Pasupati Nath Auddya v. Shiba Ch. Dhar — 1998 DIGILAW 231 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J. : These two revisional applications have been taken up together for consideration, inasmuch as, the plaintiff/opposite party is common in both the suits and the facts in issue in both the matters are also more or less identical. 2. Both the revisional applications arise out of orders passed by the 6th Assistant District Judge at Alipore in two eviction suits, being Title Suit No. 14 of 1994 and Title Suit No. 15 of 1994, respectively, brought by the plaintiff/opposite party against the defendant/petitioners as tenants in the suit property, being Premises No. 7B, Kabitirtha Sarani, P.S., Watgunge, Calcutta- 700023. 3. The facts in the two revisional applications are common in that the plaintiff/opposite party purchased the suit property from one Smt. Mayalata Dey under whom the petitioner in both the two revisional applications are monthly tenants. Both the two suits were filed on the allegation that the defendants/petitions were defaulters in payment of rent since the month of March, 1993. 4. For the sake of convenience, C.O. No. 3213 of 1997, is taken up first for consideration. 5. Appearing for the petitioner in the first revisional application, Mr. Priyabrata Mukherjee, learned advocate, submitted that prior to the institution of the eviction suit against his client, his client had instituted a suit, being Title Suit No. 307 of 1993, in the 1st Court of Munsif at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, against the said Smt. Mayalata Dey and the plaintiff/opposite party, inter alia, for specific performance of contract. In the said suit the defendant/petitioner herein contended that he was a tenant under the said Mayalata Dey in respect of one shop room and another room at the back with roof rights, in the said premises, at a monthly rental of Rs. 70/- payable according to the English calendar. It was also the case of the defendant/petitioner that there were several other tenants in the suit premises and that Mayalata Dey offered to sell to each of the tenants their respective shop-rooms together with the room at the back, under their respective occupation, at a total consideration of Rs. 23,000/-. 70/- payable according to the English calendar. It was also the case of the defendant/petitioner that there were several other tenants in the suit premises and that Mayalata Dey offered to sell to each of the tenants their respective shop-rooms together with the room at the back, under their respective occupation, at a total consideration of Rs. 23,000/-. However, without abiding by the said offer, the said Mayalata Dey sold the entire building to the plaintiff/opposite party, who is the son of another tenant, Shri Lalit Chandra Dhar, resulting in the suit for specific performance and for declaration that the Deed of Conveyance executed and registered by Smt. Mayalata Dey in favour of the plaintiff/opposite party, was viod. 6. Mr. Mukherjee also urged that the defendant/petitioner was under the impression that all arrears of rent, along with statutory interest, had been paid in Court in compliance with the provisions of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, but apparently she had been wrongly advised by the lawyer who had been conducting the case on her behalf, and, ultimately, upon coming to learn the rents were in arrears from the month of March, 1993, onwards, all the arrear dues upto April, 1996, were deposited together with the statutory interest thereon at one time vide challan No. 5299(V) dated 20th April, 1996. In view of the delay in making such deposit of the arrear rents, the petitioner filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the 6th Assistant District Judge at Alipore in the pending eviction suit for condonation of the delay in making such deposit and for acceptance of the said deposit as valid. 7. By his Order No. 56 dated 4th September, 1997, in Title Suit No. 14 of 1994 and by his Order No. 51 dated 4th November, 1997 in Title Suit No. 15 of 1994, the learned Assistant District Judge, 6th Court at Alipore, dismissed the applications filed by the defendant/petitioners in the two suits under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. 8. Before the learned Court below it was contended on behalf of the defendant/petitioners that since that suit for specific performance filed by the defendant/petitioners in the two suits were pending, they had been wrongly advised by their learned advocates that in the event the arrear rents were deposited it would seriously prejudice the pending suits for specific performance. Accordingly, the defendants did not deposit the arrears of rents within the time frame and in the manner indicated under section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, 9. While considering the submissions of the respective parties, the learned Court below came to a finding that it is the settled principle of law that an intending purchaser did not acquire title over the property proposed to be sold on the basis of an agreement, either oral or in writing, until the transfer was completed by a registered instrument. Accordingly, the petitioners could not claim any right to the property during the pendency of the suit for specific performance and it was his obligation to continue to pay the rents until the final disposal of the suit for specific performance in his favour. 10. The learned Court also referred to a money decree which the plaintiff/opposite party had obtained against the defendant/petitioner from the Court of Small Causes on account of arrears of rents. 11. On the basis of his aforesaid conclusion, the learned Court below was of the view that the defence taken by the defendants/petitioners herein was absolutely weak and was not believable at all. 12. In such circumstances, the learned Court below found that the defendants/petitioners herein were not entitled to any relief, and, accordingly, rejected the applications filed by them under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. For the sake of record it may be indicated herein that apart from the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no other application, either under section 17(1) or 17(2) or 17(2A) (a) and (b), had been made on behalf of the defendants/petitioners in both the suits. 