S. N. Kapoor, J. ( 1 ) HEARD parties Counsel on the points of court fee and the question of the rejection of the plaint in its present form at length. ( 2 ) IN this suit for declaration and injunction, the plaintiff seek the following reliefs: (A) A decree for declaration may be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants to the effect that the agreement of sale dated 13/3/1994 between the plaintiff and the defendants regarding transfer of defendants right, title and interest under the agreement dated 15/10/1992 executed between them-M/s. Inder Paratap Singh HUF for the allotment of the 11th floor of the proposed multistoreyed building known as `narain Manzil ,23, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi subsists between the parties to this suit. (B) A decree for permanent injunction may be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants to the effect that they have no right to transfer any of their right, title and interest in the agreement dated 15/10/1992 mentioned in prayer (a) above in favour of any person other than the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff claims that he is real estate agent and Mrs. Sumitra Chistion 15/10/1992 as trustee of M/s. Satazo trust applied to M/s. Inder Pratap singh HUF through plaintiff as an agent for allotment of the entire 11th floor approximately 8,000 sq ft. The builder agreed to sell entire 11th floor to M/s. satazo Trust at the rate of Rs. 3,850. 00 per sq. ft. An agreement to sell by Mr. Inder Pratap Singh on behalf of M/s. Inder paratap Singh HUF was signed in favour of Mrs. Sumitra Chisti. An allotment letter was also issued. Both these documents were witnessed by the plaintiff. On 18/12/1992 an appropriate authority under Section 269-UC of Income Tax Act by its order dated 18/12/1992 issued no objection to the transfer for a sum of Rs. 3,08,00,000. 00. On March 13,1994 an agreement to sell was executed between M/s. Satazo Trust through Mrs. Sumitra Chisti and the plaintiff as the purchaser for a sum of Rs. 4,84,00,000. 00 through two cheques dated 13/3/1994. No Objection Certificate was sought again from the appropriate authority under section 269-UC of Income Tax Act. On 18/5/1994 Appropriate Authority issued No Objection to the transfer. Sumitra Chisti and the plaintiff as the purchaser for a sum of Rs. 4,84,00,000. 00 through two cheques dated 13/3/1994. No Objection Certificate was sought again from the appropriate authority under section 269-UC of Income Tax Act. On 18/5/1994 Appropriate Authority issued No Objection to the transfer. Accordingly sale transaction was to be completed within a period of six months by execution of the transfer deeds in favour of the plaintiff or his nominees. The prices shot up. The defendants published advertisement on July 15,1994 and one H. S. Sandhu visited the office of the plaintiff asking him to execute a cancellation deed and the notice dated 18/7/1994 was also received. As the cloud has been cast on the right of the plaintiff on the agreement to sell dated 13/3/1994 the suit for declaration for permanent injunction has been filed. ( 4 ) AFTER initially clearing the plaint for registering and listing the case, an office objection was raised that "value on relief of declaration both for jurisdiction and court fee ought to be same, and C/f ad valorem is to be paid thereon" ( 5 ) THE plaintiff moved an application for amendment of the plaint to convert this suit into a suit for specific performance. That application was rejected and appeal was filed. This appeal was also dismissed as infructuous since the application for amendment was withdrawn with liberty to plaintiff to file the suit for specific performance, separate suit has also been filed. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff claims that the plaint is adequately stamped for the suit is not for declaration with regard to any property. The property is not yet constructed. Suit is for declaration with regard to a contract entered into between the parties on 13/3/1994. ( 7 ) ON the other had, learned Counsel for the defendant submits that from the allegations made and the relief of injunction as made in prayer (b), from the relief of declaration as made in prayer (a) and thus consequential relief, since relief could be granted only in the event of plaintiff succeeding in his prayer for declaration. ( 7 ) ON the other had, learned Counsel for the defendant submits that from the allegations made and the relief of injunction as made in prayer (b), from the relief of declaration as made in prayer (a) and thus consequential relief, since relief could be granted only in the event of plaintiff succeeding in his prayer for declaration. This suit therefore, falls under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and as per section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee should be the same and therefore, ad valorem court fee has to be paid on the market value of the property in suit. Thus, the defendants support the office objection. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to section 7 (iv) (c) in suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief, the amount of court fee payable under the Court Fees Act shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in paint for memorandum of appeal and in all the suits, the plaintiff is supposed to state the amount at which he wants to value the relief sought. ( 9 ) IT would be worthwhile to refer to Article 17 also which is being relied upon by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to article 17 of the Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, a plaint or appeal in a suit is to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed, proper court fee is Rs. 10. 