Judgment D.K. Seth, J. 1. Against the order dated 30-9-1980 passed in Revenue case No. 4 of 1979 by the Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act), Misc. Appeal No. 62 of 1980 was preferred by the petitioner. By an order dated 9-3-1981 the said appeal was dismissed on two grounds, namely: first, the appeal was premature and in the absence of publication of the order dated 30-9-1980 it was not maintainable. Secondly, it was held that prima facie the appeal appears to be barred by time. 2. This order has been challenged by means of this writ petition. Mr. L.P. Naithani, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the reason given in the order is wholly misconceived. In as much as there is no provision for publication of the order under Section 5(1) of the Act, therefore, the appeal cannot be premature and if it is not premature, in that event it could not have been dismissed on the grounds that it was barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel, the two propositions cannot go together. Secondly, Mr. Naithani contended that the appeal was filed within time and there was no decision on the question as to how the appeal was time barred. According to him when the Court has come to the finding that it is time barred, in that event the Court ought to have given reasons so as to enable this Court to appreciate the reasoning given by the appellate authority. Mr. A. Upadhyaya, learned Standing Counsel on the other hand, contended that there is no infirmity in the order. Even if it is not premature but was found to be barred by limitation, the petitioner having not disclosed any materials as to how the appeal was filed within time on the face of specific order of the appellate Court, it is not open to the petitioner to assail the said findings. 3. I have heard Mr. Naithani and Mr. Upadhyaya at length. 4. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, following statement has been made: "that the petitioner preferred appeal against the judgment and order, dated 30-8-1980 in the Court of the District Judge Tehri Garhwal." Thus, it appears that the petitioner has not given the date on which he had filed the appeal. Naithani and Mr. Upadhyaya at length. 4. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, following statement has been made: "that the petitioner preferred appeal against the judgment and order, dated 30-8-1980 in the Court of the District Judge Tehri Garhwal." Thus, it appears that the petitioner has not given the date on which he had filed the appeal. There is no other statement to assert that the appeal was filed within time and it wash not barred by limitation. Mr. Naithani relied on the statements made in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the writ petition. Text of the said two paragraphs is quoted below: "10. That the Section 5(1) of the Act is clear on the point of publication. It does not mean that there should be a gazette notification. The Act clearly says that the copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises and that is the mode of publication." "12. That the petitioner had filed the appeal within 15 days of the date of publication. The District Judge has held that there is no publication on the basis that there is no publication of the order. This is incorrect. The District Judge has held that publication in any manner which required publication is necessary, if there has been no publication, there is no question of appeal being time barred." 5. Perusal of the above paragraphs also does not indicate that how the appeal was not time barred. On the other hand it proceeds on argumentative basis that if there has been no publication there is no question of appeal being time barred. 6. From the scheme of the Act it appears that Section 5 does not require any publication as has been indicated in impugned order. It only requires affixation of the order on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises and that was only for the purpose of eviction. The order of eviction is not dependent on affixation of the order on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of public premises for its being effective. The order takes effect as soon it is passed. But for the purpose of implementing the order for eviction affixation may be of some value. The order of eviction is not dependent on affixation of the order on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of public premises for its being effective. The order takes effect as soon it is passed. But for the purpose of implementing the order for eviction affixation may be of some value. Section 9 provides for appeal against the order passed under Section 5, Limitation has been provided in Section 9(2) that it should be within 15 days from the publication of the order under sub-section (1) of that Section. The publication mentioned therein means pronouncement of the order. Section 5 does not require a notification in the gazette. Mr. Naithani contended publication mentioned in sub section (2) is publication by affixation on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. In paragraph 10 it has been pointed out that affixation is a mode of publication. Nowhere in the writ petition, as I find, it has been pointed out that the order was never affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises. No such case has been made out within the four corners of the writ petition. Thus, it appears that there are sub stance in the submission of Mr. Upadhyaya that the petitioner has not made out a case as to how the appeal was not time-barred. It is not the petitioner's case that it was not affixed on the outer door or any other conspicuous part of the public premises. Unless proper pleading is made out on the face of the order, dated 9-3-1981, it is very difficult for this Court to enter into such question. In the counter-affidavit in paragraph 11, the following statement has been made : "that it may be perianth to mention here that the operative portion of the order which were made by the prescribed authority dated 30-9-80 is relevant inasmuch as there was a clear direction in the matter to vacate the land in suit on which the counsel of the petitioner Sri S.S. Negi has already signed and as such the petitioner had the knowledge of the eviction order. It is also relevant that the petitioner could not produce any document in the original Court nor he had the courage to enter into the witness box to show the factum of his position alongwith the duration of time as is clear from the order of original Court dated 5-9-80 which runs as follows: ^^vkt i=koyh is'k gqbZ vizkf/kd’r v/;kfl;ksa ds odhy gkftj gSa vizkf/kd'r v/;kfl;ksa dh vksj ls vkt dksbZ lk{; is'k ugha fd;k x;k vksj u gh lk{; gsrq le; fn, tkus dk vkns’k i= fn;k x;k vr% i=koyh cgl gsrq fnukad 16-9-80 dks is'k gksa** 7. Whereas in the rejoinder-affidavit, paragraph 11 has been dealt with in paragraph 12 of the rejoinder in the following manner: "12. That the contents of paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit are denied. However, it is submitted that the petitioner had filed objections that the proceeding could only be initiated by the Land Management Committee under U.P. Zarnindari Abolition Act and the Court acted beyond jurisdiction as the property in dispute belongs to the Gaon Samaj. The Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to evict the petitioner from the premises which is under the control of Gaon Samaj. Even then the Prescribed Authority has acted illegally. Further, the eviction order is also vague. The petitioner was not given a opportunity to lead evidence that the property belongs to Gaon Samaj." 8. Thus, it appears that even in the rejoinder-affidavit no case was made out that it was not affixed neither any question as to the limitation or the date on which the appeal was preferred etc. etc. has been mentioned. It appears from the statement made in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit that when the order was passed on 30th September, 1980 with clear direction for vacating the land in question, the counsel for the petitioner Mr. S.S. Negi had signed on the order-sheet and therefore the petitioner had knowledge of the eviction order. Since even in the rejoinder-affidavit the petitioner has not made out a case that it was not published in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 5 by affixing on the outer door or any other conspicuous part of the public premises or that the appeal was preferred within 15 days, this Court cannot help the petitioner to get over the finding of the appellate authority that the appeal was time barred. But then the appeal was held to be barred by limitation prima fades, by the appellate authority in order to dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation. The Court cannot proceed on the basis of prima facie finding unless it has to come on a definite finding that the appeal is barred by limitation. 9. In that view of the matter the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation on the ground of prima facie finding cannot be sustained. 10. In the circumstances the order dated 9-3-1981 is quashed. The appeal should be decided on the question of limitation as it stood on 9-3-1981 as to whether the appeal was time barred or not when the appeal was preferred and decide the question afresh in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date a copy of this order is produced before the Court concerned. Let a writ of certiorari accordingly to issue. However, it may be mentioned that so far as the question of appeal being premature and not maintainable is concerned, that cannot be sustained in view of the discussion made hereinbefore. The writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.