Honble KHAN, J.–Arrayed, unfortunately on opposite sides, in this petition u/S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the `Cr.P.C.) are two learned, elderly and respectable members of the legal fraternity who, it appears, had once commenced their voyage in the ocean of life as friends dedicating themselves, besides their common pursuits in the profession of law to the cause of social ser- vice for the upliftment of the poor and downtrodden but time, politics and fallings and failings, the natural and inseparable attributes of mortal existence, led them to make accusations and cross-accusations against each other and the good old friends of yesteryears appear to be bad foes of today. What painful tests have you, my LORD laid down for us-the mortal frames? (2). The fallings and failings of values and standards in human relationship in the present case unfold themselves as under : (3). There situated 7 Bighas and 7 Biswas of land of Khasra No. 273 at Neem Ka Thana, Distt. Sikar. It is alleged that whereas 7 Bighas of land of that Khasra Number was owned and possessed by one, Mahadeo Prasad S/o Sri Sita Ram the remaining 7 Biswas of land, comprising of a `Bara, belonged to one, Kailash Chand S/o Sh. Hari Narain. Mahabir Prasad, aforesaid, transferred his 7 Bighas of land to Sri Madho Lal, the late father of Suraj Narain Chaudhry, respondent No.2 on July 2, 1965 vide registered sale deed Annexure 1. Mutation was also made accordingly in the relevant record. On December 29, 1966 Kailash Chand, aforesaid, also sold his `Bara, alongwith some stones collected thereupon to raise the boundary wall, to the petitioner vide registered sale-deed Annx.2. (4). Respondent No.2 is stated to have started selling the land in his possession in small plots and in doing so he allegedly sold on 8.5.95 the `Bara land to one Man Singh S/o Sri Ruda Ram and Prabhu Dayal S/o Sri Hanuman Prasad. But when the aforesaid purchasers came to know from the petitioner that the Bara land belonged to him they transferred the entire land, purchased by them, to the petitioner on May 27, 1995, vide sale deed Annx.6. (5). In the above backdrop Surya Narain Chaudhry, respondent No.2 sent the following letter to His Excellency, the Governor of the State of Rajasthan, on 5.5.93: ``Surya Narain Chaudhry, Advocate, Ex-Low and Industries Minister, Rajasthan. (5). In the above backdrop Surya Narain Chaudhry, respondent No.2 sent the following letter to His Excellency, the Governor of the State of Rajasthan, on 5.5.93: ``Surya Narain Chaudhry, Advocate, Ex-Low and Industries Minister, Rajasthan. Former Minister of law Industries and Enterprises, Elections, Press and Printing & Parliamentary affairs (State of Rajasthan) HIGH COURT CHAMBERS 4, 15 Res: Bal Mandir Moti Dungri Road Jaipur-302004, Phones:-49846, 47572 Res. 40494 Off. To, His Excellency Governor of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Date . . . . . . . . .18.2.93 Your Excellency, I, as an old social and political worker, want to bring to your excellencys notice a very damaging episode which has taken place at Neem Ka Thana in Sikar district vis-a-vis tempering and damaging the public record of great importance by some anti social elements in connivance with the concerned public servants of Neem Ka Thana Tehsil. Sir, under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 documents are got registered by Registrar and Sub-Registrars throughout the country and they are kept in very safe custody under double lock, after having been co- pied in regularly maintained registers which are supposed to last over many a decades to come such Registers and copies from them are treated on equal footings of the original documents. Recently a document purported to have registered on 29.12.66. the details of which are in the enclosed in the Hindi letter addressed to the Sub-Registrar Neem Ka Thana was detected to have been almost completely destroyed by having been rendered totally illegible. Sir, this act needs intervention and direction from you to locate and detect the culprits and restore confidence of the public. Thanking your, Yours faithfully, sd (Illegible) (S.N.Chaudhary) For favour of action to D.G. Police, Rajasthan. Sd. Illegible S.P. Crime Sd. (Illegible) 7.5.1993 IG BP SP Sikhar may be to get a case registered and investigated by Addl. S.P. Sikhar. Sd. Illegible 5.5.1993 Pl. Comply Sd. Illegible 6/5" (6). Alongwith the above letter the copy of the letter addressed to the Sub-Reg- istrar, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, referred to in the letter, was also forwarded. In the letter addressed by Resp. (Illegible) 7.5.1993 IG BP SP Sikhar may be to get a case registered and investigated by Addl. S.P. Sikhar. Sd. Illegible 5.5.1993 Pl. Comply Sd. Illegible 6/5" (6). Alongwith the above letter