JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Section 115, CPC by the defendant petitioner against the non-petitioners who are plaintiff and defendant No. 2 respectively in the Original Civil Suit No. 14/93 instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of Civil Judge (JD), Balesar, District Jodhpur against the order dated 6.10.1995 passed by the trial Court while disallowing application for amendment filed by the defendant petitioner under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151, CPC. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the petition are that the parties are residents of Village Taina in Tehsil Shergarh. Plaintiff non-petitioner No. 1 Mool Chand instituted suit for permanent injunction against the defendants that he holds possessory title, right and interest in the land described as 'Bara' as detailed and described in para 2 of the plaint situated in the village Taina and that the defendant-petitioner in connivance with the Ex-Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Taina Mr. Bag Singh, who is also relation of Smt. Dhapu, who was allegedly convicted for commission of murder of the mother of the plaintiff, entered into a criminal conspiracy to illegally and unauthorisedly take forcible possession of the suit land of 'Bara' and so the defendant-non-petitioner was bent upon invading the rights of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and to take forcible possession of the same and hence it was requested that he be restrained from interfering with the exclusive possession of the suit land and interfering with his use and occupation of the same. 3. Defendant Shankar Lal inter alia pleading that no such land belonging to and of the possession of plaintiff-non-petitioner, as described in para 2 of the plaint existed at the site and, instead, it was pleaded that the disputed land was of the ownership and exclusive established possession of the defendant-petitioner himself who himself erected stone-slabs on south-eastern and western sides of the house of the plaintiff which was existing at the site and that on the land situated in southern side of the disputed site, house of Ghan Shyam, who is son of the defendant, is existing at the site while house of the plaintiff-non-petitioner was situated on the western side of the disputed land. As a result of pleadings of defendant Shankar Lal, the disputed land was never of the ownership of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and instead, it was claimed that the same belonged to and was of the ownership and possession of the defendant-petitioner himself who was in its exclusive use and occupation since long and, consequently, he also succeeded finally to obtain a 'Patta' dated 16.2.85 in respect of the land measuring 30x100 ft. including the suit property on the basis of his old possessory title and, therefore, while disputing right, title and interest of the plaintiff-non-petitioner in the suit land, it was also alleged that the plaintiff-non-petitioner was neither owner of the property nor was he in exclusive use and possession of the suit land and, therefore, he was also not entitled to any relief by way of grant of perpetual injunction as prayed for in the plaint itself. 4. It may also be noted that the plaintiff, simultaneously, moved an application for grant of temporary injunction in respect of the suit land in the trial Court and, vide his order dated 27.7.97, the learned trial judge, though not concluding that the suit land was in exclusive use and possession, to the exclusion of the defendant-petitioner, of the suit land but, any how, looking to the nature of the dispute and the rival contentions as advanced and raised before the trial Court, it was ordered that status quo as prevalent at the site, be maintained and this order was finally affirmed by the appellate Court vide its order dated 19.10.92. 5. The necessary issues were raised and the evidence of the plaintiff-non-petitioner was under the process of being recorded and the statement of plaintiff Mool Chand had Already teen completed. 6. The defendant-petitioner moved an application under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151, CPC, supported by his sworn affidavit, that the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself pleaded in para 4 of his plaint that his mother was killed in the year 1974 and, consequently, to meet out the expenses in prosecution of case against the offenders liable for commission of murder of his mother, being in dire need of money, he, pursuant to an oral contract, borrowed money from defendant-petitioner while parting with possession of a piece of land forming part of the suit land measuring 36x30 ft. which was presently in the use and occupation of Ghan Shyam, son of the defendant-petitioner, in respect of which, the plaintiff himself has admitted that he was reserving his right to bring an action against the defendant and Ghan Shyam in due course land no action has so far been brought. The plaintiff-non-petitioner has maintained the suit on the ground that the suit property is of his ownership and he has got a vested title, right and interest in the same whereas, on the contrary, as Already referred to hereinbefore, the defendant-petitioner has been maintaining that the same land was of his ownership since, on the basis of old possessory title, he had also acquired a 'Patta' in respect thereof from the Gram Panchayat and, admittedly, the plaintiff-non-petitioner has not brought