JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 5th June, 1992 in Civil Suit No. 32 of 1991, by the plaintiff in the said suit, not satisfied with the partial amount for which the suit alone has been decreed in a sum of Rs. 3,07,614.04 as against the suit claim for recovery of Rs. 5,33,410/- with future interest from 21.2.1991. It may be pointed out even at the first instance that the first defendant is the borrower and defendants No. 2 and 3 are the guarantors. The first defendant has been granted a loan of Rs. 2 lacs for purchase of a new TDV Chassis, for fabrication of body thereon and for purchase of accessories thereof. To secure the loan, hypothecation deed, trust deed and irrevocable power of attorney were also said to have been executed by the first defendant on 5.1.1983/ 6.1.1983 with defendants 2 and 3 as guarantors, who executed also a gurantee deed on 6.1.1983. The judgment under appeal gives the relevant narration of facts in respect of what transpired subsequently and as to how the first defendant committed default and guarantors also did not meet with any portion of the claim. As a matter of fact, the vehicle in question, which was purchased out of the loan, appears to have been once seized initially and released on making some payments with further undertaking to be regular in payment of instalments and since undertaking was not adhered to even thereafter, the vehicle was again seized. As per the books of accounts maintained by the plaintiff-corporation in the normal course of its business, as on 20.2.1991, a sum of Rs. 5,33,410/- remained outstanding due towards the loan account for the first defendant of which defendants No. 2 and 3 stood as guarantors to secure payment of the same. Consequently, the suit came to be filed, as noticed earlier, for recovering the amount. 2. 5,33,410/- remained outstanding due towards the loan account for the first defendant of which defendants No. 2 and 3 stood as guarantors to secure payment of the same. Consequently, the suit came to be filed, as noticed earlier, for recovering the amount. 2. Defendants No.1 and 2 were duly served and as a matter of fact on 18.7.1991, a Counsel had put in appearance on their behalf and on behalf of the third defendant also, though time was taken to file the power of attorney as well as written statement on behalf of all the defendants, no such power of attorney for the third defendant or the written statement undertaken to be filed on all or any of the defendants was actually filed, resulting in the suit being decided ex parte against the defendants. 3. On behalf of the plaintiff-corporation PW-1 was examined and the relevant documents evidencing the grant of the login, the undertakings given and the copy of the statement of accounts certified under the Bankers Books Evidence Act have been filed and marked in evidence. The learned Single Judge though held all the issues about the maintainability of the suit, about the suit having been filed within the period of limitation and about the right of the plaintiff to recover the balance due towards the loan account by also selling the seized vehicle, in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation, so far as the claim and calculation of interest is concerned, it has been observed and held as follows: "The agreed rate of interest as shown in the deed of hypothecation Ex. PW-l/D is 14-1/2 p.a. minimum with 3% p.a. as penal interest on the defaulted amount for the period of default. In the absence of details of the periods of default and the defaulted amount, this Court is not in a position to allow 17-1/2 p.a. interest as claimed by the plaintiff-corporation throughout. Therefore, the plaintiff corporation is held entitled to 14-1/2% per annum simple interest throughout." Apparently, on account of this finding as to the rate of interest, which alone could, according to the learned Judge, be recovered from the defendants, the suit came to be actually decreed for a lesser amount than the one prayed for. Hence, the above appeal by the plaintiff. 4. Mr. Hence, the above appeal by the plaintiff. 4. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant contended that in the teeth of the certified copy of the entries from the Books of account and the provisions contained in Section 44 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, there could have been no re-opening of the accounts settled and prima facie the materials disclosed from the said accounts must have been accepted to be correct for according relief in favour of the plaintiff, particularly, in the absence of any positive proof to the contra from the defendants, who chose also to remain exparte and did not even contest the claim even by filing any written statement. Argued, the learned Counsel further that in the teeth of the indisputable default committed by the borrower in adhering to the agreed schedule of repayment of the loan, which cannot be disputed by one defendants there is no justification to deny the default or penal interest as also the appropriate working of due rests as agreed to between the parties under the loan transaction which is found duly reflected in the statement of accounts marked in evidence. In answering the contention of the learned Counsel for the third respondent that the suit was barred by limitation in the absence of proper proof of admission and acknowledgment of payments said to have been made on various dates in the year 