Judgment :- P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. This Second Appeal is by the first defendant. Defendant No. 4 in the suit who is respondent No. 4 herein and who remained exparte in both the courts is reported dead when the matter was taken up for hearing. Since he was exparte in the courts below and he has not been given any relief by either of the courts and he has acquiesced even in the dismissal of the suit by the trial court I hold that it is not necessary to implead his legal representatives in this Second Appeal for a proper disposal of this Second Appeal. 2. Plaintiff is the son of one Kunhahammed. Defendant No. 2 is the widow of Kunhahammed. Defendants 3 to 8 are the children of Kunhahammed. through the second defendant. The first defendant in the suit is the brother of defendant No. 2. Defendants 9 to 12 are the sisters of defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1. The father of defendants 1, 2 and 9 to 12 was one Moosa Haji. The plaint schedule property belonged to Kunhahammed. He had mortgaged the property to a marketing society for a sum of Rs. 8000. It appears that Kunhahammed had also incurred other liabilities and one such liability was the amounts due to one Kanaran Nair. The plaintiff on the finding now rendered was born on 30.7.1956. On 13.3.1963, the plaint schedule property was sold by defendant No. 2 wife of Kunhahammed and defendants 3 and 4 with defendant No. 4 acting also as the guardian of defendants 5 to 8 and the plaintiff who were minors at that time to Moosa Haji father of defendant No. 2 as per Ext. A2. This was for the avowed object of discharging the liabilities of Kunhahammed and to save the other properties of Kunhahammed which had come into the hands of his heirs, defendant No. 2, defendants 3 to 8 and the plaintiff. Moosa Haji in his turn sold one half of the property acquired by him under Ext. A2 to his son the first defendant. Moosa Haji died and his heirs including the first defendant divided the properties. The balance property included in Ext. A2 sale deed was also allotted to the share of the first defendant. Thus the entire property covered by Ext. A2 sale deed came into the hands of the first defendant. 3. A2 to his son the first defendant. Moosa Haji died and his heirs including the first defendant divided the properties. The balance property included in Ext. A2 sale deed was also allotted to the share of the first defendant. Thus the entire property covered by Ext. A2 sale deed came into the hands of the first defendant. 3. The plaintiff filed the suit on 18.3.1981 for partition and delivery to him of 14/94 share therein after ignoring the sale deed Ext. A2 alleged to have been executed on his behalf with past profits and for other consequential reliefs. The plaintiff pleaded that on the date of the transaction Ext. A2 he was a minor, that being Mohammedans his brother defendant No. 2 was not competent to represent him as a guardian or to sell the property on his behalf, that defendant No. 4 himself was a minor on the date of Ext. A2 sale deed, that Ext. A2 sale deed was executed without bonafides and not for any necessity or benefit to the heirs of Kunhahammed including the plaintiff, that since the transaction was void qua his share, plaintiff was entitled to ignore the same and he was entitled to relief. In the plaint the plaintiff contended that he was born on 18.3.1960 and the suit was being filed within three years of his attaining majority (the last day of expiry of three years from cessation of minority). The first defendant resisted the suit contending that the sale was bonafide, was supported by consideration, that defendant No. 4 was a major on the date of that sale deed, 13.3.1963, that out of the proceeds debts binding on Kunhahammed and on his heirs were discharged and other properties of Kuhahammed saved, that Moosa Haji was a bonafide purchaser of the property, that the allegations against the sale deed were untrue and that the suit was ill-conceived. The first defendant also contended that the suit was barred by limitation and also raised a terse plea in paragraph 26 of the written statement that if it was found that the plaintiff has any right in the property, the same was barred by adverse possession. 4. As noticed, on an appreciation of the evidence, the trial court held that the plaintiff was born on 30.7.1956 and his disability as a minor ceased on 30.7.1974. 4. As noticed, on an appreciation of the evidence, the trial court held that the plaintiff was born on 30.7.1956 and his disability as a minor ceased on 30.7.1974. This finding was not interfered with by the lower appellate Court and was accepted by that Court. Before me though counsel for the plaintiff made an attempt to challenge the said finding in support of the decree granted to the plaintiff by the lower appellate Court, I am not satisfied that there is any justification in interfering with that finding in this Second Appeal. The said finding has been rendered on the basis of the reliance placed on the birth register extract relating to the plaintiff marked as Exts B1 and B1 (a). The decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Jose (1989 (1) KLT 296) also indicate that it is preferable to place reliance on the birth register provided the identity of the individual is established as against the school admission register that may be relied on. The courts below have done exactly that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case especially in the light of the failure of the plaintiff to adduce proper evidence to show that he was born only on 18.3.1960 as claimed by him in the face of the age shown in the document and the failure of at least the mother of the plaintiff, defendant No. 2 to go to the box to speak to the date on which the plaintiff, her son was born. I may also notice that Kunhahammed himself died in the year 1959 and if one were to accept the date of birth given by the plaintiff in the plaint, the plaintiff must be a posthumous son. There is no such case for the parties and therefore, the finding that the plaintiff was born on 30.7.1956 going by the entry in the birth register is perfectly justified. I accept that finding. 