any action for cancellation of the 'Patta' and so also for possession of the suit land which is in the exclusive use and possession of the defendant-petitioner and as per the pleadings and admission of para 4 of the written statement filed by the defendant-petitioner it has been clearly pleaded and claimed that the disputed land and so also the land situated on its southern side whereat residential house of the defendant-petitioner is situated are of the exclusive ownership and use and occupation of the defendant-petitioner in respect of which the plaintiff-non-petitioner has got no right, title or interest and the disputed site did not measure 36x30 ft. and, instead, it is 30x100 ft. on the site and so the area of land including the one on which Ghan Shyam has constructed his house, is throughout claimed by the defendant-petitioner to be of his exclusive use and occupation and also of his ownership. However, during the course of his statement before the trial Court, the plaintiff Mool Chand has clearly stated that the piece of land measuring 36x30 ft. was mortgaged with the defendant-petitioner and a debt of Rs. 2000/- was taken from the defendant-petitioner by the plaintiff-non-petitioner with the condition that as and when the amount of debt will be re-paid, the possession of the land so being mortgaged would be restored to the plaintiff-non-petitioner and Ghan Shyam is in use and occupation of the same land whereat his house is existing. 2000/- was taken from the defendant-petitioner by the plaintiff-non-petitioner with the condition that as and when the amount of debt will be re-paid, the possession of the land so being mortgaged would be restored to the plaintiff-non-petitioner and Ghan Shyam is in use and occupation of the same land whereat his house is existing. Therefore, it was prayed that since the defendant-petitioner referred to an agreement entered into between the parties in the original written statement itself and existence of such an agreement also came to be referred in the statement of plaintiff-non-petitioner and, consequently, the defendant-petitioner searched for such an agreement vigorously thereafter and, lastly, the disputed document purporting to be an agreement to sell dated 24-2-84 was traced out and this document has been scribed by Devi Chand Jain, a Deed Writer and which is signed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner in token of its execution and the same bears signatures of Manak Chand who is brother of the plaintiff-non-petitioner besides Mishri Lai who is also a relation of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and, consequently, it has been further requested that, as per the deed of agreement to sell dated 24-2-84, the plaintiff-non-petitioner agreed to sell a plot measuring 106/30 ft. against a consideration of Rs. against a consideration of Rs. 8000/- to be paid by the defendant-petitioner and consequently, this document was so executed but, any how, in compliance of the terms and conditions of the agreement so entered into between the said parties no completed registered sale document has come into being but, any how, pursuant to terms and conditions and in part performance of the contract so entered into between the vendor-vendee, the possession of the land inducting the suit land was transferred simultaneously to the defendant-petitioner which is also claimed to be in old and long use and occupation of the defendant-petitioner on the basis of which the defendant-petitioner also succeeded in obtaining 'Patta' in respect of this very land and, consequently, the defendant-petitioner, in view of the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, is entitled to protect his possession on the suit land and, consequently, it has been claimed that, in the aforesaid circumstances, on the basis of possession having been acquired in part performance of the contract from the plaintiff-non-petitioner, the defendant-petitioner is also rightfully entitled to protect and claim his right, title and interest in the suit land and he cannot be evicted therefrom in the aforesaid circumstances, whereas, even if in absence of possession of the plaintiff-non-petitioner on any part of the disputed land, a suit simpliciter for grant of decree for perpetual injunction against the defendant-petitioner has been so brought and pending before the trial Court and, consequently, in this respect, an amendment has been sought to be incorporated by way of insertion of additional para 4-A as described in the application itself on the aforesaid grounds with a prayer that in case the amendment so sought for is allowed it shall not change the nature of the suit and, instead, it is just and essential in the interest of justice and complete adjudication of the controversy before the Court. However, on the basis of original pleadings of both the parties referred to hereinbefore, the plaintiff-non-petitioner resisted this application. 7. However, on the basis of original pleadings of both the parties referred to hereinbefore, the plaintiff-non-petitioner resisted this application. 