Judgment A.K.Ganguly, J. 1. Since there was some urgency in the matter, the , matter was heard at some length at the admission stage itself and is being disposed of by this judgment. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the notification No. 236 dated 16.7.1997, as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, issued under the signature of respondent No. 3, the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Bihar, Patna. Under the said notification dated 16.7.1997 tie appointment of respondent No. 4 Dr. Shekhar Choudhary to Nalanda Medical College Hospital, Patna in the Eye Department as an Assistant Professor from 1993 panel has been ordered. 2. The main ground of challenge to the said appointment by the petitioner is based on the interpretation of the advertisement notice. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the appointment of respondent No. 4 could not have been made possible but for relaxation of his teaching experience by 23 days. 3. According to the petitioner the cut off date for counting teaching experience is 31st January, 1993 and on that date respondent No. 4 had not completed three years teaching experience. Learned Counsel further states that this requirement of three years teaching experience is an essential qualification fixed by the Medical Council of India and the said qualification cannot be relaxed in favour of respondent No. 4. In support of the said submission learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on Annexure-3 which purports to be the recommendation of the Medical Council of India on the Teachers and Visiting physicians/Surgeons etc. in Medical Colleges and attached Hospitals for undergraduate and post-graduate teaching. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to a chart showing the required academic qualification for the post of Reader/Assistant Professor on the subject Ophthalmology required by the Medical Council of India. There are two categories. The first category is about the educational qualification and second category is about the teaching experience and in the said teaching experience it has been stated that at least three years teaching experience in Ophthalmology or allied subjects in a teaching institution is required. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the advertisement notice there are provisions of relaxation in Clause 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the advertisement notice there are provisions of relaxation in Clause 9. In the said provision it has been made very clear that there cannot be any change of relaxation in the essential qualification provided by the Medical Council of India authorities. 4. The word Aharta came up for some interpretation in the context of Clause 9 of the advertisement and the power of relaxation by the State Government. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that by the word Aharta it may mean qualification but such qualification is not necessarily confined to educational qualification alone. Such qualification may also include the educational qualification plus teaching experience. In other words learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present context Aharta means eligibility and in support of the said contention learned Counsel referred to Article 58 of the Constitution of India. Article 58 of the Constitution prescribes the eligibility condition for election for the post of President. The learned Counsel submits that in an authorised Hindi version of Article 58 of the Constitution the word eligible has been translated as Aharta. Therefore, relying on the said translation, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that here also the teaching experience should be included within the expression Aharta to mean eligibility conditions. Therefore, on a proper interpretation of Clause 9 of the advertisement, it should mean that the State Government has no power of relaxation of teaching experience which is ah eligibility condition fixed by the Medical Council of India for the post of Assistant Professor in question. 5. With great respect, this Court is unable to accept the said interpretation given by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Though this Court must admit that this interpretation is certainly attractive at its first blush. But a closer scrutiny of the conditions in the advertisement notice would make it clear that the State Government has reserved its right to relax the requirement relating to points as would appear from Clause 3(W) of the said advertisement notice and it also appears that the teaching experience which is separately dealt with under Clause 21(6) of the said advertisement notice makes it clear that for teaching experience points are to be allotted. Since State Governments power to relax matters relating to points cannot be doubted, it necessarily follows that the State Government has power to relax the requirement about teaching experience. 6. It is not in dispute that in the instant case respondent No. 4 had fallen short of 23 days for completing three years teaching experience on the cut off date. The said short fall of 23 days has been relaxed by the State Government in exercise of its power which is reserved in the said advertisement notice. If the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then the rawer of relaxation of the State Government is virtually rendered nugatory. But since the power of relaxation has been given in express terms both in Clauses 3 and 9 of the advertisement notice, the Court must accept an interpretation which preserves the said power of relaxation and will not interpreter the said clause in a manner which renders the said power of relaxation completely nugatory and otiose. So following this very cardinal principle of interpretation, this Court accepts the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents that in this context Aharta would mean educational qualification. 7. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 4 has the requisite educational qualification and there has been no relaxation in respect of educational qualification of respondent No. 4 and the educational qualification which respondent No. 4 possess satisfies the requirement fixed in the regulations by the Medical Council of India. 