JUDGMENT This is a revision by the tenant under Section 23-B of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 against the order by which he has been directed to deliver possession of the suit accommodation to the landlord. Dr. P.L. Shrivastava submitted an application under section 23-A of the Act before the Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the shop in which he is carrying on laundry business is required by him for running his office as an Advocate. He was a retired Government servant. The need of the applicant was upheld and the application was allowed. The tenant filed this revision. During the pendency of this revision Dr. P.L. Shrivastava died and his widow has been brought on record as his legal representative. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the need of the original applicant has come to an end with his death and therefore the impugned order should be set-aside. On the other hand it is contended that the need of the applicant was established when this order was passed and his death during the pendency of the revision has no effect on the order which had been passed in accordance with law. It is pointed out that a revision is not a continuation of the suit as an appeal is, and therefore the revisional Court can only examine the correctness of the order on the date it was passed and it cannot take note of the subsequent event. After considering the respective arguments of both the sides this Court is of the opinion that a revisional Court can take notice of the subsequent event. As the need of the applicant has perished with his death the ground for eviction set out in the application withers away. The order of eviction was based on the personal requirement of the applicant for starting his office as an advocate. It was not the requirement of running a business by the family members of the applicant. The need on the basis of which ejectment is sought must exist till the end. (Hasmatrai v. Raghunath Prasad 1981 JLJ 716). Where the original plaintiff pleaded a need which was strictly personal the need vanished with the death of the plaintiff and cannot be availed of by the legal representative. (Bhagwandas v. Gaya Prasad 1973 JLJ 469 ). The need on the basis of which ejectment is sought must exist till the end. (Hasmatrai v. Raghunath Prasad 1981 JLJ 716). Where the original plaintiff pleaded a need which was strictly personal the need vanished with the death of the plaintiff and cannot be availed of by the legal representative. (Bhagwandas v. Gaya Prasad 1973 JLJ 469 ). It is well settled that in a proceeding for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding was finally disposed of either in appeal or revision by the relevant authority. Therefore, subsequent events can be taken cognizance of if they are relevant and material. (Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamrain 1987 MPRCJ 9 (SC)). Two decisions have been cited on behalf of the respondent. In Narain v. Smt. Ansuyiya Bai 1990 MPJR 517 it was held that the proceedings for eviction do not abate on the death of the landlord during the pendency of revision if right to sue survives. In that case the need of the son of the landlord was pleaded and proved. In the present case the need of the landlord alone was pressed into service. In Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanji Agarwal AIR 1997 SC 2399 the order of eviction had become final after dismissal of the appeal. That was challenged by way of writ petition. The landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition. Then it was held that the subsequent event could not be taken notice of by the High Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction. It was further held that the cloth business for which the accommodation was needed could be carried on by the widow or son of the landlord. In the present case the landlord died during the pendency of the revision under section 23-E of the Act. An appeal is barred against the order of the Rent Controlling Authority by section 23-E(1) but the order can be challenged in revision under section 23-E(2) of the Act. No finality is attached to the order of the Rent Controlling Authority. It is liable to be rectified and corrected in revision though the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is limited. Therefore, the revisional Court can take note of subsequent event to see whether the requirement which had been pleaded exists. No finality is attached to the order of the Rent Controlling Authority. It is liable to be rectified and corrected in revision though the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is limited. Therefore, the revisional Court can take note of subsequent event to see whether the requirement which had been pleaded exists. The observations of the Supreme Court in Shankar v. Krishna AIR 1970 SC 1 are very instructive on this point where it has been said; "The right of appeal is one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider, and larger sense". In the result the revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. It has been pointed out that the tenant has not deposited the rent as required by section 23-H of the Act. The petitioner is directed to pay or deposit the entire arrears of rent uptodate within two months of the date of this order, failing which the order of his eviction will stand.