7. After hearing both the sides, the learned trial judge vide his impugned order, while observing that the defendant-petitioner, in his written statement, initially, specially in para 4 of his written statement, while throwing a challenge to the claim of the plaintiff-non-petitioner, maintained that, on the basis of old possessory title, he obtained 'Patta' from the village Gram Panchayat and, by implication, admitting that initially title of the land vested in the Gram Panchayat but, on the basis of amendment application, the amendment has been sought on the basis of alleged agreement dated 24-2-84 and, resultantly, though it was claimed before the Gram Panchayat with a view to obtain 'Patta' in respect of the suit land that the same was in old use and occupation of the defendant-petitioner while, as a result of proposed amendment in the written statement, impliedly, it has been sought to be inserted in the amended written statement that the land was mortgaged about 30 years back with the defendant-petitioner by the plaintiff-non-petitioner and that an agreement to sell also came to be executed by the plaintiff non-petitioner on 24-2-84 and so the proposed amendment sought to be incorporated in the written statement was self contradictory and inconsistent and, therefore, in case the proposed amendment is allowed, the simpliciter suit for perpetual injunction shall stand changed into a suit for title and, consequently, it would result in change of nature of the suit which would prejudice the right, title and interest of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and, consequently, prayer for amendment of the written statement was disallowed, as above and hence this revision petition. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the legality and regularity of the impugned order along with the pleadings and relevant documents furnished by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the legality and regularity of the impugned order along with the pleadings and relevant documents furnished by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the learned trial Judge, failed to exercise his jurisdiction by way of not appreciating the petitioner's case in its right perspective and lost sight of the fact that it was the plaintiff-non-petitioner who brought this suit on the basis of his alleged title and possession of the suit property which has been from its very inception challenged by the petitioner who claims his own right, title and interest in the property and in para 4 of the written statement itself, the defendant-petitioner clearly referred to the agreement and the same is confirmed by way of tracing out and sought to be produced before the trial Court showing that it was on 24-2-84 that the plaintiff-non-petitioner entered into agreement and the same is, as Already referred to hereinbefore, executed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself and, at the same time, attested by his own brother and relation and prima facie there is nothing to suggest that this document is forged one and is not executed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself. This document substantially tends corroboration to the pleadings of the defendant-petitioner in the written statement filed earlier and it clearly recites that on receipt of consideration of price of Rs. 8000/- agreed to and in fact paid by the defendant-petitioner, simultaneously, the possession of the land measuring 795 sq. This document substantially tends corroboration to the pleadings of the defendant-petitioner in the written statement filed earlier and it clearly recites that on receipt of consideration of price of Rs. 8000/- agreed to and in fact paid by the defendant-petitioner, simultaneously, the possession of the land measuring 795 sq. yards had been passed over to the defendant-petitioner and, consequently, as also admitted by the plaintiff-non-petitioner in his statement before the trial Court, previously a mortgage deed was also executed in respect of the suit land in favour of the defendant-petitioner and, consequently, it has been submitted that the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself is to succeed on the basis of well established title and, so also, as the present suit stands, factum of his own possession on the suit land to the exclusion of : lire defendant-petitioner but, any how, in absence of an iota of evidence to conclude that the disputed suit land is in exclusive use and possession of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and the same is not in use and possession of the defendant-petitioner, the suit is proceeding further to which the defendant's main defence s that the plaintiff-non-petitioner is neither owner of the land nor he is in actual use and possession of the same and that he is out of its possession and use since long and, therefore, the suit, in absence of any relief being sought for declaration and cancellation of Patta' obtained from the Gram Panchayat and restoration of possession of the disputed land Iron the defendant-petitioner, is not maintainable and, in view of these circumstances, by mere addition and, at any rate, alternative pleadings, an agreement has Already been referred to be in existence in original written statement as is borne out of para 4 of the same and the same could not be denied in the statement of the plaintiff himself before the trial Court and, consequently, the document so having been traced out and brought before the Court and, consequently, the conclusion so arrived at by the learned trial Judge is not sustainable that since, previously, the defendant-petitioner claiming his old possessory title on the suit land, succeeded in obtaining 'Patta' from the village Gram Panchayat and, at present, on the basis of agreement so sought to be filed before the trial Court, it has been also claimed that this land came to be transferred to his possession resulting from agreement dated 24-2-84 allegedly disputed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner and, besides, in case the statement of 1 the plaintiff-non-petitioner is also taken into consideration, the same having been mortgaged about 30 years back, in favour of the defendant-petitioner and so all these pleadings, being self-contradictory and inconsistent, could not be raised otherwise it is likely to change the nature of the suit itself. 