JUDGMENT - S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.:---Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General for the respondents at length. 2. The brief facts of this case are as under:- The petitioner had joined the police force of State of Maharashtra as a Police Constable on 14th July, 1958. Thereafter the petitioner was promoted as a Head Constable w.e.f. 1st August, 1970. On 1st April, 1983 the petitioner was promoted as an officiating Police Sub-Inspector. The petitioner claims that the Director General of Police on 18th March, 1995 had issued an order promoting the petitioner to the post of Assistant Police Inspector. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the said order was not communicated to the petitioner and was also not given effect to. It appears that the petitioner had ultimately retired from the police service on 30th April, 1997 as a Police Sub-Inspector. 3. After retirement the petitioner had approached the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Application No. 162 of 1997 wherein the petitioner had claimed by way of main relief that the petitioner should be paid all his retirement dues with 12% interest from the date they were due till realisation. In the said application the petitioner had also prayed by way of interim relief that pending final decision of the said application respondents should be restrained from evicting the petitioner from the service quarters. It appears that on the said application, Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal had granted an ad-interim order on 5th August, 1997 whereby the respondents were restrained from evicting the petitioner from his service quarters till the decision of the said original application. 4. After the said application was moved before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, it appears that, a sum, of Rs. 7,676/- was paid to him towards Group Insurance on 16th June, 1997 and on 2nd July, 1997 the petitioner was also granted Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity amount of Rs. 59,809/-. The petitioner's claim of General Provident Fund amounting to Rs. 1,33,951/- was paid to him on 3rd September, 1997. Ultimately on 24th October, 1997 the petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 47, 792/- towards leave encashment. 5. 59,809/-. The petitioner's claim of General Provident Fund amounting to Rs. 1,33,951/- was paid to him on 3rd September, 1997. Ultimately on 24th October, 1997 the petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 47, 792/- towards leave encashment. 5. On 24th October, 1997 the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal by its order passed on that day had vacated the interim relief granted earlier with the following words: "Interim relief stands vacated." That is to say the interim order restraining the respondents from evicting the petitioner from service quarters was vacated. 6. The petitioner thereafter, had approached the Minister of State for Home of Maharashtra Government by his application dated 27th October, 1997 praying that the petitioner may be permitted to stay in the aforesaid service quarters for a period of six months from 1st November, 1997. Based on the aforesaid application made to the Government, the Government of Maharashtra by its order dated 28th October, 1997 had ordered an extension and allowed the petitioner to stay in the said service quarters upto 27th April, 1998. The said order also makes it clear that the service quarters may be got vacated on 28th April, 1998. The order also stipulates that for the said quarters during the aforesaid period necessary rent as per rules may be recovered from the petitioner. 7. The above order passed by the Government of Maharashtra on 28th October, 1997 whereby the petitioner was allowed to stay for a period of six months from 28-10-1997 to 27-4-1998 was communicated to the Commissioner of Police on 31st October, 1997 as clearly mentioned in the affidavit dated 21-1-1998 filed by the respondent No. 5, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Head Quarters, Mumbai. The said respondent No. 5 has categorically stated in para 5 of the said affidavit as under:- "I say that in respect of the said quarter in question the registry of the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai Office, received the order of extension issued by the Government on 31st October, 1997. The said order was received by Building Branch on 2nd November, 1997. Since it was informed that the petitioner was granted extention no steps for eviction from the quarters in question was taken by the Building Branch." 8. The said order was received by Building Branch on 2nd November, 1997. Since it was informed that the petitioner was granted extention no steps for eviction from the quarters in question was taken by the Building Branch." 8. The petitioner alleges that suddenly on 11th December, 1997, he received a message from Pant Nagar Police Station that the petitioner should go to the Police Station and meet the Police Inspector Shri Marathe with regard to the service quarters whereupon the petitioner had rushed to the said police station wherein he was informed that the police are desirous of taking possession of the said service quarters even inspite of the extension granted by the Government by its order dated 28th October, 1997. Immediately the petitioner contacted his Advocate, who by his detailed letter dated 13th December, 1997 informed the Senior Inspector of Police, Pant Nagar Police Station, Ghatkopar (East), explaining the entire position as to how the Government of Maharashtra had granted the extension to the petitioner to stay in the said service quarters upto 27th April, 1998. A copy of the said Government Order dated 28th October, 1997 was also enclosed along with the said Advocate's