereafter, a revised order was passed by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer on 25.1.1989 determining the total agricultural income at Rs. 2,99,876.20 as against Rs. 3,52,108/-fixed originally in Ext.P1 order. Against Ext. P1 order, petitioner preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, Trivandrum under Ext. P2 dated 29.11.1988. It was contended that the assessment order, Ext. P1. was served on the petitioner only on 20.7.1984, though it is dated 27.3.1984 and hence, barred by limitation. There were other contentions also regarding the disallowance of labour charges for maturing etc. The Commissioner, by his proceedings dated 18.7.1989 in a common order for the assessment years 1978-79 and 1979-80, remanded the case to the Agricultural Income Tax Office, Kozhikode with a direction to dispose it according to law. A copy of the common order in Agricultural Income Tax Revision Petition Nos. 144 and 145 of 1989 is produced and marked as Ext. P3. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition dated 27.8.1989 for rectifying the mistakes in Ext. P3, namely that no specific finding was given regarding the ground that the assessment was barred by limitation. A copy of the said petition is produced and marked as Ext. P4. Petitioner has also filed a Reference Application under S.60 of the Act to draw a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court, which is marked as Ext. P5. The Commissioner, by his order dated 2,12.1989, dismissed the same under Ext. P6. 3. Sri. P. Balachandran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the assessment order (Ext. P1) and the demand notice are barred by limitation. He invited my attention to S.35(2) of the Act, which reads thus: "35. P5. The Commissioner, by his order dated 2,12.1989, dismissed the same under Ext. P6. 3. Sri. P. Balachandran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the assessment order (Ext. P1) and the demand notice are barred by limitation. He invited my attention to S.35(2) of the Act, which reads thus: "35. Income escaping assessment: - (1) If for any reason agricultural income chargeable to tax under this Act has escaped assessment in any financial year or has been assessed at too low a rate, the Agricultural Income Tax Officer may, at any time within five years of the end of that year, serve on the person liable to pay the tax or in the case of a company on the principal officer thereof a notice on training all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-s.(2) of S.17 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income and the provisions of this Act shall so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section: Provided that the tax shall be charged at the rate at which it would have been charged if such income had not escaped assessment or lull assessment, as the case may be: Provided further that the Agricultural Income Tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section unless he has recorded in his reason for doing so. (2) No order of assessment under S.18 or of assessment or re-assessment under sub-s.' (1) of this Section shall be made after the expiry of five years from the end of the year in which the agricultural income was first assessable: The above Section provides that no order of assessment under S.18 or of assessment or re-assessment under sub-s.(1) of this Section shall be made after the expiry of five years from the end of the year in which the agricultural income was first assessable. Under S.18 of the Act, the Officer shall assess the total agricultural income of the assessee and determine the sum payable by him on the basis of such return. A combined reading of the two Sections lead to the conclusion that what is contemplated under S.35 of the Act is a determination of both the total agricultural income as well as the tax to be paid. It is submitted that Ext. A combined reading of the two Sections lead to the conclusion that what is contemplated under S.35 of the Act is a determination of both the total agricultural income as well as the tax to be paid. It is submitted that Ext. P1 order and the demand notice were served on the petitioner only on 20.7.1984, long after the period prescribed by the Statute. Ext. P1 order is dated 27.3.1984. According to the petitioner, it was not despatched along with the demand notice before the expiration of the period prescribed under the Act. In the instant case, the assessment year in question was 1978-79. Five years from the end of the year in which the agricultural income was first assessable ended on 31.3.1984. The assessment order is dated 27.3.1984 and the demand notice was served on 20.7.1984. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of assessment became alive only when the notice of demand was served and that was beyond the period of five years and, therefore, the assessment was, barred by limitation. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, the communication of an order is an essential part of making such an order. According to the petitioner, Ext. P1 was communicated to him only on 20.7.1984 and hence, beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, the Commissioner was not justified in merely noting the above argument without giving a binding decision in Exts. P3 and P6 orders. It is submitted that the Commissioner should have considered the above argument which goes to the root of the matter and should have given a proper finding before directing the lower authority to consider other-points. 