The petitioner, who was working as an Executive Engineer under the Assam State Electricity Board at Dhubri Electricity Division, has challenged in this writ petition two orders both dated 25.9.95 of the Chairman of the Assam State Electricity Board (for short, ASEB) terminating/dismissing him from service. 2. The facts briefly are that by order dated 16.7.94, the Chairman of the ASEB acting as the disciplinary authority asked the petitioner to show cause under Regulation 10 of the Assam State Electricity Board (General Service) Regulations, 1960, (for short, the Regulations) as to why he should not be penalised for the charge of absence without leave and the charge of neglect of duty. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 30.7.94 to the said show cause notice denying the charges and as enquiry was conducted in respect of the said charge by the Enquiry Officer and in the said enquiry the management of the ASEB and the petitioner adduced their documentary and oral evidence. The Enquiry Officer in his report held that the petitioner was absent from duty from 30.9.93 to 19.11.93 and from 14.12.93 onwards without authority and to that extent the first charge of misconduct was established. The Enquiry Officer also held that by not attending to his duties during the period of unauthorised absence, the petitioner neglected his duty and the misconduct of negligence of duty had also been established against the petitioner. Almost simultaneously another disciplinary proceeding was held against the petitioner. By order dated 19.12.94, the Chairman of the ASEB acting as the disciplinary authority required the petitioner to show cause under regulation 10 (1) of the Regulations as to why he should not be penalised for the charge of disobedience of lawful orders of the superior. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice denying the said charge. An enquiry was conducted in which the petitioner and the management of the ASEB led evidence and the Enquiry Officer submitted his reply holding that the charge against the petitioner had been established. The disciplinary authority thereafter recorded his own findings in the two impugned orders dated 25.9.95 that the petitioner was guilty of the charges and considering the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the petitioner inflicted penalty of termination/dismissal from service with effect from 25.9.95. The disciplinary authority thereafter recorded his own findings in the two impugned orders dated 25.9.95 that the petitioner was guilty of the charges and considering the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the petitioner inflicted penalty of termination/dismissal from service with effect from 25.9.95. Aggrieved by the said two orders of termination/dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeals before the Board of the ASEB on or about 8.10.95. By letter dated 8.1.96, however, the Deputy Personnel Manager (R), ASEB, informed the petitioner that the Board in its resolution No.4 dated 21.12.95 after scrutinizing the relevant records and the appeal petitions found that the penalty of termination/dismissal inflicted on the petitioner was appropriate considering the nature and degree of misconduct committed by the petitioner. Unable to get any relief from the appellate authority, the petitioner has now moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for appropriate relief. 3. At the hearing, Mr. RP Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, vehemently contended that under Regulation 10 of the Regulations "habitual negligence or neglect of duty" and not just neglect of duty amounts to misconduct. Similarly, "absence without leave or overstay of sanctioned leave without sufficient cause" amounts to misconduct and this would mean that where there is sufficient cause for remaining absent or overstay in case of sanctioned leave, there is no misconduct on the part of the delinquent employee.. He further submitted that wilful insubordination or disobedience any lawful or reasonable order of the superior amounts to misconduct as per the said regulation and accordingly, as there was no deliberate or intentional insubordination or disobedience, there was no misconduct on the part of the delinquent employee. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & others vs. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 , for the proposition that in the absence of culpable mind or means rea on the part of a delinquent employee, he cannot be held to be guilty of misconduct for a technical breach of the rules of conduct. He further contended that in his replies to the show cause notices, the petitioner had stated that he had left the Headquarters on 29.9.93 while he was posted as the Executive Engineer, Dhubri Electrical Division because of the agitation on the part of the contract labourers claiming their wages and continuity of their services and could not resume his duties till 20.11.93 because of his heart trouble and advice of the doctor to take complete rest; but this defence of the petitioner had been brushed aside by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority and the petitioner had been arbitrarily held to be guilty of the charges of remaining absent from duty with effect from 30.9.93 and for neglect of duty. Similarly in his show cause reply, the petitioner had explained that he was suffering for a long period from heart decease and was undergoing treatment under a Heart