00 ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa and Ors. v. Chaudhry Din Mohammed and Ors. , AIR 1941 Lahore 97. In that case, following observations were made by a Full Bench of Lahore at pp. 104, 105 as under : "it is found that the plaintiff is suing for a declaration which does not fall under sec. 42 it will probably be disclosed in most cases onexamination of the substance of the relief claimed that he is really suing for some other relief and has merely expressed it in the form of a declaration to evade payment of higher court fees. 42 it will probably be disclosed in most cases onexamination of the substance of the relief claimed that he is really suing for some other relief and has merely expressed it in the form of a declaration to evade payment of higher court fees. But it may also happen that the plaintiff being ill-advised sues for a declaration which does not fall under Sec. 42, Specific Relief Act, but which at the same time does not, in fact, involve any other relief excepting a declaration. In such a case, I see no reason why he should pay a court fee of more than Rs. 10. 00. If it is held that the declaration asked for cannot be granted because it does not fall under Sec. 42, the result, I think should be dismissal of the suit on that ground, and not assessment of a higher court fee. It may be observed here that the Court Fees Act was passed in 1870, while the Specific Relief Act was passed in 1877. Section 42, Specific Relief Act was therefore not in force when Court Fees Act was enacted. The declaratory sits REFERRED TO to in the Court Fees Act cannot therefore, be taken to be necessarily those covered by Section 42 only. "the true criterion for determining the question of Court Fee in cases of this description is the substance of the relief claimed as disclosed by the plaint, taken as a whole. If the relief so disclosed is a declaration pure and simple, and involves no other relief, the suit would fall under Clause (iii) of Art. 17 of Sch. II, Court-Fees Act, and the Court Fee payable would be Rs. 10. 00 only. At the initial stage of determining the court-fee on a plaint, the question whether the declaratory suit is liable to be dismissed, either because it does not fall within the purview of Sec. 42, Specific Relief Act, or because the plaintiff has failed to sue for a further relief which was open to him or for some other reason does not seem to me to arise. That question will arise only after the necessary Court Fee on the true relief as disclosed by the plaint is paid and the plaint is properly before the Court. That question will arise only after the necessary Court Fee on the true relief as disclosed by the plaint is paid and the plaint is properly before the Court. In such a case therefore, if after the payment of the Court Fee, it is found that the declaration prayed for cannot be granted according to law for any such reasons as are mentioned above, the suit may be liable to be dismissed on that ground. If on the other hand, it is found that the declaratory relief claimed involves a consequential relief within the meaning of Sec. 7 (iv) (c), Court Fees Act, it will be for the plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief as provided in that section. " ( 12 ) AT p. 106, the term `consequential relief has also been discussed and following notable observations were made: "the expression `consequential relief means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a `substantial relief . It follows therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere `consequential relief in the above sense the plaintiff must pay Court Fee on the substantial relief. " (Emphasis Supplied) ( 13 ) IN Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and Ors. , (1973) 2 SCC 524 , the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the mortgage executed by their father in favour of the appellant was null and void and ineffectual against them as the property was a joint Hindu family property and the mortgage had been effected without consideration and family necessity. Similar objections were raised as have been raised in this case. The Supreme Court made the following observations in para 4 of the judgment at p. 525. These read as under : "4. Similar objections were raised as have been raised in this case. The Supreme Court made the following observations in para 4 of the judgment at p. 525. These read as under : "4. As regards the main question that arises for decision it appears to us that while the Court Fee payable on a plaint is certainly to be decided on the basis of the allegations and the prayer in the plaint and the question whether the plaintiff s suit will have to fail for failure to ask for consequential relief is of no concern to the Court at that stage, the Court in deciding the question of Cout Fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. In this case the relief asked for is on the basis that the property in dispute is a joint Hindu family property and there was no legal necessity to execute the mortgage. It is now well settled that under Hindu Law if the manager of a joint family is the father and the other members are the sons, the father may be incurring a debt so long as it is not for an immoral purpose lay the joint family estate open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for the payment of the debt not only where it is an unsecured debt and