the copy of the letter addressed to the Sub-Reg- istrar, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, referred to in the letter, was also forwarded. In the letter addressed by Resp. No.2 to the Sub-Registrar it was complained that the respondent, on a comparative study of the copies of the relevant, sale deeds in his possession had come to know that some manipulation and false entries had been made in the registered sale deed executed by Kailash S/o Hari Narain Brahmin on 29.12.66. It was on the basis of the letter addressed by respondent No.2 to the Governor and forwarded in original by the higher authorities in the Police Administration to their Sub-ordinates that the FIR in question came to be registered at Police Station Neem Ka Thana on 20th May, 1993 for offence u/S. 468 IPC. Pendency of investigation initiated and based on such F.I.R. is sought to be terminated and quashed by this Court in exercise of its powers u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. (7). At the very outset the Bench pointed out to Mr. Rathore that the contents of the F.I.R. did not disclose that accusations were made against any particular person, much less the petitioner, for making the alleged manipulation or false entries in the sale- deeds or other documents mentioned therein and, therefore, there should be no grievance to the petitioner. Mr. Rathore invited my attention to the letter addressed by Surya Narain Chaudhry Resp. to the Sub-Registrar, Neem Ka Thana and the copy of the sale deed attached thereto and submitted that the said letter and the copy of the sale deed left nothing for guess as to the person against whom the machinery of law was sought to be brought in to motion through and under the orders of the Head of the State. It was submitted that the sale deed dated 29.12.66 was the very document by which the said Kailash had transferred the land of his ``Bara situated in Khasra No. 273, to the petitioner. Mr. It was submitted that the sale deed dated 29.12.66 was the very document by which the said Kailash had transferred the land of his ``Bara situated in Khasra No. 273, to the petitioner. Mr. Rathore further submitted that since the exclusion of Kailashs Bara from the sale of the land of K.N. 273, made by Mahadeo Prasad in favour of the father of the respondent Suraj Narain Chaudhry on 2.7.1965, had been specifically mentioned in that document or transfer, the respondent had wrongly and falsely begun to assert that the mention of that fact in the sale deed was a subsequent manipulation and a false entry in that document and/or the relevant registers, kept in the office of the Registrar/Sub-Registrar, Neem Ka Thana, had been made. Mr. Rathore thus submitted that though the petitioner was not clearly named in the FIR as an accused but the respondent being a learned and senior Advocate besides being a seasoned po- litician, made his silent words speak by inferences and references. (8). After hearing the learned counsel and on study of the relevant documents I felt satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to put up his grievance before the court. (9). The Bench then enquired of the parties as to what was the stage of the investigation as the same appeared to have been pending for the last about four years or so. Mr. Rathore submitted that thrice the investigating agency had purposed a Final Report in the case but the respondent by exerting his high position in Politics of the State managed to get the investigation re-opened and re-started. Mr. Rathore submitted that the fact has also been stated in the petition. On query from the Bench the learned Public Prosecutor produced the case diary before the court and submitted that that investigation of the case was still pending. Mr. Rathore was then told by the Court that when the investigation of the case was already completed and the result of the investigation was to be communicated by the police to the concerned Magistrate there hardly remained any occasion for this court to consider the question of quashing the F.I.R. Mr. Mr. Rathore was then told by the Court that when the investigation of the case was already completed and the result of the investigation was to be communicated by the police to the concerned Magistrate there hardly remained any occasion for this court to consider the question of quashing the F.I.R. Mr. Rathore submitted that the difficulty of the petitioner was that he could not force or compel the police to submit its report to the Magistrate and the police had kept the sword hanging on the head of the petitioner for the last about five years and he would not be able to bear the burden on his nerves any more. The learned counsel for the respondents could offer no legitimate and reasonable excuse for the delay caused by the investigating agency in