Notice. The said notice also makes it clear that there was no order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal to evict the petitioner and also that there was no order of eviction passed by the competent authority under the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction ) Act, 1955. In the last paragraph of the said notice the Advocate had made it clear that "I hereby do and inform you that since there is an extension for occupation of the Staff Quarters till 27-4-1998 granted by the Hon'ble Government of Maharashtra, you are hereby requested not to take the law in your own hands and evict my client from the aforesaid staff quarters by force." In the said letter, the above portion from "since there is an........... by force" is underlined. Copy of this letter was duly received by the Pant Nagar Police Station on 15th December, 1997. Similarly, the copies of these letters were endorsed to the Commissioner of Police, The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI Mulund being respondent No. 3 herein and also to the Minister of State for Home, Government of Maharashtra. by force" is underlined. Copy of this letter was duly received by the Pant Nagar Police Station on 15th December, 1997. Similarly, the copies of these letters were endorsed to the Commissioner of Police, The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI Mulund being respondent No. 3 herein and also to the Minister of State for Home, Government of Maharashtra. Similarly, the respondent No. 3 who was the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Mulund had also received the said letter on 15th December, 1997 along with the aforesaid Government Order. 9. A perusal of the affidavit of the respondent No. 5 makes it clear that as he was incharge with regard to the accommodation and that he had received the aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 24th October, 1997 whereby the interim relief restraining the respondents from evicting the petitioner from the service quarters was vacated, was received by his office on 12th November, 1997. A perusal of the said affidavit of respondent No. 5 makes it clear that the officer had read the said order dated 24th October 1997 fully and he has quoted in extenso the contents of the said order. Respondent No. 5 also states in para 10 of the said affidavit as under:-- "I respectfully submit that I interpreted and construed the said order as the Hon. Member has given direction to get the quarter vacated which was in possession of the petitioner. I say that I was aware that the Government had granted extension by order dated 28th October, 1997. It was mentioned in the letter of extension of Government that the petitioner was supposed to pay the licence fee as per the rules and on verification of the relevant record it was revealed that the petitioner had not deposited any licence fee. As per the prevailing rules a retired police officer can continue to occupy the service quarter for a period of three months after his retirement. Thereafter he can continue to occupy the service quarter for further period subject to extension granted by the competent authority and on payment of licence fees." In para 12 of the said affidavit the said respondent No. 5 submits that he had interpreted the order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal to be a mandatory order of eviction and therefore he issued an eviction order on 24th November, 1997 against the petitioner. 10. 10. In fact the said order of eviction passed by respondent No. 5 dated 24th November 1997 makes an interesting reading which reads as under:- "Dt. 24-11-1997 ORDER AS PER BOMBAY POLICE ACT, 1951 SECTION 32(2) Shri Shankar Savla Chavan, P.S.I. retired on 30-4-1997. He and his family are residing in Government quarter at 62/1845, Pant Nagar, Ghatkopar (E). Final permission has been granted to him till 24-4-1998 by Government. Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal has ordered to get the said Government quarter vacated. The quarter has not been vacated as per the order. In exercise of the powers vested in me as per section 31(2) of Bombay Police Act 1951 and Government Home Dept. Order No. BPS-2056/60140, Dt. 22nd February 1957 I hereby order that the possession of the premises may be taken over by evicting any person or article found in the quarter at the time of entering into the quarter by taking necessary help and the quarter may be handed over to the concerned Asstt. Commissioner of Police. These orders may be executed immediately. Sd/- S E A L (Vijay Kamble) Dy. Commissioner of Police (Head Quarters) Brihan Mumbai." 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner had submitted that thereafter on 18th December, 1997 around 12.30 p.m. a constable from Pant Nagar Police Station had come with a message to the petitioner that he was called by the Police Inspector Shri Marathe. It appears that the petitioner had gone and met Shri Marathe. The petitioner appears to have been informed that there was no Court order restraining the respondents from evicting and that the Advocate's Notice cannot be acted upon also that the respondents were not bound to act as per the orders passed by the Government of Maharashtra. Thereafter, around 1.15 P.M. two police officers attached to the Pant Nagar Police Station along with three other policemen appear to have come to the service quarters and removed all articles, utensils and belongings of the petitioner from the service quarters, at that time petitioner's wife, his married daughter, younger son and grand daughter were only present. The learned Counsel for the petitioner states that inspite of the Government extension order dated 28th October, 1997 the said officers did not restrain themselves and had removed all the belongings of the petitioner and had kept the same in the corridor outside the said premises. