JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - The Petitioner in this application u/s 482, Cr. P.C. seeks to invoke the inherent power of this Court to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Puri, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 633 of 1991, whereby the bail granted to him by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Nayagarh, has been cancelled. The Petitioner and his parents are arraigned as accused in Nayagarh P.S. Case No. 109 of 1991 under Sections 498-A and 306/34, I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. Shortly stated, the prosecution case as set out in the F. I.R., is that the Petitioner married lndumati (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') according to Hindu rites and customs on 9-3-1988. On account non-fulfilment of demand for dowry, the Petitioner and his parents tortured her, as a result, she committed suicide. On 11-7-1991 on being informed, the informant, brother of the deceased, came to Petitioner's house and found the decessed lying dead. Thereupon he lodged information at Nayagarh P.S. on the basis of which the aforesaid case was registered against the Petitioner and his parents for the offences aforementioned. 3. Both the parents-in-law of the deceased first moved for bail before the S.D. J.M.. Nayagarh. There being a prima facie case and the offence being against the society their prayer was rejected. About a week thereafter they again moved the court through another counsel and the very same Assistant Sessions Judge released the mother-in-law on the. ground that the deceased's male child who was in her care and custody was seriously ill and there was nobody to take care of him. So far as father-in-law is concerned the court also admitted him to bail holding that in his name did not find mention in the F.I. R. It was only after their release that the present Petitioner surrendered in the court below and moved for bail. So far as father-in-law is concerned the court also admitted him to bail holding that in his name did not find mention in the F.I. R. It was only after their release that the present Petitioner surrendered in the court below and moved for bail. His prayer having been rejected he moved the Assistant Sessions Judge who on the very day obtained the L.C. R. and having heard the parties released him on bail mainly on three grounds: (i) The plea of alibi taken by the Petitioner in the affidavit that when the incident occurred he was at Damanjodi where he was earning his livelihood as a grocer, (ii) From the date of filing of the F.I. R. till the date of the order two months had elapsed and by that time Police might have completed the investigation. (iii) Petitioner was a sickly person and required medical treatment as per the certificate given by the doctor. Aggrieved thereby the informant approached the Court of Session, Puri, u/s 439(2), Cr. P.C. for cancellation of bail to the accused persons. 4. The moot question for consideration before the learned Sessions Judge was whether the learned Assistant Sessions Judge exercised discretion vested in him judiciously keeping in mind the principle of law as settled by the Apex Court on the question of bail. As it appears from the impugned order the learned Sessions Judge doubted the fairness of Assistant Sessions Judge in the matter. The relevant observation made in that regard is' extracted herein below, x x x it is crystal clear that learned Asst. Sessions Judge, Nayagarh had adopted different standards at different time in considering the prayer for bail of the accused persons, which according to ratio propounded by the Hon'ble Court in the case of Baikunth v. Bula is a bad practice. Such conduct of the learned Asst. Sessions Judge even having the power to entertain a bail application u/s 439, Cr. P.C. amounts to illegal exercise of the jurisdiction. 5. Powers of the High Court or Court of Session for grant of bail u/s 439,Cr P.C. are not controlled by the statutory limitation laid down in Section 437 for refusing bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 5. Powers of the High Court or Court of Session for grant of bail u/s 439,Cr P.C. are not controlled by the statutory limitation laid down in Section 437 for refusing bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Such powers are unfettered by any rule defining the limits within which they would be exercised, as powers u/s 437 are. It is, however, well settled that the same should be exercised judiciously on consideration of various factors, such as, nature and seriousness of the crime, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the evidence of- the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or State and similar other considerations (see The State Vs. Captain Jagjit Singh, ; Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor: A.I.R 1978 S.C. 428; Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration); A.I.R 1978 S.C. 179 and State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramesh Taurani, . 