1990, the learned Counsel for the appellant also contended that apart from the fact that the payment made by the borrower 1st dependant alone has been duly and actually found recorded, there were other materials to prove this fact and our attention has also been invited to Ex. PW-1/K wherein the first defendant-borrower has written to the plaintiff with particular reference to the repayment of the loan of HPA-1901 and permission for sale of vehicle and that he may be allowed time up to 15.7.1989, when he would submit the definite proposal for clearance of the loan and consequently no doubt could be cast on the entries pertaining to the payments, as having been made by the first defendant-borrower, was really made by him towards the loan account thereby saving the period of limitation. Consequently, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the suit ought to have been decreed, as prayed for, for the entire amount. Consequently, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the suit ought to have been decreed, as prayed for, for the entire amount. The learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions reported in (1994) 3 SCC 495, State Bank of Patiala and another v. Harbans Singh; (1994) 5 SCC 213, Corporation Bank v. D.S. Gowda and another; 1997(3) Shim. L.C. 403, UCO Bank v. Mahesh Kumar and others, and an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in RFA No. 26 of 1989 decided on 21.9.1998 Bank of Baroda v. Gopal Krishan Pandit and another. 5. The learned Counsel for the first defendant merely adopted the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in decreeing only 14-1/2% simple interest per annum throughout in respect of amount due and contended that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference in this appeal. So far as the third respondent, who is one of the guarantors is concerned, it was vehemently contended that in the plaint, no reference has been made to the entitlement of quarterly rests and that the suit claim was also barred by limitation, and cannot be sustained, at all. In order to substantiate the claim that the suit claim was barred by limitation, the learned Counsel for the third defendant contended that there is no proof about the acknowledgment by the 1st defendant of the payment said to have been made of a sum of Rs. 4,000/-on 18.4.1990 and in the absence of such proof no extended period of limitation could be availed of in the teeth of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In support of such a plea, the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in AIR (38) 1951 SC 477, Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad and others and AIR 1967 SC 1058, Chandradhar Goswami and others v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. 6. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. In our view, the appeal is well merited and the claim of the appellant deserves to be countenanced. 7. In (1994) 3 SCC 495 (supra), the apex Court, while construing the particular loan document construed the words term loan to mean the loan advanced for commercial purposes and held that in respect of such commercial loans quarterly rests being charged is permissible. 7. In (1994) 3 SCC 495 (supra), the apex Court, while construing the particular loan document construed the words term loan to mean the loan advanced for commercial purposes and held that in respect of such commercial loans quarterly rests being charged is permissible. In (1994) 5 SCC 213 (supra), while dealing with the practice adopted by bankers with reference to the customers in respect of loans granted, it was noticed that interest with periodical rests on bank loan would be governed by terms of agreement between bank and the borrower where such agreement exists and the normal practice for the bankers was to debit accrued interest to borrowers account at regular periods. In 1997(3) Shim. L.C. 403 (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Panta, J.) was party, held that the words "principal sum adjudged" as construed by the apex Court in the decision reported in 1996(5) SCC 280, would indicate the principal amount of loan and the amount of interest accrued thereon and on that view of the matter held that the plaintiff-bank, in that case, is entitled to interest with quarterly rests from the date of the institution of the suit till the decree is passed and, thereafter, the future interest at simple rate from the date of passing of the decree till the payment of the entire amount decreed. In an unreported decision of ours dated 2 1.9.1998 in R.F. A. No. 26 of 1989 and cross-objections No. 60 of 1989, after adverting to the relevant decisions of the apex Court including those now sought to be relied upon for the appellant, the claim of the plain tiff-Bank to charge at the enhanced rate, with quarterly rests has been upheld. So far as the case on hand is concerned, there can be no serious dispute and there is no dispute also before us that the documents under which the loan was granted provided for not only a minimum of 14-1/2% interest, but penal interest on the defaulted amount for the period of default at three per cent more than the minimum interest secured. Further, the loan transaction as evidenced by the documents and writings between the parties provided for quarterly rests plus compound interest. Further, the loan transaction as evidenced by the documents and writings between the