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner states that inspite of the Government extension order dated 28th October, 1997 the said officers did not restrain themselves and had removed all the belongings of the petitioner and had kept the same in the corridor outside the said premises. 12. After this act of dispossession by the respondents, the petitioner had moved this Court on 23rd of December 1997, after hearing the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents, this Court was pleased to pass following order:- "By an order passed by the Government on 28th October, 1997, Exhibit-B to the petition, time was granted to the petitioner to vacate, and hand over possession upto 27th April 1998. Petitioner has, however, been forcibly evicted from his service quarters on 18th December, 1997. In the circumstance, there will be ad-interim order in terms of prayers clause (f) Prayer clause (f). "Pending the hearing and final disposal of the writ petition the respondents be ordered and/or directed to restore possession of the service quarter viz. 62/1845, Pant Nagar, Ghatkopar(E), Mumbai 400 075 forthwith and thereafter not to disturb the petitioner's use, enjoyment and possession in respect of the same till 27-4-1998 in any manner whatsoever." A copy of this order was duly served on the respondents. The learned Counsel for the respondents states that on 23rd December, 1997 the respondents were informed of the above order orally and on 24th December, 1997 they were informed of the said order in writing. Pursuant to the above order of this Court, the petitioner was restored back possession on 25th December, 1997. 13. On 14th January, 1998 the learned Counsel for the petitioner had informed this Court that the petitioner's possession has already been restored on 25th December, 1997. The learned Asstt. Government Pleader had informed the Court that despite his having called for instructions he had received no instructions at all. Under these circumstances this Court had directed respondents 3 and 4 to remain personally present in the Court on 16-1-1998 at 11.00 A.M. The learned Asstt. Government Pleader was directed to communicate the order to the respondents forthwith. Again on 16-1-1998 it was noted that no affidavits were filed by any of the respondents, especially by respondents 3 and 4 on that day. The learned Asstt. Government Pleader was directed to communicate the order to the respondents forthwith. Again on 16-1-1998 it was noted that no affidavits were filed by any of the respondents, especially by respondents 3 and 4 on that day. The learned Asstt. Government Pleader had assured the Court that the affidavits will be filed in this Court on 21st January, 1998 On that day (i.e. 16-1-1998) inspite of the earlier directions given by this Court on 14-1-1998 directing the respondents 3 and 4 to remain personally present they were not present on 16-1-1998, again respondents 3 and 4 were directed to remain personally present in this Court on 23rd January, 1998. 14. On 23rd January, 1998 this Court again passed an order as under: "Perused the affidavits in reply filed on behalf of the respondents. Prima facie, we are not satisfied that the action on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in ordering the petitioner's eviction, despite protection granted by the State Government on 28-10-1997 was justified. As stated earlier in our order dated 16-1-1998, the order passed by the State Government was immediately brought to the notice of the respondent No. 2 and the affidavit before us shows that the concerned D.C.P. at the Head Quarters, Mr. Vijay Kamble was aware of the said order. Despite that, he has issued the order of eviction 24-11-1997. A copy of the said order dated 24-11-1997. issued by the D.C.P. Mr. Kamble, is taken on record and marked 'x' for identification. Rule. Rule returnable peremptorily on 10-2-1998. Further affidavit in reply along with the relevant orders, and/ or communication relevant to the issue raised in the petition, to be filed by 2-2-1998. Mr. Shetye, Assistant Government Pleader waives service. The concerned Police Officers, who are present today, are directed to remain present on 10-2-1998 in this Court." 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Dhamal states that as per the order of the Government of Maharashtra issued on 28th October, 1997 the petitioner has vacated the service quarters on 28th April, 1998. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that he does not press prayer (b) which is a direction directing the respondents to restore possession of the service quarters to the petitioner forthwith. This order has been complied with by the respondents on 25th December, 1997. 16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that he does not press prayer (b) which is a direction directing the respondents to restore possession of the service quarters to the petitioner forthwith. This order has been complied with by the respondents on 25th December, 1997. There is also a prayer with regard to inventory of articles belonging to the petitioner by way of prayer (c) which also the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press. Similarly, prayer (d) also seeks restoration of possession and not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner till 27th April, 1998. This prayer also the petitioner does not press inasmuch as the petitioner himself has handed over vacant and peaceful possession of the said service quarters on 28th April, 1998. By way of prayer (e) the petitioner has prayed for a direction that the respondents or their concerned officers, agents and servants be directed to pay damages to be quantified by this Hon'ble Court to the petitioner for his forceful eviction from the service quarter and for the loss, injury as well as mental and physical torture suffered by him and the members of his family due to that. By way of prayer (ee) the petitioner has also prayed that respondents 3 to 5 be ordered and directed to pay damages personally by them quantified at Rs. 50,000/- each or such other amount as may be fixed by this Court on account of the aforesaid forceful dispossession as well as mental and physical torture suffered by the petitioner and his family members in view of the forceful eviction 18th December, 1977. 