5. The trial court held that the transaction of sale Ext. A2 was not shown to be not bonafide. That court found that Kunhahammed died leaving debts, that what was done was to try and save the properties of Kuhahammed for his heirs including his wife and children, that the document Ext. I accept that finding. 5. The trial court held that the transaction of sale Ext. A2 was not shown to be not bonafide. That court found that Kunhahammed died leaving debts, that what was done was to try and save the properties of Kuhahammed for his heirs including his wife and children, that the document Ext. A2 was supposed by consideration and necessity and that the amount realised by that sale was utilised for discharge of debts with a view to save the heirs of Kunhahammed from losing their other assets and that the plaintiff has not succeeded in his challenge to the sale deed on any of the grounds set up by him in the plaint. But the trial court found that since the plaintiff was a Mohammedan minor as on the date of Ext. A2 sale on 13.3.1983 and since defendant No. 4 was only his brother and not his legal guardian recognised by Mohammedan Law, the sale of the share of the plaintiff under Ext. A2 was void and could be ignored by the plaintiff. That this position is correct is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed (AIR 1952 SC 358). 6. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation, the same having been filed by the plaintiff beyond three years of his attaining majority on 30.7.1974 and beyond 12 years of the sale deed Ext. A2 dated. 13.3.1963. As we have noticed, the suit was filed only on 18.3.1981. The lower appellate court, in the appeal by the plaintiff agreed with the trial court in holding that the sale deed was supported by consideration and was executed with a view to pay off the creditors of Kunhahammed. and with a view to save the other properties of Kunhahammed. and the sale deed was not liable to be challenged on the grounds mentioned in the plaint. But the appellate court took the view that since the plaintiff was a minor as on the date of ' Ext. A2 and since the transaction was void in so far as it related to his share and the plaintiff was not obliged to file a suit to set aside the document, the plaintiffs suit filed within 12 years of attaining majority was in time since the applicatory Article was Art.65 of the Limitation Act. A2 and since the transaction was void in so far as it related to his share and the plaintiff was not obliged to file a suit to set aside the document, the plaintiffs suit filed within 12 years of attaining majority was in time since the applicatory Article was Art.65 of the Limitation Act. The Appellate Court took the view that the starting point of adverse possession against a minor is the date of his attaining majority and as such the suit filed within 12 years of the attaining of majority must be held to be not barred. In that view the lower appellate court reversed the decree of the trial court and granted the plaintiff a decree. Without any discussion or advertence to that aspect specifically, the lower appellate court also proceeded to declare that defendants 5 to 8 were also entitled to 14/9 6 shares each. The lower appellate court ultimately passed a preliminary decree for partition. The first defendant challenges this preliminary decree. 7. Learned counsel for the first defendant contended that on the finding, the suit was instituted beyond three years of the date of attaining majority by the plaintiff and beyond 12 years of the impugned transaction of sale and hence the suit was clearly barred by limitation. According to counsel time started to run against the minor from the date of the void sale deed Ext. A2 and 12 years having elapsed therefrom, the suit was out of time even applying Art.65 of the Limitation Act. Counsel further contended that under S.6 of the Limitation Act read with S.8 of the Act the plaintiff would get only an extended period of limitation by three years from the date of his attaining majority and the suit not having been filed within three years of attaining majority, the suit must be held to be barred. Counsel submitted that the view adopted by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff would have a further period of 12 years from the date of his attaining majority on 30.7.1974 was incorrect and since the said view was substantially erroneous in law, an interference was called for with the said decision in this Second Appeal. Counsel submitted that the view adopted by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff would have a further period of 12 years from the date of his attaining majority on 30.7.1974 was incorrect and since the said view was substantially erroneous in law, an interference was called for with the said decision in this Second Appeal. Learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand contended that since the transaction of sale was void, the plaintiff was not obliged to seek the setting aside of the sale deed wholly or in so far as it relates to his share and since the Article of the Limitation Act applicable is Art.65, it was for the first defendant to plead and prove a case there was no sufficient pleading and no evidence at all of any adverse possession. Counsel further contended that by the assignment Ext. A2 Moosa Haji the predecessor of the first defendant had stepped into the shoes of the other co-owners with the plaintiff and since the possession of Moosa Haji is traceable to his lawful title as a co-owner, in the absence of pleading and evidence of any ouster, the decree passed by the lower appellate court was justified. Counsel also contended that as against a minor time would not run under Art.65 of the Limitation Act and the suit filed within 12 years of attaining majority cannot be defeated by holding that the suit is barred by Art.65 of the Limitation Act. 8. There cannot be any doubt that Ext. A2 sale deed, in so far as it relates to the share of the plaintiff is void and the plaintiff is not obliged to seek the setting aside of that sale deed. It is also clear that the suit was filed only beyond 12 years of the date of the transaction of sale on 13.3.1963. On the finding it is also clear that the disability of the plaintiff as a minor ceased on 30.7.1974. The suit was filed only on 18.3.1981. The question is whether under the circumstances the plaintiff has 12 years from 30.7.1974 to file the suit for recovery of his share by way of partition or otherwise. 