Judgment J.C. Gupta, J. 1. This is tenant's writ petition. Since counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged, with the consent of the parties' Counsel, the writ petition is disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situate at Bazar Kalan, Rampur. Undisputedly the petitioner is a tenant in this shop since before the shop was purchased by respondent No. 3 on 8-2-1991. Alter having purchased the shop in question, the landlord respondent No. 3 served a notice on the petitioner on 22-4-1991 informing him that he has purchased the shop for his personal use an also gave time to the petitioner to vacate the shop. On 23-2-1994, that is, on the expiry of three years period from the date of purchase, the respondent No. 3 moved an application under Section 21(a)(b) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 with the allegations that the landlord has no other property from where he could carry on his business and since he was unemployed; and not engaged in any business or profession, the shop in question was bonafidely required by him for his personal use. It was also alleged that shop in question was in a dilapidated condition and, therefore, the landlord required the same for his occupation after demolition and reconstruction for carrying on his business of General Merchandize. It was also alleged that the shop in question was kept under lock and the tenant petitioner was practically doing no business therein. The defence of the tenant petitioner was that the landlord has already been doing business of general merchandize in a shop situate in Puranganj, Rampur. His father has a shop at Bazar Nasrullakhan, Rampur and the landlord is engaged in that business also with his father. The tenant further alleged that he has been doing his business from the shop in question and he has no other source of income to cater the need of his eight family members. The shop in question has been under tenancy of his father and before him his grandfather. The landlord is a man of affluent means and there were number of vacant shops available near the shop in question and if the landlord was in genuine and pressing need, he could have purchased any one of them, instead of purchasing the shop in dispute. The landlord is a man of affluent means and there were number of vacant shops available near the shop in question and if the landlord was in genuine and pressing need, he could have purchased any one of them, instead of purchasing the shop in dispute. The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 20-1-95 allowed the landlord's application for release holding that the landlord has a bona fide need for establishing himself in business in the shop in question and he has no other property to start the said business. On the question of comparison of hardship also, the Prescribed Authority recorded a finding in favour of the landlord. The appeal filed by the tenant petitioner has been dismissed by respondent No. 1 by the order dated 7-10-1997. The lower appellate Court affirmed the findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the tenant petitioner has come up before this Court in this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through record. 4. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact on both the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardship. These are essentially findings of fact and are not to be ordinarily interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. While recording conclusion on the question of bona fide need of the landlord-respondent, both the Courts below have found that the landlord is unemployed and not engaged in any business repelling the tenant's contention that the landlord was already engaged in business in another shop at Puranganj, Rampur. The tenant's plea that the landlord is also engaged in business of cloth with his father has also been discarded. It has also been found that the landlord has no other accommodation available to him to establish his business. Similarly, on the question of comparative hardship, both the Courts below have weighted the respective hardships of the parties and it has been concluded that the landlord would suffer a granter hardship than that of the tenant in case the application for release was rejected. Similarly, on the question of comparative hardship, both the Courts below have weighted the respective hardships of the parties and it has been concluded that the landlord would suffer a granter hardship than that of the tenant in case the application for release was rejected. While arriving at this finding the Courts below have also taken into consideration the fact of availability of a number of newly constructed vacant shops in the near vicinity of the disputed shops yet no attempt was made by the tenant to have any one of them. It was a relevant consideration and the finding is not vitiated on this account. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner firstly argued before this Court that while comparing the hardship of the parties, the Courts below have not taken into consideration Rule 16(2)(a) of the rules framed under the provisions of Act which lays down that while considering an application for release under clause (a) of Section 21, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such fact as the following: "the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less in the jurisdiction for allowing the application." 6. It is well settled law that Rule 16(2) lays down only guidelines for making a comparison of hardship of the parties which are likely to be suffered by each of them on rejection of release application or-on account of its being allowed. In the present case, it has been found as a fact by both the Courts below that the landlord has got no other accommodation wherein he could start his business and he purchased this property for starting his business therein. It has also been found as a fact that a number of vacant shops were available in the near vicinity yet no attempt was made by the petitioner to have any one of them on rent. It appears that the tenant was simply interested to stick to the disputed shop obviously for the reason that he was paying only a nominal rent for the same. Merely for the reason that the petitioner is an old tenant in the disputed shop, the landlord's need, which has been found to be bonafide and genuince cannot be sacrificed. It appears that the tenant was simply interested to stick to the disputed shop obviously for the reason that he was paying only a nominal rent for the same. Merely for the reason that the petitioner is an old tenant in the disputed shop, the landlord's need, which has been found to be bonafide and genuince cannot be sacrificed. The argument that the landlord if the really was in genuince and pressing personal need, instead of purchasing the disputed shop should have purchased anyone of those vacant shops which were available in the near vicinity is not tenable as it is the sweet will of the landlord to purchase a particular property and there may be a number of factors which may weight for selecting a particular property such as low price, its geographical situation and son on. The questions relevant for consideration were whether or not the landlord was unemployed and no engaged in any business or profession, whether he has any other building to established himself in the business, whether he really wanted to set up business in the disputed shop. While answering these questions in favour of the landlord, no illegality was committed by the Courts below in reaching to the conclusions that the landlord's need for the disputed shop is bona fide. The finding on the other question of comparative hardship is also based on a consideration of relevant facts. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below thus are perfectly justified and they do not suffer from any manifest error of law. The writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that the petitioner may be given one year's time to vacate the premises in question so that in the mean time the tenant petitioner may make alter native arrangement for shifting his business. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 objected to this prayer by con tending that the release application was filed as early as on 23-2-1994 and the petitioner tenant has already enjoyed the shop in question for more than four years. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 objected to this prayer by con tending that the release application was filed as early as on 23-2-1994 and the petitioner tenant has already enjoyed the shop in question for more than four years. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I think it expedient in the interest of justice of allow one year's time to the petitioner from the date of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, that is, upto 7-10-998 to vacate the premises in question subject to the following conditions: (a) that the petitioner shall file an under taking in writing on affidavit before the Prescribed Authority within three weeks from today to the effect that the petitioner shall hand over the vacant physical possession of the shop in question to the landlord, respondent No. 3 and not to any other person on or before 8-10-1998; and (b) that the petitioner shall go no paying rent to the respondent No. 3 every month by 15th of the month till the date of delivery of possession. In the event of petitioner not filing the required undertaking within the above noted period, the landlord, respondent No. 3 shall be at liberty to get the release order enforced forthwith. 9. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.