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also brought to our notice the provisions of Bombay Government Premises Eviction Act, 1955. Under section 4 of the said Act there is a detailed procedure contemplated before passing any eviction order by a competent authority under the said Act. The detailed procedure contemplates that the competent authority must issue a show cause notice why an order of eviction should not be made and the said show cause notice will also specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be issued. The person against whom such an action is to be taken, is entitled to file written statement and also file documents in support. The person against whom such an action is to be taken, is entitled to file written statement and also file documents in support. Such a person will be heard and finally, the competent authority is entitled to pass an order of eviction after considering all the materials placed before him, wherein the competent authority must give 14 clear days notice for handing over possession of the premises. Against the said order passed by the competent authority an appeal is provided to the District Judge and in case of city of Bombay before the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 is applicable to any Government premises as such even service quarters of police personnel are also governed by this Act. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the respondents purportedly taken under section 31 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is patently illegal. Section 31 authorises any authorised officer by the State Government can issue an eviction order under section 31 if the Police Officer ceases to be in service and that the Government is entitled to get the said person evicted from such premises even by using force. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that Bombay Police Act, does not exempt the provisions of Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 which was enacted subsequent to Bombay Police Act, 1951. There is also no provision in the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 that the provisions of this Act viz. The Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 will not be applicable to the service quarters belonging to the police personnel. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that apart from the fact that the acts of respondents 3 and 5 being mala fide, illegal, even otherwise the action of respondents 3 and 5 in evicting the petitioner from service quarters is without any authority of law. The learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that respondent No. 4 being a much junior officer had acted only at the behest of respondent Nos. 3 and 5 and as such does not press the case against respondent No. 4. 18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that respondent No. 4 being a much junior officer had acted only at the behest of respondent Nos. 3 and 5 and as such does not press the case against respondent No. 4. 18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out all the relevant parts of the affidavits filed by the respondents 3, 4 and 5 and contended that the illegal action on the part of the respondents 3 and 5 in evicting the petitioner and his family members from 18th December, 1997 to 25th December, 1997 is illegal and has caused severe physical and mental trauma and that the concerned Police Officers must be made to bear the damages for the same. 19. The learned Advocate General strongly contended that the provisions of Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 does not apply to the service quarters belonging to the police personnel. The main contention of the learned Advocate General is that as Bombay Police Act being a special enactment, the same would prevail over a general enactment viz., Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 applies to all kinds of Government premises whereas Bombay Police Act provisions in section 31 applies only to premises of service quarters of police personnel and as such the same ought to be prevail over the provisions of Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. In this case, this issue would be academic in the sense the petitioner has already retired on 30th April, 1997 and he has even vacated the said service quarters viz. on 28th April, 1998 and the petitioner is in no way entitled to continue to occupy the said quarters. May be in an appropriate case this issue will have to be finally resolved. In this case we are not inclined to go into the issue whether Bombay Police Act, 1951, provisions in section 31 will prevail over provisions of Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 or otherwise. The said issue is left open and we are not deciding the same. 20. The learned Advocate General has very candidly conceded that respondents 3 and 5 are very much bound by the aforesaid Government order dated 28th October, 1997 whereby the petitioner was allowed to continue in the said service quarters. The said issue is left open and we are not deciding the same. 20. The learned Advocate General has very candidly conceded that respondents 3 and 5 are very much bound by the aforesaid Government order dated 28th October, 1997 whereby the petitioner was allowed to continue in the said service quarters. Respondents 