9. On the finding it is also clear that the disability of the plaintiff as a minor ceased on 30.7.1974. The suit was filed only on 18.3.1981. The question is whether under the circumstances the plaintiff has 12 years from 30.7.1974 to file the suit for recovery of his share by way of partition or otherwise. 9. The lower appellate court relied on the decision in Sankaran Nair v. Govindan (1982 KLT 948) to hold that in a case where the plaintiff was not called upon to seek the setting aside of an alienation, neither Art.59 nor Art.60 of the Limitation Act can have any application to a suit for recovery of possession. The only Article of the Limitation Act applicable to such a suit was Art.65 of the Limitation Act as per which the period of limitation was 12 years from the date on which possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff. There cannot be any quarrel with this proposition. The lower appellate court also relied on the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Hajarummal v. Suhara Beevi (1963 KLT 105). In that decision, the learned judge overruled the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiffs that no time under the Limitation Act can run against a minor during his minority. The learned judge relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in Seetha Rama Raju v. Subba Raju (ILR 45 Mad. 361) and Mf. Maltibaiv. Wamanrao Shear am (AIR 1948 Nag 253) held that under the Limitation Act minority does not by itself prevent time from running against the minor; in such cases only an extended period of limitation is provided. After so holding in the concluding portion of the judgment the court found that the brother of a Mohammedan (there also it was a Mohammedan) was not a legal guardian and the brother of the deceased father had taken the sale deed knowing that fully. The possession of the brother of the father in that case was only as the agent or bailiff of the minors and hence the suit filed within 12 years of the property being sold to a stranger was not barred. The possession of the brother of the father in that case was only as the agent or bailiff of the minors and hence the suit filed within 12 years of the property being sold to a stranger was not barred. It has to be noted here that in that case there was a finding that the purchaser, the paternal uncle was in the position of an agent or bailiff of the minors and the suit was laid within 12 years of the property passing into the hands of a stranger by a sale by a purported guardian. What is contended by counsel for the first defendant is that having held that time would run against a minor even under Art.65 of the Limitation Act, the learned judge in that case was not correct in holding that the minor had a further period of 12 years from the date of attaining majority and that there was no discussion on that aspect in the judgment and there was no plea in the present case that the maternal grand father Moosa Haji the purchaser of the property was holding the property on behalf of the minors or as agent or bailiff of the minor plaintiff. 10. When a sale is illegal and void, the possession of the vendee thereunder is thereafter prima facie adverse to the vendor and after the expiry of 12 years from the date of assignment, the vendee will acquire a title by prescription. If there is nothing in the Limitation Act which precludes the running of time against a minor, the cause of action in the present case must be taken to have arisen on 13.3.1963, the date of the sale deed Ext. A2 and the time would start to run even against the minor plaintiff from that date subject of course to the other rights available to the minor under the Limitation Act in view of his disability at the point of time at which the cause of action for him arose. S.6 of the Limitation Act provides that where a person entitled to institute a suit is at the time from which the prescribed periods to be reckoned a minor, he may institute the suit within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore, in the third column of the schedule. S.8 of the Limitation Act in a sense limits the period so available to a person entitled to rely on S.6(1) of the Limitation Act. S.8 provides that nothing in S.6 of the Act shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability, the period of limitation for a suit. Reading Ss.6 and 8 of the Limitation Act together, if one were to proceed on the basis that the cause of action for the minor to recover the share of the property included in Ext. A2 sale deed accrued to him on 13.3.1963, the date of the sale effected by the defacto pretended guerdon, the plaintiff would have only a further period of three years to sue from the date when his disability ceased on 30.7.1974 since 12 years from 13.3.1963 the date of the impugned sale deed would have expired by 14.3.1975. In other words even if the plaintiff could have sued within 12 years of the transaction itself even if he had attained majority prior to the expiry of three years from the date of suit, in the present case he would have to rely only upon the benefits conferred on him by S.6 of the Act subject to the limitation provided for in S.8 of the Act. Controversy