S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals which are directed against a common judgment and order dated 5. 3. 98 passed by Sri K. J. Majumdar, learned Judge 12th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 23/1998 whereby and whereunder the said learned court granted an interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and also dismissed the application filed by the defendant/appellant under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff/respondent No. 1 is represented by one Ranjit Dhar, said to be Chairman of an Ad-hoc Committee. A suit was filed against the defendant praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:" (A) Declaration that the defendant has no right or authority to function or act or to hold himself out or to represent himself as Hony. General Secretary of the plaintiff association or to issue any notice/circular or to give any effect to the notice dated 30th December 1997 or to hold any meeting on 7th January 1998 or any other date on behalf of the plaintiff. (b) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant from functioning or acting or holding himself out or representing himself to be the Hony. General Secretary of the plaintiff Association or from issuing any notice/circular or from giving any effect to the purported notice dated 30th December 1997 or from holding the meeting purportedly fixed on 7th January 1998 or on any other date. " ( 3 ) THE basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. ( 4 ) THE appellant before us was Hony. General Secretary of West Bengal Kabadi Association, an association registered under the Societies Registration Act, being Act XXI of 1860. It has its own constitution, rules and bye laws. It is affiliated with Amateur Kabadi Federation of India (hereinafter referred to as AKFI), which is also a registered body. It is a common ground that 2 parallel bodies of AKFI had been running and a suit is pending in the Court of Munsif at Swai Madhopur at Rajasthan as regard validity of election. It is, however, stated before us that the said suit has been dismissed for default. Be that as it may, admitted fact remains that the executive committee of AKFI in its meeting held on 1. 12. It is, however, stated before us that the said suit has been dismissed for default. Be that as it may, admitted fact remains that the executive committee of AKFI in its meeting held on 1. 12. 97 suspended the appellant for a period of 6 years for his anti federation activities and an ad-hoc committee has been constituted under the chairmanship of the aforementioned Ranjit Dhar. The appellant claiming himself to be the Hony. General Secretary of the plaintiff association called a meeting on 7. 1. 98 whereafter the aforementioned suit was filed, inter alia, on the ground that in view of the constitution of the ad-hoc committee, the defendant-appellant had no jurisdiction to issue the said notice. The defendant/appellant upon appearance also filed an application for injunction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the plaintiff and an interim order was passed. ( 5 ) THE defendant/appellant also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for dissolving the interim injunction passed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The learned trial Judge, upon consideration of the materials on record, inter alia, held that in terms of Rule 20 (17) of Constitution and Articles of Association of AKFI, it had jurisdiction to suspend any member organisation or individual when found guilty, and in that view of the matter, the appellant could not interfere with the affairs of the appellant association. ( 6 ) MR. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised 3 contentions in support of this appeal. Learned counsel has submitted that AKFI is merely an apex body with which the plaintiff association was affiliated, and in that view of the matter, the said association had no jurisdiction at all to form an ad-hoc committee for the said association. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised 3 contentions in support of this appeal. Learned counsel has submitted that AKFI is merely an apex body with which the plaintiff association was affiliated, and in that view of the matter, the said association had no jurisdiction at all to form an ad-hoc committee for the said association. In terms of Rule 20 (17) of the said constitution, articles and memorandum of AKFI it was only the general council, who could suspend any member organisation or individual, but admittedly the said power has been exercised by another committee, namely, the executive committee, which had no jurisdiction to pass such an order; in any event, by reason of the order of suspension passed as against the appellant by the said association, he did not cease to be the General Secretary of the plaintiff association, and in that view of the matter, the suit was misconceived and consequently the impugned order cannot be legally sustained. ( 7 ) MR. Dasgupta appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, took us through various provisions of the constitution, articles and memorandum of AKFI as also constitution, rules and bye-laws of the plaintiff/respondent and has submitted that in view of such provisions, an ad-hoc committee could be constituted. Learned counsel submitted, relying on or on the basis of a decision of the apex court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2219 that unless the defendant/appellant questions such an order, the same even if void ab initio, must be held to be valid unless set aside by a competent court of law. Keeping in view the rival contentions of the parties, the only question which arises for consideration in these appeals is as to whether the executive committee of AKFI could appoint an ad-hoc committee, or not. ( 8 ) THE plaintiff/respondent association, as indicated hereinbefore is a body registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is, therefore, a body corporate. It is governed by its own rules and bye-laws. In terms of Article 2 (j), its one of the objects is to get itself associated with the National Kabadi Federation of India (Amateur) and Bengal Olympic Association. Article 4 deals with the membership. Article 5, which is relevant for the purpose of these appeals reads thus :-"5. It is governed by its own rules and bye-laws. In terms of Article 2 (j), its one of the objects is to get itself associated with the National Kabadi Federation of India (Amateur) and Bengal Olympic Association. Article 4 deals with the membership. Article 5, which is relevant for the purpose of these appeals reads thus :-"5. (a) Suspension and expulsion of members and players : any violation of the decision of the Executive Committee by any member or Organisation and District Association or the Rules and Bye-laws of the 'association' (or decision of the Executive Committee) and or any misbehaviour or unfair practice or misconduct or any action detrimental to the interest of the 'association' shall render such member or organisation or player liable to suspension for such period or expulsion by the Executive Committee as they deem fit. " ( 9 ) IT is accepted that the plaintiff/respondent association is affiliated with AKFI. The relevant provisions of the constitution, articles and memorandum of AKFI are as under :"3. The jurisdiction of the Federation shall extend to all States and Union Territories in India having governing bodies for kabadi game, which accept and agree to abide by the rules hereinafter contained, institution and vocational organisation of All India nature may also be affiliated as Members subject to similar conditions. 4 (m ). To do generally all such acts as may be necessary to further the interests to the Federation. Chapter II 5. Club-Institution : the Organisation affiliated to the State Association or District Association affiliated to the State Association. Chapter III 14. Authority : a Member Organisation shall be represented only by its President, Secretary or representative (s) who must be a Member of the Association and his/their letter of authority duly signed by the Secretary of the Association/institution they represent must be submitted to the Hony. General Secretary prior to the commencement of the Meet. 18. General Council : the General Council of the Federation shall consist of President, Chairman, Hony. General Secretary, Hon. Treasurer, two representatives of each Member unit. The President need not be a representative of any Member organisation. The other office bearers and Members of Federation continue to hold the offices and represent the Member organisation they belong until such time as the representation is not withdrawn. 20. General Secretary, Hon. Treasurer, two representatives of each Member unit. The President need not be a representative of any Member organisation. The other office bearers and Members of Federation continue to hold the offices and represent the Member organisation they belong until such time as the representation is not withdrawn. 20. Powers and Functions of the General Council : the powers and functions of the General Council shall be 1. To formulate the policy of the Federation and the principles on which it shall be carried out. 2. To elect the office-bearers and the Managing Committee after every four years. 3. To impose and enforce penalties for any violation of the Rules or the Bye-laws of the Federation 4. To realise the dues and control the funds of the Federation and expand them. 5. To appoint the auditors to examine and certify the Balance Sheet and the Income and the Expenditure Accounts annually. 6. To call regular and Special meeting of the General Council and fix date and place for holding all such meeting. 7. To approve budget of the Federation. 8. To appoint Sub-committees. 9. To appoint Selection Committee to select Team and officials. 10. To recognise and register the National Records. 11. To amend the Constitution when considered necessary. 12. To ratify the affiliation granted to a new member organisation by the Executive Committee. 13. To maintain a register of approved officials. 14. To raise funds of the Federation and administer the same. 15. To explain and interprete the Rules and Regulations of the Federation and to give decisions on any point not covered by them. 16. To maintain affiliation with FINA. 17. To suspend and member organisation or individual when found guilty. 21. Executive Committee : the Executive Committee of the Federation shall consist of : 1. The President and other office bearers. 2. One representative from each Member unit. 22. Power and functions of the Managing Committee : 3. To decide cases of indiscipline, misconduct, protests breaches of regulations, interpretations of Rules and impose suitable penalties against individuals where necessary, subject to the right of appeal to the General Council. " ( 10 ) A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions clearly go to show that both the bodies are independent ones, one is only affiliated to the other. It is not a case that AKFI has any supervisory jurisdiction over the State body. " ( 10 ) A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions clearly go to show that both the bodies are independent ones, one is only affiliated to the other. It is not a case that AKFI has any supervisory jurisdiction over the State body. There, however, cannot be any doubt that each State association is either represented by the President, Secretary or representative, who must be a member of the association. Only by reason of holding an office in a State body, a person can represent the State body in the AKFI. ( 11 ) BY reason of such representation, he could also become a member of the General Council. Articles and Memorandum of AKFI clearly demarcates different powers and functions amongst different bodies. Powers and functions of the General Council, ex facie, could not have been exercised by the Executive Committee or the Managing Committee. Even assuming that the argument of Mr. Dasgupta is correct to the effect that the Executive Committee and the Managing Committee is one and the same, a bare perusal of sub-rule (3) of Rule 22 goes to show that the penalty imposed by a Managing Committee would be subject to the right of appeal to the General Council. In terms of sub-rule (17) of Rule 20 power of suspension of member organisation or individual when found guilty is vested in the General Council alone. Thus, it is absolutely clear that whereas in terms of sub-rule (3) of Rule 22, the Managing Committee can decided the cases of indiscipline, misconduct, protest, breach of regulation and other matters enumerated therein, it does not have the power to suspend any member organisation or individual when found guilty. Evidently the power to suspend cannot be passed by a body which can decide the case of discipline etc. Such a power of suspension is vested solely in the General Council. Even if it be assumed that the Managing, Committee has exercised the power at the instance of the General Council, the same, ex facie, must be held to be had in law, in as much as, the General Council, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises appellate jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Managing Committee. Even if it be assumed that the Managing, Committee has exercised the power at the instance of the General Council, the same, ex facie, must be held to be had in law, in as much as, the General Council, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises appellate jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Managing Committee. The right of appeal conferred upon a member who has been found guilty of indiscipline or misconduct by the Managing Committee, cannot be taken away by reason of any order or direction by the General Council; although no such case has been made out. Even such an order, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Commissioner of Police v. Gobardhan Das, reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 would be had in law. Any decision, it is well known, taken by a body, which is a coram non-judice would be a nullity. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was not correct in holding that the order of suspension passed by the Executive Committee of AKFI against the appellant was legal. Furthermore, we are satisfied that the Executive Committee in terms of the aforementioned rules, had absolutely no jurisdiction to appoint an ad-hoc committee so far as running of the affairs of the State body is concerned. Article 4 (m) which has been referred to by Mr. Dasgupta is totally misplaced, inasmuch as, Article 4 of Chapter I only refers to the object of AKFI. With a view to give effect to the aforementioned object, it can take such action as may be necessary for the interest of the Federation, but that by itself even by necessary implication cannot clothe the association to appoint an ad-hoc committee. It is now well known that when a juristic person is directed to act in a particular manner, by its own rules, it has to follow the manner laid down under the said rules, or not at all. The law in this connection is well settled that a person who takes the procedural sword, must perish with the sword. The learned trial Judge, therefore, in our opinion, failed to apply his mind to the aforementioned vital aspect of the matter and came to an erroneous decision. The law in this connection is well settled that a person who takes the procedural sword, must perish with the sword. The learned trial Judge, therefore, in our opinion, failed to apply his mind to the aforementioned vital aspect of the matter and came to an erroneous decision. It was obligatory on the part of the learned trial Judge to pose unto himself the right question so as to enable him to acquaint himself with the correct state of affairs, with a view to arrive at a correct decision and as he has failed to do so, he has misdirected himself in law. It may be true that in certain situation a bad order does not become a nullity unless it is set aside. The decision of the Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 2219, in our opinion, cannot be said to be applicable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, the court was considering a matter of dismissal under the Industrial Disputes Act. The apex court in that situation held :"but none the less the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or court. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1956) AC 736 at p. 769 Lord Redcliffe observed: "an order even if not made in good faith is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. " ( 12 ) ). However, in the instant case, the fact of the matter is absolutely different. The plaintiff, who claims himself to be a member of the Ad-hoc Committee, with a view to obtain an order of injunction, when questioned, was bound to show that such committee was appointed by a body, which was authorised therefor. If the Ad-hoc Committee was not constituted by a body which was authorised therefor, the formation of the committee would be a nullity from its inception, as the order of AKFI forming such a committee will be wholly without jurisdiction. If the Ad-hoc Committee was not constituted by a body which was authorised therefor, the formation of the committee would be a nullity from its inception, as the order of AKFI forming such a committee will be wholly without jurisdiction. Such an order, which lacks inherent jurisdiction, need not be challenged by a party by initiating a proceeding, but the same may be challenged by him in a collateral proceeding. Also, a distinction has to be borne in mind as regards an order which is void and an order which is a nullity. An order which has been passed wholly without jurisdiction is a nullity, and thus, can be subject-matter of a decision in a collateral proceeding, whereas, an order which is void, must be set aside by a competent court of law. Only when the plaintiff could succeed in showing that he has usurped his office under a valid order, it could be said to have established a prima facie case for the purpose of obtaining an order of injunction. Once it is held that the plaintiff did not have any prima facie case, question of passing any order of injunction in his favour did not arise. The court, in that situation, is not even required to go into the question of balance of convenience or irreparable injury, which it is otherwise bound to do. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Smith Stanistreet Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Prabir Kumar Sengupta, reported in ILR (1995) 2 Calcutta 389. In view of the fact that now it is stated at the Bar that the suit filed by one of the bodies in the Court of Munsif at Swal Madhopur has been dismissed for default, we do not intend to address ourselves on that question, but from a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial judge, it appears that no such question was raised before him, and in that view of the matter, the learned trial Judge was bound to pass an order keeping in view the principles of comity of decisions even in relation to an order of injunction. ( 13 ) IT further goes without saying that even if the order of suspension against the appellant was valid, ipso facto he could not be held to have been suspended by the State body, as separate procedure has been laid down therefor as contained in Article 5 (a) of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the West Bengal Kabadi Association, inasmuch, as, he being primarily a member of the West Bengal Kabadi Association, he could be suspended from the said association only in terms of the said rules. Furthermore, even in so far as the representation of the State body before the apex body is concerned, even in absence of its General Secretary, the State body could be represented by the President or any other member, and thus only by reason of suspension of the appellant as a member of AKFI, he would not automatically cease to be the General Secretary of the said association. ( 14 ) THESE observations which have been made by us, were only for the purpose of finding out a prima facie case in favour of the appellant. It, however, goes without saying that we have not gone into the merit of the matter, and the questions which have been raised before us, should not deter the learned court below to consider the merit of the case, including jurisdictional question, as and when it is raised before it irrespective of our decision. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned order cannot be upheld which is accordingly set aside. ( 15 ) URGENT xerox certified copy, if applied for, be supplied on priority basis. P. K. Samanta, J.-I agree. Impugned Order set aside