14. In the aforesaid background, Mr. 13. For the sake of record it may be indicated herein that apart from the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no other application, either under section 17(1) or 17(2) or 17(2A) (a) and (b), had been made on behalf of the defendants/petitioners in both the suits. 14. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Mukherjee urged that having regard to the different provisions of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, it was not really necessary for a separate application to be made under any of the provisions of section 17 and that for the purpose of condoning the delay in depositing the arrear rents and also for acceptance thereof as valid deposits, it was sufficient if an application was made under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Mr. Mukherjee urged that sub-section (1) of section 17 provides that when the Landlord institutes a suit for eviction on any of the grounds referred to in section 13, the tenant shall subject to the provisions of subsection (2), within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or where he appears in the suit without the writ of summons being served on him, within one month of appearance, deposit in court or with the Controller or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default, including the period subsequent thereto, upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit of payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of 81/3% per annum from the date when any such amount was payable up to the date of deposit, an shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. 16. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that nowhere in sub-section (1) of section 17 as it had been indicated that an application was required to be made to the Court seeking permission to make such deposits and that it was incumbent on the tenant upon receiving writ of summons or entering appearance in the suit to make such deposits as indicated. 17. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that nowhere in sub-section (1) of section 17 as it had been indicated that an application was required to be made to the Court seeking permission to make such deposits and that it was incumbent on the tenant upon receiving writ of summons or entering appearance in the suit to make such deposits as indicated. 17. Mr. Mukherjee urged that, on the other hand, both sub-section (2) and (2A) as also (2B) of section 17 contemplates the filing of an application for the purposes indicated therein. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that it was, therefore, clearly the intention of the legislature that for the purpose of making deposits under section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the tenant would not to be required to make any application to the Court and that in case there was delay in depositing the arrear rents as contemplated in section 17(1), an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be sufficient for the purpose of condonation of the delay in making such deposits. 18. In support of his submissions, Mr. Mukherjee firstly referred to the well-known decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. B.P. Khemka Private Limited vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmik, reported in AIR 1987 SC Page 1041, wherein a Bench decision involving application of the provisions of section 17(2A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, in the case in hand, was sought to be reversed. 19. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the effect of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967, whereby the provisions of section 17(2A) and 17(2B) were inserted under section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and whereunder, in terms of section 5, retrospective effect was given to the amendments by providing that such amendments would have effect in respect of all suits, including appeals, which were pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance. In the said context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the Ordinance permitted an application under section 17(2A)(b) to be made within one month from the date of promulgation thereof, this Court had erred in holding that such an application was not maintainable and that having complied with the orders of the Court under section 17(2A)(b), the appellant was entitled to claim the benefit under section 17(4) of the aforesaid Act. 20. While dealing with the aforesaid question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also had to consider the provisions of section 17(3) of the above Act, inasmuch as, on account of the default in depositing the rents for the months of September, 1968 and March, 1969, the defendant appellant's defence against delivery of possession had been struck out. 21. On the said question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the directions given in section 17(3) of the above Act were merely directory and not mandatory and that since the Court had the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment or deposit of rent as required by a provision in any Rent Restriction Act, then the Court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit and such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. 22. Mr. Mukherjee next referred to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sitala Devi vs. Man Bahadur, reported in 76 CWN at Page 435, wherein among other things the Court's inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to condone delay in depositing rents was under consideration. In the said case, the Division Bench observed that under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court always has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The Division Bench went of to observe that the exercise of this power has been extended to cover cases where a breach occurs, to the prejudice of the party litigant and to the advantage of the other litigant, not due to any fault or negligence of the defaulting party, but on account of an action or inaction of Court. 