Specialist at Guwahati and his wife after meeting with an accident had been suffering from slip-disc and it is for these reasons that he could not join at Haflong in the office of the Chief Engineer (Hills and Barak Valley) and continued at Guwahati. But the said defence of the petitioner ha not been considered and he was found to be guilty by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority for disobeying the order of transfer dated 3.10.94 issued by the superior authority. Mr. Sharma submitted that the petitioner had although unblemished career as an employee of the ASEB and there were very compelling reasons as indicated in his show cause replies and various letters adduced as documentary evidence during the enquiry to show as to why he had to remain absent from Headquarters from 30.9.93 to 19.11.93 and as to why he could not join pursuant to his transfer to Haflong and instead remained at Guwahati. But the Enquiring Officer and the disciplinary authority have mechanically without any application of mind held the petitioner guilty of the charge of misconduct. Mr. Sharma cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority vs. Manilal Gobardhandas & others, (1996) 11 SCC 482 , for the proposition that there is no application of mind by the administrative authority, the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review can quash the orders passed by the administrative authority. Mr. Sharma cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority vs. Manilal Gobardhandas & others, (1996) 11 SCC 482 , for the proposition that there is no application of mind by the administrative authority, the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review can quash the orders passed by the administrative authority. Mr. Sharma further pointed out that even appellate authority had not considered all these aspects and had passed a very cryptic order and had not indicated the reasons for its appellate order as would be clear from the communication dated 8.1.96 of the Deputy Personnel Manager (R) of the ASEB. Mr. Sharma also contended that even if it is held that misconduct had been established, considering the fact that this was the first/apse ever made by the petitioner in his entire career, the penalty of termination/dismissal from service was disproportionate on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, ought to be quashed by this Court. He also argued that the disciplinary proceeding stood vitiated as the copy of the Board's order dated'12.1.94 which was a document relied on by the management and exhibited as Ext 8 was not furnished to the petitioner, it listed in the list of document furnished to the petitioner along with the charge. He submitted that similarly copy of the letter dated 26.12.93 exhibited as Ext 10 in the enquiry was not furnished to the petitioner nor included in the list of documents furnished to the petitioner along the charges. 4. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. NN Saikia, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the ASEB, submitted that all opportunities were given to the petitioner during the enquiry to defend himself against the charges as would be evident from the two reports of the Enquiring Officer. He further argued that on the basis of the materials on record as adduced during the enquiry, both the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority have held the petitioner guilty of the charges and as the misconduct established against the petitioner was of serious nature, namely, wilful disobedience to the orders of the superior, absence from duty and neglect of duty, the punishment of termination/dismissal from service was imposed by the authorities and were justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. He cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India & others vs. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357 , and Govt of Tamilnadu vs. KN Ramamurthy, (1997) 7 SCC 101 , in which it has been held that Tribunal or the Court has no jurisdiction to take over the functions of the disciplinary authority and to go into the truth or otherwise of the charges against a delinquent employee. He also argued that in the case of BC Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 484 , on which reliance was also placed by Mr. RP Sharma, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court or the Tribunal while exercising the power of judicial review cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on the punishment to be imposed and it only when the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal it would remit the matter back to the disciplinary or the appellate authority for reconsideration. But, in the instant case, the punishment of dismissal from service imposed by the disciplinary authority is proportionate to the grave misconduct committed by the petitioner and should not be interferred with by the Court. 5. From the examination of the records of the case, it appears that reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner during the enquiry to defend himself against the charges. Although, Mr. Sharma argued that copies of Exts 8 and 10 were not furnished to the petitioner nor were said documents listed in the list of documents furnished to the petitioner along with the charges, he has not shown how exactly the petitioner was prejudiced for non-supply of the copies of the said documents to the petitioner or due to the fact that the said documents were not mentioned in the list of documents furnished to the petitioner. It is, therefore, difficult to come to the conclusion that the enquiry stood vitiated due to the fact that the copies of the aforesaid documents were not furnished to the petitioner and due to the fact that the said documents were not even mentioned in the list of documents furnished to the petitioner. 