3 and 5 being Government servants under the State of Maharashtra are duty bound to follow the said order according to the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General has also very candidly stated that right course that ought to have been taken by the respondents 3 and 5 after having come to know of both the orders i.e. the order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal on 24th October, 1997 whereby the interim relief was vacated and thereafter on 28th October, 1997 the order of the Government of Maharashtra granting further time of six months to the petitioner for vacating the said service quarters, the concerned officers ought to have approached the Government of Maharashtra and got the said order suitably modified (i.e. the order dated 28th October, 1998) or cancelled etc. The learned Advocate General took us through the affidavits of respondent No. 5 dated 21st January, 1998 and a further affidavit of respondent No. 5 dated 2nd February, 1998 and 8th June 1998 and also another affidavit filed today i.e. on 11th June, 1998. On a perusal of these affidavits it is abundantly clear that the said respondent No. 5 was fully aware of the Government order dated 28th October, 1997 whereby the Government had granted an extention to the petitioner to stay in the said quarter for a period of six months. In fact in para 10 of the said affidavit the respondent No. 5 has categorically stated that Government had granted an extension by its order dtd. 28-10-1998 to the petitioner. The said respondent has also stated in para 5 of the said affidavit categorically that the said Government order of 28th October, 1997 was duly received by the Commissioner of Police, Office, Mumbai on 31st October, 1997 and also that the Building Branch had received the said order on 2nd November, 1997. It is also interesting to note that the officer goes further to state that in view of the extension granted to the petitioner no steps for eviction of the service quarters were taken by the building branch. It is also interesting to note that the officer goes further to state that in view of the extension granted to the petitioner no steps for eviction of the service quarters were taken by the building branch. This affidavit makes it clear that the respondent No. 5 had read the said order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal dated 24th October, 1997 fully and various contents in the said order are even quoted in his affidavit. The said order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal as far as eviction from the said quarters is concerned there is only one line viz. "interim relief stands vacated". There is absolutely no ambiguity in the said order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, in the sense that the interim relief granted to the petitioner that he should not be evicted stood vacated, thereafter the Government is entitled to take further steps to evict the petitioner. The order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal in no way suggests that the petitioner ought to be evicted or that the tribunal has not, in any manner, directed the Government of Maharashtra or the respondents to evict the petitioner. Whereas the respondent No. 5 has repeatedly stated in the aforesaid affidavits that he had interpreted and construed the order of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal to get the petitioner evicted from the said quarters. The respondent No. 5 goes further and states that he had interpreted the order of M.A.T. as a mandatory order of eviction therefore the order of eviction was issued by him. The respondent No. 5 in para 11 of his affidavit dtd. 21-1-1998 states as under : "I accordingly issued the order of eviction of the petitioner on 24th November, 1997 after the decision of M.A.T. It was mentioned in the order that the petitioner was granted extension by the Government till 27th April, 1998, but in view of the order passed by M.A.T. I issued the order of his eviction as per the rule." 21. In the affidavits filed today the said respondent No. 5 takes a contention that he was concerned with various kinds of activities as a Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquarters and that he was overburdened and under these circumstances respondent No. 5 claim that he had passed the said order of eviction. In the affidavits filed today the said respondent No. 5 takes a contention that he was concerned with various kinds of activities as a Deputy Commissioner of Police, Headquarters and that he was overburdened and under these circumstances respondent No. 5 claim that he had passed the said order of eviction. We are not at all satisfied with the explanations tendered by respondent No. 5 inasmuch as if the respondent No. 5 were to be overburdened with so much of work, one could understand an omission on the part of the respondent No. 5 in not passing an order or not perusing certain documents whereas in this instant case the respondent No. 5 has read the order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal in detail as he himself has quoted in extenso in his affidavit and he was also very much aware of the order of the Government of Maharashtra dated 28th October, 1997. He was also aware of the said order received by the Commissioner of Police Office on 31st October, 1997. He was also aware that the order was received by the Building Branch on 2nd November, 1997 and most pertinent aspect in this behalf is that respondent No. 5 had received the Advocate's Notice dated 13th December, 1997 on 15th December, 1997 wherein the Advocate had categorically remarked that the respondent shall not evict the petitioner by taking the law in their own hands. The said letter also annexes Government order even at that stage the respondent No. 5 could have very well cancelled the eviction