23. The Division Bench went of to observe that the exercise of this power has been extended to cover cases where a breach occurs, to the prejudice of the party litigant and to the advantage of the other litigant, not due to any fault or negligence of the defaulting party, but on account of an action or inaction of Court. 23. However, it was also indicated that while there may be various reasons for such default, such as general strike, civil commotion, a failure of communications, a strike or a bandh in a particular locality disrupting and suspending the normal activities of people. it would be for the defaulting party to establish that there was no negligence or inaction on his part and that the default occurred only because of supervening circumstances which could not be tided over, inspite of his best diligence and further as soon as the obstacles had been removed, he had taken all steps as was required under the law and his conduct was bona fide all along. If the Court was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for such non-compliance within the requisite period, it could treat the delayed compliance as being in terms of the statutory requirement. 24. Reference was also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao vs. Naragani Govinda Seharagao, reported in AIR 1989 SC at Page 2185, wherein while considering the provisions of section 10(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since a discretion had been given to the Controller, if he was satisfied that the default was not wilful or deliberate, to give the tenant an opportunity to make good the arrears within a reasonable time, the landlord's application for eviction would have to be rejected. In other words, the Controller was vested with authority to extend the time for deposit of the arrear rents beyond the period stipulated in the Statute. 25. Mr. In other words, the Controller was vested with authority to extend the time for deposit of the arrear rents beyond the period stipulated in the Statute. 25. Mr. Mukherjee also referred to certain other decisions of this Court in support of his contention that the courts had the authority, in exercise of its powers under section 5 of the Limitation Act and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to condone delays in making deposits of rent beyond the stipulated period in extraordinary circumstances, namely, (i) Ramendra Krishna Bose vs. Smt. Manjushree Bhattacharya (1975(1) CLJ P 393) (ii) Devokinandan Boobna vs. Harasundar Sarkar (1988(1) CLJ P 278). (iii) Krishna Gopal Ghosh vs. Mihir Baran Nandy & Ors. (1987 (2) CLJ P 297) and (iv) Sri Ranjit Kumar Ghosh vs. Manindra Chandra Saha (1995 (II) CHN P 43) 26. Mr. Mukherjee also urged that since the petitioners had been pursuing their respective suits for specific performance and had been advised that if the monthly rents were deposited while the said suits were pending their suits would be seriously prejudiced, the delay in depositing the arrear rents could also be condoned under section 14 of the Limitation Act. 27. Appearing for the petitioner in the second application, Mr. Sanjoy Ghosh, while adopting Mr. Mukherjee's submissions, urged that because of the pending suit for specific performance, the defendant/petitioner had been advised not to deposit the monthly rents in the eviction suit as that would weaken his case. There was, therefore, sufficient cause for the resultant delay in depositing the arrear rents which could be condoned by the Court, both under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, as also under section 5 of the Limitation Act and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28. In support of his submission, Mr. Ghosh firstly relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Sri Himanshu Kumar Lahiri vs. Gajendra Kumar De, reported in 1986 (I) CHN Page 413, wherein a learned Judge of this Court observed that since under section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court was vested with authority to condone the delay in depositing the arrear rents, the trial court should have treated the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as one under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and should have disposed of the application on merits. 29. Mr. 29. Mr. Ghosh also laid stress on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Gopal Ghosal's case (supra) in support of his contention that a belated deposit of rent under section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, could be accompanied by an application for condonation of delay and that for ends of justice delay in deposit of rent made under section 17(1) could be condoned if there were exceptional circumstances. 30. Mr. Ghosh then referred to another decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Shaw vs. Kanailal Pakhira (92 CWN Page 755) wherein it was held that the litigant should not be made to suffer because of the delay in depositing the monthly rents on account of mistaken legal advice. 31. Mr. Ghosh also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of Sadhan Chowdhury (92 CWN Page 908), where, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. B.P. Khemka's case (supra), a learned Judge of this Court held that where the monthly rent had been deposited on the re-opening day after the Puja vacation and all the other dues, both current and arrears, had been deposited within the stipulated time, the trial Court ought not to have acted so technically and should have taken a pragmatic view of the matter. 32. Mr. Ghosh lastly referred to the decision in the case of Ghanashyam Das vs. Krishna Gopal Ghosal, reported in 83 CWN Page 228, where it was reiterated that there may be instances where for certain bona fide reasons, it may not be possible for the tenant to make the required deposit in time, and where appropriate circumstances exist, the delay in making such deposit may be condoned and the deposit accepted as being made in compliance with law. 33. Mr. Ghosh urged that it was now well-settled that the Court has sufficient powers to condone the delay in making deposits of rent both under the statute as also under section 5 of the Limitation Act on account of section 38 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and in exercise of its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He submitted that this was not a case for extension of time to make the deposits, since the rents had already been deposited, and it was only necessary that the delay in making such deposit be condoned for which an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was sufficient. 