Judgment :- S. Marimuthu, J. This appeal is filed questioning the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Thalassery, passed in O.S. No. 63 of 1989. The plaintiff is the appellant and the defendant is the respondent herein. 2. The above suit was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs. 58,271/- from the respondent/ defendant, for carrying out repairs in the appellants vehicle (bus), KRZ 2124 on 10.3.1988. The above bus, which has been insured with the respondent, met with an accident near Chittariparamba, while it was proceeding from Thalassery to Peravoor, as a result of which the passengers traveled in the bus sustained injuries and the bus also was heavily damaged. As per the terms of the Insurance Policy, the appellant has to be indemnified by the respondent. 3. The defendant/respondent controverted the above averments of the appellant on the ground that as per the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy, the insured, namely, the appellant must first refer the dispute to an arbitrator, before approaching the Court. In this case, it was not done by the appellant. Hence, the suit is not maintainable. The suit is barred by limitation, since it is not filed within a period of twelve months. The vehicle, covered by a stage carriage permit had to ply in a particular route and however it was taken through a diverted route on the date of accident and the accident occurred in the diverted route and the elore, there is a violation of route permit. The bus ought to have reached Peravoor at 7.35 P.M.. as per the permit, but, as a matter of fact, it met with an accident in the mid-night of that day on the way to Peravoor. Therefore, there is also a violation of the route-permit. One another condition of the Insurance Policy is that the vehicle can carry only 51 passengers exclusive of the driver and conductor. But at the time of the accident, there were more than 90 passengers travelling in the bus. On account of the above irregularities, the appellant is not entitled to -compensation. 4. The point that was urged before me is whether the appellant/ plaintiff is entitled to the compensation claimed in the plaint, 5. But at the time of the accident, there were more than 90 passengers travelling in the bus. On account of the above irregularities, the appellant is not entitled to -compensation. 4. The point that was urged before me is whether the appellant/ plaintiff is entitled to the compensation claimed in the plaint, 5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, Insurance Company, contended that on account of the clause 8 of the Insurance policy, since the dispute has not been referred to an arbitrator, the suit is liable to be dismissed and indeed the appellant is estopped to institute the suit. The Insurance Certificate is marked as Ext. B2, as per which, the date of accident is covered by the policy". Clause No. 8 of the Ext. B2 reads as follows: "If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an Arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference". The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the proposition ruled by this Court in Rosamma Joseph and United Insurance Company, wherein it has been held that since the contract between parties stipulated arbitration and award as a condition precedent for instituting a suit and since the suit was not preceded by arbitration and award, it must follow that the suit is not maintainable. No doubt, as per the above principle laid down by this Court, when there is a contract between parties, that before instituting the suit, dispute has to be referred to arbitration, and in case without referring the matter to an arbitrator, if any suit is filed, it is not maintainable. In this context, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant would be that a mere reading of clause No. 8 of Ext. B2 would disclose that any dispute as between the appellant and respondent with reference to the difference in the quantum of money arises, that alone has to be referred to an arbitrator and in the present suit, practically there is no dispute with regard to the quantum for carrying out that repairs in his bus, namely, Rs. 58,271/-. For, the amount has been fixed by the Surveyor of the respondent, while he inspected the vehicle. 58,271/-. For, the amount has been fixed by the Surveyor of the respondent, while he inspected the vehicle. Thus, in the instant case, the liability is admitted and there is also no difference in the amount claimed by the appellant and the amount assessed by the Surveyor of the respondent and so clause No. 8 of Ext. B2 policy is not attracted. I examined the above submissions of both the learned Counsel in the light of the principle laid down by this Court in the above citation and also in accordance with the clause No. 8 of Ext. B2 Insurance Policy and on my examination I am fully satisfied to hold that clause No. 8 of Ext. B2 is not attracted in this dispute since there is no conflict between the appellant and the respondent with regard to the quantum of the amount for carrying out the repair. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the injured persons in the accident filed claim petitions before the Motor Claims Tribunal, in which the respondent raised the same plea and that was rejected by the Tribunal and award was passed and 'the award passed by the Tribunal will operate as res judicata as against the pleadings set forth by respondent in this case. In support of this submission, he relies upon the decision in Page 1 KLJ 1993 (1) Muhammed Haji & Ors. v. Kunhunni Nair & Ors. wherein, it has been ruled that the order passed by the Land Tribunal will operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings in between the same parties and in respect of the same subject matter. Yet another decision referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant would be one of the Orissa High Court, in Ramachandra Sahu v. Pramila Sahu, reported at page 183, AIR 1992, Orissa. There, it is ruled that the order passed under the Rent Control Act will operate as resjudicata in the subsequent civil proceedings in between the same parties. As against the above submission, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Motor Claims Tribunal is not a court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, the verdict of the Motor Claims Tribunal will not operate as res judicata under S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as against the subsequent civil proceedings in between the same parties. As against the above submission, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Motor Claims Tribunal is not a court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, the verdict of the Motor Claims Tribunal will not operate as res judicata under S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as against the subsequent civil proceedings in between the same parties. In support of this submission, he relies upon the decision of this Court reported at page 320,1991 (1) KLT N.I. Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Koyammu. In this decision, it is ruled that the Tribunal is not a civil court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. On the above principle, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent would be that the words employed in S.11 are crystal clear that the earlier judgment must have been rendered by the Civil Court and that judgment alone can be used for the purpose of raising the plea of res judicata in the subsequent civil proceeding. S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows: "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the sanies parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court". S.11 reflects that the issue of the plea of res judicata can be raised in a civil proceeding on the footing of an earlier judgment of a court. In the instant case, as per the decision of this Court referred to above, the Tribunal is not a court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, the award passed by the Motor Claims Tribunal will not operate as res judicata in this suit. However, in the above two decisions, one by this Court and the other by the Orissa High Court, the decision of res judicata has been taken on the provisions of two self-contained Acts, wherein the liabilities, rights and obligations of the parties have been ensured. On the other hand, the Motor Claims Act is not a self contained enactment where the parties cannot seek all their remedies under it. On the other hand, the Motor Claims Act is not a self contained enactment where the parties cannot seek all their remedies under it. The learned counsel for the appellant in this context, referred to explanation 8 of S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which reads as follows: "An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised." In the above explanation also, the word referred to is court. 'Court', as per the decision of this Court stated above, does not include the Motor Claims Tribunal as it is not subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, Explanation-8 will not help the case of the appellant. On account of the position of law, bom settled and statutory, the award passed by Motor Claims Tribunal will not operate as res judicata. Yet another point raised by the respondent would be that the suit is barred by limitation, since it has not been filed within 12 months from the date of the accident. As per Art.44 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the suit can be filed within a period of three years from the date of the accident or from the date, on which the claim of the insured was denied by the Insurance Company and in this case the date of occurrence as well as the date of the denial of the claim of the appellant come within the period of limitation. This matter has also been enlightened by the Karnataka High Court in a decision reported at page 185 AIR 1988, Karnataka, Secretary, T.A.P. Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. v. Custodian, N.I.A. Co. Ltd. 7. It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the conditions and terms of the policy have been violated by not taking the bus from Tellicherry in the schedule time and by taking the same through a diverted route, not covered by the permit and by permitting more than 90 passengers to travel in the bus, against the permitted passengers of 51. As a reply, the counsel for the appellant would submit that taking the bus in a diverted route cannot be taken as a violation of the condition of the permit and that will not disqualify the appellant to claim the compensation. In support of this contention, he drew my attention to the judgment of the Mysore High Court reported at page 107 AIR 1973, Mysore, Human Transport Co. v. R.G. Insurance Co. There it is held that the insurer is liable to pay the compensation even if the accident occurs when the bus is plying in the route, not covered by the route mentioned in the permit. The above view is perfectly correct, in the sense that in case of a breach in the road or some other obstructions like band and strike, the bus cannot be taken through the road, prescribed in the permit. So, in such situation, when an accident occurs in the diverted route, the insured is not responsible and he has to be rightly indemnified. Therefore, that objection of the respondent cannot be sustained and even regarding the time, it is not possible to stick on to it as stipulated in the route permit. In this case, the bus had to reach Peravoor at 7.15 P.M.. Sometimes it might not be possible because of some road block or some mechanical defect in the bus. These contingencies are beyond the control of the driver. Therefore, any irregularity in following the timings will not affect the right of the insured in claiming compensation. In that view, I am fully satisfied that the timing cannot be taken as a violation for denying the claim of compensation. It is also the submission of the respondent that as per the policy', 'only 51 passengers have to be taken in the bus, but on the date of accident as borne out in evidence, more than 90 persons has travelled and it is clear violation and on that score, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the compensation. Ext. B3 is the certified copy of the first information report as per which, in respect of the occurrence, a criminal case was registered. The body of Ext. B3 would uphold that more than 90 persons were travelling in the bus at the time of accident. Ext. B3 is the certified copy of the first information report as per which, in respect of the occurrence, a criminal case was registered. The body of Ext. B3 would uphold that more than 90 persons were travelling in the bus at the time of accident. To controvert this, the appellant has not produced the counterfoils of the bus tickets, or the trip sheets to show that at the time of the accident, there were only 51 passengers or less than it. When that be the position, it is evident that more than 90 passengers had travelled in the bus at the time of the accident. Now whether this amounts to a violation of the condition of the policy and if it is a violation, whether the appellant can claim the compensation, is a question to be decided. This court in an earlier decision reported at page No. 219, 1971 A.C.J. Kesava Nair v. State Insurance Officer, held that over loading or over speeding does not constitute a violation of the purpose of the user of the vehicle. The same view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in yet another decision reported at page No. 2411977 A.C.J., Madras Motor & General Insurance Co. v. Nanjappa & Ann I fully agree with the principle laid down by the Bench of Karnataka High Court and by the learned Single Judge of this High Court. So, consequently, the above objection with regard to the over loading set forth by the learned counsel for the respondent has also to be rejected. On account of the foregoing reasons and discussions, the point is answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. In the result, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside by allowing this appeal. And the suit stands decreed as prayed for.