Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs in a suit for partition are the appellants. The suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. 2. Parties followed Hindu Mithakshara Law. The properties belonged to Kandappan on kanom. He died long ago. He had three song, Andi, Nayadi and Karuthachi. First plaintiff is the widow and second plaintiff the daughter of Karuthachi who died before the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act and its extension to agricultural lands. There was no partition between the three brothers. Defendants 1 to 6 are the children of Andi. Defendants 7 to 9 are the children of Nayadi. They had another brother Sankaran and defendants 10 to 13 are bis widow and children. 3. Plaintiffs claimed one-third share of Karuthachi. Their claim was resisted on the ground that since Karuthachi died undivided, bis share devolved by survivorship to the other two brothers and plaintiffs have no right. Limitation and adverse possession were also pleaded. 4. Both the contentions were accepted by the trial court and the appellants were non-suited. The appellate court concurred with the trial court in its finding that appellants have no right. Therefore the plea of limitation and adverse possession was not considered as unnecessary. 5. Appellate court said that Karuthachi died leaving no sons and hence according to Hindu Mithakshara Law, his right will devolve by survivorship on Andi and Nayadi and bis widow and daughter are not entitled to succeed. This finding was based solely on what is stated at Page 87 of Hindu Law by Mulla, 13th Edition that: "A Hindu who is possessed of separate property dies leaving two sons A & B. A then dies leaving a daughter C. According to the Bengal School, A and B inherit as tenants-in-common, and therefore on A's death his share in the property goes to his heir C by succession. According to the Mithakshara School. A and B inherit as joint owners who are living as members of a joint family. Therefore, if A dies without having partitioned the property, his undivided interest in the property will pass to bis brother B by survivorship to the exclusion of bis daughter C. But if the property was partitioned between A and B. the share which came to A on partition would go to bis heir C by succession". 6. Correctness of this legal position was seriously assailed before me. 6. Correctness of this legal position was seriously assailed before me. The properties are admittedly agricultural lands and the matter would not have presented any difficulty if Karuthachi died on or after 26-11-1946 from which date the operation of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 as amended to agricultural lands in the Province of Madras by the Madras Hindu Women's Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act XXVI of 1947. The widow's estate created under the Act would have matured into full right under S.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. But admittedly succession opened long before. Now the question for consideration is only whether, even without the widow's estate which ripens into full ownership, the widow and daughter were entitled to succeed under the Hindu Mithakshara Law as it existed when the succession opened. 7. Everything depends upon the question whether the three sons obtained the property as joint tenancy by survivorship or by succession or inheritance as tenants-in-common. If it was ancestral property over which there was birth right the matter would not have presented any difficulty and the plaintiffs may not have any claim when their predecessor died undivided. The properties will go only by survivorship. But here the properties were admittedly the self acquired and separate properties of Kandappan over which he had full disposing power. His sons had no birth right or right to claim partition in those properties and their right was only by succession after the death of the father when the properties remained undisposed of. 8. In the opinion of Mulla, according to the Mithakshara School, two or more persons inheriting jointly take as tenants-in-common except in the cases of four classes of heirs who take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. One such case is two or more sons, grand-sons and great grand-sons succeeding as heirs to the separate or self-acquired property of their paternal ancestor. This passage and the examples given by Mulla were considered by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hari Kishan Dass v. Rajeshwar Prasad and others (AIR. (39) 1952 Punjab 165) and found to be not a correct statement of the law accepted in any other treatise or decisions. Joint family involves community of interest and unity of possession and right of survivorship which springs from birthright and the right to claim partition. (39) 1952 Punjab 165) and found to be not a correct statement of the law accepted in any other treatise or decisions. Joint family involves community of interest and unity of possession and right of survivorship which springs from birthright and the right to claim partition. In case of obstructed inheritance those who succeed have no birthright or survivorship. In the case of self-acquired and separate properties of the father be is having right of disposal and the question of inheritance will arise only if they remain undisposed of by him on his death. That is obstructed inheritance and they take only as tenants-in-common. 9. The other decision cited is M.D.R. Ranganatha v. M.D.T. Kumaraswami (AIR. 1959 Madras 253) which said that joint tenancy and survivorship are unknown to Hindu Law except in the case of joint property of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law. There is no reason why right by birth should be allowed to operate more than once. The unobstructed succession is put an end to by partition and the obstructed succession is replaced even regarding joint family properties got by the father on partition. That is the case with his other self-acquired and separate properties also In cases covered by the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act the widow is excluded from succession to her husband's right of co-ownership only when the co-ownership involves a joint tenancy governed by survivorship. 10. A Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Vairavan Chettiar v. Srintvasachariar (AIR 1921 Madras 168) held that even an undivided Hindu son has no joint tenancy on the self-acquired properties of his deceased father and be acquires it at his death by inheritance and not by survivorship as joint tenancy. The correctness of this decision was reiterated in M.D.R. Ranganatha's case (AIR 1959 Madras 253) rejecting a request to refer the matter to a Pull Bench for reconsideration. The correct legal position could therefore be taken to be that the self-acquired and separate properties will be taken by the heirs by inheritance as tenants-in-common. 11. The properties were the self-acquisitions of Kandappan and the heirs were his three sons. They took as tenants-in-common having 1/3rd right each. The properties are admittedly agricultural lands and Karuthachi died before the date of operation of the Madras Hindu Women's Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act XXVI of 1947 in 1946. 11. The properties were the self-acquisitions of Kandappan and the heirs were his three sons. They took as tenants-in-common having 1/3rd right each. The properties are admittedly agricultural lands and Karuthachi died before the date of operation of the Madras Hindu Women's Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act XXVI of 1947 in 1946. He left no son, grand-son or great-grand-son, but only his widow and daughter. There is no question of acquisition of right under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act or its extension to agricultural lands and Such rights maturing into full rights under S.14 of the Hindu Succession Act. But in the absence and exclusion by any heir the appellants were entitled to inherit the 1/3rd right of Karuthachi. There is no question of Karuthachi's right devolving on his brothers by survivorship to the exclusion of his personal heirs. The incidence of joint tenancy would have arisen in relation to the properties only if they devolved on his male descendants. That contingency has not arisen. At the time of Karuthachi's death he had a definite 1/3rd co-ownership right as a tenant-in-common and even in the absence of partition with his brothers that right was available to be inherited by bis personal heirs. Appellants were therefore entitled to a 1/3rd share. 12. But their claim was resisted on the plea of limitation and adverse possession also. Though the trial court found these contentions against the appellants, the appellate court did not consider that contention. The matter has therefore necessarily to go to the appellate court for fresh decision after entering finding on that aspect. The appeal is allowed reversing the finding of the appellate court that plaintiffs are not entitled to any share and holding that appellants (plaintiffs) were entitled to 1/3rd share as heirs of Karuthachi. The judgment and decree under appeal are set aside subject to that finding and the matter is remanded to the appellate court for fresh decision after entering findings on other contentions. Parties are directed to suffer costs incurred before this Court. Office will remit the records to the appellate court forthwith and the parties will appear there on 15-7-1988. Allowed.