Judgment : D. Raju, J. The writ petitioner, the proprietrix of Anna Touring Talkies, Vairavikulam, Tirunelveli District, who lost before the learned Single Judge, has filed the above appeal against the order dated 18. 1997 in W.P.No.5919 of 1988. The said writ petition was filed seeking for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings of the first respondent State Government made in G.O.Rt.No.1449 Home (Cinemas-I) Dept., dated 20.4.1988, whereunder the Government. While concurring with the orders of the Appellate Authority as well as that of the licensing Authority rejected the claim of the appellant for renewal of a “C” Form Licence for a third term after the expiry of the renewal earlier granted till 112. 1986. The Licensing authority viz., the District Collector of Tirunelveli District, by his proceedings dated 26. 1987 rejected the application for renewal taking into account the bad antecedents in the matter of running of the Theatre not only in the form of selling tickets without the seal of the Department, but also for running the theatre by exhibiting film without the required licence therefor on 210. 1986. As a matter of fact, criminal prosecutions were pending in respect of some such incidents and she has also compounded an offence by paying the compounding fee for committing violation of Rules by selling unsealed tickets. An appeal filed by the appellant before the Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration, The Appellate Authority also was rejected after an elaborate and exhaustive consideration of all the materials. Not satisfied, the appellant pursued the matter on further revision. Though initially the revision was entertained and interim orders were granted, subsequently the revision also came to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant was guilty of defalcations and violations of serious nature and grave magnitude. The relevant materials and instances forming the basis of such antecedents have been also noticed by the revisional authority elaborately. 2. Though initially the revision was entertained and interim orders were granted, subsequently the revision also came to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant was guilty of defalcations and violations of serious nature and grave magnitude. The relevant materials and instances forming the basis of such antecedents have been also noticed by the revisional authority elaborately. 2. Thereupon, the appellant filed W.P.No.5919 of 1988 as noticed earlier, while the writ petition was pending, the owner of the land on which the touring talkies in question is located and with whom initially there was a lease agreement with the appellant, which has expired, got impleaded as a party-respondent to the writ petition and he also objected to the relief being granted in favour of the appellant on the ground that there is no valid lease in favour of the appellant and he cannot be said to satisfy the requirements of law, particularly the provisions of Rule 13(1) of Tamil Nadu Cinema (Regulations) Rules, 1957 (Hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). The coming up of a new theatre within the prohibited distance was also urged as a ground based on violation of Rule 14(2) of the Rules. 3. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the compounding of the offence of selling tickets without the seal of the Department would constitute violation of Sec.5(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Cinema (Regulations) Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). That apart, the learned single Judge was also pleased to agree with the stand taken for the owner of the site and held that not only there was no subsisting lease, but that the question of lawful possession of the site, even de hors Rule 13 of the Rules, the licensing authority is entitled to take into account such consideration in evaluating the suitability of the place as envisaged under Sec.5(1)(c) of the Act and consequently the learned single Judge Dismissed the writ petition agreeing with the orders of the authorities below. 4. Mr.M.Kalyanasundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, made only two submissions while challenging the orders of the learned single Judge. 4. Mr.M.Kalyanasundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, made only two submissions while challenging the orders of the learned single Judge. It was contended by placing reliance upon the decision reported in R.V.Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.R. (1995)5 S.C.C. 698 and Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai Attached to Sri Venkatachapathi Perumal Temple v. Subramanian, (1994)2 M.L.J. 239 , that the appellant could not be considered to be not in lawful possession of the site and that her possession is lawful. The further submission of the learned senior counsel was that the compounding of the offence by payment of Rs.100 will not constitute a bad antecedent in the absence of any conviction as such to operate as a disqualifying factor for getting the renewal and that, therefore, the order of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside. 5. Before adverting to the tenability of the submissions made, it will be useful to refer to the decisions relied upon on either side. In M.C.Chockalingam v. V.Mainckavasagam, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 104: (1974)2 S.C.J. 80: (1974)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27, the Apex Court was dealing with the scope of Rule 13 on an appeal filed from a decision of this court. The Apex Court held as hereunder: "Mr.Gupte strenuously submits that "Lawful possession" cannot be divorced from an affirmative positive legal right to possess the property and since the lease had expired by efflux of time the tenant in this case had no legal right to continue in possession. In the context of Rule 13, we are clearly of opinion that tenant on the expiry of the lease cannot be said to continue in "lawful possession" of the property against the wishes of the landlord if such a possession is not otherwise statutorily protected under the law against even lawful eviction through court process, such as under the Rent Control Act. Sec.6 of the Specific Relief Act does not offer such protection, but only, as stated earlier, forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. 15. Turning to Rule 13, even in the first part if the applicant for the licence is the owner of the property he has to produce before the licensing authority the necessary records not only relating to his ownership but also regarding his possession. 