parties provided for quarterly rests plus compound interest. On the other hand, the stand taken by the learned Counsel for the third respondent is that the plaint as such did not specifically refer to any claim based on quarterly rests. In our view, there are no merits in this contention. The plaint specifically refers to the hypothecation deed, trust deed and irrevocable power of attorney executed by the first defendant as also the deed of guarantee executed by defendants 2 and 3 as the basis for the suit claim and the outstanding amount worked out in terms of those documents is not only specified in the plaint filed but a copy of the accounts has also been furnished. It is not necessary that the plaint should be argumentative in nature referring to all grounds of claim and the reasons for making such claim also, and when the plaint specifically refers to the suit documents on which the claim is made and those documents have been marked and proved in evidence, it would suffice and, therefore, the objection taken in this regard does not merit our acceptance. 8. As for the plea based on limitation, strong reliance has been placed on the decisions reported in AIR 1951 SC 477 and AIR 1967 SC 1058 (supra). In the first of the decisions, it was observed while adverting to the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that to get a particular payment said to have been made an extended period of limitation under Section 20 of the old Act, the payment has got to be proved in a particular way and for reasons of policy the Legislature insists on a written or signed acknowledgment as the only proof of payment and excludes oral testimony and that unless, there is acknowledgment in the required form, the mere payment itself may not be of any avail. Ultimately, on the facts of the case before their Lordships of the apex Court, it was held that though none of the payments were endorsed on the bond itself and no acknowledgment either in the handwriting of or signed by the debtors prior to the institution of the suit was also proved, the written statement filed in the suit and the admission made therein of the payments specified in the plaint on the respective dates, would not fulfil the requirement of a signed acknowledgment. In AIR 1967 SC 1958, the apex Court was dealing with the admissibility and evidentiary value of entries in Bankerss Books of account and computation of limitation with reference to Article 85 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. It was held therein that no person can be charged with liability merely on the basis of some mere entries in books of account, even if such books of account are kept in the regular course of business and the need was emphasised for further evidence to prove payment of the money which may appear in the books of account in order that a person may be charged with liability thereunder, except in cases where the person to be charged himself accepts the correctness of the books of account and does not challenge the same. While dealing with the question of computation of Limitation under Article 85 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, adverting to the very account which was a current and mutal account in that case provided by the Bank, it was noticed that the last payment of Rs. 100/- was found to have been made in November 1949 and the subsequent entries were only those showing interest to the Bank being credited and such entries were found lacking mutuality, which was held to have come to an end in 1949 with the last payment of Rs. 100/-. This decision by itself, does not, in our view, lay down any principle which will enure to the benefit of the case of the third defendant. The plaint in paragraph 14 relating to cause of action has specifically set out and quoted as follows: "14. 100/-. This decision by itself, does not, in our view, lay down any principle which will enure to the benefit of the case of the third defendant. The plaint in paragraph 14 relating to cause of action has specifically set out and quoted as follows: "14. That the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff against the defendants firstly on 13.11.1982 when the defendant No.1 made loan application and then on 2.12.1982 when the loan was sanctioned and on 5.1.1983 & 6.1.1983 when the documents of loan were executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff-corporation and then on the dates the default was committed by the defendant No.1 and then on dates of demand and then on 1.9.1984 and 7.10.1986 when the truck was seized and then on 18,4.1990 when defendant No.1 made last payment of Rs. 4,000/- and lastly on 18.7.1990 when legal notice was issued to the defendants and then on each date after the expiry of time given in the notice." 