arose before this Court whether under such circumstances suit has to be instituted within three years of attaining majority or whether the plaintiff would have 12 years from the date of attaining majority to institute the suit. A Full Bench of this Court in Indira Filial v. Kesavan Channar (1968 KLT 673 (FB)) considered that question. The majority speaking through Mr. Justice K. K. Mathew (as he then was) held that what S.6 of the Act had done was not to give a fresh starting point of limitation, but to extend the period of limitation prescribed in the First Schedule. The Section did not prevent the running of time as against a person under disability. S.6 of the Act only meant that the person under disability was entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period mentioned in the Schedule calculated from the cessation of his minority subject to the limitation mentioned in S.8 of the Act. After referring to the decision of the Madras High Court in Seeta Rama Raju v. Subba Raju (ILR 45 Mad. After referring to the decision of the Madras High Court in Seeta Rama Raju v. Subba Raju (ILR 45 Mad. 361) and other relevant decisions the majority held that under S.8 of the Act a plaintiff under disability cannot get more than three years from the cessation of disability to file the suit. It may be noted that His Lordship Justice P.T. Raman Nair (as he then was) disagreed with this view and held that the person under disability would have a further period of 12 years from the date of cessation of his disability to file the suit. In the light of this Full Bench decision it may not be possible to wholly accept the inclusion recorded in Hajarummal v. Suhara Beevi (1963 KLT 105) by the learned judge that the suit having been filed within 12 years of the subsequent alienation the suit was within time. 11. It appears to me that the question whether a further period of 12 years from the cessation of disability will be available to a minor by recourse to S.6 of the Limitation Act is concluded by at least two decisions of the Supreme Court. But before referring to those decisions I may advert to one of the decisions relied on by Earned counsel for She defendant reported in Chinaia v. Kattayya (AIR 1978 Mad. 51). The learned judge held thus: "Though prima facie under Art.65 read with S.6(1) of the Limitation Act, suit for recovery of possession could be filed by the minor within 12 years from the date when he attained the age of majority, in cases where the transaction was void, by reason of S.8, such a suit will have to be filed within three years of attaining the age of majority and the minor could not claim the extended period of 12 years. The period of limitation therefore, for recovery of possession by a minor in respect of a void transaction is 12 years from the date of sale or three years from the date the minor attained the age of majority, whichever is longer". In that decision, the learned judge referred to the decision in Seetha Rama Raju v. Subba Raju (ILR 45 Mad. 361) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rachappa v. Hadiyalaya (AIR 1945 Bom. In that decision, the learned judge referred to the decision in Seetha Rama Raju v. Subba Raju (ILR 45 Mad. 361) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rachappa v. Hadiyalaya (AIR 1945 Bom. 63) and took the view that the observations of the Calcutta High Court in Lalit Kumar v. Nagendra Lai (AIR 1940 Cal. 589) were rather general and were not on a consideration of the actual question involved. I must say that the ratio of this decision supports the case of the defendant that the present suit filed beyond 12 years of the date of the impugned transaction and beyond three years of theplaintiffatiaining majority must be held to be barred under Art.65 of the Limitation Act. 12. It appears to me that the question whether a plaintiff under disability covered by S.6 of the Limitation Act will have a period of 12 years from the cessation of disability or only three years as limited by S.8 of Limitation Act is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court. In Hukmi v. Smt. Gian Kumar (1971 (3) SCC 782), the High Court had observed that a minor was entitled to a period of 12 years from the date on which he attained the age of majority if the cause of action to sue arose during the minority. That was a case where the suit itself was filed within 12 years of the impugned transaction. The Supreme Court clearly stated: - "The observations made by the learned judge that a minor is entitled to a period of 12 years from the date on which he or she attains the age of majority, if the cause of action to sue arises during minority is not correct". In Darshan Singh v. Gurudev Singh (AIR 1975 SC 75) the Supreme Court held that S.8 of the Limitation Act was a proviso to Ss.6 and 7 of the Limitation Act. In Darshan Singh v. Gurudev Singh (AIR 1975 SC 75) the Supreme Court held that S.8 of the Limitation Act was a proviso to Ss.6 and 7 of the Limitation Act. I feel that it will be profitable to quote para 4 of the said decision since it also deals with certain instances while discussing the question :- "In other words, S.8 is a proviso to S.6 or 7 A combined effect of Ss.6 & 8 read with Third Column ofthe appropriate Article would be that a person under disability may sue after cessation of disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefor, in the third column of the schedule but special limitation as an exception has been provided in S.8 laying down that extended period after cessation of the disability would not be beyond three years from the date of cessation of the disability or death of the disabled person. Take for instance, if a minor acquires a cause of action to sue for possession of immovable property but due to being minor, S.6 aids him to lay the suit within the same period of 12 years after attaining majority. Suppose he dies, his legal representatives would be entitled to lay the suit within three