JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above second appeal has been filed by the defendant in case No. 129/1 of 1983,33/1 of 1985, who lost before both the Courts below challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, dated 29.10.1992 in C.A. No. 5-S 13 of 1986, whereunder the learned first appellate Judge has chosen to confirm the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge in decreeing the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff that the sale-deed dated 4.7.1978 registered on 31.7.1980 is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and also for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from collecting any rent or profit covered under the sale-deed. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that she was the owner in possession of 1/2 undivided share in the property, comprised in Khasra No. 80, Bazar Ward, Bara Shimla, measuring 396 Sq. ft., bearing Municipal No.35, The Mall, Shimla, and that she had through her husband Shri Sansar Chand, who was acting as special attorney of the plaintiff signed a sale-deed on 4.7.1978 for the sale of the suit property for Rs. 26,000/- in favour of the defendant-appellant and that the sale consideration was to be paid by the defendant to the husband of the plaintiff before the Sub-Register, Shimla, at the time of registration of the sale-deed. It appears that the defendant had also obtained an affidavit from the husband of the plaintiff for facilitating the change of mutation of the suit property on the registration of the sale-deed and when the parties went to the office of the Sub-Registrar to get the sale-deed registered on 4.7.1978, the Sub-Registrar was not available and the parties were asked to come the next day. The further plea on behalf of the plaintiff was that the sale-deed and the affidavit were kept by the defendant herself and on 5.7.1978 when the husband of the plaintiff went to the office of the Sub-Registrar, he found that the sale-deed and affidavit had been tampered with and unauthorised overwriting and cuttings were found, which were without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and therefore, the husband of the plaintiff refused to present the said documents before the Sub-Registrar and left Shimla, without executing the same and getting it registered. Asserting and reiterating the claim that no consideration actually was paid to the husband of the plaintiff and that was the reason for non-registration of the deed also, it is further stated that the defendant moved an application on 5.10.1978 under Sections 32, 71 and 73 of the Indian Registration Act for compulsory registration before the Sub-Registrar and ultimately, the document came to be registered under the orders of the Sub-Registrar on 31.7.1980 in the absence of the plaintiff and her special power of attorney, which necessitated the filing of the above suit for the relief, noticed supra. 3. The defendant contested the suit claim by contending that the plaintiffs special attorney had signed and executed the sale-deed on 4.7.1978 and also signed and executed the affidavit by which the receipt of consideration has been admitted and the parties appeared before the Sub-Registrar for registration of the above documents, when it could not be registered actually on 4.7.1978 and the parties were asked to comp to the office next day. According to the defendant, since the special attorney of the plaintiff was in a hurry to go back and, therefore, he was paid the amount of consideration, he delivered the sale-deed and other connected papers, namely, letters addressed to the tenants and to the Taxation Department and an affidavit of having received the amount of consideration, with an assurance that he will come to the office the next morning. According to the defendant, the special attorney did not turn up on 5.7.1978 despite long waiting and an application for compulsory registration was made before the Sub-Registrar and the special attorney attended the office on 5.12.1978 when though he admitted the execution of the documents, but denied the receipt of consideration, which was said to be a dishonest and an illegal act and the allegation made by the plaintiff of tampering with the sale-deed and making unauthorised overwriting and cuttings was said to be a false claim. The alterations were said to have been made with the consent of the plaintiffs attorney by the scribe, who was said to have typed the sale-deed. The plaintiffs suit was said to be time-barred as the sale-deed related back to the date of execution, namely, 4.7.1978 and the defendant contended that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief, whatsoever, in the suit. 4. The plaintiffs suit was said to be time-barred as the sale-deed related back to the date of execution, namely, 4.7.1978 and the defendant contended that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief, whatsoever, in the suit. 4. On the above claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and the learned trial Judge, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that there was denial of execution of Sansar Chand, who purported to execute the sale-deed on behalf of his wife by virtue of the power of attorney and the registering officer committed an error in himself conducting an inquiry and ordering the registration of the document in spite of denial of execution and, therefore, the act of registration by the Registering authority was totally without jurisdiction. As for the plea pertaining to the passing of the consideration, it was held by the learned trial Judge that though there has been no proper and sufficient proof that the consideration has been paid to the plaintiff or to her husband and the defendant