The writ petitioner Shri Mridul Dutta has been operating his business of audio-cassette, radio and tape etc. in the name and style of M/s MB Enterprise in a room constructed by him by the side of AT Road at Jorhat town since 1990 under authority of a trade license obtained from the Jorhat Municipal Board, hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'. The business premises has also been allotted with a House No.i.e. No.54 of Part 10 of Jorhat town by the Board. The petitioner paid annual fees/tax to the Board till March, 1993. But on 6.7.93, an officer from the Board visited the premises and took measurement thereof. The petitioner ' collected the information that the Board was soon going to demolish the structure standing thereon. Apprehending imminent eviction, the petitioner moved this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the competence of the Board to take recourse to such action as the land in question did not vest with the Board and, that too, without serving any notice. In addition, it is also averred that no notice has also been served upon him under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 and, as such, any step taken by the respondents to evict him or demolish the premises constructed by him will be in violation of the law in force. 2. At the initial stage, on being moved, this Court vide order dated 9.7.93 issued a Rule and also passed an interim order prohibiting demolition of the premises described in the writ petition until further orders. 3. Mr. G. Gopal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Muktar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.l and 4, advanced argument in support and in opposition of the averments made in the petition. Mr. Gopal, during the course of argument, referred to the documents Annexures 1 to 4 annexed with the writ petition to sustantiate the contention of the petitioner as stated above. 4. The legal position with regard to the averments made in the writ petition on oath and the documents annexed thereto, which are not controverted by any of the respondents by default to file any counter-affidavit, is that the averments made in the writ petition must have been taken as admitted. 4. The legal position with regard to the averments made in the writ petition on oath and the documents annexed thereto, which are not controverted by any of the respondents by default to file any counter-affidavit, is that the averments made in the writ petition must have been taken as admitted. Therefore, the factual matrix made available by the petitioner in the petition and the documents annexed therewith have to be relied upon for answering the lone question whether the State or the Board, as the case may be, can eject an unauthorised occupant or remove/demolish any building without issuing any notice as contemplated under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 or under section 159 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956. 5. Before the above question of law is taken up for consideration, it is considered imperative to mention that the controversy whether the land in question is vested in the Board or not, or whether the land is reserved for road or whether the petitioner has acquired any right as defined in Rule 18 (2) are matters of minute details. The established principles of law that the provisions under Article 226 are available for enforcement of an existing right and not for establishment of any such right which require a detailed examination of the evidence discharge this Court from the obligation to answer the above questions. Hence, these issues are left open for adjudication by a competent Court at an appropriate occasion, if it is so needed. 6. Now, reverting back to the question of law involved, we may traverse the textual version of sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 18 of the Rules which read as follows : "(2) When such person has entered into possession of land that has previously been reserved roads or roadside land or for the grazing of village cattle or for other public purposes, or has entered into possession of land from which he has been excluded by general or special orders and when further, there is no bonafide claim of right involved he may be ejected or ordered to vacate the land forthwith, and4he Deputy Commissioner may sell, confiscate or destroy any crop raised, or any building or other construction erected without authority on the land. (3) (a) (1) In all other cases ejectment shall be preceded by publication of a notice in the manner prescribed below requiring the occupant generally to vacate the land specified in the notice, within 15 days of the date of publication of the notice on the land concerned or in a prominent place in the vicinity thereof, and to remove any buildings, houses, fences or crops, etc., which may have been raised on such land, provided that the Deputy Commissioner may give time to any particular occupant to harvest the crops, if any growing on such land. Any buildings, houses, fences, crops, etc. which have not been removed in accordance with such notice shall be confiscated to the Govt.." 7. It would appear that sub-rule (2) of Rule 18 provides for summary proceeding for ejectment when a person has entered into possession of land that has been previously reserved for road, roadside lands or grazing