years from the date of his attaining majority though he may the after the expiry of three years since his right to file the suit is extended only up to three years from the date of his attaining majority. In other words, cessation of disability or death whichever occurs earlier. The date of death of disabled person does not provide further extended cause of action, a period beyond three years after the disability ceases and death. Take another instance, where a cause of action for possession has arisen when the minor was at the age of 16 years. On his attaining majority, he gets three years' period but Art 65, Column 3 gives him the right to file suit within 12 years from the date the defendant acquires prescriptive title. His cessation of disability and expiry of three years under S.8 does not take away his right to file the suit within 12 years under Art.65. In other words, the benefit of S.6 is available to him. His cessation of disability and expiry of three years under S.8 does not take away his right to file the suit within 12 years under Art.65. In other words, the benefit of S.6 is available to him. Take a third case, where the cause of action had arisen to a minor when he was at the age of 4 years. During his minority, the 16 years' prescriptive period expired by efflux of time at his attaining 15 years but on his becoming major, his disability ceases. Therefore, he gets a further period of three years from the date of cessation of disability to file a suit for recovery of the possession from the defendant who claims adverse possession to the plaintiff. Thus considered that S.8 is a special exception to S.6 or 7 and the period of limitation though barred under S.3, remained available to persons under disability specified in S.6 or 7 and the right to lay the suit or application after disability ceased under S.6 or 7 is regulated by the limitation prescribed by S.8". It can be seen that the third instance referred to by their Lordships was a case parallel to the case on hand and their Lordships stated that where the cause of action had arisen to a minor when he was at the age of 4 years and during his minority, 12 years prescriptive period expired by efflux of time on his attaining 16 years, since only on his becoming a major his disability ceases, he gets a further period of three years from the date of cessation of disability to file a suit for recovery of possession from the defendant who claims adverse possession to the plaintiff. The observations in Hukmi's case (1971) (3) SCC 782) and the discussion in Darshan Singh's case (AIR 1995 SC 75) clarify the legal position. The observations also support the reasoning of the majority in the Full Bench of this Court in Indira Pillai v. Kesavan Channar (1968 KLT 673 (FB)). 13. The observations in Hukmi's case (1971) (3) SCC 782) and the discussion in Darshan Singh's case (AIR 1995 SC 75) clarify the legal position. The observations also support the reasoning of the majority in the Full Bench of this Court in Indira Pillai v. Kesavan Channar (1968 KLT 673 (FB)). 13. It is thus clear that if the property exclusively belonged to a Mohammedan minor and the same had been alienated by a person who was not his legal guardian, the said transaction would be void and applying Art.65 of the Limitation Act and in the light of Ss.6 and 8 ofthe Act the suit had to be instituted by the quondam minor within three years of his attaining majority or within 12 years ofthe transaction itself. The question is whether this would be the position in a case where the Mohammedan minor was only a co-owner ofthe property at the time ofthe impugned alienation. Law prefers to trace possession of any person to its lawful origin rather than considering it wrongful in the eye of law. Though in Joseph v. John (1959 KLT 630), later affirmed by a Division Bench in appeal, the learned Single Judge held that the possession of the alien ee from a co-owner would become adverse from the moment the alien ee enters possession of the property, a later Division bench in Ramachandrannair v. Gouri Pillai (1975 KLT 269) took the view that the possession of the alien ee from a co-owner could be traced to possession in his capacity as a co-owner and it could be considered that the alien ee had stepped into the shoes of the alienating co-owner and consequently, unless after such alienation, a case of ouster is pleaded and proved, the rights ofthe non-alienating co-owner cannot be held to be barred. It is also clear from the decision ofthe Supreme Court in Laxmi Reddy v. Laxmi Reddy (AIR 1957 SC 314), that in the case of co-owners, possession becomes adverse only on ouster being established and this could be established by bringing home to the knowledge ofthe co-owner the fact that the person in possession was holding the property as his own and adverse to the other and not by mere proof of long or exclusive possession. Here the possession of Moosa Haji on the basis of Ext. Here the possession of Moosa Haji on the basis of Ext. A2 could be traced to a lawful origin, namely, an assignment from the Mohammedan co-owners wo were competent to convey their shares. Thus, the possession of Moosa Haji is traceable to a lawful origin, namely, the assignment of their shares by the other co-owners ofthe property. If that possession be accepted, the right ofthe plaintiff can be held to be barred only if the first defendant specifically pleads and proves ouster as known to law. It is clear that though a plea of adverse possession has been vaguely raised in paragraph 26 of the written statement, the first defendant had failed in this case to establish a case of ouster of the plaintiff, one of the co-owners whose title has not come to him. 14. But, will there be an alteration in this position since the parties are Mohammedan co-owners? In Mohammed Amin v. Vakil'Ahmad (AIR.1952 SC 358) referred to earlier, the Supreme Court has held: "If the deed of settlement was thus void, it could not be void only