JUDGMENT B. P. Singh & B. P. Sharma, JJ. The appellants herein have preferred this letters Patent Appeal by leave granted by this Court to prefer an appeal, even though the appellants were not parties in the writ petition in which the impugned judgment was rendered. The respondents herein were the writ petitioner in the writ petition being CWJC No. 3210 of 1990. They claimed that they were working as Havildars in the Bihar Military Police Force, but their names have been wrongly left out from the penal, Annexure 5, which had been prepared for the purpose of granting promotion to the eligible Havildars to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Arms). According to the petitioners, though they were working as Havildars and though they were eligible for promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Arms,) the names of persons junior to them were included in the said penal but the name of the writ petitioner had been left out. It was their case that their exclusion from the penal (Annexure-5), was unreasonable unjustified and arbitrary, since only the cases of those person were considered for promotion whose name were included in the aforesaid penal. The learned judge after hearing the parties and after a careful appraisal of the material on record came to the conclusion the even Havildar who were junior to the write petitioner have been included in the afore said penal leaving out the writ petitioner. He therefore allowed the writ petitioner and directed that the names of the writ petitioner (respondents 1 to 6) be included in the list for consideration and be considered for promotion of the rank of Sub-Inspector of police (Arms) against the post reserved for them by an interim order passed by this Court in the writ petition on 2.11.1990. 2. A few facts which are not ha dispute may first be noticed. Respondents 1 to 6 herein, who were the writ petitioner were promoted as Havildars as a Special case under Rule 660 C of the Bihar Police Manual which provide that out of turn promotion may be recommended by the Selection Board to officers with outstanding record of service, and the competent authorities may order such promotion in deserving cases as they deem fit and proper with the approval of the next higher authorities. The criteria taken together for determining outstanding records of service has been laid down under the said rule. It is not necessary for us to consider those matters in this writ petition because out of turn promotion granted to respondent 1 to 6 has not been challenged by any one at any time. The, were given out of turn promotion to the post of Havildar on different dates in the year 1917. So far as the appellants are concerned it is not disputes that they were promoted to the post of Havildar later than respondents 1 to 6. The names of the appellants were included in the penal, Annexure 5, but the names of respondent 1 to 6 did not find place in the said panel which had been prepared for the purpose of granting promotion to the higher post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Arms) 3. Counsel for the appellants submitted before us that in accordance with the relevant rules, circulars etc. a Sepoy was to be promoted to the post of Havildar reckoning his seniority by reference to the date on which ho passed the Senior Promotion Course, or on the date he was exempted from passing the said Senior Promotion Course. It was submitted that basis for determining seniority in the cadre of Havildar must also be the same namely, the date on which the Sepoy concerned had passed the Senior Promotion Courses or was exempted from passing that course. He argued that so far as respondents 1 to 6 are concerned, they passed the Senior Promotion Course after their promotion as Havildar but within the period granted to them for passing that examination. He, therefore, submitted that in the cadre of Havildar the appellants must rank senior to respondents 1 to 6 on account of the fact that they had passed the senior Promotion Course after the appellants. 4. The submission urged on behalf of the appellants must be rejected. It is no doubt true that for promotion to the post of Havildar, the Selection Board is required to prepare panel including therein the names of all eligible Sepoys who have passed the Senior Promotion Course. 4. The submission urged on behalf of the appellants must be rejected. It is no doubt true that for promotion to the post of Havildar, the Selection Board is required to prepare panel including therein the names of all eligible Sepoys who have passed the Senior Promotion Course. For the purpose of determining their seniority inter set in the matter of promotion to the post of Havildar, their names have to be arranged in the order of seniority in the panel having regard to the date on which the concerned Sepoys passed the Senior Promotion Course, or the date on which they were exempted from passing the said course. After their names are so arranged in order of seniority they are to be considered for promotion to the post of Havildar. The appellants as well as the respondents have placed reliance on Annexure-5 which is a circular dated 20th January, 1980. The aforesaid circular makes this position clear it also provide that in case some of the candidates considered for promotion in order of seniority are not selected by the board and are therefore not promoted as Havildar they loss the benefit of seniority in the sense that if they are selected by a selection Board in future, they cannot claim seniority over the Sepoys who have been promoted as Havildar earlier, even though those earlier promoted had passed the Senior promotion Course later than the Sepoys promoted later. This only clarifies that that though the name of the Sepoys have to be arranged in order of seniority for promotion on to the post of Havildar, a person not selected from promotion, loses his seniority when the others are promoted as Havildar. If the person who was earlier rejected is subsequently found suitable for promotion in any subsequent year to the cadre of Havildar, he cannot claim seniority on the basis of the date on which he had passed the senior promotion Course. The rule only makes explicit what is otherwise understood as a settled principal in service law. 5. So understood, it is not possible to hold that in the cadre of Havildar, the principle for determination of seniority is the date on which a Sepoy may have passed the Senior Promotion Course. The rule only makes explicit what is otherwise understood as a settled principal in service law. 5. So understood, it is not possible to hold that in the cadre of Havildar, the principle for determination of seniority is the date on which a Sepoy may have passed the Senior Promotion Course. While it is true that the seniority inters of all Sepoys who have passed the Senior Promotion Course, and who have been found suitable for promotion by the same selection Board, will be determined by reference to their dates of passing the senior Promotion Course. The same rule will not apply to the persons who are not selected for promotion, because their promotion to the cadre of Havildar is later, even though as Sepoys they may have been considered to be senior by reckoning seniority from the date of passing the Senior Promotion Course. The learned Judge has, therefore, rightly held that the principle of determining seniority inter se is by reference to the date on which they were initially appointed to that cadre which is the normal rule for determining seniority. In the instant case, undoubtedly, respondents 1 to 6 were promoted earlier than the appellants to the post of Havildar. They have been granted out of turn promotion under Rule 660 (C) of the Bihar Police Manual and obviously, by the very nature of the promotion granted, their seniority its Sepoys was of no consequence as they were granted promotion in recognition of their outstanding service and performance. It must, therefore, follow that respondents 1 to 6 who were promoted earlier to the cadre of Havildar rank senior to Sepoys regularly promoted as Havildar in subsequent years. Logically, therefore, if the cases of those promoted later were being considered for promotion to the higher post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Arms), the cases of respondents 1 to 6 should also be considered for promotion. This is precisely what the learned Judge has hold, and we find no reason to take a different view. We find no error in the judgment and order of the learned Judge and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed.