Judgment B.M.Lal, J. 1. Jahagir Khan and Md. Khalik Khan, who are Havildar and constable in Police Department, have filed this writ petition challenging their transfer orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 3/1 and their suspension orders as contained in Annexures 1 and 1/1, respectively and a further prayer has been made that their subsistence allowance be increased to the extent of 3/4th of their respective salary. 2. At the relevant time, the petitioners were posted in Siwan district and were deputed as shadow of Md. Sahabuddin, M.L.A. However, both the petitioners along with others have been charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 307/353/34 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 27 of the Arms Act. 3. Consequent upon the criminal prosecution, both the petitioners were put under suspension vide orders as contained in Annexure 1 and 1/1 both dated 4-5-1996. Thereafter, vide orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 3/1 both dated 24-1-1998 both the petitioners were transferred to Patna and Samastipur, respectively. 4. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that during the suspension period a delinquent employee cannot be transferred and to substantiate his contention learned Counsel has strongly reljed upon an order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3334 of 1996 Jay Mangal Rav V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. decided on 6-8-1996 passed by a learned Single Bench of this Court. It is also contended that since both the petitioners are facing trial at Siwan, therefore, their transfer from Siwan will cause great hardships to them in facing criminal trial at Siwan. 5. Whether during suspension period a delinquent Government servant can be transferred or not is the pivotal question to be decided in this case. 6. If suspension of a delinquent employee is treated as a punishment in Service Jurisprudence then indeed during the suspension period the delinquent employee cannot be disturbed from the place of his headquarters where from he was suspended. But law in this regard is otherwise. Yet suspension has not been construed to be a punishment, rather it is only a temporary deprivation of office or privilege. Grade, rank, designation etc. of the delinquent employee remain the same and simply his powers, functions, privileges etc. But law in this regard is otherwise. Yet suspension has not been construed to be a punishment, rather it is only a temporary deprivation of office or privilege. Grade, rank, designation etc. of the delinquent employee remain the same and simply his powers, functions, privileges etc. during the period of suspension remain in abeyance, which is known as "temporary deprivation of discharging his functions in the office" though during this period as well the delinquent employee has to attend his office. Thus suspension so far has not been construed as a punishment. 7. Now the question would be as to whether during the suspension period the delinquent employee can be transferred? 8. Transfer of a Government servant is a concomitant of service and, therefore, in the exigency of public administration or in the departmental exigency as well as Government servant can be transferred, which cannot be questioned, save in a case where transfer is made in colorable exercise of jurisdiction, based on mala fide or against any statutory rule. 9. In the instant case, except contending that the transfer of the petitioners from Siwan would cause great hardship to them in facing criminal trial, nothing has been brought on the record to suggest that the impugned order of transfer of the petitioners either suffers from colorable exercise of jurisdiction or based on mala fide or against any statutory rule. 10. Thus, in the absence of any such pleading supported by cogent materials on the record, to investigate this issue is out of purview of a writ Court. 11. From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that a delinquent Government servant remains a Government servant in office even after suspension. Then why not a Government servant can be transferred during the period of suspension. Had there been any Impediment for transferring a Government servant during the period of suspension, a specific rule would have been framed in the Service Rules. So in the absence of any specific rule in this regard, a suspended Government servant may be transferred. 12. We have gone through the decision referred to by the learned Counsel in C.W.J.C. No. 3334 of 1996 (supra) and we find that the said decision does not lay down any ratio decidendi of binding nature to the facts of the present case. 12. We have gone through the decision referred to by the learned Counsel in C.W.J.C. No. 3334 of 1996 (supra) and we find that the said decision does not lay down any ratio decidendi of binding nature to the facts of the present case. For the application of any decision as a precedent much less as a binding precedent, an onerous duty is cast upon the Court to see that the Courts decision lays down ratio decidendi and that is why what is binding on the Court is ratio of the decision as confined to its factual background. A decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. 13. In C.W.J.C. No. 3334 of 1996 (supra) what we find is that the said decision does not lay down any ratio decidendi rather it speaks of conclusion as follows: In my opinion, the respondent authorities should not have transferred the petitioner vide order contained in Annexure 8 during the period of suspension when the petitioner was facing departmental proceeding at Samastipur. 14. The above conclusion, in our view, does not stand the test of ratio decidendi and so except conclusion of the learned Court, indeed it cannot be said to be ratio decidendi, and so the same does not come within the purview of doctrine of binding precedent. Besides, citation of a single bench decision before a Division Bench has got persuasive value but would not have any binding effect. 15. Since, in our considered opinion, no ratio decidendi has been laid down in the above referred case, that decision cannot have any application as a precedent much less as binding precedent to the facts of the present case. 16. Learned Counsel has also made attack on the order of suspension passed against the petitioners. Law in this regard is well settled that in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding or during the pendency of a criminal trial, a Government servant can be put under suspension. Since in the instant case the petitioners are facing criminal trial for the offences punishable under Sections 307/353/34 I.P.C. read with Sec. 27 of the Arms Act, therefore, rightly they have been put under suspension. So no interference is called for in the order putting them under suspension. 17. Since in the instant case the petitioners are facing criminal trial for the offences punishable under Sections 307/353/34 I.P.C. read with Sec. 27 of the Arms Act, therefore, rightly they have been put under suspension. So no interference is called for in the order putting them under suspension. 17. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that after one years period of suspension, the subsistence allowance is to be paid to the extent of 3/4th of the salary and at least to this extent necessary order may be passed. 18. In this regard relevant rule is Rule 96 of the Bihar Service Code and for better appreciation of the point in issue the same is reproduced herein below: 96. (1) A Government servant under suspension shall be entitled to the following payments: namely (a)... (i) the amount of subsistence grant may be increased by a suitable amount not exceeding 50 per cent of the subsistence grant admissible during the period of the first twelve months, if, in the opinion of the said authority the period of suspension has been prolonged, for reasons to be recorded in writing, not directly attributable to the Government servant. (ii) the amount of subsistence grant may be reduced by a suitable amount, not exceeding 50 per cent of the subsistence grant admissible during the period of the first twelve months, if in the opinion of the said authority, the period of suspension has been prolonged, due to reasons to be recorded in writing directly attributable to Government servant. 19. Rule 96(1)(i) as quoted above postulates that the authority concerned may increase the subsistence grant by a suitable amount but not exceeding 50 per cent of the admissible subsistence grant during the period of first twelve months if the authority concerned opined that the period of suspension has been prolonged for reasons to be recorded in writing. 20. This being so the discretion vests with the authority concerned. In the instant case the authority concerned has not exercised that discretion. Therefore, the petitioners, if so advised, may approach to the concerned authority by making suitable application therefore. After such an application is made, it is expected of the authority concerned to pass appropriate order in accordance with the relevant rule. 21. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of. S.K.Singh, J. 22 I agree.