M. Ramakrishna, C.J.- This appeal arises out of the judgment and order made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No.482 of 1994, dated 29th January, 1996, upholding the view taken by the Labour Court and further observing as follows : , “I find that the Labour Court rightly found that these persons continuing in their services as they were never terminated according to the procedure. So. no fault can be found with this observation.” Aggrieved by this order and judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Management presented this appeal challenging the correctness and legality of the orders under appeal for the ground taken therein. 2. The salient facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows : Respondent No.2, the Secretary, All Asom Chah Sarmik Sangha (AACSS), Sonari, District Sibsagar, alongwith the other 109 persons, claiming to be the employees of the appellant, Tingalibam Tea Estate, Sonari, District Sibsagar, presented two applications, (1) one under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the Act), which was numbered as Misc Case No.6 of 1990, and (2) another application under section 33A of the said Act, registered as Case No.4 of 1991, before the Labour Court at Dibrugarh, seeking for certain relief. In the first of the applications referred to above under section 33C (2) of the Act. the applicants claimed a certain sum of money payable to them by way of arrears of wages which, according to them, were not paid by the Management, while in the second of the applications under section 33 A of the Act. the Union represented by its Secretary (representing Shn Biren Gorh & other 109 persons), sought for an adjudication alleging that the Management illegally refused to take weighment of the tea leaves plucked by these 110 persons with effect from 13th November, 1990. and that, therefore, appropriate relief may be granted in their favour. These two applications were opposed by the Management by filing objections. 3. As to the first application presented under section 33C (2) of the Act. in the written statement of the Management it was alleged that the proceedings as initiated before the Labour Court by the applicants were not maintainable since the Management was not guilty of any violation of the provision of section 33 or 33 A of the Act. 3. As to the first application presented under section 33C (2) of the Act. in the written statement of the Management it was alleged that the proceedings as initiated before the Labour Court by the applicants were not maintainable since the Management was not guilty of any violation of the provision of section 33 or 33 A of the Act. It was pointed out that the Management had indeed appointed some of these persons as casual labourers for a short period on temporary basis. However, these employees were stopped from working with effect from 12th November. 1990. by issuing a notice dated 16th November. 1990. A copy of the same was enclosed along with the written statement. 4. In spite of the Management's legitimate order, a section of the temporary workers forcefully went for plucking of tea leaves on their own sweet will and thereby causing injury to the tea bushes. It was further alleged that since these persons went for plucking of the tea leaves according to their own will, the Management refused to take weighment of these plucked tea leaves and that they were not allowed to go inside the factory compound. Thus these people left the plucked leaves outside the factory gate which ultimately got damaged. However, this matter was also informed to the concerned authorities. 5. Referring to the maintainability of the petition presented by these persons. a specific stand was taken that there was not either a Sangha or an Association recognised by the Management, much less there is a Sangha by name. “All Asom Chah Sramik Sangha”, as alleged in the petition. The person who signed the petition, claiming to be the Secretary of the Sangha. is an imposter and that the petition as brought in the name of the Sangha is not maintainable in law. 6. In so far as the claim put forward in the application under section 33C (2) of the Act is concerned, the specific stand taken by the Management in their counter was that since these persons did not work as they were only casual labourers and that they had no right to perform any duties claiming wages for such work, inasmuch as, the Management did not allow them to pluck the leaves and to carry on regular work and that they were employed only for a temporary period. Therefore, the question of considering their right to wages did not arise at all. The petition as brought before the Labour Court being not maintainable in law, the same is required to be dismissed. 7. The Labour Court on the completion of the pleadings referred to the specific stand taken by both parties in their pleadings and raised the following two questions for consideration : (1) Whether the employer contravened section 33 of the ID Act by stopping work of these 110 petitioners with effect from 12.11.90 during the pendency of Misc Case No.6 of 1990 under section 33C (2) of the Act ? (2) Whether the employer Management's action in refusing weighment of plucked leaves of these 110 workers wef 13.11.90 was justified on merits ? 