10. The learned counsel has also relied on various authorities in support of his contention that since the proposed amendment is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy specially the suit property is of the ownership and possession of the plaintiff-non-petitioner or not and, therefore, the burden of proving his own title in respect of the suit land on the defendant-petitioner is not as heavy as it is on the plaintiff-non-petitioner in order to succeed in obtaining a decree in the suit and, therefore, once as there are no reasons to conclude otherwise and the Court reaches a conclusion that the amendment so proposed to be incorporated in the written statement are necessary for the aforesaid purpose, such amendment may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings, being permissible by the provisions of O. 6, Ft, 17, CPC, and inconsistent pleas as well, in the aforesaid circumstances, cannot be dis-allowed as held by the learned trial Judge. 11. In N.K. Jain v. Kanhaiya Lal, 1990 (I) RLR 41 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, while discussing the scope of O. 6, R, 17, CPC, it has been held that in an application for amendment of written statement, the trial Court is not expected to have gone into merits of the case without allowing amendment application and the trial Court having done so, fell into jurisdictional error and the amendment application was allowed. 12. In Ram Chandra v. Jagdish Narain Mathur, 1988 (I) RLR 331 , regarding amendment of pleadings, the learned Single Judge was pleased to observe that the Courts are supposed to liberal in granting prayers of amendment unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is likely to be caused to the either side or character of the suit would be changed and not otherwise. 13. 13. In Chotey Khan v. Vimal Kumar, 1991 (I) RLR 198 , the amendment sought for in the plaint by the plaintiff in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity was allowed at the stage of final argument and, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, at any stage of the suit, in case the requirements of O. 6, R. 17, CPC are meted out, such an amendment, being necessary for adjudication of the question in controversy before the trial Court, can be allowed and there is no dispute in this respect from the opposite side as well. 14. 14. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners, while throwing a serious challenge to the contentions as have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as above, referring to the provisions of 0.6, R. 17, CPC as well as Section 115, CPC maintained that the proposed amendment is self-contradictory with the initial averments, in the written statement and, as yet, even in case the proposed amendment is allowed to be incorporated in the written statement, the defendants case is not wholly clear and consistent and, as a result, at present, there is nothing to disbelieve or overlook the pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint itself and he is to succeed on the basis of his pleadings and so the suit, at present, is pure and simple for perpetual injunction against the defendants and in case the amendment application is allowed and revision petition is accepted, it would unnecessarily prejudice, embarrass and delay the fair trial of the suit and, the amendment so sought for has been rightly dis-allowed by the learned trial Judge since, in case the same is allowed, it would allow the defendant-petitioner to raise inconsistent pleas, contrary to the previous one raised in the written statement and would also resultantly change the nature of the suit as well and, consequently, relying on the decision rendered in Mohan Lilani v. Smt. Pevi Bai, 1994 (1) WLC (Raj) 42 and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Shirimoni Gurdwara Committee v. Jaswant Singh, 1996 (4) CCC 3 (SC) 3 , further contended that the amendment in the written statement raising mutually inconsistent pleadings though permissible though mutually destructive pleadings are not permissible on the face of denail of the title in such person and subsequent pleadings of gift made by him in favour of the defendant, besides, the same having been proposed at belated stage and, hence, the defendant-petitioner has been rightly disallowed to incorporate proposed amendment in his original written statement and hence the impugned order warrants no interference on any ground whatsoever. 15. 15. For the limited purpose of disposal of this petition, the core question that calls for adjudication is whether the proposed amendment has illegally or by way of commission of a material irregularity in non-exercise of its jurisdiction by the trial Court in not allowing the proposed amendment, the impugned order suffers from any illegality or material irregularity thereby justifying interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC. 16. Before adverting to the merits of the case, Order 4, Rule 1(1), CPC provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Sub-rule (2) of R. 1 further provides that every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII, so far as they are applicable. 