Judgment : The defendants are the appellants in the second appeal. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the defendants are the tenants in respect of the suit property and for possession etc. .3. The case of the plaintiff was that the suit property belonged to one Parthasarathy Naidu. He built up a thatched hut and let it out to the first defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.10. Thereafter, he filed R.C.O.P.No.497 of 1979, for eviction. The first defendant denied his title and the Rent Controller found that the denial was bona fide. But the first defendant did not deny the title of Parthasarathy Naidu to the land. On 13. 1981, the plaintiff purchased the land from Parthasarathy Naidu. The plaintiff sent a notice calling upon the defendants to surrender vacant possession. Since they failed to do so, he filed the suit. 4. The defence was that the first defendant was the daughter of Parthasarathy Naidu. At the time of her marriage, Parthasarathy Naidu gifted the land to the first defendant. He promised to execute a gift deed and in the mean time permitted the first defendant to put up a hut. The first defendant constructed the superstructure and she is paying tax to the building. The defendants have prescribed title. The notice is not valid. The defendants are not liable to pay rent. The plaintiff has no title also. 5. The trial court considered the evidence in detail and found in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the suit was decreed as prayed for with costs. He also directed the future mesne profits could be worked out separately. 6. On appeal, the XI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, has almost confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial court, but however he found that the superstructure was put up by the first defendant; hence, the plaintiff should either pay the value of the same or he give them a chance to remove the superstructure. He also held that the defendants were not tenants. He rejected the claim of damage for use and occupation. .7. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the Rent Controller has already found that the first defendant was not the tenant, the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession treating the first defendant as tenant is not maintainable. He rejected the claim of damage for use and occupation. .7. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the Rent Controller has already found that the first defendant was not the tenant, the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession treating the first defendant as tenant is not maintainable. Secondly, it was contended that, the courts have erred in not finding that there was an oral gift. Thirdly, it is contended that since the defendants are the owners of the superstructure, the sale in favour of the plaintiff by Parthasarathy Naidu, including the Superstructure is not valid. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the superstructure has been put up by the defendants and lower appellate court has accepted the claim of the defendants, the plaintiff should be directed to sell the land to the defendants. 8. Mr.S.V.Jayaraman and Mr.N.Maninarayanan, learned counsels appearing for the respondent contended that the finding of the Rent Controller will not operate as res judicata. They also contended that there was no plea raised in the lower court that the defendants were entitled to purchase the land. 9. The oral gift is pleaded by the defendants. The defendants themselves have admitted that the land was purchased for a sum of Rs.900. Therefore, an immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 cannot be conveyed by way of gift without a registered document. Both the courts have concurrently found that the oral gift has not been proved. As regards the superstructure, the lower appellate court has found that with the permission of Parthasarathy Naidu, the defendants have put up the superstructure and live in it. Relying upon Exs.B-7 to B-11, the lower appellate court has come to this conclusion. That apart, in the rent control proceedings as evidenced by Exs.A-2, A-3 and A-4 the Rent Controller has found that the claim for superstructure by the defendants was bona fide. Therefore, the lower appellate court has rightly found that the superstructure belonged to the defendants. But that does not mean that since the superstructure belongs to the defendants, they cannot be evicted from the land. Even in Ex.A-2, the plaintiff has claimed to be tenants of both land and superstructure. But the defendants claim that they are not tenants of the land, but it was orally gifted. But that does not mean that since the superstructure belongs to the defendants, they cannot be evicted from the land. Even in Ex.A-2, the plaintiff has claimed to be tenants of both land and superstructure. But the defendants claim that they are not tenants of the land, but it was orally gifted. As we have seen above, the oral gift has not been proved and the same cannot be accepted in the absence of a valid registered document. Therefore, the defendants can either be treated as tenant or permissive occupiers. In either case, the plaintiff has issued a notice under Ex.A-4 to vacate. In the said notice, the plaintiff has treated the defendants as tenants and the tenancy has been terminated. But the same notice can be construed as one terminating the permission also, even if the defendants are treated as permissive occupiers of the land. The definite case of the defendants is that they are not the tenants of the land and the superstructure. Therefore, they cannot claim right under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act also. .10. The next question to consider is whether the defendants cannot be evicted at all from the land, since they have put up the superstructure with the permission of the plaintiff’s vendor Parthasarathy Naidu. It cannot also be denied that the superstructure was put up by the defendants with the knowledge and consent of Parthasarathy Naidu. It is also worthwhile to note that the first defendant is the daughter of the said Parthasarathy Naidu, while the second defendant is his son-in-law as he married the first defendant. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants cited the following decisions: (1) Venkataswami Naidu v. Muniappa Mudaliar, (1949)2 M.L.J. 406 : A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 53. (2) A.C.C. Ltd. v. Ramakrishana, A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 318 and (3) Palanivelu v. Varadammal, 90 L. W. 531 and contended that if a person builds superstructure upon another man’s land and if the other person does not object to the construction and acquiesce in the action of the other person, the person i.e., the owner of the land cannot claim delivery of the land from the person who put up the superstructure. 12. In Venkataswami Naidu v. Muniappa Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 12. In Venkataswami Naidu v. Muniappa Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 53, a single Judge of this court has held as follows: “Could it be said that in a situation like this, having allowed defendant 1 to expend the money and build a substantial structure on the property in the bona fide belief that the land would become his on the fulfillment of certain conditions, Duraiswami Naidu can turn round and say that defendant 1 has no legal title and that the property should be surrendered to him or to his alienee? Following the well known dicta contained in the various cases mentioned by me above, the only answer that could be given to it is that Duraiswami Naidu could not; and if he could not, the plaintiffs, who are not even bona fide purchasers, are prevented from claiming any higher rights.” In the present case, the defendants claim that Parthasarathy Naidu gifted the land to them and on that basis they put up the superstructure. It has been found that the case of gift is not proved. In the circumstances, it is for the defendants to prove on what terms they put up the superstructure. As we have seen above, the construction could have been only permitted by Parthasarathy Naidu. In the case cited, the facts are the land was purchased for the benefit of the first defendant by the plaintiff. But the first defendant was to pay the purchase money to the plaintiff with interest thereon. In that situation, the defendant put up the superstructure and the plaintiff did not object to the same. A learned single Judge of this Court applied the rule of equitable estoppel, since the plaintiff allowed the defendant to put up the construction in the belief that the property was his and that he should only pay the purchase price to him. In spite of that, the plaintiff did not raise his little finger to object to the construction of the building. Therefore, the learned Judge has directed the payment of the value of the land to be fixed by the Commissioner. But in this case, the claim of the defendant is that the land was gifted to her and the superstructure was built up with that hope. When the first defendant’s case is found to be false, the question of equitable estoppel does not arise at all in this case. 13. But in this case, the claim of the defendant is that the land was gifted to her and the superstructure was built up with that hope. When the first defendant’s case is found to be false, the question of equitable estoppel does not arise at all in this case. 13. In A.C.C. Ltd. v. Ramakrishana, A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 318, a Division Bench of this Court has applied the principle of equitable estoppel. In the said case, a person bona fide thinking himself to be the owner of the land spent money upon it while the true owner was standing and allowed him to spend money for the improvements, upon his land. Hence, the Bench held that the latter would be estopped from asserting his title to the land as against the person bona fide believing the property to be his and was making improvements. In the present case, we have found that at the most the defendants would be permissive occupiers of the land and not trespassers. The facts of the said case is not applicable to the present case. 14. In Palanivelu v. Varadammal, 90 L. W. 531, it was held that when the owner of the land has not done anything when the defendant put up a building on a portion of the land after committing trespass, the learned Judge held that the defendant could not have put up the building in a hurry and the same would have taken several months for the defendants to complete and yet the plaintiff did not object. Further in the suit filed by the plaintiff, there is no prayer for mandatory injunction for removal of the superstructure. Therefore, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff should be compensated for the value of the trespassed portion only. The facts of this case is also not helpful to the appellant. Therefore, the aforesaid case is not helpful to the appellants. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants has also raised a plea of res judicata. According to him, the Rent Controller has refused to order eviction. The control court as a court of limited jurisdiction is governed by the principle of res judicata as per Explanation 8 to Sec. 11 of Civil Procedure Code. 16. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants has also raised a plea of res judicata. According to him, the Rent Controller has refused to order eviction. The control court as a court of limited jurisdiction is governed by the principle of res judicata as per Explanation 8 to Sec. 11 of Civil Procedure Code. 16. First of all, eviction was refused in the Rent Control Proceedings on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute with reference to the title to the superstructure and the landlord failed to prove his title to the building. As the relationship of landlord and tenant was disputed, the Rent Controller found that the petition could not be entertained. The finding in that case is that the title to the suit property is defective. I am not able to appreciate that the said finding and that order will operate as res judicata. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Rent Controller is a civil court having limited jurisdiction, it is well settled now that the Rent Control Court is not a court. Therefore, the argument that the finding of the Rent Controller will operate as res judicata is unsustainable. 17. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is correct. Hence, no interference is called for. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed, However, there will be no order as to costs.