8. Considering the evidence on record, the Labour Court reached the conclusion on the first point as follows : “The evidence above discloses that the action of the employer in resorting to all these dubious tactics to oust these 110 workers is without merit. But since there has been technically no contravention of section 33 of the ID Act, 1947 (Misc Case No.6 of 1990 under section 33C (2) of the ID Act being no industrial (rates) reinstatement of these 110 complainants cannot be ordered.” (emphasis supplied) 9. However, referring to the provision of section 33C (2) of the Act and considering the evidence on record, dealing with the second point, the Labour Court recorded a finding as follows : “But, nonetheless, these 110 complainants will be deemed to be continuing in their services until their services, are dispensed with as per procedure according to law. These complainants will be at liberty to come up with their claims under section 33C (2) of the ID Act, 1947, in respect of their wages for the periods these remain in due and outstanding from their employer . The second part for consideration is accordingly answered in favour of these 110 complainants.” 10. Thus, at para 10, an award came to be passed in favour of the complainants. Aggrieved by this judgment and award made by the Labour Court, the Management presented Civil Rule No.482 of 1994 in this Court, for the grounds taken therein. The learned Single Judge, after hearing learned counsel on both sides, by an order made on 29th January, 1996, disposed of the writ petition with the observation extracted above. Aggrieved by this judgment and award made by the Labour Court, the Management presented Civil Rule No.482 of 1994 in this Court, for the grounds taken therein. The learned Single Judge, after hearing learned counsel on both sides, by an order made on 29th January, 1996, disposed of the writ petition with the observation extracted above. Hence this appeal. 11. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. 12. Shri C. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/Management, in support of the appeal, urged the following points : (1) The Labour Court at Dibrugarh once having recorded a finding that there was no contravention of section 33 of the Act, an application under section 33A of the Act is not maintainable and that, therefore, the subsequent finding recorded by the Labour Court in favour of the applicants is one without jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge failed to consider this important legal aspect of the matter when he heard the writ petition. (2) As there was no contravention of section 33 of the Act, as held by the Labour Court, the workmen, cannot maintain an application under section 3 3 A, much less an action to be taken seeking relief under section 33C (2) of the Act, and that, therefore, the Labour Court was in error in having proceeded to record a finding in favour of the applications after rejecting their case holding that there was no contravention of section 33 of the Act. The writ Court ought to have seen that this is an important point urged as one of the grounds in the writ petition, which unfortunately was not considered, though argued, before the writ Court. (3) The last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge on merits is erroneous and the same cannot be sustained in law. 13. Shri K. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/ workmen, however, argued that the view taken by the learned Single Judge to uphold the conclusion of the Labour Court is justified and that this Court need not interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 14. 13. Shri K. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/ workmen, however, argued that the view taken by the learned Single Judge to uphold the conclusion of the Labour Court is justified and that this Court need not interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. 14. In view of the foregoing, the following questions arise for our consideration in this writ appeal: (1) Whether in the light of the finding recorded by the Labour Court holding that there was no contravention of the provision of section 33 of the Act, a subsequent finding recorded in favour of the workmen under section 33C (2) of the Act is justified ? (2) Whether the workmen were able to make out a case that a petition under section 33 C (2) of the Act seeking monetary benefit could be maintained in the light of the finding of the Labour Court holding that there was no contravention of section 33 of the Act ? 15. In order to enable us to record appropriate finding on the above two questions, first we will have to ascertain as to whether an application presented by the workmen under section 33 C (2) of the Act, as brought in this case by the workmen, is maintainable. Section 33C (2) of the Act lays down as follows : “(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Govt. within a period not exceeding three months.” 16. So far as the State of Assam is concerned, there are no specific rules framed under this section. Therefore, we will have to find out, referring to the facts and circumstances of the case, as to whether the workmen could maintain a petition claiming any benefit under this section. 17. within a period not exceeding three months.” 16. So far as the State of Assam is concerned, there are no specific rules framed under this section. Therefore, we will have to find out, referring to the facts and circumstances of the case, as to whether the workmen could maintain a petition claiming any benefit under this section. 17. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. Workmen, (1974) 4 SCC 696 , interpreting the provisions of section 33C (2) of the Act, the Supreme Court laid downs as follows : “Proceedings under section 33C (2) are in the nature of execution proceeding and therefore this does not involve a right of plaintiffs to relief and the corresponding liability of the defendant i.e. whether the defendant is at all liable or not. The workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under section 33C (2) in respect of a matter not based on existing right.” (emphasis supplied) This view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd vs. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 . 18. Therefore, we will have to find out as to whether in the instant case a right to claim the monetary benefit said to have been accrued to the workmen, has been established. Regard being had to the specific stand taken by the Management in their defence that these employees were temporary casual labourers and that they were stopped to work with effect from 12.11.90, and that some of these employees in spite of this order forcefully entered into the garden and began to pluck tea leaves on their own will and that the plucked tea leaves were left at the main gate of the factory which were said to have been destroyed or damaged. Therefore, the question for the Labour Court was to see whether there is a contravention of the provisions of section 33 of the Act. Therefore, the question for the Labour Court was to see whether there is a contravention of the provisions of section 33 of the Act. Another question which should have been addressed by the “Labour Court was whether there was a retrenchment wrongfully in contravention of the conditions of the appointment or settlement, Unfortunately, the Labour Court without addressing to these questions and without ascertaining as to whether a case is made out under section 10 or under section 25FF of the Act, the Labour Court simply proceeded to record a finding that the complainants were deemed to have been continued in service until their services are dispensed with in accordance with the law. We hasten to add that in the same paragraph answering the first question, the Labour Court reached the conclusion that: “But since there has been technically no contravention of section 33 of the ID Act, 1947, reinstatement of these 110 complainants cannot be ordered.” 19. It is very strange that these two contradictory findings have been recorded by the Labour Court without considering the real questions as we have referred to above. To reiterate, at the outset the Labour Court ought to have collected necessary evidence to see that there is retrenchment and if there is a retrenchment, whether such an order of retrenchment could be sustained or not. This could be considered only in a case where a properly brought petition under section 10 or section 25FF of the Act may be considered and not under section 33. much less under section 33C (2) of the Act, particularly, in the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation case (supra). Therefore, in otherwords, the Labour Court committed an error in making the observation that these 110 complainants would be deemed to have been continued in service. We have also perused the evidence collected by the Labour Court. Based upon such evidence it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that such a view could be taken by the Labour Court in favour of the workmen. Therefore, to that extent the conclusion reached by the Labour Court cannot be sustained. 20. We have also perused the evidence collected by the Labour Court. Based upon such evidence it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that such a view could be taken by the Labour Court in favour of the workmen. Therefore, to that extent the conclusion reached by the Labour Court cannot be sustained. 20. We will now examine the second aspect, namely, whether, once the Labour Court considering the case of the workmen, analytically appreciating the evidence on record, arriving at a conclusion that there was no contravention whatsoever of section 33 of the Act, it would be possible for the Labour Court to proceed to record a finding in favour of the workmen under section 33C (2) of the Act. 21. In the Central Bank of India Ltd vs. PS Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, considering the scope of section 33C (2) of the Act, held as follows : “When sub-section (2) of section 33 C refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, it does not mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer. Section 33C (2) takes within its purview cases of workman who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. The claim under section 33C (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2).” (emphasis supplied) ' In order to lay down the above law by the Supreme Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court relied upon the rulings in Kasturi & Sons vs. N. Salivateswaran, AIR 1958 SC 507 and Shri Ambica Mills Co Ltd vs. SB Bhat, AIR 1961 SC 970 . 22. 