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1998 DIGILAW 271 (PAT)

Rajendra Kishri v. State Of Bihar

1998-03-31

M.Y.EQBAL

body1998
Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. In this application the petitioner-informant (hereinafter referred to as the informant) has prayed for cancellation of bail of accused Shambhu Agrawala (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) who has been granted bail by this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 2090/97 (R) vide order dated 11.4.1997. The petitioner in this case was made accused for committing a non-bailable offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with Dhanbad P.S. Case No. 735/95. 2. It appears that the informant lodged first information report on 7.9.1995 alleging inter alia that while he returned from Calcutta to Dhanbad after collecting sale proceeds of Cigarettes and after taking out his Scooter from Dhanbad Railway Station proceeded for coming to home he was intercepted by some miscreants who were on the Hero-Honda Motor-cycle and at the pistol point the miscreants snatched the breaf-case containing Rs. 4,50,000.00 . After looting the money and other articles the accused persons sat on the motor-cycle and fled away. In the first information report the informant alleged that neither he could see the registration number of Motorcycle nor could identify the miscreants. However, in course of investigation involvement of certain miscreants came into light but no material against the petitioner was collected by I.O. Despite the fact that the informant had been with the Investigating Officer on different dates but he did not speak for the involvement of the petitioner. It was only after one year of the occurrence all of a sudden the informant stated that he had identified the petitioner who was amongst the miscreants. Consequently requisition was made to the Court for his arrest on the basis of statement made by the informant. The petitioner then moved the learned Sessions Judge for the grant of anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the petition for bail vide Bail Petition No. 53/97 in terms of order dated 18.2.1997. The learned Sessions Judge in his order took notice of all these facts and observed that the conduct of the informant in taking the name of the petitioner after one year when he was with the Investigating Officer on several dates creats a serious doubt in his subsequent statement recorded by I.O. which seemed to be pregnant with meaningful substance. However, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the prayer holding that some of the points raised by the petitioner is quite convincing. However, the learned Sessions Judge rejected the prayer holding that some of the points raised by the petitioner is quite convincing. The petitioner then moved this Court by filing application for the grant of bail under Secs. 438 and 440 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was registered as Cr. Misc. No. 2090/97 (R). This Court after hearing the counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State allowed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner in terms of order dated 11.4.1997 and the petitioner was directed to be released on bail in the event of his arrest. The information after about nine months filed this application for the cancellation of bail. 3. I have heard Mr. Mahesh Tiwary, learned Counsel appearing for the informant and Mr. P.S. Dayal, Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner accused. Mr. Tiwary, learned Counsel firstly submitted that the petitioner accused ought not to have been granted anticipatory bail by this Court for the reason that prior to his application for anticipatory bail charge sheet was already submitted by the police against the petitioner and other accused persons under Sec. 395 of the Indian Penal Code and the petitioner was declared absconder. The learned Counsel then submitted that some materials already collected prior to the prayer for anticipatory bail and those materials disclosed an accusing finger against the accused then the Court should not have granted bail to the petitioner. Learned Counsel further submitted that even recovery of the looted amount has been made from the possession of the petitioner. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, the order granting bail to the petitioner is liable to be cancelled. Learned Counsel put heavy reliance on the decision in the case of Directorate of Enforcement V/s. P.V. Prabhakar Rao -- . 4. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Dayal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner accused submitted that no case for cancellation of bail has been made out by the informant and in fact the petitioner seeks review of the order by which petitioner was granted bail. The learned Counsel submitted that there is no material regarding recovery of the money from the possession of the petitioner and even in the charge sheet submitted by the police there is no whisper about recovery of any amount from the petitioner. The learned Counsel submitted that there is no material regarding recovery of the money from the possession of the petitioner and even in the charge sheet submitted by the police there is no whisper about recovery of any amount from the petitioner. The learned Counsel submitted that the application for cancellation of bail at the behest of the informant is not maintainable inasmuch as the State has not come for the cancellation for bail and there is no ground either of tampering with the evidence or any interference by the petitioner in the course of trial or proceeding. Learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the case of Bhagirath Singh Judeja V/s. State of Gujarat -- and in the case of Ganapati v. State of Mysore 1972 Crl. Law Journal 417. 