order and informed the concerned police station not to act on his eviction order dtd. 24th November, 1997. There is absolutely no basis for the respondent No. 5 to contend that there is a mandatory order passed by Maharashtra Administrative Officer to evict the petitioner. Even assuming that the said respondent No. 5 had misconstrued the order to that extent, right course would have been, as the learned Advocate General had stated, he ought to have approached the Government for modification or cancellation or sought legal opinion in this behalf, inspite of hurriedly passing an eviction order. We are strongly of the view that the respondent No. 5 has acted in a very casual and irresponsible manner in passing the above order. We are strongly of the view that the respondent No. 5 has acted in a very casual and irresponsible manner in passing the above order. This is not a mere act of omission in view of the pressure of work, this is a positive act of passing an order of eviction after fully knowing the order of extension granted by the Government. This aspect is writ large even in the affidavit filed by the said officer. In fact the very order of eviction dated 24th November, 1997 mentions very clearly in the very first para as under :-- "Final permission has been granted to him till 24-4-1998 (wrongly stated as 24-4-1998 it ought to be 27-4-1998) by the Government." The said order further states that Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal has ordered to get the said quarters vacated which is factually wrong. Obviously the respondent No. 5 is fully aware of the Government order granting extension when he passed the eviction order on 24-11-1997. There is no basis whatsoever to hold that the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal had ordered that the Government quarter should be vacated. We do not agree with the learned Advocate General that the officer had acted in this manner, due to pressure of work. 22. Coming to respondent No. 3 who is a Deputy Commissioner of Police at the relevant time was posted at Zone-VI, Mumbai. We have perused the affidavit of respondent No. 3 dated 21st January, 1998 and a further affidavit filed today i.e. on 11th June, 1998. In the first affidavit the respondent No. 3 categorically states that he was fully aware of the case of the petitioner and the learned Counsels agree that in fact even before Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal this respondent No. 3 had filed an affidavit in reply contesting the claim of the petitioner. The respondent No. 3 has also given all details with regard to payments towards retirement benefits to the petitioner. As far as the Advocate's letter dated 13th December, 1997 which was received by his office on 15th December, 1997 the following are the statement made with regard to the same : "I say, after consulting my office records, that the notice dated 13-12-1997 was inwarded in my office on 15-12-1997. The said notice had as an annexure, the letter of Government dated 28-10-1997. The said notice had as an annexure, the letter of Government dated 28-10-1997. Due to a clerical misunderstanding as to the nature of the communication, the notice, after its receipt, was marked for further action to the Crime Applications Section. Hence, as is the practice, it was sent to the Senior Police Inspector, Pant Nagar Police Station on 29-12-1997 for taking necessary action and was received by that Office on 30-12-1997." 23. In today's affidavit respondent No. 3 states that during the period from 15-12-1997 to 30-12-1997 he was busy with the visits of V.I.Ps., Law Order etc. The greater emphasis was that respondent No. 3 was very much involved in security arrangement of V.I.Ps. etc. In fact, in the said affidavit respondent No. 3 has categorically stated that all letters which are received in his office are scrutinised by an inward clerk and thereafter by the headclerk and then it goes to the Administrative Officer. Respondent No. 3 also states that this reference was made by the inward clerk and head-clerk and Administrative Officer and then came to him only for a formal endorsement orders i.e. respondent No. 3 blindly signs these orders as formal endorsement orders. The respondent No. 3 also states that it is an established practice in the office of Zonal Deputy Commissioner of Police that the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police personally examines the correspondence which is originally and directly addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police whereas if the same is addressed to him only as a copy the Administrative Officer routinely decided what is to be done. In fact the said affidavit of Respondent No. 3 does not state that even after letters are addressed to him personally whether he directly reads, as he only states that it is a practice in Zonal Deputy Commissioner of Police Office. In any event, the contents of this affidavit discloses a shocking state of affairs, if the letter addressed to Deputy Commissioner of Police either directly or by way of a copy, the Deputy Commissioner of Police states that he does not bother to read what it contains, only inward clerk, head-clerk and the Administrative Officer will take a decision with regard to the same and the Deputy Commissioner of Police will only incorporate the signature as a formal endorsement order. In fact, we repeatedly asked as to why the said letter which was received by his office on 15-12-1997 was placed before him only on 29-12-1997 for his endorsement. Now today's affidavit discloses the reason that the said Deputy Commissioner of Police was all throughout busy with various other activities and he had no time at all till 29-12-1997. We also do not understand as to what is the clerical misunderstanding involved in this case. Respondent No. 3 also states