17. Rule 7 of Order 7, CPC provides that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. (italics supplied) 18. R. 4 of O. 8, CPC inter alia, provides that where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Sub rule (1) of R. 5 of the said Order, inter alia, further provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if riot denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleadings of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. 19. O. 6, R. 16(b), CPC inter alia, provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit. 19. O. 6, R. 16(b), CPC inter alia, provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit. R. 17 of O. 6, CPC provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. (Italics supplied). 20. In Smt. Tara Devi v. Kailash Chand Joshi, 1989 (1) RLR 844 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Single Judge of this Court observed that the power of allowing amendment is intended to shorten litigation and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to do justice between the parties. The power of allowing amendment of the pleadings should be exercised liberally more so when it has become necessary on account of subsequent events or passing of subsequent legislation, as was the case under adjudication; The learned counsel for the petitioner further relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay, AIR 1983 SC 462 contended that an ; admission of fact made in the original pleadings can be withdrawn provided there are reasons therefor and that a party can even take inconsistent pleas in the pleadings provided, as referred to hereinbefore, the proposed ; amendments are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. 21. Similarly, in Firm Janki Lai Ram v. Mohan Das, 1986 RLR 433 , the learned Single Judge has held that pleas sought to be raised by way of amendment sought to be inserted in the written statement by way of addition going to the root of the matter can- not be dis-allowed on the ground of delay only. 22. Besides, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention for allowing amendment application and the same is quoted ad verbatim running as below : "53-A. Part performance. 22. Besides, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention for allowing amendment application and the same is quoted ad verbatim running as below : "53-A. Part performance. - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transferor can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being Already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and had done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract. Though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall effect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." 23. The disputed agreement dated 24-2-84 relied upon by the defendant-petitioner is alleged to be executed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself and none else and, on the basis of evidence to be adduced before the trial Court, subsequently, the genuineness of the document shall be considered by the trial Court but, at present, ex facie there are no grounds to suspect its genuineness and, accordingly, when a written agreement is alleged for have been entered into between the parties and the plaintiff-non-petitioner undertakes to transfer the land mentioned therein including the suit land in favour of the defendant-petitioner against an acknowledged receipt of consideration of Rs. 8000/-, since the defend-ant-petitioner's consistent case is that he is in established possession of the suit property as well to the exclusion of the plaintiff-non-petitioner much prior to the institution of the suit and, therefore, on the basis of this agreement, this section incorporating equitable doctrine of part performance only partially though by itself does not give transferee any right on which he can bring a suit as a plaintiff but only as a right which is available to him as defence in order to protect his possession. It does not confer any title on the transferee who is the defendant-petitioner who allegedly took possession in pursuance of this written document being unregistered contract but, he can press this agreement and the supporting document to protect his possession and, consequently, since the plaintiff-non-petitioner, so far has maintained his suit for perpetual injunction simpliciter and, therefore, in case the defendant-petitioner,in the aforesaid circumstances, advanced a plea in his defence that he came into possession of the disputed land as a result of part performance of the written contract entered into by the parties, as above, and he is continuing in possession the same, this is a valid defence in the eye of law in view of the statutory provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, referred to above. 24. 