34. Opposing both the applications, Mr. Bidyut Banerjee submitted that while the court undoubtedly had power to condone the delay in making deposit of the monthly rents, the same had to be invoked by making appropriate applications under the relevant provisions of law. 35. Mr. Banerjee submitted that upon entering appearance in a suit for eviction, it was incumbent upon the defendant tenant to seek the Court's permission for making deposits in accordance with section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, by filing a substantive application, and, in the event, extension of time was required to make such deposits, to make an application under section 17(2A) (a) and (b) of the said Act for the said purpose. 36. Mr. Banerjee also referred to the decision of this Court in Sitala Devi's case (supra), which had been cited by Mr. Mukherjee, in support of his contention that, although, the Courts have the jurisdiction to condone delay in deposit of rents, the same should not be taken for granted and the defaulting party would have to establish that he had been prevented by sufficient cause in not making the deposit/deposits within the time stipulated and only when the court was satisfied as to the reasons of the delay, it was entitled to treat the delayed deposit as compliance with the statutory requirement. Mr. Banerjee pointed out that in the aforesaid case the delay was not ultimately condoned and the plaintiffs application under section 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, was allowed. 37. Mr. Banerjee urged that since the petitioners in both the matters had failed to make any substantive application either under section 17(1) or 17(2) or 17(2A) (a) and (b) of the aforesaid Act, their application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been rightly rejected and no interference was called for in the instant revisional applications. 38. Mr. Banerjee urged that since the petitioners in both the matters had failed to make any substantive application either under section 17(1) or 17(2) or 17(2A) (a) and (b) of the aforesaid Act, their application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been rightly rejected and no interference was called for in the instant revisional applications. 38. On behalf of the petitioners in both the applications it has been contended that having regard to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. B.P. Khemka's case (supra) and of the Special Bench of this Court in Krishna Gopal Ghosal's case (supra), where the Court's power to condone delay in depositing the monthly rents has been duly recognised, the learned court below acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction erroneously in rejecting the applications made by the defendants/petitioners under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for condonation of the delay in depositing the arrear rents. 39. Admittedly, in neither of the two suits was any application made under any of the provisions of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. This has complicated the matter, which could otherwise have been disposed of in the light of the above-mentioned decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. 40. In M/s. B.P. Khemka's case, the Supreme Court was faced with a situation arising out of the promulgation of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967, whereby sections 17(2A) and 17(2B) were inserted in section 17 of the Act and retrospective effect was given thereto in respect of all suits and appeals pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance. 41. In the said case an application had actually been made by the defendant tenant under the amended provisions of section 17(2A)(b), but the same was held to be not maintainable as it had not been filed within the time specified in section 17(1) of the Act. In the said circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the Ordinance permitted an application under section 17(2A)(b) to be made within one month from the date of promulgation thereof, this court should not have rejected the said application. 42. In the said circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the Ordinance permitted an application under section 17(2A)(b) to be made within one month from the date of promulgation thereof, this court should not have rejected the said application. 42. Another point which also came up for consideration in Khemka's case, was whether under section 17(3) of the above Act, a mandatory duty had been cast on the Court to strike out the defence against delivery of possession of a tenant who defaulted in making deposits or in paying any amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified or within such extended time as allowed under clause (a) of subsection (2A) or fails to deposit or pay any instalment permitted under clause (b) of sub-section (2A) within the time fixed therefor, and to proceed with the hearing of the suit. 43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that the aforesaid provision was not mandatory but directory and since the court had a discretion not to strike out the tenant's defence against delivery of possession it correspondingly had the power to condone any delay in making the deposits under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2A) of section 17 of the aforesaid Act and extend the time for payment of deposit. 44. In the said case there is no reference to the Court's inherent powers or to the question as to whether delay in depositing the rents under subsection (1) and (2) and under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2A) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, could be condoned by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers de hors the provisions of section 17 of the said Act, This fact was noticed by the Special Bench in Krishna Gopal Ghosal's case, but in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 17, it was held that delayed deposit of rent under section 17(1) may be accompanied by an application for condonation of delay and if the Court was satisfied as to the cause of such delay, it could condone the delay or extend the time, as the case may require. 