that as far as the petitioner's case in M.A.T. was concerned he was fully aware of all the payments made to the petitioner and it appears that he had also filed an affidavit in the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal. Whereas with regard to the act of dispossession and again granting possession back to the petitioner as per this Court's orders, the respondent No. 3 categorically states as a Deputy Commissioner of Police Zone-VI, that he was not in any manner directly concerned with the same. On our query, the learned Advocate General fairly stated that the petitioner is directly under the control of respondent No. 3 inasmuch as the petitioner was posted in the said Zone-VI and the said Pant Nagar Police Station also comes under Zone-VI. From the perusal of both these affidavits of respondent No. 3 it is very clear that a very Senior Police Officer holding the rank of a Deputy Commissioner of Police has been absolutely callous and indifferent and has been mechanically endorsing orders passed by some lower officials without even bothering to read and understand the contents of any letter addressed to the said officer. Copy of petitioner's Advocate's letter dated 13-12-1997 was sent to the present respondent No. 3. This is a grave omission leading to a grave injury to the petitioner. We do not agree with learned Advocate General that there was no lapse on the part of respondent No. 3. 24. In this behalf, the following passages with regard to public accountability in (Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta)1, reported in 1994(3) Bom.C.R.(Cons.) 5(S.C.) were brought to our notice. "It is immaterial that the respondents had acted bona fide and in the interest of preservation of public health. Their motive may be good but their orders are illegal. 24. In this behalf, the following passages with regard to public accountability in (Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta)1, reported in 1994(3) Bom.C.R.(Cons.) 5(S.C.) were brought to our notice. "It is immaterial that the respondents had acted bona fide and in the interest of preservation of public health. Their motive may be good but their orders are illegal. They would accordingly be liable for any loss caused to the appellants by their action." "I take it, without citing cases, that it is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for doing that which the Legislature has authorised, if it be done without negligence, although it does occasion damage to anyone; but an action does lie for doing what the Legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently." "No functionary in exercise of statutory power can claim immunity, except to the extent protected by the statute itself. Public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions oppressively are accountable for their behaviour before authorities created under the statute like the commission or the courts entrusted with responsibility of maintaining the rule of law." "A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it. Compensation or damage as explained earlier may arise even when the officer discharges his duty honestly and bona fide. But when it arises due to arbitrary or capricious behaviour then it loses its individual character and assumes social significance. Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous. Crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. An ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. Therefore the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evil. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. An ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. Therefore the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evil. In may result in improving the work culture and help in changing the outlook." "In Farrington v. Thomson the Supreme Court of Victoria awarded damages for exercising a power the authorities knew they did not possess. A licensing inspector and a police officer ordered the plaintiff to close his hotel and cease supplying liquor. He obeyed and filed a suit for the resultant loss. The Court observed : "Now I take it to be perfectly clear, that if a public officer abuses his office, either by an act of omission or commission, and the consequence of that is an injury to an individual, an action may be maintained against such public officer." "But where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose? In a modern society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matter which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. Public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority." 25. Similarly our attention was drawn to another judgment of the Apex Court in (Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India and others)2, reported in 1996(4) Bom.C.R. 519 (S.C.). The Supreme Court in its judgment in para 26 has dealt with this aspect of public accountability as under :--- 'With the change in socio-economic outlook, the public servants are being entrusted with more and more discretionary powers even in the field of distribution of Government wealth in various forms. The Supreme Court in its judgment in para 26 has dealt with this aspect of public accountability as under :--- 'With the change in socio-economic outlook, the public servants are being entrusted with more and more discretionary powers even in the field of distribution of Government wealth in various forms. We take it to be perfectly clear, that if a public servant abuses his office either by an act of omission or commission, and the consequence of that is injury to an individual or loss of 'public property', an action may be maintained against such public servant. No public servant can say "You may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you cannot hold me personally liable". No public servant