8. Apart from that it the matter is examined from another angle, I presume that the power of relaxation always presupposes a situation in which a requirement which is to be relaxed is otherwise almost satisfied. It is only a marginal short fall which can be relaxed. By power of relaxation a requirement which id never attained cannot be relaxed. As for instance if a persons does not have an educational qualification at all, that deficiency cannot be relaxed. But if the teaching experience of a person is falling short say by 10 days or 15 days or 20 days or one month, such a shortfall admits of relaxation. 9. As for instance if a persons does not have an educational qualification at all, that deficiency cannot be relaxed. But if the teaching experience of a person is falling short say by 10 days or 15 days or 20 days or one month, such a shortfall admits of relaxation. 9. So following this parity of reason, this Court accepts the interpretation put forward by the learned Counsel for the State which has been adopted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 that in the instant case it was within the power of the State Government to condone the short fall of 23 days teaching experience by exercising their power of relaxation. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on two judgments in support of his contention that such power of relaxation cannot be exercised. One of them was in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. V/s. Ramjee Prasad and Ors. reported in -- . In the said case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court found that the High Court was wrong in specifying a different cut off date than the one mentioned in the advertisement notice. This Court, with great respect to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is of the view the decision in the case of State of Bihar (supra) was on a different factual basis and has no application here. Here the State Government has not at all tinkered with the cut off date while exercising its power of relaxation. The other judgment which has been cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Shainda Hasan V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. . In that case the learned Judges considered the question of relaxation of qualification in the absence of statutory rules and in the absence of any indication in the advertisement that such power of relaxation of qualification is possible. But in the instant case the advertisement notice specifically reserves States power of relaxation in favour of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes candidates and it is not in dispute that respondent No. 4 is a Scheduled Caste candidate. So the ratio in the case of Shainda Hasan (supra) is also not attracted. 11. But in the instant case the advertisement notice specifically reserves States power of relaxation in favour of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes candidates and it is not in dispute that respondent No. 4 is a Scheduled Caste candidate. So the ratio in the case of Shainda Hasan (supra) is also not attracted. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondents has also urged another contention that there are 28 posts of Assistant Professor, Eye and out of that four post are reserved for Scheduled Castes and three posts for Scheduled Tribes but no Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes candidates were posted against those seven posts from before. Therefore, it was categorically stated in the counter affidavit that it was compulsory for the State Government to post a Scheduled Caste candidate in one of such vacancies. Considering all these facts and circumstances, the short fall of 23 days teaching experience was relaxed in favour of respondent No. 4 as the Government was bound to fill up one vacancy by the person belonging to reserved category in the light of the provisions of the Reservation Act. 12. On a perusal of the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (For Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1991 (hereinafter called the said Act) it appears from Secs. 4(5) and 4(6)(e) that the vacancies reserved for the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes shall not be filled up by the candidates not belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes except as otherwise provided in this Act, and in case of non-availability of suitable candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for appointment and promotion in vacancies reserved for them, the vacancies shall continue to be received for three recruitment years and if suitable candidates are not available even in the third years the vacancies shall be exchanged between the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the vacancies so filled by exchange shall be treated as reserved for the candidate for that particular community who are actually appointed. Sub-clause (e) of Sub-sec. Sub-clause (e) of Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 4 of the said Act makes it further clear that if the required number of candidates of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Extremely Backward and Backward Classes are not available for filling up the reserved vacancies, fresh advertisement may be made only for the candidates belonging to the members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Extremely Backward and Backward Classes, as the case may be, to till the backlog vacancies only. 13. Relying on these provisions, learned Counsel for the State submits that in any event reserved vacancies for Scheduled Castes candidates cannot be offered to the petitioner. Even if the appointment in favour of respondent No. 4 is quashed, it will have to be converted in accordance with the aforesaid provisions relating to the members of the reserved category. Therefore, the petitioner will not be, in any way benefited. This Court finds that there is a lot of substance in the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the State. 14. Taking all these facts into account and for the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court is unable to pass any order in favour of the petitioner. The Court cannot persuade itself to pass any order in favour of the petitioner. This Court however records its appreciation of the very able assistance received from the learned Counsel for the parties. 15. This writ petition is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.