had also not let in any evidence before the Sub-Registrar regarding the payment of the sale price to the plaintiff or filed any receipt about the payment of sale consideration, the non-payment of consideration alone cannot invalidate the registration of the document in case the document has been properly presented and its execution is proved and the document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act. On the materials on record, it was also held by the learned trial Judge that there had been no proper presentation of the document for registration and that it was also not presented within the prescribed period of limitation, as provided in the Registration Act. The plea raised by the defendant that the Civil Court cannot decide about the validity of a deed duly-registered was also rejected and ultimately, the suit came to be decreed, as prayed for. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant pursued the matter on appeal in C.A. No. 5-S 13 of 1986. The learned first appellate Judge also elaborately as well as independently and meticulously adverted to the materials on record and confirmed the findings of the learned trial Judge in all respects and dismissed the appeal Hence, the above second appeal. 6. Mr. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant pursued the matter on appeal in C.A. No. 5-S 13 of 1986. The learned first appellate Judge also elaborately as well as independently and meticulously adverted to the materials on record and confirmed the findings of the learned trial Judge in all respects and dismissed the appeal Hence, the above second appeal. 6. Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, while elaborating the substantial question of law formulated for consideration in this appeal, contended that a sale-deed, the execution of which was admitted by the executant and which has been properly proved by the purchaser, could not have been declared to be null and void merely for the reason that the sale consideration is either alleged or proved to have not been paid. In elaborating the said contention further, the learned Counsel invited my attention to the relevant portions of the judgments of the Court below, to demonstrate his stand about the irregularities and infirmities said to have been committed by the Courts below in appreciating the relevant provisions of the Registration Act as well as oral and documentary evidence on record. 7. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff while adopting the reasoning of the Courts below and the reasons assigned in support of the factual findings recorded, contended that the findings so recorded concurrently by both the Courts below are well merited and sustainable on the materials on record and consequently, there is no scope or need for interference in this second appeal. The learned Counsel for the appellant also contended that once the execution of the document as such has been admitted the Registering authority is not obliged to go into the question of actual payment or receipt of the consideration by the vendor and that, therefore, the judgments of the Courts below stood vitiated on this count also. 8. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side. The salient as well as necessarily vital facts relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the actual issues arising in the case are not in serious dispute except with reference to the alleged payment of consideration. Ex. D-5 is a photocopy of the sale-deed and the cuttings said to have been unauthorisedly made have been marked as A’ & ‘B’. The salient as well as necessarily vital facts relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the actual issues arising in the case are not in serious dispute except with reference to the alleged payment of consideration. Ex. D-5 is a photocopy of the sale-deed and the cuttings said to have been unauthorisedly made have been marked as A’ & ‘B’. On the face of the document, it has been found that neither such cuttings have been initialed by anyone nor any note has been appended to the document about making of such cuttings in the deed by the scribe, as used to be normally and necessarily made in such cases. Yet, another fact over which there is no controversy is the recital in the sale-deed itself about the payment and receipt of the entire consideration to be made before the Registering authority at the time of registration of the document. In contrast to the said recital, the stand of the appellant-defendant is based on an affidavit, said to have been executed and the copies of the letters addressed to the tenants as also to the Taxation authorities marked in the case as Exts. D-3 & D-4, which are said to bear the date 3.7.1978 as against even the sale-deed which bears the date of 4.7.1978. Both the Courts below have categorically held that the consideration recited in the sale-deed did not pass through. Though, no doubt if a sale-deed duly executed and properly registered by the competent Registering authority under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908, cannot be said to be rendered illegal or void or the transaction covered by the deed as a nullity for the simple reason that the consideration, which was recited to have been passed did not really and actually pass through and in such cases, the normal remedy of the vendor is only for the recovery of the sale consideration with interest or damages, if any, due thereon, the case on hand is a peculiar one and it has to be considered only on such peculiar facts and not on the general principle, noticed as above. It is not unusual for some of the parties to a sale-deed either, to agree and recite in the document of sale itself providing for the payment of sale consideration