of village cattle or for other purposes or has entered into possession of land from which he has been excluded by general or special orders. Obviously, this remedy cannot be resorted to when there is bonafide claim of right involved. In the instant case, the respondents have not made any attempt to show that the land in occupation by the petitioner is one of those described in Rule 18 (2). This being the position, the petitioner obviously cannot be evicted by taking recourse to sub-rule (2) of Rule 18. It is needless to point out that the authority has to satisfy itself as to the requirements of this sub-rule before initiating steps for eviction of any person. Simultaneously, it would appear that no eviction proceeding under sub-rule (3) (a) (i) of Rule 18 is permissible unless a notice is published prior to eviction in the manner prescribed in sub-rule (3) (b). In the instant case, admittedly no notice has been served. Therefore, the competent authority cannot evict the petitioner invoking the powers under sub rule (3) of Rule 18. The ratio behind this decision is relatable to the principles highlighted by this Court in Kamala Deka vs. State of Assam, (1983) 2 GLR 258 and in SC Chouhan vs. Revenue Officer, Karbi Anglong, (1984) 1 GLR 474. 8. Therefore, the competent authority cannot evict the petitioner invoking the powers under sub rule (3) of Rule 18. The ratio behind this decision is relatable to the principles highlighted by this Court in Kamala Deka vs. State of Assam, (1983) 2 GLR 258 and in SC Chouhan vs. Revenue Officer, Karbi Anglong, (1984) 1 GLR 474. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that even the Board while exercising power under section 159 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 has to issue a notice prior to initiation of an eviction proceeding. The provision incorporated in section 159 of the aforesaid Act clearly lays down that an obstruction or encroachment may be removed by the Board only after service of a notice and also after obtaining necessary orders from the Magistrate. In the instant case, neither any notice has been served under this section nor any application was made before the Magistrate. This shows that the Board also cannot avail the remedy as prescribed in section 159 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted a copy of the judgment of this Court delivered in Civil Rule No.441 of 1991. The situation in the aforesaid writ petition was different from the instant case inasmuch as that no order was obtained by the Board from the Magistrate although notices were served. In that, case, the notice issued by the Board was quashed. 10. We may also refer to a decision delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in Parama Singh vs. Shillong Municipal Board, AIR 1964 Assam 80. While interpreting the provision of section 163 of the Act, the aforesaid Division Bench-of this High Court held as follows : "(2) A reference to section 163 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 (Assam Act XV of 1957) shows that every order made by a Magistrate under section 159, 160,161 and 162 shall be deemed to be an order made by him in the discharge of his judicial duty," In the above case, the Board had obtained an order from the Magistrate which otherwise suggests that notice was served as required under section 159 of the Assam Municipal Act, 195 6. Even, then, this Court interfered with the eviction proceedings on the ground that the Magistrate had passed the order without issuing show cause notice or without hearing the person affected. Even, then, this Court interfered with the eviction proceedings on the ground that the Magistrate had passed the order without issuing show cause notice or without hearing the person affected. In the instant case, not to speak of any order from the Magistrate, no notice whatsoever was issued by the Board. This omission to comply with the statutory requirements renders the entire process of eviction ultra vires of the relevant law. 11. From the discussion above, it emerges that neither the State nor the Board can evict the petitioner from the premises described in the petition without following the provisions of law as indicated above. 12. The peculiar feature of this case is that the writ petition was submitted before this Court on the basis of an apprehension that the petitioner was likely to be dispossessed from his business premises. This apprehension has its origin on the information gathered by the petitioner from an officer of the Board. Besides this, there is no overt act attributed to the Board in this matter. Therefore, theapprehension of the petitioner which is not relatable to any overt act of the Board can be relegated to a 'state of mind' not based on any kind of manifestation by the Board On this context, it is to be seen whether a writ petition purely based on a 'state of mind' can be entertained and relief extended as sought for. Although not argued at the Bar, this situation creates a proposition of law whether the instant writ petition is maintainable. Considering this situation and by way of abundant precaution, I think that the writ petition may be disposed of with the observation that the petitioner shall not be disturbed except without taking recourse to the provisions of law as detailed above. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of.