can arrogate to himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary.' From the above it is very clear that a public servant who abuses his office either by an act of omission or commission, and the consequence of that is an injury to an individual or loss of public property, an action may be maintained against such public servant. No public servant can say "you may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you cannot hold me personally liable". No public servant can arrogate to himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. In the instant case respondent Nos. 3 and 5 are precisely seeking to do the same. 26. Similarly in another case the Apex Court has held in (Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of India)3, reported in 1997(1) Bom.C.R. 636 (S.C.) as under:- "8. This Court has authoritatively laid down in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa that damages can be awarded by this Court in proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Salve has taken us through the Privy Council judgment in Rookes v. Barnard. Lord Devlin in his opinion has held that exemplary damages can be awarded for "oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional action by the servants of the Government". Mr. Salve has also taken us through the judgment of the Court of Appeal in A.B. v. South West Water Services Ltd. Broome case was elaborately discussed and relied upon in this judgment. Lord Devlin in his opinion has held that exemplary damages can be awarded for "oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional action by the servants of the Government". Mr. Salve has also taken us through the judgment of the Court of Appeal in A.B. v. South West Water Services Ltd. Broome case was elaborately discussed and relied upon in this judgment. It would be useful to quote the relevant part of the opinion by Stuart-Smith, L.J., 1993(1) All E.R. p. 616 g. 'The first category is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the Government.' It is common ground that this category of persons is not limited to the servants of Central Government, but includes servants of local Government and the police. 9. In Broome v. Cassell Co. Ltd. (AC at pp. 1077-78) Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. said: '....I would be surprised if it included only servants of the Government in the strict sense of the word. It would, in my view, obviously apply to the police ... and almost as certainly to local and other officials exercising improperly rights of search or arrest without warrant, and it may be that in the future it will be held to include other abuses of power without warrant by persons purporting to exercise legal authority.' " In this case also the Supreme Court has made it clear that as far as public accountability is concerned the common ground that this category of persons is not limited to the servants of Central Government, but includes servants of local Government and the police. 27. The learned Advocate General relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in (State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh)4, 1994(4) S.C.C. 430, to contend that costs should not be imposed on respondents 3 and 5. Facts in that case were totally different, in the sense, it was a case of delay in discharging duty by a public servant, and delay in compliance of Court's orders. The Supreme Court had declined to interfere with the High Court Order imposing costs. The above case has no application to the present case. 28. Facts in that case were totally different, in the sense, it was a case of delay in discharging duty by a public servant, and delay in compliance of Court's orders. The Supreme Court had declined to interfere with the High Court Order imposing costs. The above case has no application to the present case. 28. As far as the petitioner's claim for damages as per prayer (e) and prayer (ee) of the writ petition, in the facts and circumstances of this case, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be an appropriate remedy to award the damages and quantify the same. Therefore, liberty is granted to the petitioner to file an appropriate suit for damages in this behalf. By prayer (a) of the petition, the petitioner has prayed that the high-handed forcible dispossession from service quarters committed by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 dated 18-12-1997 be declared null and void and illegal. We are inclined to grant this prayer (a). Whereas prayers (b), (c) and (d) of the petition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press the same. As far as prayers (e) and (ee) we have already granted liberty to the petitioner to file an appropriate suit for damages. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) only. The learned Counsel for petitioner has submitted that though damages may not be awarded but there has to be an award of some amount of costs, in view of public accountability, especially by respondent Nos. 3 and 5, being Senior Police Officers. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel to maintain and uphold the concept of public accountability it would be appropriate and we do hereby direct respondent Nos. 3 and 5 to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/- each by way of costs to the petitioner, personally out of their own funds within a period of two weeks from today. 29. Rule accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer (a). At this stage the learned Asstt. Government pleader orally applies for stay of this order for six weeks. We see no reason to stay this order. Hence the oral application is rejected. 30. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of the judgment duly authenticated by the Shirestedar of this Court. 31. Certified copy expedited. Rule made absolute. *****