9. As noticed earlier, neither the borrower, the first defendant nor the guarantors defendants No. 2 and 3 who have been served with the plaint containing such claims have chosen to either dispute or deny the same or even filed any written statement or contested the claim. The witness examined for the plaintiff, PW-1 deposed to the facts by marking among other documents, Ex. PW- 1/P, which is a copy of the running account between parties with a due certification of its correctness as envisaged under the statutes. Though an attempt has been made to contend at the time of arguments before us that in the absence of an acknowledgment of the amount said to have been paid on 18.4.1990, the last of the payments said to have been received, the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be availed of, we are of the view that nothing will turn merely on this plea and it deserves to be rejected for the reasons to be hereinafter, set out. On 8.2.1990 a sum of Rs. 10,000/- has been paid, by a demand draft submitted by the first defendant. Similarly, on 13.3.1990 a cash payment of Rs. 4,000/- and another Rs. 4,000/- on 18.4.1990 was shown to have been made. The suit has been instituted in this Court on 31.3.1991. On 8.2.1990 a sum of Rs. 10,000/- has been paid, by a demand draft submitted by the first defendant. Similarly, on 13.3.1990 a cash payment of Rs. 4,000/- and another Rs. 4,000/- on 18.4.1990 was shown to have been made. The suit has been instituted in this Court on 31.3.1991. The first defendant who was said to have remitted these amounts in spite of the specific averments in the plaint, noticed above, and the statement of accounts has not chosen to dispute such payments having been made by him or even pleaded that they are fictitious entires. Even if the last of the payments has to be ignored which alone is made an issue and that too by the 3rd defendant only there could be no challenge to the payment said to have been made in a sum of Rs. 10,000/- by demand draft on 8.2.1990 and the subsequent payment by cash on 13.3.1990 in a sum of Rs. 4,000/ - and nothing was said even before us to discredit those payments. Ex. PW-l/L could also, in our view be said to have constitute an admission of the loan and an undertaking to pay and clear and loan being in the handwriting of the 1st defendant. It is only taking into account all these aspects that the learned Single Judge also has chosen to record a categorical finding that the suit is well within time. Acknowledgment is a matter of evidence and we find that in order to disclose as to how the suit claim was within time in this case the plaintiff has given, in the plaint itself sufficient factual details, which remain, as indicated earlier, undisputed and unassailed by the first defendant whose payments have been strongly relied upon for the purpose. Payment by cheque or demand draft is in our view an acknowledgment within the meaning of the provision. Payment by cheque or demand draft is in our view an acknowledgment within the meaning of the provision. The accounts have been maintained by a statutory authority in the normal course of its business and in the absence of any challenge by the first defendant or for that matter by any one of the defendants also before the trial Court, either by filing any written statement or disputing entries by means of cross-examining the oral evidence tendered through whom these materials came to be brought on record, it is not permissible, in our view, for the third defendant-guarantor to take such a stand at the appellate stage and that too in the appeal filed by the plaintiff to project such a claim. We are also of the view that when the first defendant-borrower who was said to have paid the amounts as disclosed therein, has not himself chosen to dispute the same, and neither he nor any of the gurantors filed any appeal/cross-objections it is not permissible for the third defendant guarantor to dispute such payments, particularly, on the ground that it is not followed up by any acknowledgment by the borrower as long as the guarantee is for the general balance due from the 1st defendant. Not only the case of the defendants including that of the third defendant has to fail for the initial lapse committed by them in not filing the written statement or participating in the tried but such default or lapse has been perpetuated even at the appellate stage by not taking up any steps to seek any indulgence of the nature to file any written statement or challenge that portion of the decree against them by any appeal/ cross-appeal. Though the third defendant appears to have filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree, in spite of the same having been dismissed, no attempt appears to have been made to pursue the matter in this Court either by way of challenging that order or filing an independent or filing any memorandum of cross-objection in this appeal. Though the third defendant appears to have filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree, in spite of the same having been dismissed, no attempt appears to have been made to pursue the matter in this Court either by way of challenging that order or filing an independent or filing any memorandum of cross-objection in this appeal. These facts stealing against the defendants will go to show that contentions now raised are pure after-thoughts and merely vexatious, which do not merit, either in law or on facts or on any other ground of justice, our acceptance, all the more so for the reason that under the pretext of such claims the decree passed against them which has already become final between parties, cannot be collaterally allowed to be assailed in this appeal by the plaintiff. For all the reasons stated above, we overrule the contentions urged for the defendants-respondents. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge shall stand modified and the suit shall stand decreed, as prayed for, with costs throughout. The subsequent interest shall be 14-1/2 per cent per annum simple interest, which is the agreed rate, the loan being a commercial one. Appeal allowed.