S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 7th August, 1997 passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Title Suit No. 2835 of 1995 whereby and whereunder the petitioners applications filed under Order 40, Rule 1 and under Order 39, Rule 1 of Code of Civil procedure were dismissed. ( 2 ) THE fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The appellant appears to be a financier. He entered into a hire purchase agreement with defendant respondent No. 1. Respondents 2 and 3 were their guarantors. The defendants Nos. 4 and 5 entered into an alleged hire purchase agreement with the appellant defendant No. 1. ( 3 ) IT appears that an arbitration agreement was entered into by and between the parties, pursuant whereto the disputes and differences between the parties were referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator made an award. The suit was filed by the respondent No. 1 herein in terms of Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which was registered as Title Suit No. 2835 of 1995 In the said suit a consent order was passed in terms whereof a receiver was appointed in that proceedings to sale the vehicle allegedly belonging to the appellant on 2-5-1996 The appellant herein filed the application in the nature of pro interesse suo in the self same proceedings meaning thereby in the arbitration proceedings itself praying inter alia the following reliefs: (a) Leave be granted to the petitioner to be examined pro interesso suo; (b) Injunction restraining the Receiver and/or Dover Credit Ltd. , and/or Sharif Ul Alam and Ashif Ul Alam and/or their man, servants and agents from giving effect and/or further fact to and/or from acting in pursuance of the said terms of settlement recorded by the said order dated 30-8-1996 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta in suit No. 2835 of 1995 in so far as the same pertains to the said vehicle of the petitioner bearing regn. No. WGA 4807; (c) Mandatory injunction directing the receiver appointed under the said purported terms of settlement dated 30-8-1995 to release the said vehicle bearing regn No. WGA-4807 in favour of the petitioner; ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge by reason of the impugned judgment has held that the appellant being a third party and the suit having being decreed the Court has become functus officio and as such the said application were not maintainable. ( 5 ) MR. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned trial Judgeerred in passing the impugned order in asmuch as the aforementioned consent decree is not binding on the appellant. According to the learned counsel as the receiver was not discharged which order was mandatorily required to be passed, the learned Trial Judge ought to have allowed the applications in the nature pro interessess suo and grant him the requisite reliefs. Without going into the contention raised in this appeal we are of the opinion that this appeal is not maintainable. As indicated herein before the applications under Section 14 (2) of the arbitration was filed and the same was registered as a suit; though the same cannot be said to be a suit in the ordinary sense of the term. ( 6 ) IN that arbitration proceedings a consent decree was passed. Such a decree could have been passed by the Court in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. In the instant case as an award has already been passed. The Court also have power to appoint the receiver in terms of Section 18 thereof. If the compromise petition filed by the parties of the said arbitration proceedings was fraudulent or the receiver having acted illegally in selling out the vehicle, the appellant could not have filed any application in the said proceeding itself. In any event, a direction upon the receiver could have been made by the learned Trial Judge only in exercise of its power conferred upon him under Section 18 of the arbitration act. He having refused to exercise the saie power no appeal is maintainable. Section 39 of the arbitration Act provides for appeal under the said act. An order passed under Section 18 of the said Act is not an appeliable order. He having refused to exercise the saie power no appeal is maintainable. Section 39 of the arbitration Act provides for appeal under the said act. An order passed under Section 18 of the said Act is not an appeliable order. ( 7 ) THE right to prefer an appeal must be conferred upon by a statute. As the proceedings are governed under Arbitration Act and in view of the fact that the appellant had filed an application in the said proceedings itself, the appellate forum to entirtain an appeal must be determined with reference to the arbitration Act alone. Mr. Banerjee, submits that as the decree had already been passed his appliction could have been considered under order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said application could have filed only in execution proceedings. The plaintiff deree holder of that suit did not file any execution proceedings and in this view of the matter, we are of the view, that the said application could not have been treated to one under order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned we have no other option but to hold that this appeal is not maintainable. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 9 ) D. B. DUTTA, J. : -. I agree. Appeal dismissed. .