6. In the present case, it is specifically alleged in the F.I. R. that on account of non-fulfilment of demand for dowry the deceased was being taunted and mal-treated by the accused and his mother. Ultimately she met her death which occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Initially on the report of the informant, a case under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34. I P.C. and u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was registered. Death of the deceased having occurred within seven years of the marriage (date of marriage being 9-3-1988) the trial court may consider whether there is prima facie case u/s 304-B, I.P. C. In a case of this nature the main witnesses generally are the parents and other relations of the deceased who can give true account of the ill-treatment which ultimately led to end her life. In the present case when the informant, the brother of the deceased specifically complained against the Petitioner, as stated earlier, that he along with his mother bad ill-treated the deceased for not getting sufficient dowry, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge should have refused bail to the accused. He ought not to have taken the defence plea into consideration at the stage of consideration of bail. He ought not to have taken the defence plea into consideration at the stage of consideration of bail. To my mind he over-stepped his jurisdiction and passed the impugned order illegally and arbitrarily and to undo the wrong the learned Sessions Judge has rightly cancelled the bail in exercise of power u/s 439(2), Cr. P.C. 7. In course of argument the learned Counsel for the accused strenuously contended that rejection of bail at the initial stage is one thing and cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. Since cancellation of bail involves the review of a decision already made cancellation if permitted is supervening circumstances exist. In support of his contention he relied upon decisions of the, Apex Court in the cases of State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Sanjay Gandhi, ; Bhagirath Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat: A.I.R 1984 S.C. 373; and of this Court in Chandramani Swain v. State of Orissa and others: 1993 (1) O.L.R. 298 .. In the oft quoted decision reported in Sanjay Gandhi (supra), the Court considered the scope of power of cancellation, of bail and held thus: x x x Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made can by large be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. x x x 8. Similarly it has been laid down in Bhagirath Singh Judeja (supra) that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of bail. In the aforesaid two cases the question for consideration before the court was not whether the court at the first instance granted bail to the accused persons on scrutiny of the available materials and by proper exercise of judicial discretion. In Sanjay Gandhi (supra) cancellation of bail was sought for since the accused was alleged to have influenced the witnesses.Therefore, the question arose whether this was a supervening conduct on the part of the accused so that the bail granted to him should be reviewed and he be taken into custody. 9. The decision in Bhagirath Singh Judeja (supra) though to some extent supports the case of the accused, but the gravity of the offence in the said case was not so serious as in the present case. 9. The decision in Bhagirath Singh Judeja (supra) though to some extent supports the case of the accused, but the gravity of the offence in the said case was not so serious as in the present case. The offence alleged against the accused in the reported case was one u/s 307, I.P.C. and the learned Sessions Judge by a well reasoned order directed for release of the accused on bail. The said order was interferred with by the Gujarat High Court and on approach being made by the accused, the Hon'ble Supreme Court'upset the High Court's order observing that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of bail. On a reading of both the decisions referred to above, I do not find that the Supreme Court has laid down a definite proposition that only where supervening circumstances exist, the bail granted to the accused can be cancelled and otherwise not. True it is, High Court will not ordinarily interfere with exercise of discretion of the Sessions Judge granting bail. But where it is found that gravity of the offence and overwhelming evidence against the accused were overlooked, then power of cancellation of bail has to be exercised. It is neither legal nor logical to contend that once the court at the first instance or the Court of Session has exercised discretion and granted bail to the accused, notwithstanding the nature and gravity of the offence and the evidence, the High Court is denuded of power to sit upon the said order. However where the bail has been granted in proper exercise of judicial discretion and on consideration of the prosecution case and the available materials, then power of cancellation of bail can only be resorted to if there exist supervening circumstances, as ruled by the Apex Court. To put it differently the High Court is competent to cancel bail in exercise of power u/s 439(2).Cr. P.C. if it finds that the bail has been granted illegally improperly and by arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion. 10. In the case in hand,since the learned Assistant Sessions Judge did not take into consideration the nature and seriousness of the offence and the evidence collected during investigation, and by arbitrary exercise of discretion admitted the accused to bail, the learned Sessions Judge was perfectly justified to cancel the bail. 10. In the case in hand,since the learned Assistant Sessions Judge did not take into consideration the nature and seriousness of the offence and the evidence collected during investigation, and by arbitrary exercise of discretion admitted the accused to bail, the learned Sessions Judge was perfectly justified to cancel the bail. I, therefore, find no reason to take a different view and upset the impugned order in exercise of inherent power conferred by Section 482, Cr. P.C. 11. In the result, the Criminal Misc. Case fails and the same is dismissed. Crl. Misc. case dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed