JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner was compulsorily retired as a result of disciplinary proceedings taken against him as per Exhibit P-1 dated 25th April 1989. Exhibit P-1 was set aside by this Court in Exhibit P-2 Judgment dated 7th June 1994. This Court in Exhibit P-2 Judgment held that the memo of charges, show cause notice, enquiry report and the order compulsorily retiring the petitioner could not be sustained in law and therefore quashed them. But it was observed that the Government was free to conduct a de novo enquiry, if so advised, to establish the guilt of the petitioner. 2. After the Judgment the Government made certain attempt to conduct a de novo enquiry. But this Court did not grant permission and finally it was dropped. Thereafter Exhibit P-1 order compulsorily retiring the petitioner was revoked as per Exhibit P-3 dated 3rd November 1995. It was further ordered in Exhibit P-3 that the period of compulsory retirement (must be the period of suspension) from the date of compulsory retirement from service to the date of his retirement on superannuation (from 5th December 1985 to 31st January 1990) would be treated as if he had continued in service. But it was stated that orders would be issued as to how to treat the above period of absence. Thereafter by Exhibit P-4 notice the petitioner was requested to show cause why the above period shall not be treated as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. The petitioner filed Exhibit P-5 representation. By Exhibit P-6 the earlier decision was confirmed treating the period as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. It is Exhibit P-6 that is under challenge in this Original Petition, 3. It was argued by Sri. Sugathan that there was no specific provision in the Kerala Service Rules to treat the period of absence as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. None of the provisions contained in R.56 of Part I, K. S. R. mentions an order like Exhibit P-6. According to the petitioner, neither R.56 nor R.56 C is applicable to him. It was further argued that once a Court set aside an order of compulsory retirement or dismissal, there is no question of revoking the original order thereafter by the Government. Thus, according to the petitioner, he is entitled to get full salary during the above period. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent. It was further argued that once a Court set aside an order of compulsory retirement or dismissal, there is no question of revoking the original order thereafter by the Government. Thus, according to the petitioner, he is entitled to get full salary during the above period. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the period of absence has been treated as non-duty without forfeiture of past service based on the norms dated 26th November 1994 issued by the Government in terms of R.56 B Part I, K.S.R. It was further stated that the petitioner was not exonerated by this Court and this Court permitted a de novo enquiry. But the above de novo enquiry could not be materialised because by the time the petitioner retired from service. Therefore, under R.56 B of Part I, K.S.R. the Government have got power to decide how the period of absence has to be treated. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued on the basis of the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Devendra Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1334 that once the Court set aside an order of punishment an officer is entitled to be reinstated in service with full salary. "(10) The High Court in dealing with the appellant's claim to salary during the period of his suspension pending the earlier enquiry observed that there was no justification for 'not granting the appellant his full pay' for the period after the date of the suit. But the counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh asserted that it is open to the State, notwithstanding the direction, to award as remuneration to the appellant for the period for which he was under suspension any amount which on a reconsideration of the matter in the light of the relevant rules and after hearing the appellant the State Government considers just and proper. This power, counsel contends, arises by virtue of R.54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under the authority conferred under Art.309 of the Constitution. This power, counsel contends, arises by virtue of R.54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under the authority conferred under Art.309 of the Constitution. Counsel says that it was because of this rule that the High Court directed the State Government to reconsider the matter in the light of the relevant rules." But in this case the petitioner is governed by various provisions contained in R.56 of Part I, K.S.R. Therefore, we have to look into the above provisions contained in Part I, K.S.R. R.56 deals with the case of an officer who is reinstated in service as a result of the decision in an appeal or review from an order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. In such cases the competent authority is authorised to pass orders regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the officer for the period of absence from duty. R.56A deals with a case where a Court of Law set aside the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer. If such an officer is reinstated without holding any further enquiry the period of absence from duty shall be regularised and the officer shall be paid pay and allowances after following sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (3) of R.56A. R.56A (2) deals with the case of setting aside the orders of punishment by the Court solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Art.311 of the Constitution. In such cases the officer is not exonerated on merits. Where the above sub-rule applies the pay and allowances of the officer for the intervening period between the date of punishment including the period of suspension and the date of reinstatement shall be determined by the competent authority in accordance with sub-rules (4), (5) and (7) of R.56A. According to sub-rule (3) of R.56A, if the order of punishment is set aside by the Court on the merits of the case, then the period of absence shall be treated as duty for all purposes and he shall be paid the full pay and allowances for the above period. According to sub-rule (3) of R.56A, if the