Judgment D.S.Dhaliwal, J. 1. Dr. Rama Nand Kumar, the petitioner herein figures as one of the accused in Patna (Vigilance) P.S. Case No. 10 of 1984 in which case charge-sheet has been filed against him and four others in the Court of Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna. It appears that petitioner filed an application under Sec. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for his discharge in the said case, and that application was dismissed by the Special Judge vide order dated 21-7-1997. Petitioner seeks quashing of the said order by filing this petition under Sec. 482 of the Code. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for Vigilance and have perused the records with their assistance. 3. Going through the records, I find that the Court below is not proceeding with the case in strict compliance with the procedure laid down in the Code, as a result whereof the trial of the case is being unnecessarily delayed as unwarranted opportunities come handy to the accused to seek intervention from the courts above. In this respect, it has come to the notice of this Court that a practice has become prevalent in the courts-below to entertain and adjudicate upon the applications for discharge even when the case is not fixed for hearing on the point of charge. Strictly speaking the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for moving of such an application. 4. One of the offence alleged in this case is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and as such the trial of the case is being held by the Special Judge, Sec. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cleariy lays down that the Special Judge has to hold trial by following procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to the provisions pertaining to trial of warrant cases by Magistrate and Part (A) of that Chapter relates to the procedure provided for the cases instituted on a Police report like the present one. The relevant provisions of this part are being quoted here: Sec. 238: "Compliance with Sec. 207.-When, in any warrant-case instituted on a police report, the. The relevant provisions of this part are being quoted here: Sec. 238: "Compliance with Sec. 207.-When, in any warrant-case instituted on a police report, the. accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that he has complained with the provisions of Sec. 207. Sec. 239: "When accused shall be discharged.-If, upon considering the police report and the document sent with it under Sec. 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. Sec. 240: "Framing of charge.-(1)//, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and when in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of. the offence charged or claims to be tried. (emphasis supplied) 5 A bare perusal of the above provisions would show that as soon as the accused appears or is brought before the Court at the commencement of the trial, the Court shall satisfy itself as to whether the provisions of Sec. 207 in respect to the supply of copy of documents relied upon by the prosecution in its report under Sec. 173 of the Code have been complied with, and as soon as the Court is satisfied with regard to above, the case immediately moves to the next stage contemplated by Secs. 239 and 240 of the Code, which relate to hearing of the accused and the prosecution on the point of charge. The words If upon such consideration appearing in the opening part of Sec. 240 leaves no room for doubt that both the aforesaid sections are integral to each other and as such the Court has to pass an order either under Sec. 239 or 240 of the Code at one and the same time. The words If upon such consideration appearing in the opening part of Sec. 240 leaves no room for doubt that both the aforesaid sections are integral to each other and as such the Court has to pass an order either under Sec. 239 or 240 of the Code at one and the same time. It also needs notice that strictly speaking the Code does not provide for filing of an application under Sec. 239 by the accused or under Sec. 240 by the prosecution. The reason being that the aforesaid provisions make it obligatory upon the Court to give an opportunity to the accused and the prosecution of being heard on the point of charge ordering for discharge or framing of the charge. 6. It, however, appears that a practice has developed of filing application on the part of the accused for their discharge under Sec. 239 of the Code, and in some cases the individual applications filed by the accused are taken up and disposed of by the court below individually on different dates when the case is not fixed for hearing on the point of charge. This practice leads to multiplicity of the proceedings in the court below and unnecessary wastage of courts time; such applications, if filed, require to be taken up together only at the time of hearing on the point of charge. The provisions of Secs. 239 and 240 of the Code further make it clear that after hearing the parties on the point of charge, the Court has to either act under Sec. 239 or under Section 240 of the Code, and in case the Court considers that the charge against the accused is not groundless and finds that there is ground to presume that the accused has to be framed against the accused for that offence. Thus, while passing an order refusing to discharge and ordering for framing of the charge, the Court in its order should indicate as to what offence is prima facie made out against the accused so that charge for the said offence be framed immediately thereafter on the same day in terms of the order calling for framing of the charge. 7. Another factor leading to the delay in trial is the grant of exemption to the accused from appearing once in Court in a cavalier like manner. 7. Another factor leading to the delay in trial is the grant of exemption to the accused from appearing once in Court in a cavalier like manner. Needless it to say that an accused on bail is bound to appear in Court personally on each and every date of hearing and his failure to put in appearance on a single date can make him and the surety sureties liable for forfeiture of bonds and recovery of the amount of forfeited bonds by way of penalty. Presence of the accused is required at the time of supply of copies of the police papers under Sec. 207 of the Code and framing of the charge. Therefore, the practice of dispensing with personal appearance of the accused after they appear or are brought before the Court to stand trial till framing of the charge needs to be strongly deprecated. 8. Perusal of the impugned order goes to show that although the application for discharge was dismissed and the Court became of the view that there was sufficient material on records to frame and charge against the petitioner but the order no where indicates as to for what offence the petitioner was to be charged. Taking into consideration the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and keeping in mind the speedy is postal of the trial. In case the Trial Court after hearing on the point of charge is of the view that the charge is not groundless it must indicate in the order as to what prima facie offences are made out against the accused and charge should be framed immediately thereafter on the same date under Sec. 240(1) of the Code to be followed by the recording of the plea of the accused as required by Sub-clause (2) of Section 240 of the Code. 9. In view of what has been noticed above, the impugned order appears to be lucanic, as it does not indicate as to what prima facie offence has been committed by the petitioner. This petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order dated 21-7-1997 is set aside and a direction is given to the court- below to hear the petitioner and other accused afresh at the time of hearing on the point of charge and thereafter proceed with the trial in accordance with the legal position/procedure indicate above.