45. 45. What emerges from the ratio of the two aforesaid decisions and the other decisions cited on behalf of the parties is that when a deposit, as contemplated under section 17(1), is made out of time, such delay may be condoned by the Court if sufficient cause is made out for such delay and if such delayed deposit is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, or the Court may extend the time for making the deposit, as the case may require. 46. In Devokinandan Boobna's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, relying on B.P. Khemka's case, held that in case of default in depositing the rents, the attention of the Court could be attracted either by invoking section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by filing an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, whatever may be the form of the application, the Court has the discretion to condone the default and to extend the time for payment or deposit and such discretion is the fall out of the Court's discretion to either strike out or not to strike out the tenant's defence against delivery of possession. 47. It also necessarily follows that no separate application is required to the made under section 17(2A) (a) or (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, for condonation of time to make the arrear deposit, since the object to be achieved thereunder can, in view of the abovementioned judicial pronouncements, be also achieved in exercise of the Court's inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or even under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 48. This brings us to the merits of the two cases and the two impugned orders which are identical, inasmuch as, the facts giving rise to the two orders are identical. 49. The case made out by the petitioners for not complying with the provisions of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is that they were advised by their lawyers that their pending suits for specific performance would be seriously prejudiced if they deposited any amount towards the arrear rents after having entered appearance in the eviction suits filed by the plaintiff/opposite party. It has been submitted on their behalf that they should not be made to suffer the consequences of noncompliance with the provisions of section 17(1) of the above Act because they acted on the advice of their lawyers. 50. On considering such submission the learned Court below quite lightly observed that an intending purchaser does not acquire any title over the property proposed to be sold to him on the basis of an agreement, either oral or in writing, until the transfer is completed by a registered conveyance and that the defendants could not claim any right over the suit property on the basis of such agreement or by reason of having filed a suit for specific performance in respect thereof. 51. The learned Court below has disbelieved the story of the defendants for not depositing the arrear rents in time and has given elaborate reasons for arriving at such a conclusion. 52. However, the fact that litigation is going on between the parties for a long time and that they have had occasion to come up in revision on several occasions, is no reason to presume that the defendants had not been advised not to deposit their rents during the pendency of the suits for specific performance. On the other hand, the fact that subsequently the petitioners deposited the entire arrear rents at a time, supports their case that they had initially acted on the advice not to deposit the said rents during the pendency of their suits for specific performance. Had the petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of section 17(1) of the above Act when there was no suit for specific performance pending, there possibly would have been little or no justification for such noncompliance. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Court below, that the defendants/petitioners did not acquire any right to the suit property merely by filing a suit for specific performance, but that does not answer the question at issue as to whether the petitioners were prevented by sufficient cause from complying with the provisions of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act within the time specified. 53. 53. In my view, the explanation given by the defendants/petitioners for not complying with the said provisions within the specified time cannot be brushed aside completely merely because the legal practitioner, who allegedly gave such advice, did not come to the witness box or because litigations are going on between the parties for a long time. 54. I am, therefore, inclined to accept the explanation given by the defendants/petitioners for the delay in complying with the provisions of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Such delay is, accordingly, condoned and the impugned order No. 56 and 51, both dated 4th September, 1997, passed by the learned Court below in Title Suit No. 14 of 1994 and in Title Suit No. 15 of 1994, are hereby set aside. The deposits made vide Challan No. 5299 (V) dated 20th April, 1996, in Pasupati Nath Auddya's case (C.O. No. 3213 of 1997) and vide Challan No. 5300 (V) also dated 20th April, 1996, in Smt. Radha Rani Dhar's case (C.O. No. 7 of 1998) are accepted as valid deposits for the purposes of section 17(1) of the above Act. 55. The revisional applications are thus disposed of. 56. There will be no order as to costs. 57. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Court below forthwith by Special Messenger in both the cases at the cost of the respective petitioner. Such costs are to be put in by Friday. 58. If a xerox certified copy of this judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant within a week from the date of making of such application, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. Appeals disposed of.