5. Before dealing with the rival contention made by the counsel appearing for the parties I must take notice of the fact that the trial is still pending in the Court below and any observation made by me in this application may unwittingly influence the course of trial. I should, therefore, not say anything on the merit of the prosecution case as the matter is within the exclusive domain of the Sessions Court. It is well settled that rejection of bail when bail is applied for the one thing, cancellation of bail when already granted is quiter another. It is easier to reject a bail petition in a non-bailable case than to counsel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of decision already made and can, by and large, be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. In the case of Delhi Administration V/s. Sanjay Gandhi AIR 1978 S.C. 1961 the Apex Court held as under: Sec. 439(2) of the Criminal P.C. confers jurisdiction on the High Court or Court of Session to direct that any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII be arrested and committed to custody. The power to take back in custody an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. The power to take back in custody an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. But the power, though of an extraordinary nature, is meant to be exercised in appropriate cases when, by a preponderance of probabilities it is clear that the accused is interfering with the course of justice by tampering with witnesses. Refusal to exercise that wholesome power in such cases, few though they may be, will reduce it to a dead letter and will suffer the Courts to be silent spectators to the subversion of the judicial process. We might as well wind up the Courts and bolt their doors against all than permit a few to ensure that justice shall not be done. 6. The question as to what should be the prime consideration for deciding an application for the cancellation of bail has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Bhagirath Singh Judeja V/s. State of Gujrat -- where Their Lordships held: The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent over-whelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of bail and the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether is he also likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with the evidence. I do not want to go any further on the question as the law have been well settled by the Apex Court in the matter of deciding an application for cancellation of bail. It is well settled that generally the grounds for cancellation of bail are interference or attempt to evade the course of justice or abuse of the liberty granted to the accused. It is equally well settled that due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating the witness, by interfering with investigation or creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. It is equally well settled that due administration of justice may be interfered with by intimidating the witness, by interfering with investigation or creating or causing disappearance of evidence etc. The course of Justice may be evaded by leaving the country or going underground or otherwise placing himself beyond the reach of the sureties. In the words of his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J.: The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses -- . 7. In the light of settled Principles of law laid down by the Apex Court now I will consider whether the informant has been able to make out a case for cancellation of bail. In the petition the informant has made prayer for cancellation of bail on two grounds, firstly, it is alleged that there has been recovery of part of the amount from the custody of the petitioner and secondly that after the submission of charge-sheet new material has come by which the complicity of the petitioner is prima facie established. Nothing has been said in the petition that the petitioner after getting the privilege of bail is either tampering with the evidence or with the investigation, if any, or he is interfering with the course of justice or making any hinderance in the trial of the case. Although there is allegation of recovery of part of the looted money from the custody of the petitioner but this statement is without any basis. 8. Mr. Mahesh Tiwary, learned Counsel appearing for the information put heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement and Anr. V/s. P.V. Prabhakar Rao 1997 Vol. 6 SCC 647. The principles laid down by the Apex Court, in my opinion, does not apply in the facts of the present case. In the case before Their Lordships the respondent accused apprehended that he would be arrested in "Urea Scam" in which a fraud costing a whopping sum of Rs. 133 crores was perpetrated by some individuals after hatching a criminal conspiracy. It further revealed that there was a conspiracy with Turkish Company and substantial amount was paid to the middlemen. In the case before Their Lordships the respondent accused apprehended that he would be arrested in "Urea Scam" in which a fraud costing a whopping sum of Rs. 133 crores was perpetrated by some individuals after hatching a criminal conspiracy. It further revealed that there was a conspiracy with Turkish Company and substantial amount was paid to the middlemen. The matter was investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation and some persons were arrested and during the investigation it was also found that the petitioner accused was involved in the commission of fraud. In the meantime the petitioner accused moved the High Court and obtained anticipatory bail. When subsequently matter came for cancellation of bail it was held that there was sufficient material already collected disclosed an accusing finger against the accused and therefore, anticipatory bail granted was fit to be cancelled. In the instant case as noticed above in the broad day light the allegation of looting was made by the informant but he did not name any person in the first information report and even during the course of investigation which continued for more than one year the informant did not name the petitioner although he was with the Investigating officer during the course of investigation. It was only after one year suddenly the informant alleged that the petitioner was also one of the miscreants who looted the money and accordingly he was involved in the commission of crime. Considering all these materials this Court on the prima facie satisfaction found the involvement of the petitioner doubtful and released him on bail. It is not the case of the informant that subsequent to the grant of bail further materials have come on the record which strongly proves the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. Further as stated above there is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner is either tampering with the evidence or interfering in the administration of justice. It has been categorically stated in the show cause filed by the petitioner that after grant of bail he has been regularly appearing in the Court below either personally or though his lawyer and this fact has not been disputed by the informant. 9. It has been categorically stated in the show cause filed by the petitioner that after grant of bail he has been regularly appearing in the Court below either personally or though his lawyer and this fact has not been disputed by the informant. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in the application filed by the informant which is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that any observation made or opinion expressed in this order will not in any way prejudice the prosecution case during trial and the trial Court shall decide the case on its own merit.