qua the minor plaintiff but would be void altogether, qua all the parties including those who were suijuris". In the light of this observation, will it be the position that the alienation effected by the Mohammedan co-owners including the defacto guardian of the minor plaintiff, has to be considered altogether void? If it were to be considered void altogether void, that is to say, as not being capable of conveying even the rights of the Mohammedan co-owners who were competent to execute the sale deed, the position would be the same as a case where a Mohammedan minor is the exclusive owner of the property and an alienation is effected on his behalf by a defecto guardian and the alienation is treated as void. In that case, the suit by the Mohammedan quondam minor will have to be filed within three years of his attaining majority or within 12 years of the alienation itself, lest his rights become barred. The aspect that has therefore, to be considered now is whether the alienation by the heirs of Kunhahammad. including the alienation of the shares of the minors by a person who was not their legal guardian, could be considered void altogether or void only to the extent of the share of the minors. 15. The aspect that has therefore, to be considered now is whether the alienation by the heirs of Kunhahammad. including the alienation of the shares of the minors by a person who was not their legal guardian, could be considered void altogether or void only to the extent of the share of the minors. 15. In Mohammed Amin v. Vakil Ahmed (AIR 1952 SC 358) the Supreme Court held that a family settlement in which a Muhammedan minor is represented by a defacto guardian, is void altogether and not void qua the minor alone, In Matadln v. Ahmed All (39 Ind. Ap. 49), a case where some of the mortgagors were suijuris and some minors not represented by a legal guardian, in a suit by the quondam Mohammedan Minor, the Privy Council permitted him to redeem his share and not the entire property in his capacity as the co-share mortgagor on the basis that the entire transaction was void. If the entire mortgage, even qua the other co-owners who were suijuris, were considered to be void, it could have been held that the minor mortgagor was entitled to redeem the whole mortgage. But there was no discussion of this aspect as such, in that decision. In Imambandi v. Mutsaddi (45 Ind. App. 73) the Privy Council held that a defacto guardian of a minor governed by Mohammedan law had no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property, which the transferee can enforce against the infant. There it was. a sale by a mother of her share as well as the share of her infants who were defendants 9 and 10. The suit was by the purchaser for possession. It was contended on behalf of the infants that the sale by their mother as against men was void. The trial court and the High Court held that the purchaser had acquired the rights of the infants, defendants 9 and 10 also by the conveyance by the mother. The Privy Council, after laying down the law, discharged the decree only in respect of the share of the minors. Their Lordships held: "that the decree of the High Court in so far as it awards to the plaintiffs possession of the shares of the defendants Nos. The Privy Council, after laying down the law, discharged the decree only in respect of the share of the minors. Their Lordships held: "that the decree of the High Court in so far as it awards to the plaintiffs possession of the shares of the defendants Nos. 9 and 10 should be discharged, and, subject to this variation, it should be affirmed" Their Lordships, thus, did not proceed on the basis that the entire alienation by the mother was void, in which case, the suit of the alienee should have been dismissed in its entirety. It is clear from paragraph 42 of Mulla on Mohammedan Law (Nineteenth Edition pages 27 and 28) that a Mohammedan heir is entitled to transfer his own share. In Jan Mohammed v. Karuchand (AIR 1947 P.C. 99) the Privy Council has stated that law thus: "One of the co-heirs of a deceased Mohamedan, though he may be in possession of the whole of the estate of the deceased, has no power to alienate the shares of the deceased, has no power to alienate the shares of his co-heirs, not even for tiie purpose of discharging debts of-the deceased. If he sells any property in his possession forming part of the estate of the deceased, though it may be for payment of the debts of the deceased, such sale operates only as a transfer of his interest in the property. It is not binding on the other co-heirs or creditors of the deceased, the reason being that the estate of a deceased Mohammedan dying intestate devolves on his heirs at the movement of his death and his heirs take their shares in severally, their rights being analogous to those of tenants-in-common and not of members of a joint Hindu family. AIR 1918 Mad.1049 (FB) approved". In Bhismadev v. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1968 Orissa 230) following Imambandi's case, it was held that the fact that some of the heirs of a deceased Mohamean were minors, did not bar the major heirs from alienating their interests and even if the share of the minor heirs is also purported to be transferred by persons who are not legal guardians, the transaction of sale would not become void in toto and the share of those who were competent to convey their share would pass to the transferee. 16. 