Judgment :- P.A.Mohammed, J. The tenant in a rent control petition for eviction is the revision petitioner. The revision is directed against the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thrissur passed under S.20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'). The respondent-landlord filed the application seeking to evict the petitioner-tenant from the petitioner schedule building under S.11(2)(b) and S.11(3) of the Act. The Rent Control Court has refused eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and thus, disallowed eviction under S.11(2)(b). However, the eviction was ordered on the ground of bonafide requirement under S.11(3) of the Act. As against the order of the Rent Control Court the tenant filed appeal under S.18 of the Act before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The order of the Rent Control Court under S.11(2)(b) has become final. Therefore, the substantial ground available for eviction before the Appellate Authority was under S.11(3). The Appellate Authority, after evaluating the evidence, agreed with the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under S.11(3). Hence the present revision petition has been filed by the tenant. 2. Before examining the correctness of the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, we should remind ourselves of the power conferred on us under S.20 of the Act. The power conferred under the above provision is to call for and examine the records relating to the impugned order for the purpose of satisfying ourselves as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. What does it mean? Can we make a re-appraisal of evidence for the purpose of recording an independent finding? No. We cannot do it. What we can do is to have a reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of testing whether the impugned order is not vitiated by anyone of the vices stated in S.20 of the Act; that is to say, whether the order is vitiated for the reason of illegality, irregularity or impropriety. In this context, before further examining the scope of this provision, it must be worth while to note the observation of the Supreme Court in K. S. Sudamraju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu, (1994) 5 SCC 14: "The contention that the Rent Act is a legislation for protecting a tenant will be oversimplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act. In our view, it will be more appropriate to hold that the Rent Act regulates the incidence of tenancy and inter se rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant". In this context, it would be worthwhile to note the Preamble of the Act which points out that the Act is intended to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the State of Kerala. 3. The revisional authority exercising power under S.20 cannot substitute its conclusions when the conclusions of the appellate authority are reasonable, even if another conclusion is also possible. The Supreme Court in K.A. Anthappai v. C. Aliammed (1992 (2) KLJ 376) observed that the power conferred on the High Court, is essentially a power of superintendence and despite the wide language employed, the High Court should not interfere with the findings of the fact of the subordinate authority merely because it does not agree with the said findings. The Supreme Court in a similar rent control case further observed in Rajbir v. S. Chokesiri & Co. (1989 (1) SCC 19) that the revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of the evidence and to suppl ant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the court below. 4. In the aforesaid legal premise, we will now examine the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority ordering eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. 5. The respondent landlord is a medical practitioner and he is the landlord of the petition schedule building as well as two other buildings in the same compound. His case is that he was conducting a nursing home from the year 1979 onwards in two other buildings in the same compound. One building is a two storeyed building, in the first floor of which the landlord is residing. The ground floor of the said building and the second building were used for running the nursing home. The petition schedule building is one of the three rooms in the said building. All the three rooms are required for convenient running of the nursing home. The ground floor of the said building and the second building were used for running the nursing home. The petition schedule building is one of the three rooms in the said building. All the three rooms are required for convenient running of the nursing home. It is alleged that the space now available is inadequate to carry on the nursing home and therefore, the room rented out to the appellant is required for convenient running of the nursing home. In the context of these facts, the case of the landlord is that his requirement is bona fide. Of course, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority found that the requirement pleaded by the landlord is bonafide. However, in order to satisfy ourselves as to the correctness of the said orders, we will now advert to the evidence available in support of the said finding. PW.1 'examined in this case is Dr. Raju who is the respondent-landlord. He has deposed that he was running a nursing home in the compound where the disputed building is situated from the year 1979 onwards and was treating the patients in the nursing home. He further added that later there was improvement in his practice and hence additional space was required for running the nursing home. The Commissioner reported that the landlord was running a nursing home in the existing building. He further reported that the space available is not adequate for running the nursing home in the existing building. The two other vacant rooms in the compound are also in the possession of the landlord. The case of the landlord is that all these rooms are necessary for the convenient running of the nursing home. When the tenant was examined himself as Rw.l, he did not dispute the running of the nursing home by the landlord in the petition schedule building. From the above evidence, it is crystalline that the need pleaded by the landlord is bona fide. 6. When the tenant was examined himself as Rw.l, he did not dispute the running of the nursing home by the landlord in the petition schedule building. From the above evidence, it is crystalline that the need pleaded by the landlord is bona fide. 6. Another contention advanced before us is that the tenant is entitled to the protection available under the second proviso to S.11(3) which provides that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. What is required to be proved under this section is that the tenant was depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the building sought to be evicted and that there was no other suitable building available in the locality for carrying on such trade or business. These two requirements are not alternative, but conjunctive. Both the requirements must he satisfied. Now let us examine the evidence in this regard. There was come controversy whether the aforesaid protection was withdrawn by the tenant. Notwithstanding the said controversy, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has evaluated the evidence available in this case in that behalf. The Appellate Authority points out that the real evidence given by RW.1, tenant would not support his case for protection of the second proviso to S.11(3). No evidence has been produced by the tenant in support of the two requirements aforesaid mentioned warranting the protection available under the second proviso to S.11(3). The Appellate Authority further points out that there is a clear statement by the Rent Controller in his order to the effect that the tenant does not. seek protection of the second proviso to S.11(3). The counsel has endorsed to this effect in the petition. In this context, the Appellate Authority points out that the Court below had specifically observed that the learned counsel for the tenant did not want to press the claim for protection of the second proviso to S.11(3). It is further pointed out that no affidavit is filed by the counsel to say that he had not made such a contention. In this context, the Appellate Authority points out that the Court below had specifically observed that the learned counsel for the tenant did not want to press the claim for protection of the second proviso to S.11(3). It is further pointed out that no affidavit is filed by the counsel to say that he had not made such a contention. Whatever that be, no evidence in that behalf is available and therefore, the protection is unavailable to the tenant. In spite of our anxious evaluation of the evidence, we do not see any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority upholding the order of eviction under S.11(3). We therefore, dismiss this Civil Revision Petition.