6. It is true as contended by Mr. 6. It is true as contended by Mr. Saikia that the scope of judicial review in a disciplinary proceeding is very limited and that it is for the disciplinary authority to go into the truth or otherwise of the charges against the delinquent employee and to impose punishment proportionate to the misconduct committed by the delinquent employee and that the Court will not interfere with the finding of guilt recorded by the disciplinary authority so long as the said finding is based on some materials and will also not interfere with the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority unless the punishment compared to the misconduct committed by the delinquent employee is such as would shock the judicial conscience of the Court. But, in the instant case, the petitioner's grievance is that the petitioner was not guilty of misconduct as defined in Regulations 10 (a), (e) and (i) of the Regulations for which the petitioner had been charged and that there was sufficient materials on record to support the defence of the petitioner that he was not guilty of the said misconduct as defined by the Regulations. This being the grievance of the petitioner, the Court can always examine in exercise of its power of judicial review as to whether the disciplinary authority had applied his mind to the definitions of misconduct for which the petitioner had been charged as enumerate in the Regulations and had considered the materials collected in course of enquiry for the purpose of recording a finding that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 , code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service and it would follow that conduct which is blame-worthy for the Govt servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. In M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd vs. Presiding Officer, Meerut, AIR 1984 SC 505 , the Supreme Court has further held that some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto would not expose the workman to a penalty and it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly failing within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Again in AL Kalra vs. P & E Corporation of India Ltd, AIR 1984 SC 1361 , the Supreme Court has further held that where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. 7. The charges against the petitioner as per order dated 16.7.94 of the disciplinary authority were that he left his Headquarters at Dhubri unauthorisedly on 30.9.93 and absented himself and did not attend office- and was therefore guilty of absence without leave under Regulation 10 (e) of the Regulations and that he was guilty of mi sconduct of neglect of duty under Regulation 10 (i) of the Regulations. The charge against the petitioner as per order dated 19.12.94 was that although the petitioner was transferred and posted in the office of the Chief Engineer (Hills and Barak Valley) and was directed to join within 10.10.94, instead of joining his new place of posting, he submitted an application dated 8.10.94 and prayed for his posting at Guwahati. But the said prayer was not acceded to and was advised to join his new place of posting by 17.10.94. But the petitioner disobeyed the aforesaid order and did not report for duty in the office of the Chief Engineer (Hills and Barak Valley) at Haflong and was therefore guilty of misconduct of disobedience to lawful order under Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations. But the petitioner disobeyed the aforesaid order and did not report for duty in the office of the Chief Engineer (Hills and Barak Valley) at Haflong and was therefore guilty of misconduct of disobedience to lawful order under Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations. The charges against the petitioner were thus that he was guilty of misconduct as defined in Regulations 10 (a), (e) and (i) of the Regulations, which are quoted hereunder: "(a) Wilful insubordination or disobediece, whether alone or in combination with others, to any lawful and reasonable order of a superior; "(e) Absence without leave or overstay of sanctioned leave without sufficient cause; "(i) Habitual negligence or neglect of duty ;" 8. A reading of Regulation 10 (e) quoted above would show that it was not just absence without leave or overstay of sanctioned leave which amounted to misconduct and it was only when such absence without leave or overstay of sanctioned leave was 'without sufficient cause' that an employee would be guilty of misconduct. In the-present case, the petitioner had stated in his reply dated 1.8.95 to the second show cause notice annexed to the writ petition-as Annexure F that on 29.9.93 when he was working in the office all contract labourers along with some other person numbering about 200 entered in his office chamber and demanded payment of their wages and continuity of service and gave a threat to his life if he did not concede to the demand and that in the late hours of the night they forced him to sign on an undertaking that on the next day he would proceed to the Chief