JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---By the present petition the petitioners are challenging the orders passed by the respondents 4 and 5 in the matter of application filed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter called as 'the said Act') by the respondent No. 1 on 5th October 1991 and subsequently amended by application dated 14th November 1991 claiming that certain amount of wages have remained to be paid by the petitioners to the Members of Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union for the period from 1st January 1988 to 31st October 1991 amounting to Rs. 9,99,942/- besides an amount of Rs. 1,79,990/- towards interest. 2.The facts in brief relevant for the decision are that the U.P.S.B. Corporation Limited entered into a contract with the State of Goa for construction of a bridge across River Mandovi and in the course of the said construction employed the members of the said Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union as its employees. It is the case of the respondent No. 1 before the respondents 4 and 5 that the petitioners failed to pay minimum wages payable to its employees for the period from 1-1-1988 to 31-10-1991 inspite of specific Circulars being issued by the State of Goa under section 3 of Minimum Wages Act 1948 fixing the rates of wages payable to the labourers employed in construction activities of bridges and roads and, therefore, they were entitled to claim the same under section 15 of the said Act. The said application was objected to by the petitioners on the ground that subsequent to the filing of the said application, the Members of Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union entered into a settlement, being settlement dated 22nd December 1991, and thereby agreed that the revised rate shall be payable only with effect from 1st November 1991 and that the respondent No. 4 had no jurisdiction under section 15 to decide as the amount of wages payable to the employees. The respondent No. 4 while rejecting the objections raised by the petitioners allowed the application filed by the respondent No. 1 by its order dated 29th May 1992. Being dissatisfied, the petitioners filed appeal under section 17 of the said Act before the District Judge at Panaji, who is the Appellate Authority to hear the appeals under the said Act. The respondent No. 4 while rejecting the objections raised by the petitioners allowed the application filed by the respondent No. 1 by its order dated 29th May 1992. Being dissatisfied, the petitioners filed appeal under section 17 of the said Act before the District Judge at Panaji, who is the Appellate Authority to hear the appeals under the said Act. The Appellate Authority after hearing the parties did not find favour with the petitioners' contentions and rejected the appeal confirming the order passed by the Labour Commissioner. The Appellate Authority passed its order on 19th September 1994. 3.Shri N.K. Sawaikar, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, while assailing the orders passed by the respondents 4 and 5, submitted that section 15 of the said Act did not empower the Authority acting under the said section to decide as to the amount of wages payable to an employee and such a claim is outside the scope of its jurisdiction while dealing with the matter under the said section. In support of his contention he sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of (A.V. D'Costa, Divisional Engineer, G.I.P Railway v. B.D. Patel and another)1, reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412. He further submitted that the scheme of the said Act is for the benefit of the employees only to ensure the prompt payment of wages and avoid illegal deductions by the employer and not to enable the authorities under the said Act to quantify the wages payable to the employees and in that regard he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the matter of (Arvind Mills Ltd. v. K.R. Gadgil)2, reported in A.I.R. 1941 Bombay 26. He also referred to the decision of Calcutta High Court in the matter of (Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. v. The Authority appointed by the State of West Bengal under the Payment of Wages Act and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 109 and (Administrator, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and another v. Gauri Shanker)4, reported in 1997 (1) C.L.R. 527. Shri Sawaikar then submitted that undisputedly the Members of Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union had entered into a settlement with the U.P.S.B. Corporation Limited on 22nd December 1991 and in terms of the said settlement the revised rates were to be effective from 1st November 1991. Shri Sawaikar then submitted that undisputedly the Members of Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union had entered into a settlement with the U.P.S.B. Corporation Limited on 22nd December 1991 and in terms of the said settlement the revised rates were to be effective from 1st November 1991. The claim application was filed prior to the said settlement and , therefore, it is to be understood that by the said settlement the employees had settled all the disputes between the parties and there being no reservation made in the said settlement regarding the period prior to 1st November 1991 regarding the quantum of wages, there was no scope for the respondent No. 4 to go into the issue regarding the quantum of wages payable to the said employees of the Corporation and to decide the quantum thereof contrary to the terms of the said settlement between the parties. The respondents 4 and 5 ought to have considered that the terms of settlement between the parties were binding on them and the decisions of the Apex Court are clear on this issue in the matter of (Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1801 and in the matter of (Ram Pukar Singh and others v. Heavy Engineering Corporation and others)6, reported in J.T. 1994(6) S.C. 26. Being so, according to the learned advocate, the respondent No. 4 clearly erred in deciding the matter regarding the quantum of wages payable to the employees of the Corporation solely on the basis of the circulars issued by the State Government and which are contrary to the terms of settlement arrived at between the parties. The orders of respondents 4 and 5 are, therefore, without jurisdiction and, therefore, are liable to be set aside. 