16. The effect of the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Amin v. Vakil Ahmad (AIR 1952 SC 358) quoted earlier, were considered by the Madras High Court in Maitmmnissa Bibi v. Abdul Jabbar (AIR 1966 Mad. 468). Referring to the observations of the Supreme Court that the family settlement would be altogether qua all the parties including those who were suijuris, the learned judge held that: "The nature of a conveyance is not identical with that of a contract or an agreement or a family settlement. Of the four persons who executed the sale, two were competent to execute the conveyance and the other two being minors represented by the de facto guardian it is as if they did not execute the conveyance. In effect the conveyance should be regarded as one executed only by the two persons who were majors and had independent shares in the propertywhich they could convey. A finding that the sale is void in so far as it related to the, minors does not necessarily, in my opinion, affect the conveyance in so far a sit related to the other executants, who were suijuris and were entitled to make a conveyance of their relative shares". The learned judge also referred to the decision in Khatoon Bibi v.bdulwahab (AIR 1939 Mad. 306) wherein it was held that every Muslim was entitled to sell or mortgage his share of the property without reference to the other heirs, just like any tenant in common. 17. In Abdulsukkoor v. Muhammed Dirar (1966 KLJ 737) and in Lakshmi amma v. saidutty (ILR 1967(1) Ker. 631), a learned single judge of this Court has even held that an alienation by a defacto guardian is capable of being ratified by a Muhammaden minor. When the transaction is held to be void qua the minor, how far this view could be accepted does not arise for consideration in this case. But, I notice these decisions, since, if a sale by a de facto guardian is capable of being ratified by the minor, a conveyance could certainly be held to be valid in respect of those who were suijuris at the time of the transfer. 18. But, I notice these decisions, since, if a sale by a de facto guardian is capable of being ratified by the minor, a conveyance could certainly be held to be valid in respect of those who were suijuris at the time of the transfer. 18. In the light of the discussion as above, I am inclined to hold that an alienation by a Muhammedan co-heir would be valid to the extent of the share of the co-heir who was competent to transfer his share even if the sale also purported to be on behalf of a minor represented by a defacto guardian. So viewed, it cannot be held in this case that the sale deed Ext. A2 is wholly void. The said sale deed validly conveys to the purchaser, the shares of those heirs of Kunhahammed. who were suijuris, since they were capable of validity conveying their shares. It can therefore, be found that Moosa Haji, the assignee, had stepped into the shoes of the co-owners and his alienee and heir, the first defendant, has also only stepped into the shoes of a co-owner. In that situation, it is necessary for the first defendant to establish a case of ouster as against the plaintiff. 19. There is another aspect to be considered. This is the course suggested by Mr. Justice Raghavan (as he then was) in the decision in Hajarummal v. Sahara Beevi (1963 KLT 105) referred to earlier. Could the alienee in this case be considered to be in the position of a bailiff or agent of the minor on the facts and in the circumstances of the case? In Naltibai v. Wamanrao (AIR 1948 Nagpur 253) a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court observed as follows: "It cannot be stated as a general proposition that there can be no adverse possession of property which belongs to a lunatic or a minor during the continuance of the lunacy or minority of the owner, and the question has in each case to be decided with reference to the anterior relationship between the person taking possession and the minor or lunatic and to whether any circumstances exist which would entitle the court to hold that the person who entered into possession did so under circumstances which would in law make him only an agent or bailiff of the minororlunatic". (Headnote) 20. (Headnote) 20. In the case on hand, there is the close relationship of Moosa Haji to the widow and children of Kunhahammed., the owner of the property. The widow of Kunhahammed. was the daughter of Moosa Haji and the children were his grand children. It is from his daughter and the grand children that Moosa Haji took the assignment Ext. A2. Obviously, the object with which Moosa Haji purchased the property from his daughter and grand children was to save for the heirs, at least the other properties of Kunhahammed who had contracted debts and against whose legal representatives creditors were apparently taking steps to recover the amounts due to them. The object with which the sale was taken by Moosa Haji, the maternal grand father of the plaintiff, could then only be to protect the interests of his grand children including the plaintiff. This intimate relationship of the purchaser to the minor and his status as the grand father enables the Court to find that the grand father-alienee was taking control of the property only for and on behalf of the minors so as to save it from the clutches of the creditors of Kunhahammed. It has to be noted that when Kunhahammed died in the year 1960 leaving his wife and children, except two of the children, others were minors and the eldest daughter and the son immediately after her, might have only just attained majority. In fact there is a case for the plaintiff that defendant No. 4 his elder brother, who represented him as his guardian in the sale was, as a matter of fact, a minor on the date of the transaction Ext. A2. True, that case of the plaintiff has been found against by the courts below. But the fact is that the children of Kunhahammed were young and in that context, if the grand father Mosa Haji thought it proper that he should do something to safeguard the interests of the minors and his daughter, the same could only be considered to be probable and as part of normal human conduct. Though there is no clear evidence in the case, it is also possible to infer from the circumstances that immediately after the death of Kunhahammed, Moosa Haji had taken control of the properties of Kunhahammed and also the duty of looking after his wife and children of Kunhahammed. Though there is no clear evidence in the case, it is also possible to infer from the circumstances that immediately after the death of Kunhahammed, Moosa Haji had taken control of the properties of Kunhahammed and also the duty of looking after his wife and children of Kunhahammed. Under such circumstances, the possession of Moosa Haji or the continued possession of Moosa Haji can be considered to be for and on behalf of the minor plaintiff and the other children of Kunhahammed and it could be held that Moosa Haji was holding the property as a bailiff or agent of the minor plaintiff. 