22. In paragraph 18, their Lordships further ruled as follows : “For the purpose of making the necessary determination under section 33C (2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests. When the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to excute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the executing Court to interprete the decree for the purpose of execution. It is of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court, but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under section 33C (2).” 23. In the instant case, it is nobody's case that before the claim put forward by the workmen under section 33C (2) claiming certain sum of money by way of benefit accrued to them, that there was an award passed in their favour by the competent Court of law. nor did they rely upon a settlement of the parties. Therefore, the Labour Court ought to have seen that in the face of the defence taken by the Management that these persons were stopped from working from a specified date as they were only serving as casual labourers for a short period. The Labour Court ought to have recorded a finding, to begin with, whether the workmen were able to establish a case of either retrenchment or termination of service as workmen. It is thereafter that the Labour Court was competent to record a finding as to whether there was contravention of section 33 of the Act. To reiterate, there is a clear finding recorded by the Labour Court in the instant case holding that there is no contravention of section 33 of the Act. But, unfortunately, there is no specific finding recorded by the Labour Court that the workmen were able to establish a case that there was illegal retrenchment or termination. A mere observation that these 110 complainants were deemed to have been continuing in their service ... But, unfortunately, there is no specific finding recorded by the Labour Court that the workmen were able to establish a case that there was illegal retrenchment or termination. A mere observation that these 110 complainants were deemed to have been continuing in their service ... would not in any way assist the workmen to make themselves entitled for the benefit of a certain sum of money as contemplated under section 33C (2) of the Act. Therefore, the very approach of the Labour Court is erroneous and. therefore, the finding of the Labour Court on this point must be held to be bad in law. 24. Considering, the very question by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank Ltd. vs. K.Ramanath V. Bhat, AIR 1968 SC 231 , the Supreme Court laid down as follows : “If the contention of the appellant, that there was no industrial dispute, pending at the time when the order of dismissal was passed, is accepted, then, quite naturally, it follows that no question of contravention of section 33 of the Act, arises, in which case, the complaint, under section 33 A, is not maintainable, in law. In an enquiry, under section 33 A, the first question that the Tribunal will have to consider is regarding the contravention, by the employer, of the provisions of section 33 of the Act. If this issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done, under section 33A of the Act.” 25. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the finding recorded by the Labour Court in the instant case saying that there is no contravention of section 33 of the Act, makes it abundantly clear that the application as brought under section 33A of the Act by the workmen requires to be dismissed in limine. On the other hand, the Labour Court proceeded to give relief on that application. This is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court, as referred to above. 26. Considering from this point of view also, the conclusion reached by the Labour Court is not justifiable. 27. The learned Single Judge ought to have seen that these finding of the Labour Court, not being supported by any evidence much less could be supported by law by applying the rulings of the Supreme Court, should have considered the several questions before he upheld the view of the Labour Court. 28. 27. The learned Single Judge ought to have seen that these finding of the Labour Court, not being supported by any evidence much less could be supported by law by applying the rulings of the Supreme Court, should have considered the several questions before he upheld the view of the Labour Court. 28. There is one more aspect, which is required to be considered in this case. The Management has taken a specific defence that there is no Association or Sangha in the tea estate. Therefore, the question of presenting an application in the name of the Union, represented by the so-called Secretary, should have been considered by the Labour Court and an appropriate finding should have been recorded as to whether such a petition could be maintained and whether the person who brought the petition has locus standing to maintain the same. No finding whatsoever, has been recorded by the Labour Court in this regard. 29. In view of the foregoing, it is not possible to sustain the judgment and award of the Labour Court and the orders of the learned Single Judge of this Court. 30. In the result and for the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 482 of 1994, dated 29th January, 1996 and also the award passed by the Labour Court in Case No.4 of 1991, dated 5th November, 1993, are set aside. However, it is open for the workmen to seek for the appropriate relief in accordance with the law, if they are so advised. Parties to bear their own costs.