15. Turning to Rule 13, even in the first part if the applicant for the licence is the owner of the property he has to produce before the licensing authority the necessary records not only relating to his ownership but also regarding his possession. It is implicit, that the owner having a title to the property, if he can satisfy the licensing authority with regard to his possession also, will indeed be in lawful possession", although the word "lawful" is not used in the first part. It is in that context that the word "possession" is even not necessary to be qualified by "lawful" in the first part of Rule 13. If however, the applicant for the licence is not the owner, there is no question of his showing title to the property and the only requirement of the law is to produce to the satisfaction of the authority documentary evidence with regard to his lawful possession of the property. The word "Lawful" therefore, naturally assumes significance in the second part while it was not even necessary in the first part. The fact that after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property by resisting a suit for eviction, does not establish a case in law to answer the requirement of lawful possession of the property within the meaning of Rule 13, lawful possession, cannot be established without the concomitant existence of lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant, Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with the temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, (1968)2 S.C.R. 203 had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession." 6. This Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others, (1968)2 S.C.R. 203 had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession." 6. In R.V.Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P., (1995)5 S.C.C. 698 on which reliance has been placed for the appellant by the learned senior counsel, the Apex Court dealt with the distinction between a "tenant holding over" or "a tenant at will" and a "tenant by sufferance". In our view, the decision of the Apex Court, despite the discussion of the distinction as above, categorically held in the context of a similar rule under the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules that continuance in possession by a lessee after the expiry of the lease deed and in the absence of an acquiescence by the lessor, such possession cannot be said to be lawful possession for the purpose of the Rules. 7. In Sri Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai Attached to Sri Venkatachalapathi Perumal Temples v. Subramanian, (1994)2 M.L.J. 239 , a learned single Judge of this Court seems to have taken the view that a tenant, who overstays after the expiry of the lease period, cannot be considered to be in unlawful possession. But, at the same time, the learned Judge made it clear that even in such a situation, Rule 13, if satisfied, will be entitled to renewal. In our view, the decision of the learned single Judge proceeds upon an erroneous understanding of not only the principles laid down by the Apex Court as to the scope of Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinema (Regulations) Rules, 1957, but also the categorical principles laid down by the Apex Court in the two decisions noticed supra. May be the learned single Judge’s view could be justified because of the absence of any positive objection by the owner of the site, unlike in the present case. If the decision of the learned single Judge is to be considered to have laid down any general principle of universal application, the same cannot be considered to be in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court and for that reason cannot be approved by us. If the decision of the learned single Judge is to be considered to have laid down any general principle of universal application, the same cannot be considered to be in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court and for that reason cannot be approved by us. The relevant rule makes it clear that even at the time of renewal, the applicant has to satisfy the authorities that the site of the building continued to conform to the relevant rules and this would postulate the necessity for compliance with Rule 13 even at the stage of renewal also. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the learned single Judge has noticed the fact that the owner of the site has also filed a suit for recovery of possession apart from the suit filed by the appellant to protect her possession and the rents also appear to have been paid without prejudice to the rights of parties. In such a case, the possession would only be not a lawful possession, but a litigious possession not conforming to the requirements of Rule 13 as held by the Apex Court. 8. Even that apart, the grounds on which the authorities below rejected the request for renewal are very solid and substantial grounds based on concrete materials. The appellant was found to have run the theatre by exhibiting films from 30.10.1986 to 11. 1986 without any valid licence. In addition thereto, at the time of surprise inspection during the period from 30.10.1986 to 11. 1986, the appellant also appears to have sold tickets without the seal of the Commercial Tax Department. The said offence, concedingly, was compounded by payment of Rs. 100 These facts would sufficiently constitute, as held by the authorities below and the learned single Judge, relevant and clinching materials to prove the bad antecedents, which could be taken into account as a relevant consideration in the matter of grant or refusal of a licence of a renewal as envisaged under Sec.5(1)(b) of the Act. The provisions contained in Sec.3-A and Sec.5 of the Act have different roles to play and in respect of a consideration of the antecedent even as per the explanation to Sec.5(1)(b) of the Act, the conduct of the applicant in relation to payment of any tax due and payable by him to the Government would be a relevant one. The provisions contained in Sec.3-A and Sec.5 of the Act have different roles to play and in respect of a consideration of the antecedent even as per the explanation to Sec.5(1)(b) of the Act, the conduct of the applicant in relation to payment of any tax due and payable by him to the Government would be a relevant one. A division bench of this court in the decision reported in P.K.M.Jainuladeen v. The Commissioner of Land Revenue, Madras, 1972 T.L.N.J. 170 has in categorical terms held that by the mere payment of a fee on compounding an offence, the person cannot be claimed to have been exonerated of the stigma attached to a violation so as to wipe of the evil or incident from being taken into account as indicative of the antecedent. We have no sufficient reason to take a different view from the one taken by the earlier Division Bench and the principles laid down therein would govern the case against the appellant. 9. For all the reasons stated above, we see no merit whatsoever in the above appeal. The writ appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. C.M.Ps. are dismissed.