simple money decree the debt but also to a mortgage debit which the father is personally liable to pay and to a decree for the recovery of the mortgage debt by the sale of the property even where the mortgage is not for legal necessity or for payment of antecedent debt (Faqir Chand v. Harnam Kaur, (1967)1 SCR 68 : AIR 1967 SC 727 ). Consequently, when the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that the decree obtained by the appellant against their father was not binding on them they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do. Consequently, when the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that the decree obtained by the appellant against their father was not binding on them they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do. This aspect is brought out in a decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Zeb-ul-Nisa v. Din Mohammed, AIR 1941 Lah. 97, where it was held that: "the mere fact that the relief as stated in the prayer clause is expressed in a declaratory form does not necessarily show that the suit is for a mere declaration and no more. If the relief so disclosed is a declaration pure and simple and involves no other relief, the suit would fall under Article 17 (iii ). "in that case the plaintiff had sued for a twofold declaration: (i) that the property described in the plaint was a waqf, and (ii) that certain alienations thereof by the mutwali and his brother were null and void and were ineffectual against the waqf property. It was held that the second part of the declaration was tantamount to the setting aside or cancellation of the alienations and therefore, the relief claimed could not be treated as a purely declaratory one and inasmuch as it could not be said to follow directly from the case could be treated as a declaration with a "consequential relief". It was substantive one in the shape of setting aside of alienations requiring ad valorem Court Fee on the value of the subject-matter of the sale, and even if the relief sought for well within the purview of Section 7 (iv) (c), the plaintiffs in view of Sections 8 and 9, Suits Valuation Act, having already fixed the value of the relief in the plaint for purposes of jurisdiction were bound to fix the same value for purposes of Court Fee. It was also pointed out that in deciding whether a suit is a purely declaratory, the substance and not merely the language or the form of the relief claimed should be considered. It was also pointed out that in deciding whether a suit is a purely declaratory, the substance and not merely the language or the form of the relief claimed should be considered. The Court also observed: "it seems to me that neither the answer to the question whether the plaintiff is or is not a party to the decree or the deed sought to be declared as null and void, nor to the question whether the declaration sought does or does not fall within the purview of Section 42, Specific Relief Act, furnishes a satisfactory or conclusive test for determining the Court Fee payable in the suit of this description. When the plaintiff is a party to the decree or deed, the declaratory relief, if granted, necessarily relieves the plaintiff of his obligations under the decree or the deed and, hence it seems to have been held in such cases, that the declaration involves a consequential relief. In cases where the plaintiff is not a party to the decree or the deed, the declaratory relief does not ordinarily include any such consequential relief. But there are exceptional cases in which the plaintiff though not a party to the deed or the decree is nevertheless bound thereby. For instance, when a sale or mortgage of joint family property is effected by a manager of a joint Hindu family, the alienation is binding on the other members of the family (even if they are not parties to it ) until and unless it is set aside. Similarly, a decree passed against the manager will be binding on the other members of the family If therefore, a coparcener sues for a declaration that such an alienation is null and void, the declaration must I think be held to include consequential relief in the same way as in those cases in which the plaintiff is himself a party to the alienation or the decree, which is sought to be declared null and void. The case dealt with in AIR 1936 Lah. 166 seems to have been of this description. The case of an alienation by a mutwalli of waqf property would also appear to stand on a similar footing. The case dealt with in AIR 1936 Lah. 166 seems to have been of this description. The case of an alienation by a mutwalli of waqf property would also appear to stand on a similar footing. In the case of waqf property, it is only the trustee or the mutwalli who can alienate the property, If he makes an alienation it is binding on all concerned, until and unless it is set aside. If therefore, a person sues to get such an alienation declared null and void, he can only do so by getting the deed invalidated. The relief claimed in such cases also may therefore, be found to include a consequential relief. "the decision of the Lahore High Court in Prithvi Raj v. R. C. Ralli, AIR 1945 Lah. 13, is exactly in point. " ( 14 ) FROM the operative portion of the judgment, it is very much apparent that the case was governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and accordingly, the Court allowed one month s time for paying the necessary court fee. ( 15 ) THE case of Smt. Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, AIR 1987 SC 2085 , was also REFERRED TO to by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff but that case related to the question of valuation made by the plaintiff. In that case, in was observed that in a suit for consequential relief, the valuation made by the plaintiff is ordinarily to be accepted and it is only in cases where it appears to the court in considering the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. The suit for the purpose of declaration was valued at a particular value and the court fee has not been paid accordingly in terms of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. Consequently, this judgment is of no help. ( 16 ) THE same is true in respect of Bawa Bir Singh v. Ali Niwaz Khan, AIR 1964 Punjab 381, and the case of M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company and Ors. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, AIR 1988 SC 1636 . This matter related to rendition of accounts and court fee was payable under Section 7 (iv) (f) and not under Section 7 (iv) (c ). v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, AIR 1988 SC 1636 . This matter related to rendition of accounts and court fee was payable under Section 7 (iv) (f) and not under Section 7 (iv) (c ). ( 17 ) NO doubt, earlier the view was that the valuation of relief by appellant should be accepted by the Court but in view of the case of Smt. Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, (supra), and M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company and Ors. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal, (supra), it is not an absolute right of the plaintiff that the Court should not question the valuation put by the plaintiff which is kept demonstratively unreasonably low to avoid payment of court fee to cause loss to the revenue. In this light, the Full Bench judgment of Emperor v. Ralla Ram, AIR 1946 Lahore 94, does not appear to be of any help to the plaintiff. Smt. Sheila Devi and Ors. v. Shri Kishan Lal Kalra and Ors. , ILR 1974 (2) Delhi 491, is also not of much help to the plaintiff. ( 18 ) IN Mahant Purushottam Dass and Ors. v. Har Narain and Ors. , AIR 1978 Delhi 114, the Full Bench of this Court followed Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa and Ors. v. Chaudhri Din Mohammad and Ors. (supra), so far as the definition of consequential relief is concerned. And in this case, it was also held that the plaintiff could not claim the relief of injunction without paying for declaration as prayed for. It must be held that the injunction prayed for is a claim to obtain declaratory relief where the consequential relief (of injunction) is prayed for. ( 19 ) LEARNED Counsel for the plaintiff had REFERRED TO to a number of other authorities which do not appear to be relevant especially in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench. I feel that I should not burden the judgment by referring to all those judgments. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the defendant also relied upon S. M. Gulati v. Dream Land House and Anr. , 1994 (31) DRJ 576 . In that case, for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the relief of declaration, the suit has been valued at Rs. 6 lakhs. For the relief of declaration, the suit was valued at Rs. 200. 00 on which court fee of Rs. 20. 00 had been paid. , 1994 (31) DRJ 576 . In that case, for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the relief of declaration, the suit has been valued at Rs. 6 lakhs. For the relief of declaration, the suit was valued at Rs. 200. 00 on which court fee of Rs. 20. 00 had been paid. For relief of mandatory injunction, the suit was valued at Rs. 130. 00 and Rs. 13. 00 was paid as court fee. Thus, total court fee of Rs. 46. 00 was paid. Learned Single Judge of this Court after relying on Mahant Purushottam Dass and Ors. v. Mrs. Balwant Kaur Malik, AIR 9171 Del. 249; Govind Gopal and Ors. v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1983 Del. 323 ; and Smt. Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj (supra), observed in para 4 as under: "4. However, in the case before me, Rule 7 and the operating part of the Rule 7 makes it abundantly clear that in a suit where the plaintiff ask for mere declaration without any consequential relief respect of property, the value for the purposes of court fee has to be in terms of the Court Fees Act. Admittedly, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has stated that at the bar that it is not a suit simplicitor for declaration but a suit with consequential relief of mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions and the relief of injunction is dependent on the relief of declaration. That being the situation, it is not open for the plaintiff to give two valuations, one for the purposes of declaration and other for the purposes of jurisdiction. There is no force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that as the consequential relief is not in relation to the property but in relation to the rights of the tenancy, therefore he can take advantage of putting different valuation for jurisdiction. "( 21 ) LEARNED Single Judge further observed after referring to the observations made in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and Ors. , (1973) 2 SCC 524 , in para 5 that the allow the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case that he may be permitted to maintain different valuations for the relief of declaration and jurisdiction is demonstratively arbitrary and manifestly illegal. ( 22 ) HE also relied upon Rampur Distillery and Chemicals Co. , (1973) 2 SCC 524 , in para 5 that the