Y. K. Sabharwal, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 6th May, 1997 whereby the petition of the respondent (petitioner in suit) under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act was allowed and Mr. Justice D. R. Khanna, a retired Judge of this Court appointed as an arbitrator for adjudicalion and determination of claims. An application for obtaining certified copy of the judgment was tiled by the appellant on 16th May, 1997 and me certified copy was prepared on 20th May, 1997. The delivery of the certified copy from the Registry was obtained by the appellant on 2nd June, 1997. The appeal was tiled on 28th August, 1997 and again re-filed on 4th and 6th September, 1997, ( 2 ) THERE was delay of eighty days in filing the appeal. Thus, CM-3166/97, has been filed by the appellant u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation to delay. Only two paragraphs of this application may be said to be of some relevance, which read as under :- (A) That as the matter was relating to an important factor, which affects the entire system of the NDMC on the basis of which the general agreements for arbitration are formulated. Therefore, the matter was intensively discussed and thus the delay upto the Chairperson including the Heads of the Departments in decision to file the appeal, therefore the delay is not deliberate. (b) The delay in filing the appeal is not intentional and has been occasioned due to the reasons beyond the control of the appellant and due to movement of the file in the office. ( 3 ) AS can be seen from the aforesaid averments in the application, hardly any reason has been set out resulting in delay in filing of the appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, places strong reliance on decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. P. P. Builders 57, (1997) DLT 337 particularly the observations of Justice Ramaswamy of Supreme Court noticed therein. The paragraphs relied upon read as under :- "justice Ramaswamy, after referring to the abovesaid decision, summarised the legal position that the approach of the Court must be to advance substantial justice but should not be a pedantic or a legalistic approach. P. P. Builders 57, (1997) DLT 337 particularly the observations of Justice Ramaswamy of Supreme Court noticed therein. The paragraphs relied upon read as under :- "justice Ramaswamy, after referring to the abovesaid decision, summarised the legal position that the approach of the Court must be to advance substantial justice but should not be a pedantic or a legalistic approach. While "law makes no distinction between a private party and Government", it must be remembered that a private party "would take instant decision and would pursue the appellate or revisional remedies promptly but Govt. acts through its officers who delay in their deliberations resulting in procrastination, "unmidful and insensitive to bar of limitation" and this was their "routine" behaviour. Sometimes files are even kept back for obvious reasons or by manoeuvres of the parties. Experience shows that the "public exchequer is the easy decisions to file appeals. Courts must take into consideration the "hard realities and prevailing conditions" and cannot ignore them for that may breed corruption, nepotism or inefficiency. The Courts must note that delays occur in Govt. responsibility for the final decision. A pragmatic approach is necessary particularly when public exchequer is involved, pointed out his Lordship. On these principles, the appeal was allowed and delay condoned. The other learned Judge in the Bench, Justice Sahai pointed out that Govt. cannot claim a different treatment. His Lordship pointed out that there cannot be a rigid principle in these cases and that if there was loss to Govt. revenue, action should be taken against the officials responsible Ramegowda s case and observed that for a common man, it may be that his ignorance, illiteracy, delayed communication and poor legal advice may be good cause and likewise, for the State, the consultative process. Justice Sahai condoned the delay in that case and concurred in the appeal being allowed.------" ( 4 ) IN our considered view, the decision relied upon has no applicability. It is not a case where anyone had kept back the file. It is also not a case where there were any manoeuvres. The Supreme Court or this court has not held that even in absence of any cause, delay has to be condoned. It is not a case where anyone had kept back the file. It is also not a case where there were any manoeuvres. The Supreme Court or this court has not held that even in absence of any cause, delay has to be condoned. It is no doubt true that this court has been adopting very liberal approach while dealing with applications seeking condonation of delay but that does not mean that the moment an application is filed by public authority though without disclosing any cause, the court has no option but condone the delay. The delay cannot be condoned on mere asking. Reverting now to the present application; who discussed the matter; when was it discussed; when was decision taken and when was the file sent to the counsel for filing the appeal, are factors which are all absent from the application. We can understand the liberal approach while considering application seeking condonation of delay if some facts are pleaded in the application. ( 5 ) ON the facts and circumstances of the present case we are of the view that the application is devoid of any force and the appellant is not entitled to condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In this view, the application is dismissed and consequently, appeal is also dismissed as time barred. defendants/respondents. For this reason argument of Mr. Sharma cannot be accepted. Supreme Court in Panna Lal vs. State, AIR 1963 SC 1516 reiterated that "order 41 Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code permits, as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as, where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents is correct. " After analysing various provisions of the Act and decisions this court in the case of Nirmal Singh (supra) concluded that :- "ordinarily, there is no dispute about the proposition that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 permits a respondent to prefer objection/against appellant. " After analysing various provisions of the Act and decisions this court in the case of Nirmal Singh (supra) concluded that :- "ordinarily, there is no dispute about the proposition that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 permits a respondent to prefer objection/against appellant. But in exceptional case relief can be granted against the respondent as well where the objection is intermixed with the relief granted in the matter and to do complete justice between the parties. The law is clearly stated in the cases REFERRED TO above wherein it has been held that the provision of Order 41 Rule 22 only confers restrictive rights on the respondents to prefer objections to the decree without tiling a separate appeal and such objections should, as a general rule, be primarily against the appellant but in exceptional cases it may incidentally be also directed against the other respondents. Further more, the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 will come to the rescue of the cross-objectors and they can be granted manifestly to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties to the appeal. " ( 6 ) IN the present case, the cross objections were filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. Though these objections may not as such be covered under Order 41 Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code but at the same time provisions of Order 41 Rule 33, CPC, will come to the rescue of the objectors. In order to do the complete justice cross objections are maintainable against co-respondents who suffered a common decree alongwith the appellant cannot be allowed to set at naught the statutory right of the claimants to seek enhancement against them as well as through them against the present appellant. ( 7 ) IN view of my above discussion it is held that cross objection filed by claimants are maintainable against co-respondents i. e. owner and driver of the truck as well as against this appellant. However, since notice of cross objections had not ben served on co-respondents nor in fact they appeared in this case hence it is ordered that notice be issued of these cross objections to co-respondents as well as to the appellant, returnable on 18. 3. 98. Notice is ordered to be issued in order to avoid any technical objection later on.