Engineer's office at Guwahati and come back with their wages and order of continuity of their service and that the salary of the regular staff would not be paid without meeting their demand and if he failed to do so he would not be allowed to resume his duty. In the said reply, the petitioner had further stated that on 30.9.93 he along with other officers approached the Additional Chief Engineer, Lower Assam Zone at Bongaigaon and informed him to the incident and prayed for permission to go to Guwahati to meet the Chief Engineer for solution of the problem and to arrange fund and that the Additional Chief Engineer permitted him by, nodding his head. In the said reply, the petitioner had relied on the defence statements of Sri Ramendra Choudhury, Assistant Executive Engineer, Sri Alok Chakraborty, Accounts Officer, and Manindra Ghose, Assistant Executive Engineer, in which they had stated that the Additional Chief Engineer at Bongaigaon on 30.9.93 had permitted the officers to go to Guwahati by nodding. In the said reply, the petitioner had further stated that even Superintening Engineer, Kokrajhar Electrical Circle in his statement had stated that the Additional Chief Engineer had himself confessed that the petitioner met him at Bongaigaon and took his permission before leaving for Guwahati. The petitioner had further stated in his said reply that he failed to understand as to how the Enquiry Officer in his finding in the inquiry report disbelieved the petitioner that he was allowed to leave Headquarter by the Additional Chief Engineer when so many officers including the Superintending Engineer had given a statement that such permission was given by the Additional Chief Engineer to the petitioner to leave Headquarters. But the said defence of the petitioner as indicated in the said reply dated 1st August, 1995 and the statement of various persons on which the petitioner had relied on had not been considered by the disciplinary authority in the impugned order dated 25.9.94 and the disciplinary authority had brushed aside the plea of the petitioner by stating in the impugned order that the said plea had been dealt with and detailed in the enquiry report and that such incidents not being uncommon in any establishments could not justify his desertion of the Headquarters and dereliction of duty, especially as the Head of the Division whose duty was to deal administratively with such problems. What the disciplinary authority failed to appreciate was that if there was sufficient cause for the petitioner to leave the Headquarters on 30.9.93 as pleaded by him and if there were materials adduced during the enquiry to show that there was sufficient cause for the petitioner to remain absent from the Headquarters from 30.9.93, the petitioner would not be guilty of misconduct as defined in Regulation 10 (e) of the Regulations. Further, Regulation 10 (i) of the Regulations treated habitual negligence or neglect of duty and not just neglect of duty on a single occasion as misconduct, Thus, a single instance of case where the petitioner leaves the Headquarters under very compelling circumstances would not amount to the misconduct of habitual negligence or neglect of duty as defined in Regulation 10 (i) of the Regulations. The disciplinary authority was thus required to find out whether the materials adduced during the enquiry established that this was the only occasion when the petitioner had left the Headquarters due to very compelling circumstances. But on a reading of the impugned order dated 25. 9.95 of the disciplinary authority, it appears that the definition of the misconduct of habitual negligence or neglect of duty in Regulation 10 (i) of the Regulations had not been kept in mind by the disciplinary authority had not been kept in mind by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority had therefore held the petitioner guilty and punished him by a penalty of termination according to his own notion of what amounted to misconduct and not according to what amounted to misconduct under the Regulations. 9. Similarly, Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations quoted above would show that 'wilful' insubordination or disobedience to lawful or reasonable order of a superior amounts to misconduct. Thus, mere disobedience of an order of a superior will not amount to misconduct unless the disobedience was wilful. In his reply dated 1st August, 1995, the petitioner had stated that he suffered from heart trouble and his suffered from slip-disc after an accident and as there was none except him to took after his ailing wife he requested the authorities from February 1994 to transfer him to any place in Guwahati so that he could lookafter his ailing wife vide representations dated 7.3.94, 2.5.94, 6.6.94 and 1.8.94 and yet he was transferred by order dated 3.10.94 to Haflong. In the said reply, the petitioner had stated that the Enquiry Officer had ignored the statements of all officers for defence and the message and letters of the petitioner adduced as proof of his genuine difficulties for not being able to comply with the aforesaid order of transfer. In his said reply he requested the disciplinary authority to consider this aspect of the matter and drop the charge against him. In his said reply he requested the disciplinary authority to consider this aspect of the matter and drop the charge against him. On a reading of the impugned order dated 25.9.95,1 find that the disciplinary authority