allow the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the case that he may be permitted to maintain different valuations for the relief of declaration and jurisdiction is demonstratively arbitrary and manifestly illegal. ( 22 ) HE also relied upon Rampur Distillery and Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1995 1 AD (Del) 425. In that case, the suit filed by the plaintiff was also governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Learned Single Judge of the Court observed that in such a suit, the amount of court fee payable has to be concluded on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint for Memorandum of Appeal. The plaintiff has to state the amount at which the relief was sought. In para 8 of the judgment, learned Single Judge REFERRED TO to a judgment of Full, Bench of Nagpur High Court in Moti Ram and Ors. v. Daulat, AIR 1939 Nagpur 50. Relevant paragraph are reproduced as under: "8. Though discretion is given to the plaintiff to make the valuation but the discretion has to be exercised reasonably and not in an arbitrary fanciful or whimsical manner. In Moti Ram and Ors. v. Daulat, AIR 1939 Nagpur 50, the Full Bench of Nagpur High Court has held: "it is true that under Section 7 (iv) (c), the plaintiff may put any valuation on the relief but such value is not binding on Court and can refuse to accept that figure. There is nothing in the Court Fees Act which shows that in case coming under Section 7 (iv) (c), the power which the Court is given by Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, is taken away. If the valuation put by the plaintiff is arbitrary and unreasonable, in other words if the disparity is so great as to show that the plaintiff has not endeavoured to fix a fair value at all but has simply set down a figure which is unreasonable and bears no relation to the value of the right litigated the Court can interfere and exercise its powers under Order 7, Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. " 9. There is no divergence of judicial opinion in so far as the view taken by the Full Bench Of Nagpur High Court is concerned. " 9. There is no divergence of judicial opinion in so far as the view taken by the Full Bench Of Nagpur High Court is concerned. reference may be made to Hajrabi w/o Abdul Jalil and Ors. v. Md. Ibrahim s/o Md. Sharif, AIR 1948 Nagpur 219; Sureshkumar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 Madhya Pradesh 30; and Idol Shri shrijit and Ors. v. Chaturbhai Mangalbhai Patel and Anr. AIR 1965 Madhya Pradesh 4. 10. If the relief sought for by the plaintiff is capable of specified valuation then that will be the valuation for payment of court fee and ad valorem. In Nathuram Kashiram v. State Government of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1962 Madhya Pradesh 367, it has been held: "a declaration which affects only the pecuniary relationship between the plaintiff and a defendant does not come within the purview of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and a suit for such a declaration is not maintainable. The plaintiff has therefore, got to specify in the suit that he is challenging his liability for a certain amount and if he were to do so, it would mean that he is avoiding the liability to that extent, necessarily requiring an adjudication whether that amount is or not due. Thus, it is not a case where the claim is incapable of any valuation or liable to be arbitrarily valued. The claim in such a suit being capable of definite valuation it cannot be argued that to the plaintiff it has got a different value which he can put down in the plaint either for purposes of court fee or for purposes of jurisdiction . When he seeks to avoid that liability for a definite amount, value to him must be the same which he seeks to avoid. Hence, when a plaintiff files a suit against the State Government challenging the right of the State Government to recover the specified amount from him as a surety for the performance of a contract, the claim in suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, and an ad valorem court fee on the specified sum is liable to be paid. " 11. Nathuram s case (supra) is a Single Bench decision but the view taken therein has been approved by a Division Bench in Badrilal Bholaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. , 1964 MP 9. " 11. Nathuram s case (supra) is a Single Bench decision but the view taken therein has been approved by a Division Bench in Badrilal Bholaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. , 1964 MP 9. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view so taken. " ( 23 ) IN the case in hand, the plaintiff cannot seek permanent injunction without declaration of his rights under the alleged agreement to sell, he has no right to seek permanent injunction restraining the defendant to transfer any of his right, title or interest under the Agreement dated 15/10/1992 mentioned in prayer (a ). In such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the proposition that the case is covered by Article 17 (3) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The matter is squarely covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) for not only declaration to the effect that Agreement dated 15/10/1992 executed between M/s. Inder Pratap Singh, has been sought, the consequential relief to give effect to that declaration is also sought for the plaintiff seeks permanent injunction by restraining the defendants from transferring any of their rights, title and interest under the agreement dated 15/10/1992. ( 24 ) IN this case, the relief has been valued at Rs. 4,84,00,000. 