4. A perusal of the order of the Commissioner under Ext. P3 would show that the Commissioner has not decided the issues raised by the petitioner and has left open all the issues to be agitated afresh before the assessing authority. The Commissioner, in his order dated 2.12.1989 (Ext. P6) which was tiled as a rectification application under S.36 of the Act as well as the reference application under S.60 of the Act against the revision order Nos. 144 and 145 of 1989 which were filed against the assessment orders for the years 1978-79 and 1979-80, has extracted the grounds raised in the two revisions filed by the petitioner. P6) which was tiled as a rectification application under S.36 of the Act as well as the reference application under S.60 of the Act against the revision order Nos. 144 and 145 of 1989 which were filed against the assessment orders for the years 1978-79 and 1979-80, has extracted the grounds raised in the two revisions filed by the petitioner. The question of limitation has been raised as ground No. 7 for the assessment year 1979-80. It is stated in ground No. 7 that the assessment is barred by limitation. The Commissioner has also extracted other grounds raised by the petitioner in the revisions. The Commissioner was of the view that since the petitioner has raised many grounds which actually necessitated a detailed verification of the basic records, receipts, vouchers etc. at the lower level, has remanded the matter to the lower authority. The applicability of S.35(2) on an assessment under S.18(4) was also left open to be decided by the lower authority. Since the Commissioner has remitted the entire matter for a re-examination of the whole facts, I am of the view that an interference with such an order is not warranted at. this stage. As pointed out by the Commissioner, the petitioner is also free to raise any other new grounds along with the grounds raised earlier. I make it clear that the assessing authority shall decide the specific ground raised by the petitioner with regard to the limitation issue. It is the petitioner's case that the assessment order was communicated to him only on 20.7.1984, that is, beyond the period of five years as provided under S.33(2) of the Act. The assessing authority shall consider this specific issue with reference to the records and decide the same in merits. 5. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, an order of assessment comes into force only when it is communicated. This is not only by reason of S.30 of the Act, but also for more fundamental reasons that a party against whom an order is made must be put on that order. The date of making or signing the order is not determinative of its effect. The order, at that stage, is only unilateral in a sense and not irrevocable and it become bilateral or binding only tin communication. In this case, the date of communication of order of assessment is in dispute. The date of making or signing the order is not determinative of its effect. The order, at that stage, is only unilateral in a sense and not irrevocable and it become bilateral or binding only tin communication. In this case, the date of communication of order of assessment is in dispute. As already noticed, according to the petitioner, it is beyond the period of limitation. A Division Bench of this Court comprised of Paripoornan and Viswanatha Iyer, JJ. in an identical matter in Government Wood Works v. State of Kerala (69 STC 62) held thus: "The order of any authority cannot be said to be passed unless i t is in some way pronounced or published or the party affected has the means of knowing it. It is not enough if the order is made, signed, and kept in the file, because such order may be liable to change at the hands of the authority who may in initiator even destroy it, before itis made known, based on subsequent information, thinking or change of opinion. To make the order complete and effective, it should be issued, so as to be beyond the control of the authority concerned, for any possible change or modification therein. This should be done within the prescribed period, though the actual service of the order may be beyond that period." The Division Bench, in the above case, has also remitted the matter to the Tribunal for an examination of the records to ascertain whether the order of the Deputy Commissioner in that case had been issued from his office within the period of four years prescribed under S.35(2) of the Act. The Tribunal was directed to adjudicate the matter in the light of the observations contained in that judgment and the judgment in the case of Malayil Mills v. State of Kerala (TRC Nos. 15 and 16/81) decided by this Court on 7.7.1982. I, therefore, do not feel justified in interfering with the order of the Commissioner in remitting back the matter to the assessing authority. I confirm the remittal order to the lower authority for consideration of the question whether the assessment order under S.35 has been passed and served within the time prescribed in S.35(2) of the Act and to pass a considered order in the light of the issues and contentions raised by the petitioner in this Original Petition. I confirm the remittal order to the lower authority for consideration of the question whether the assessment order under S.35 has been passed and served within the time prescribed in S.35(2) of the Act and to pass a considered order in the light of the issues and contentions raised by the petitioner in this Original Petition. The lower authority may consider other issues, if necessary, and that would be depending upon the finding to be rendered on the question of limitation. The Original Petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.