24. As regards the nature of the suit, the plaintiff has based his suit on the basis of his title in the suit land whereas it is seriously challenged by the defendant-petitioner who claims his own use and possession over the disputed land since long and, besides, in support of his possession he also claims a title in the land on the basis of 'Patta' acquired from village Gram Panchayat as well as his continuance in the possession of the suit property dating back to the point of time when the same was, as also deposed to by the plain-tiff-non-petitioner in his statement by way of mortgaging it with the defendant-petitioner and, as presently claimed and sought to be pleaded by the defendant-petitioner, on the basis of a contract of sale of the suit property entered into under an unregistered agreement of sale and, therefore, from whichever angle it is viewed, the defendant-petitioner has been throughout challenging title and so also the right and interest of the plaintiff-non-petitioner in the suit property and, as a result, the trial Court inter alia raised as many as 6 issues including the last one of relief and the issue Nos. 3 and 4 respectively pertained to the title of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and the defendant-petitioner which necessarily requires the plaintiffs-non-petitioner, in order to succeed, to establish his own title in the suit and, the defendant is required to defeat the claim of the plaintiff-non-petitioner thereby disabling the plaintiff-non-petitioner from proving his title as preferred to the right, title and interest of the defendant-petitioner claimed in the suit land and, consequently, as Already referred to hereinbefore, the provisions of R. 7 of O. 7, CPC inter alia, provides that these provisions are equally applicable to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement requiring that a party shall specifically state the relief which he claims either simply or in the alternatively, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as it had been asked for Consequently, it cannot be denied that either party may rely upon several different rights alternatively although they may be inconsistent provided the same do not impinge upon specific provisions of O. 6, R. 16, CPC as referred to hereinbefore. 25. 25. As a result, so far as the facts and circumstances referred to above, looking to the complicity and controversy under adjudication, since the proposed amendments are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties and, presently, there is nothing to dispute bona fide of the defendant-petitioner and so also genuineness of the agreement dated 24-2-84 entered into between the parties and since the parties are living in the neighbour; hood of each other and the suit land falls between their residential houses and the suspicion passing over the period anterior to (he filing of the suit and the dispute alleged to: have, lastly, arisen on 2-3-92 and anterior to it and so also, the defendant-petitioner has, in totality of facts and circumstances referred to above, maintained that he is in exclusive use and possession of the suit land since long to the exclusion of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and, besides, he has also, in addition to obtaining a 'Patta' in proof of his title from the Gram Panchayat, now claims that the plaintiff-non-petitioner who, admittedly, did not hold any proof of title of the suit property vesting in him or his predecessor in interest, also claims his possessory title and consequential possession of the suit land on the face of serious challenge from his adversary and, as a result, in case defendant-petitioner is allowed proposed amendment it would not occasion any failure of justice and, instead, it will be helpful in dispensation of justice and, consequently, merely because the proposed amendment application has been moved at the stage of recording evidence of the parties or that the same, as referred to above, raises inconsistent pleas, that by itself cannot be a valid ground in case there is every justification for acceptance of such an amendment application in view of the provisions of O. 6, R. 17, CPC. 26. In view of the above discussion and the conclusion so arrived at, looking to the nature of controversies that have been raised by both the sides, in case the proposed amendments are allowed, the same cannot be termed to take away any vested right or material direct admission of title of the plaintiff-non-petitioner in the suit land and so also there cannot be any valid justification against allowing of the amendment application as has been done by the learned trial Judge. Resultantly, the facts of the decisions rendered in Shrimoni Gurdwara Committee and Mohan Lilani (supra) are clearly distinguishable from the case in hand and the same do not come to the rescue of the plaintiff-non-petitioner. 27. Consequently, the present petition is worth acceptance resulting in setting aside of the impugned order. 28. Accordingly, this petition is accepted and the impugned order dated 6-10-95 passed by the learned trial Judge is hereby set aside and the amendment application dated 31-8-95 moved by defendant petitioner's allowed permitting the proposed amendments by way of incorporation in the written statement on the condition that the defendant-petitioner shall pay Rs. 1000/- as costs for amendment in the written statement to the plaintiff-non-petitioner by way of deposit in the Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt/presentation of copy of this order by/before the trial Court. In case the defendant-petitioner fails to comply with this condition within the stipulated period, then revision petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed thereby disabling him from incorporating any proposed amendments in the written statement. No order as to costs of this petition. 29. This revision petition along with its connected stay petition is disposed of in the matter indicated hereinbefore.Petition allowed. *******