JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Briefly stated relevant facts are that one Jainarain petitioner's father, was Khatedar of Khasra Nos. 9, 16, 19, 30 and 72 measuring 25 Bighas and 11 Biswas situate at Tan Bobari, and Khasra Nos. 29,22,27 situate at Brijpura. The said Jainarain had two sons namely Sualal, the present petitioner and Mohanlal, the deceased has band of Smt. Anandi Devi respondent No. 1. It is alleged that Mohanlal had gone to another family by adoption. It is further alleged that Jai Narain, keeping in mind the fact of adoption of Mohan Lal by another family, had executed a Will also in favour of the petitioner in respect to his movable and immovable properties. Any way, after the death of Jainarain mutation in the revenue record came to be made in the name of both of the sons, Sualal and Mohan Lal afore said. Sualal challenged the mutation entries before the Revenue Authorities and litigation in that behalf if reportedly still pending before Higher Revenue Courts. 3. It further appears that on the strength of the entry in revenue record in his favour, Mohan Lal filed partition suit being Revenue Suit No. 118/92 under Sections 52, 88 and 181 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for partition of the alleged joint holding of Shri Jainara in. This suit is still pending before the Higher Revenue Courts. It is also the admitted position that ad-interim order regarding protection of the property in question were passed from time to time by the Revenue Courts, including the Board of Revenue. 4. It was in the above background that on 10.5.96 the police submitted their report before Executive Magistrate for initiation proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. in respect to the property in question. By his order of the even date the learned Executive Magistrate declined to initiate such proceedings on the ground that the Revenue Courts were already seized of the subject matter of dispute and that there existed no apprehension of breach of peace. 5. By his order of the even date the learned Executive Magistrate declined to initiate such proceedings on the ground that the Revenue Courts were already seized of the subject matter of dispute and that there existed no apprehension of breach of peace. 5. It further appears that after about a year of the dismissal of his report on 10.5.96 the concerned Police Officer again requested the Executive Magistrate to initiate proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. Vide their information dated 27.1.97 and this time the learned Magistrate on feeling satisfied that likelihood of breach of peace concerning land in question existed withing his jurisdiction, initiated such proceedings under Section 145 vide his order dated 10.3.97 which is being challenged by the petitioner through this petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. 6. Mr. Mehrishi, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that since the parties to the present litigation have already approached the competent Revenue Courts for adjudication of their right and title to subject matter of the present litigation and a similar petition under Section 145, Cr.P.C. and also another report under Section 107, Cr.P.C. had been negatived by the learned Executive Magistrate, there were no cogent grounds for the learned Executive Magistrate to have initiated present proceedings of the same nature. In this behalf, the learned Counsel referred to Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Tikuda v. State (1961 R.L.W. 469) . Mr. Nand Kishore learned Counsel for the opposite parties, however, supported the order in question on the ground that he likelihood of breach of peace can not be controlled by the Revenue Courts and, therefore, the jurisdiction of Executive Magistrate for initiating the proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. in those case wherein the parties are litigating before competent Revenue Courts for determination of their rights, does not get excluded. 7. 1 have given due consideration to the submissions advanced before me. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1985 (SC) 475 ) , the Supreme Court has clearly held that purpose of summary proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. ultimately has to settle down the dispute between the parties giving rise to the apprehension of breach of the peace and to require them to approach the competent Courts for adjudication of their rights to the subject matter of such proceedings. Therefore, where, parties had already been genuinely litigating for adjudication of their rights to the subject matter before competent Courts, initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were inherently bad and would simply be duality of proceedings consuming the precious time of the Court and hard earning money of the parties and would accordingly amount to abuse of the process of Court. 8. In the case of Tikuda v. State (supra) the Full Bench held that where a competent Court is already seized of a dispute with regard to a property, which is also the subject matter of dispute under Section 145, Cr.P.C. the likelihood of the apprehension of breach of peace, if any, maybe effectively and properly controlled by the concerned Authority by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 107/116, Cr.P.C. and the proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. should not be initiated which cases as that would simply amount to delicacy or plurality of the proceedings. 9. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rain Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. (supra) and decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Tikuda v. State (supra) the criminal proceedings initiated by the learned Executive Magistrate in the present case should not survive. In fact it is quite clear from the material placed before me that on similar allegations the learned Executive Magistrate, at previous cast on,had him self declined to initiate such proceedings. If he felt satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace in respect to the subject matter of the present proceedings, it was open to him to have drawn proceedings under Section 107/116, Cr.P.C. instead of taking re- course to the provision of Section 145(1) and possibly thereafter to Section 146(1), Cr.P.C. Such delicacy of proceedings, when competent Revenue Court was already seized of the matter and is competent to pass appropriate order for the protection of the property in question amounts to abuse of process of the Court and such abuse is required to be prevented. 10. In the result, the impugned order dated 10.3.97 passed by the Executive Magistrate in Case No. 6/96 (Anandi Devi v. Sua Lal) is hereby set aside and the proceedings are directed to be dropped.The petition is allowed.Petition allowed. *******