has held that all throughout the petitioner pleaded his defence, verbally and in writing, that owing to his personal family circumstances it was not possible for him to move out of Guwahati and he had continuously persistently ignored and defied the transfer order and refused to join at Haflong in compliance thereof not only upto the date of the charge sheet but till date and thereafter held him guilty of misconduct under Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations. What the disciplinary authority failed to appreciate was that the misconduct as defined in Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations would only be established if the disobedience to an order of transfer by the petitioner was 'wilful' and not otherwise. Since the petitioner had pleaded his own heart-trouble and the slip-disc of his wife as the reason for his not being able to move out of Guwahati during the period in question and had adduced materials, both oral and documentary, in course of inquiry in support of his said plea it was incumbent on the part of the disciplinary authority to have considered the said plea and the materials on record and thereafter recorded a finding as to whether the petitioner had wilfully disobeyed the order of his superior authority transferring him to Haflong and had thus committed misconduct as defined in the said Regulation 10 (a) of the Regulations. 10. Coming now to the question of quantum of punishment, the relevant provision of the Regulations under which penalties are to be imposed on an employee is quoted hereunder : "No order imposing a penalty shall be made unless the employee concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. Before passing orders awarding a punishment the competent authority may make such further enquiries and give such hearing to the employee against whom misconduct is alleged, as may be considered necessary, and shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee, and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances, that may exist. Before passing orders awarding a punishment the competent authority may make such further enquiries and give such hearing to the employee against whom misconduct is alleged, as may be considered necessary, and shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee, and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances, that may exist. A copy of the order passed shall be supplied to the employee concerned : Provided that this clause shall not apply when penalty is imposed on an employee on the ground which led to his conviction on a criminal charge involving moral turpitude." (emphasis supplied) The under-lined portion of the aforesaid provision would show that the disciplinary authority is to take into consideration not only the gravity of misconduct but also the previous record of the employee and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances, that may exist before awarding the punishment. The case of the petitioner was that his previous record had been without any blemish and therefore he should not have been subject to highest punishment of termination/dismissal from service under the impugned orders passed by the disciplinary authority. On a reading of the two impugned orders dated 25.9.95 passed by the disciplinary authority, I find that the disciplinary authority had not at all considered the previous record of the petitioner and straightway imposed the severest punishment of termination/dismissal from service for the misconduct and had thus ignored the aforesaid provision in the Regulations. Against the aforesaid two impugned orders dated 25.9.95 of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeals before the Board, but the records do not indicate that the Board while upholding the two orders of punishment of the disciplinary authority had applied its mind to the definitions of misconduct for which the petitioner had been charged and to the previous record of the petitioner, as discussed above; and the communication dated 8th January, 1996 of the Deputy Personnel Manager (R) of the ASEB to the petitioner, annexed to this writ petitioner as Annexure K only shows that the Board in its Resolution No.4 dated 21.12.95 had after scrutinizing the relevant records found that the penalty of termination/dismissal of the petitioner was appropriate considering the nature and degree of misconduct committed by him. For the reason stated above, the two impugned orders dated 25.9.95 terminating/dismissing the petitioner from service as well as the Resolution No. 4 dated 21.12.95 of the Board of the ASEB confirming the said punishment imposed on the petitioner in appeals are quashed and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority who will consider the reply dated 1 st August, 1995 of the petitioner to the second show cause notice afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment and pass fresh orders in accordance with the law. Depending on the final outcome of the disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority will consider payment of such amount of back wages to the petitioner as he deems fit and proper in the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The aforesaid exercise will be completed by the disciplinary authority within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment from the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed. However, considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.