MUKTA PRASAD (DECD. ) THROUGH L. RS. v. XVITH ADDTIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, KANPUR
1998-03-03
J.C.GUPTA
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
J. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is landlords petition. This writ petition is directed for quashing the orders passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively as contained in Annexures-8 and 11 to the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE dispute relates to a shop situated in premises No. 8/36, Arya Nagar, Kanpur, which is under the tenancy of respondent No. 3. The petitioner-landlords moved an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for the release of the disputed shop in their favour on the ground that the said accommodation is bona fide required by the landlords for their residential use as number of their family members have increased and the accommodation which was in their accommodation was not sufficient to cater their need. The application was contested by the tenant and the defence was that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and there is sufficient accommodation with them. ( 3 ) ON appraisal of the evidence filed by respective parties, both the courts below have recorded categorical finding of fact against the landlord-petitioner that their need for additional accommodation was not bona fide. The question of comparative hardship has also been answered against the petitioner. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of this writ petition, a new ground was added through amendment that since Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) was in existence at the time when the release application was moved, it was attracted to the facts of the case, hence the bona fide need of the landlord was to be presumed and there was no need of making comparison of hardship of respective parties. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners in support of his argument relied upon the Full Bench decision of tills Court in Gopal Das and another v. 1st Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, AIR 1987 All 261 , wherein it was held that the proviso which was added to Section 21 after the third proviso by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 was retrospective and if Explanation (iv)was applicable in terms to the facts of the case, the need of the landlord shall have to be presumed to be bona fide. There cannot be any dispute with regard to this proposition of law.
There cannot be any dispute with regard to this proposition of law. However, the question which requires consideration in the present case is whether Explanation (iv) to Section 21 of the Act as then stood was attracted to the facts of the present case? In order to appreciate this question, it may be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Amending Act of 1976. Section 21 (1) of the Act reads as under : "21.
In order to appreciate this question, it may be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Amending Act of 1976. Section 21 (1) of the Act reads as under : "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.-- (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely : (a) That the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction : provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years : provided further that if any application under clause (a) is made in respect of any building in which the tenant is engaged in any profession, trade or calling, the prescribed authority while making the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant facts of the case, award against the landlord to the tenant an amount equal to two years rent as compensation and may, subject to rules, impose such other conditions as it think fit: provided also that no application under clause (a) shall be entertained : (i) for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects of which provide for discrimination in respect of its beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste or place of birth ; (ii) in the case of any residential building, for occupation for business purposes ; (iii) in the case of any residential building, against any tenant who is a member of the armed forces of Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act.
1925 (Act No. IV of 1925) has issued a certificate that he is serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act, or where he has died by enemy action while so serving then against his heirs. . Explanation.--In the case of a residential building : (i) where the tenant or any member of his family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained ; (ii) where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment, away from the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and by reason of the cessation of such engagement, he needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a); (iii) where the landlord is a member of the armed forces of the Union and the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act No. IV of 1925 has issued a certificate in his favour that he if serving under special condition within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act, then his representation that he needs the building for residential purposes for members of his family whose particulars are specified in the application shall be deemed sufficient for purposes of clause (a) ; (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. " ( 6 ) A plain reading of Explanation (iv) referred to above would indicate that in an application moved for the release of a residential building or part thereof, the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of building, the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. ( 7 ) THIS Explanation remained on the statute book till 5. 7.
( 7 ) THIS Explanation remained on the statute book till 5. 7. 1976 and could be applied to all those applications for release of residential building which had been moved under Section 21 (1)before the said provision was deleted from the Statute. In the present case, undoubtedly the application for release had been moved before the deletion of the aforesaid Explanation. However, the said Explanation cannot be applied to the facts of the case for the simple reason that the dispute here is not in respect of release of a residential building but it is in relation to an application for release of a non-residential building. Explanation referred to above could apply only to the applications moved for the release of residential buildings and not to non-residential buildings. It was nowhere the case of the petitioner that the disputed shop was let out for residential use or was being treated as a residential building. On the other hand, a plain reading of paragraph 3 of the release application moved by the petitioners leaves no room of doubt that they themselves treated the disputed shop as a non-residential building. Therefore, Explanation (iv) on the face of the facts of the present case was not applicable and the Courts below have committed no error of law in not applying the said Explanation while going into the questions of bona fide need of the landlord and of comparative hardship. ( 8 ) SINCE both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship and those findings of fact are not shown to be suffering from any manifest error of law, this Court would not interfere in those findings of fact and accordingly this writ petition must be dismissed. ( 9 ) FOR the above reasons and discussions, this writ petition is dismissed, with no order as to costs.