order of punishment is set aside by the Court on the merits of the case, then the period of absence shall be treated as duty for all purposes and he shall be paid the full pay and allowances for the above period. According to R.56 B, when an officer who has been suspended is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, or has retired from service on superannuation before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against him the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to the officer during the period of absence. It is R.56 B that has been relied on by the Government. But R.56B deals with a reinstatement of an officer who f has been under suspension or an officer who would have been so reinstated but for the retirement either under suspension or before the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. In this case the petitioner was suspended and thereafter compulsorily retired before his date of superannuation. The petitioner retired on superannuation only pending decision of this Original Petition. Therefore, the provisions contained in R.56 B cannot be applied in the case of the petitioner. 6. According to me, it is R.56A(2) which is applicable in the case of the petitioner. As indicated earlier the above sub-rules deals with the case of an officer who was dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired and the order of punishment was set aside by the Court on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Art.311 (2) of the Constitution. In such case orders regarding how to treat the period of absence from duty must be determined by the competent authority in accordance with R.56(4), (5) and (7). In such case orders regarding how to treat the period of absence from duty must be determined by the competent authority in accordance with R.56(4), (5) and (7). Sub-rules (4), (5) and (7) of R.56 read as follows: "(4) In cases other than those, covered by sub-rule (2) including cases where the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service is set aside by the appellate or reviewing authority solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of clause (2) of Art.311 of the Constitution and no further inquiry is proposed to be held, the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (6) and (7) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the officer of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period as may be specified in the notice: Provided that except in the case of such officers as are governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Central Act 4 of 1936), any payment under this sub-rule shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceding 'reinstatement or retirement on superannuation, as the case may be. (5) In a case falling under sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that if the officer so desires such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the officer. * * * * * * * * * (7) The amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances determined under the provision to sub-rule (2) or under sub-rule (4) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under R.55." 7. * * * * * * * * * (7) The amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances determined under the provision to sub-rule (2) or under sub-rule (4) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under R.55." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner advances an argument that the words " would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation" which occurred in R.56(1) are absent in R.56A. Therefore, it was argued that in the absence in the above contingency not mentioned in R.56A, the above rule may not be applicable, in this case the petitioner retired on 30th January 1990. Therefore, the reinstatement was not possible. But I think the above words can be read into R.56A in order to meet the contingency of an officer who would have been reinstated in service, but for his retirement on superannuation, May be the absence of the above words is a lacuna in the rule. At the same time, all other ingredients of R.56(2) are present in the present case like setting aside the compulsory retirement by a Court as per Ext. P-2 on technical ground and not on merits. The petitioner would have been entitled to be reinstated in service had he not retired on superannuation. 8. R.56(4) says that the officer shall be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such punishment as the competent authority may determine. Under sub-rule (5) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. Under sub-rule (7) the amounts so determined to de paid to an officer shall not be less than subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under R.55. 9. Therefore, in the light of these provisions the legality of the impugned order has to be examined. In this case the period of absence from 5th December 1985 to 31st January 1990 was treated as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. Sub-rule (4) specifically says that the officer shall be paid such amount of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been compulsorily retired. In this case the period of absence from 5th December 1985 to 31st January 1990 was treated as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. Sub-rule (4) specifically says that the officer shall be paid such amount of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been compulsorily retired. The above amount has to be determined by the competent authority. As per sub-rule (7) the minimum amount shall be the subsistence allowance. Therefore, the Government has to pass an order, by deciding the quantum of amount to be paid to the petitioner in accordance with sub-rules (4) and (7) of R.56 of Part I, K.S. R. for the above period. Perhaps the Government may be right in treating the period as non-duty without forfeiture of past service. Such an order can be justified as an order passed under sub-rule (5) of R.56. 10. Therefore, I find that Exhibits P-4 and P-6 have been passed without complying with the provisions contained in R.56 and R.56A of Part I, K.S.R. S. Therefore, I quash these orders. The first respondent is directed to pass fresh orders in the matter in accordance with law and taking into consideration the observations made in this Judgment. Orders in this respect must be passed within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. Original Petition is disposed of as above.