4.Smt. A.A. Agni, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 on the other hand, submitted that there is no quarrel about the proposition that the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide the potential wages payable to the employees. However, it cannot be said that the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide the quantum of actual wages payable to the employees while dealing with an application under section 15. However, it cannot be said that the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide the quantum of actual wages payable to the employees while dealing with an application under section 15. The learned advocate further submitted that without deciding the quantum of actual wages payable to the employees it would be practically impossible for the Labour Commissioner to decide whether the deductions made by the employer were rightly made or not and what is the balance amount of wages payable to the employees. Unless the basic amount payable to the employees is ascertained, it would not be possible for any authority to certify whether the deductions are lawfully made and what could be the amount due and balance payable out of the actual wages payable to the employees. In support of her contention she sought to rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of (Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S.B. Bhatt and another)7, reported in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 970. She further submitted that section 15 of the said Act clearly provides that the Authority while hearing and deciding the claim arising out of the deduction of wages or delay in payment of wages can decide all matters incidental to such claims and, therefore, the decision regarding the actual wages payable would be certainly incidental to the issue regarding the deduction and delay in payment of the wages. Being so, according to Mrs. Agni, no fault can be found with the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 4 and confirmed by the respondent No. 5 while dealing with the application filed by the respondent No. 1 under section 15 of the said Act. Further drawing my attention to clause 5 of the settlement arrived at between the parties on 22nd December 1991, the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 submitted that by the said clause it was specifically agreed that the revised rate shall be effective from 1st November 1991 and under Clause 9 the parties had agreed that the existing benefits either in cash or in kind available to the employees shall be continued to be available to the employees. The settlement did not refer to any wages being payable at the rate different than one which the petitioners were obliged to pay to their employees in terms of Clause 34 of the agreement between the Corporation and the State of Goa. The settlement did not refer to any wages being payable at the rate different than one which the petitioners were obliged to pay to their employees in terms of Clause 34 of the agreement between the Corporation and the State of Goa. She also submitted that the fact that the Corporation had entered into an agreement with the State of Goa to the effect that the Corporation at all times during the continuance of the contract would fully comply with all existing Acts, regulations and bye-laws and would pay the labourers engaged by it at the rate to be fixed by the Public Works Department of Government of Goa as the fair rate payable to the different categories of workers was not in dispute and in fact the records disclose that the Corporation had been paying its employees at such rates at other places. Taking me through the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd., the learned advocate further submitted that the Apex Court in the said judgment had considered its earlier judgment in the matter of A.V. D'Costa, which was relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners, and the Apex Court therein has clearly held that the authority while deciding the application under section 15 had jurisdiction to determine what the terms of the Contract between the parties are. Referring to various observations made by the Apex Court, Mrs. Agni submits that considering the terms of settlement which restrict to the period from 1st November 1991 and there being specific clause assuring the continuation of benefits already enjoyed by the employees, no fault can be found with the orders of the authorities passed on the basis of the circulars which are already in existence prescribing the amount of wages payable to the labourers employed. 5.Upon hearing the advocates for the parties and on perusal of the entire records, the points which arise for determination are that, firstly, whether the respondent No. 4 exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the application filed by the respondent No. 1 under section 15 of the said Act and, secondly, whether the terms of the settlement debarred the respondent No. 1 from making the claim put forth by it in its application dated 5th October 1991 and amended on 14th November 1991. 6.Referring to section 15 of the said Act, it is not in dispute that under the said section the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide about the potential wages payable to the employees. However, it is equally true that section 15 clearly provides that while deciding the matters, regarding the payment of wages to decide all the matters incidental pertaining to such claims put forth by the employees. The Apex Court in the matter of Shri Ambica Mills Co. (supra) while considering the scope of section 15 has clearly held that section 15 confers jurisdiction on the authority appointed under the said section to hear and decide for any specified area claims arising out of deductions from wages or the delay in payment of wages and while doing so, the authority inevitably would have to consider the question incidental to the said matters and incidental matters would include the competency of the authority to decide regarding relationship of employer and employee, its subsistence, terms of employment etc., and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to determine incidental questions. Considering the provisions contained in section 15 of the said Act and the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shri Ambica Mills Co., it was but natural that the authority acting under section 15 while considering the application of the respondent No. 1 was required to find out the actual wages payable to the Members of the said Goa Trade and Commercial Workers' Union in order to verify whether the deductions were lawfully made and to ascertain the balance amount payable to the employees. In fact their Lordships of the Apex Court have also considered their earlier judgment in the matter of A.V.D' Costa (supra) while delivering the judgment in the matter of Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd.. Besides, as rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of A.V.D' Costa (supra) rather than supporting the case of the petitioners, lends support to the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 7.Undisputedly the application which was filed by the respondent No. 1 was for the period from 1st January 1988 to 31st October 1991. 7.Undisputedly the application which was filed by the respondent No. 1 was for the period from 1st January 1988 to 31st October 1991. It is also not in dispute that by virtue of the agreement entered into between the Corporation and the State of Goa in terms of Clause 34 thereof, the Corporation had agreed to pay to its employees the wages at the rate to be fixed by the Public Works Department as fair wages payable to the different categories of labourers in Goa. It is also not in dispute that the two notifications namely one dated 28th December 1987 and the other dated 14th October 1991 were issued by the Government of Goa prescribing such wages payable to the labourers of different categories. The findings arrived at by the fact finding authorities on the basis of materials on record disclose that the rates paid to the workers of the Corporation at the bridge project at Thane are those prescribed by the Maharashtra Government. The settlement arrived at on 22nd December 1991 specifically provides that the revised rates in the said settlement would be applicable from 1st November 1991 onwards. The settlement nowhere provides that the workers have either given up any claim or workers had arrived at any different settlement apart from the settlement of 22nd December 1991 regarding the wages payable to the workers in relation to the period prior to 1st November 1991. If one reads the application filed by the respondent No. 1, it clearly refers to the claim of wages at the rates prescribed in terms of the said two Circulars. Undisputedly the settlement in relation to the period from 1st November 1991 was arrived at while the application for claim of wages prior to 1st November 1991 was pending before Labour Commissioner, and therein claim was based on the said two circulars. In other words, the period prior to 1st November 1991 was knowingly and deliberately excluded from the settlement arrived at on 22nd December 1991. In this background terms of the settlement cannot debar the respondent No. 1 from making claims put forth by it by the said application under section 15 of the said Act. In other words, the period prior to 1st November 1991 was knowingly and deliberately excluded from the settlement arrived at on 22nd December 1991. In this background terms of the settlement cannot debar the respondent No. 1 from making claims put forth by it by the said application under section 15 of the said Act. 8.The settlement arrived at between the parties ex facie does not relate to the period from 1st November 1991 and restricts its application as regards the payment of wages from the period starting from 1st November 1991. The settlement expressly ensures the employees the continuation of the benefits already enjoyed by them prior to the said date. Undisputedly, for the relevant period, that is 1st January 1988 to 31st October 1991 it is found that the circulars issued by the Government dated 28th December 1987 and 14th October 1991 were applicable as regards the quantum of wages payable to the workers in the construction activities including the workers at the site of construction of bridges. Being so, as rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the respondent, the authorities while deciding the application under section 15 would not have been able to ascertain the balance amount payable to the workers and would not have been able to find out whether the deductions were lawfully made or not, unless the authorities had first decided the quantum of actual wages payable to the labourers. The respondent No. 4 by order dated 29th May 1992 has, in fact, on considering that the said two circulars were in force at the relevant time, arrived at the quantum of the actual wages payable to the employees of the Corporation for the relevant period. In doing so, the authorities have not decided the potential wages. The Appellate Authority respondent No. 5 has re-assessed the materials on record and has confirmed the findings of the Labour Commissioner as regards the actual amount of wages. While doing so the Appellate Authority had rightly taken into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd.. The Appellate Authority respondent No. 5 has re-assessed the materials on record and has confirmed the findings of the Labour Commissioner as regards the actual amount of wages. While doing so the Appellate Authority had rightly taken into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd.. There being no error of jurisdiction by both the authorities while arriving at the quantum of actual wages payable to the employees based on relevant materials placed before them and the decision being not beyond the jurisdiction bestowed upon the authority under section 15, I do not find any case made out for interference in the orders passed either by the respondent No. 4 or by respondent No. 5. 9.Considering the ruling of the Apex Court in the matter of Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd., it is not necessary to refer to the other decisions relied upon by the Counsel for the parties. The law being well settled by the decision of the Apex Court in the above case, it is not required to refer to other decisions. The case in hand is covered by the decision of Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd., and as such I do not find any reason to interfere with the orders passed by the authorities. 10.In the result, the petition fails. Rule is discharged. The interim relief granted by order dated 7th December 1994 stands vacated. 11.At this stage, the learned advocate for the petitioners prays for stay of the implementation of the impugned order. The same is objected to by the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1. However, relief of stay granted by way of the interim relief on 7th December 1994 shall continue to be in force for a period of 6 weeks from today. Petition dismissed.