before the Registering authority at the time of registration or a portion of it to be paid at the time of execution of the document even before and for the payment of the balance amount before the Registering authority or of having paid the entire consideration either at the time of the execution or before, but in a case where the entire consideration has been agreed to between the parties to be paid before the Registering authority at the time of registration and such was the specific recital in the sale-deed itself, in the absence of proper proof of having paid such consideration agreed to be paid before the Registering authority and the absence of an appropriate endorsement of the Registering authority also at the time of presentation of the document and registration the consideration having been paid to the vendor in his presence as also the amount so paid, it has to be considered that the recital in respect of consideration which has been stipulated as a condition for agreeing it to be registered has failed. A sale-deed in which the passing of the entire consideration has to be before the Registration authority at the time of registration as per the recital contained therein, I am of the view that unless and until such consideration has been paid before the Registering authority at the time of registration and the Registering authority has made an appropriate endorsement in this regard on the document and thereby the condition has been shown to have been actually fulfilled, it should be considered that the document itself was an inchoate and incomplete one and the transaction of sale itself cannot be said to have become complete in all respects before even it could be authenticated by its registration. All the more so, when the person who executed the document has chosen to dispute and deny the payment of consideration and the purchaser also did not care to comply with the recital in the document itself to make the transaction a perfect and complete one in all respects to enable the parties to have the document being registered. All the more so, when the person who executed the document has chosen to dispute and deny the payment of consideration and the purchaser also did not care to comply with the recital in the document itself to make the transaction a perfect and complete one in all respects to enable the parties to have the document being registered. In the light of the overwhelming materials on record in this case, the Courts below have concurrently recorded the finding that there had been no payment of consideration and that the attempt made to prove the payment, otherwise than before the Registering authority has also failed. In the light of such factual findings, which go to undermine the very legality and validity of the transaction of the sale itself, the mere act of registration by the Registering authority does not, in my view accord any more or further sanctity or legality to the document so as to preclude the competent Civil Court from declaring the sale as also the sale-deed to be null and void. Consequently, the judgments of the Courts below in the regard cannot be said to suffer any infirmity whatsoever to call for interference in this second appeal. 9. Even that apart, the Registering authority could not be said to have been well within its power or jurisdiction to register the document as has been done by it in this case. It is not merely the execution of a document by affixing signature or even the admission of the signatures that itself is sufficient, in certain cases, to prove due execution, which is essential for the Registering authority to register the document. The case on hand is one where the payment of the consideration, which has been agreed to be made at the time of registration before the Registering authority also forms part of the process of due execution and when the executant disputed these vital facts, it constituted denial of execution in law and the Registering authority, in this case-the Sub-Registrar, had no power to register the document and he should have only followed the procedure laid down in Section 71 of the Registration Act by refusing registration and leaving the parties to work out their remedies, if any, under Part XII of the Registration Act. Consequently, the findings recorded by both the Courts below that the Registering authority, namely, the Sub-Registrar in this case, committed an illegality and exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the document and registering the same despite the denial made by the executant is well merited and is unassailable too. The further reason assigned by the Courts below for invalidating the registration on the ground that the document cannot be said to have been presented also within the statutorily fixed period of four months from the date of its execution, the document in question being a sale-deed, does not appear to be in accordance with law but in any event, it is unnecessary to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise of the said reasoning since even de hors the said reasons, the other reasons assigned in the judgments and decrees concurrently passed by both the Courts below are substantial in nature and sufficient and valid to sustain and support the judgments and decrees passed by them. 10. For all the reasons stated above, I see no infirmity, whatsoever, or any patent error of law in the judgments of the Courts below or that the learned Judges in the Courts below could be said to have committed any perversity of approach in the matter of appreciation of the materials on record to warrant any interference with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below. The second appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.