00 and for the purpose of jurisdiction, it has been observed in S. M. Gulati v. Dream Land House and Anr. (supra) that "it would be demonstratively arbitrary and manifestly illegal if the plaintiff is permitted to maintain different valuation for the relief of declaration and jurisdiction for the relief of declaration for the purpose of court fee and for the purpose of jurisdiction different. " ( 25 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff it is not a suit for declaration with regard to immovable property and the property does not exist, it is only proposed to be constructed, it may be mentioned that Section 7 (iv) (c) does not relate to any immovable, property, is not confined to immovable property only; it covers movable, immovable as well as auctionable claims for the purpose of declaration. The suit could not be valued for the purpose of court fee for relief of declaration at Rs. 200. 00 "under rules" without referring to and pointing out any rule. The suit could not be valued for the purpose of court fee for relief of declaration at Rs. 200. 00 "under rules" without referring to and pointing out any rule. ( 26 ) THE submission of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff is that the suit is for mere declaration as provided by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and amounts to the plea that there is no plea for seeking any injunction on the basis of the declaration that the rights of the parties subsist under 1992 and 1993 agreement. But it cannot be just wished away in view of the fact that the relief of injunction has been sought with a definite purpose of giving effect to the declaration in para (b) of the relief clause. It is also not a mere surplusage. ( 27 ) ANOTHER facet of the argument of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff to be considered is whether it is a suit for mere declaration as provided in Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 42 reads as under: "42. Injunction to perform negative agreement.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (e) of Section 41, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstances that the Court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not preclude it from granting an injunction to perform the negative agreement: PROVIDED that the plaintiff has not filed to perform the contract so far as it is binding on him. " ( 28 ) IN this regard, it is apparent that the plaintiff is seeking declaration about his legal character or to a right to purchase the property under 1992 and 1993 agreement. Under Section 34, this relief is discretionary and the Court under the proviso to Section 34 may refuse to grant any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Such a declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit. Section 42 would apply only to a case where the Court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement. Such a declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit. Section 42 would apply only to a case where the Court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement. When the plaintiff withdrew the application for amendment before the Appellant Court with liberty to file a suit for specific performance and when the plaintiff has already filed a suit for specific performance, it cannot be assumed that it is the case of the plaintiff that this Court is unable to compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement. As such, Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act cannot be resorted to. It could be resorted to only in cases of suit for injunction as a primary relief and not as a consequential relief. Therefore, this argument does not appear to be of any help to the plaintiff. ( 29 ) IN so far as the question of valuation of the relief of declaration is concerned, relief of declaration is sought on the basis of agreement, and the applicant wants to enforce his right under the agreement to sell dated 15/10/1992 and as modified by Agreement to Sell dated 13/3/1994. It indicates that the correct value of the sale consideration under the agreement in favour of the purchaser free from all encumbrances and defects of the title has been settled at Rs. 4. 84 crores which is payable by the purchaser, i. e. plaintiff and 1% of that amount i. e. 4. 84 lakhs was paid through two cheques. The balance of Rs. 4,79,16,000. 00 was payable by the plaintiff to the defendants. If a right is claimed in respect of a property worth Rs. 4. 84 crores, the valuation for the purpose of court fee could not, by any stretch of imagination, be Rs. 220. 00 and it has to be valued at Rs. 4. 84 crores as mentioned in the plaint for the purpose of jurisdiction. ( 30 ) ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff is supposed to make good the deficiency on the value of Rs. 4. 80 crores under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. It would be appropriate in such circumstances that the plaintiff should be given one month s time to pay the court fee. ( 30 ) ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff is supposed to make good the deficiency on the value of Rs. 4. 80 crores under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. It would be appropriate in such circumstances that the plaintiff should be given one month s time to pay the court fee. In case he fails to pay the court fee within a period of one month, the plaint would be liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. ( 31 ) LIST the matter on 16/2/1998.