21. But I must notice, that, there is no pleading on the side of the plaintiff on this aspect of the case and the parties have really not joined issue on this aspect. But considering the close relationship between the parties, the evidence available in the case, and the case even as put forward by the first defendant, I feel that the sale deed Ext. A2 was taken by Moosa Haji with a view to protect the interest of the minors and to save the other properties of Kunhahammed for them and there cannot be any difficulty in inferring that the possession of Moosa Haji can be considered to be in his capacity as the bailiff or the agent of the plaintiff. In such a case, the possession of Moosa Haji could be considered to have become adverse to the minor only on 18.7.1970 when under Ext. B7, Moosa Haji, in assertion of his exclusive title, assigned away a moiety of the property to his son, the first defendant. The suit having been filed on 18.3.1981, within 12 years of that date, it has to be held that the right of the plaintiff has not become barred by adverse possession or by limitation. 22. The lower appellate court while decreeing the suit has awarded shares not only to the plaintiff but also to defendants 5 to 8. It has to be noticed that defendants 5 to 8 have not filed any suit challenging the transaction and have not raised any claim for their shares. They have not paid the court fee for any relief. They have not sought an adjudication of their entitlement to recover their shares from trie alienee. There was therefore, no occasion for the court to try the claim of defendants 5 to 8. They have not paid the court fee for any relief. They have not sought an adjudication of their entitlement to recover their shares from trie alienee. There was therefore, no occasion for the court to try the claim of defendants 5 to 8. There is also no discussion of their rights by the lower appellate court in its judgment. It was therefore, not legal or proper for the appellate court, to have declared that defendants 5 to 8 are also entitled to shares in the property even without adjudicating on their rights, in the light of the defences that may be available to the first defendant. I am therefore, satisfied that the lower appellate court has committed an illegality in purporting to declare the shares of defendants 5 to 8 when no claim had been made by them in that behalf and the court had no opportunity to try such a claim in the light of the relevant aspects that might arise for consideration in such a case. It is possible that the first defendant has valid defences available against their claims. It is therefore; necessary to delete the finding of the lower appellate court to the effect that defendants 5 to 8 are entitled to 14/96 shares each. The decree has to be confined only to the plaintiff and hence the decree is confirmed only as regards the preliminary decree for partition declaring the shares of the plaintiff as 14/96 shares in the suit property as found and directing the final decree court only to work out that relief. The declaration of the shares of defendants 5 to 8 is deleted and left open to be decided in any litigation they may launch. 23. It is clear that though the transaction impugned is void as against the plaintiff, the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the heirs of Kunhahammed and to discharge the obligations of Kunhahammed, the father of the plaintiff. This was a benefit accrued to the heirs of Kunhahammedd including the plaintiff. The Courts below have in fact found that the transaction was not invalid for any other reasons. In a sense, the plaintiff is bound to disgorge the benefits derived by him by the transaction though he may not have directly derived any benefit therefrom. This was a benefit accrued to the heirs of Kunhahammedd including the plaintiff. The Courts below have in fact found that the transaction was not invalid for any other reasons. In a sense, the plaintiff is bound to disgorge the benefits derived by him by the transaction though he may not have directly derived any benefit therefrom. The lower appellate court has granted the plaintiff his share of profits for three years prior to the date of suit as well as his share of profits for future. Considering the equities in the case I think that the proper course to adopt is to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share of profits prior to the institution of the suit. I therefore, delete the direction of the lower appellate court to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to his share of profits for three years prior to the suit. I hold that the plaintiff is entitled only to share of profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of possession to him of his 14 out of 96 shares. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed in part, the decree of the lower appellate court awarding shares to defendants 5 to 8 is vacated and the preliminary decree for partition in favour of the plaintiff declaring his share in the suit property as 14/96 is confirmed. The decree awarding share of profits to the plaintiff for three years prior to the suit is deleted. The decree for share of profits from the date of suit is confirmed. The claims, if any, of defendants 5 to 8, are left open. Taking note of the relationship between the parties and the circumstances obtaining in the case, the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs throughout.