completing the investigation of an offence u/S. 468 IPC only. (10). A study of the FIR in the present case discloses that commission of certain cognizable offences with regard to private and public documents kept in custody of public servants, had been complained of by the informant. Averments made in para Nos. 8,9 and 10 (D) of the petition reveal that investigation into such offences had been commenced by an Addl. S.P. and allegedly final report had been proposed by him. In para 10 (D) the petitioner himself has alleged that the relevant documents in the custody of the public servants had got damaged though, as is the case of the petitioner, on account of leakage of the roof of the room wherein such documents were kept. The letter written by the petitioner to the Addl. S. P. Sikhar (Annx.5) and to the Director General Police (Annex.7) disclose that the dispute between the parties is whether the damage to the relevant documents was attributed to the petitioner or to the respondent. Waiting for almost four years for the outcome of the investigation being conducted by various and different cells of the Investigating Agency, Prima- facie, exhibits the conduct of a person who had, thou- gh unwillingly and under protest, surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer to investigate the offence. It is thus clear that since the FIR in question disclosed the alleged commission of a cognizable offence the police, as of right, could have commenced and did in fact commence investigation into such an offence in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is thus clear that since the FIR in question disclosed the alleged commission of a cognizable offence the police, as of right, could have commenced and did in fact commence investigation into such an offence in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (11). In the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after examining a number of authorities on the point, quoted with approval the following words of Chandrachud CJ. in State of West Bengal vs. Swapn Kumar Gupta (2): ``The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by brother Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the FIR must disclose. Prima-facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. The right of enquiry conditioned by the existence by reasons to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot reasonably, have reason to suspect unless the FIR, prima-facie, discloses the commission of such offence. (12). It is thus the settled position in law that reasonable suspicion regarding commission of a cognizable offence confers jurisdiction upon the police to investigate the crime alleged to have committed. In the instant case it has been seen above that the FIR disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence. For that reason, therefore, the F.I.R. lodged by Surya Narayan Chaudhary respondent in this case, cannot be quashed at this advanced stage of proceeding unless the circumstances attending on the pendency of the investigation warrant cancellation of the investigation. (13). At this stage Mr. Rathore submitted that the FIR in the present case was tainted with malice and ill-will on the part of the respondent towards the petitioner on account of political animosity and rivalry between the parties and, therefore, the FIR deserves to be quashed on that ground. (14). Malafide and/or malicious ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge is one of the seven illustrative grounds categorized in para 102 of the report in Bhajan Lals case. (14). Malafide and/or malicious ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge is one of the seven illustrative grounds categorized in para 102 of the report in Bhajan Lals case. The petition contains allegations to the effect that, though initially belonging to one and the same group in the Janta Party, the petitioner and respondent No.2 had developed difference between themselves and had parted company to join rival groups in the same party. The petitioner appears to have complained to the Adhyaksh of the party against the alleged anti-party activities of the respondent who, despite that, rose to the Ministerial heights in the States political administration. The respondent could have a motive to settle the old score particularly when Kishans Bara (the existence of which seems to have been disputed by the respondent) had been purchased by the petitioner. But, as stated above, since the case is being investigated for the last about four or five years and allegedly negative police reports had been repeatedly proposed by different investigating officers, at one or the other stages of investigation. it cannot be now held that the F.I.R. disclosed no cognizable offence and was motivated solely by malice. Malice is one and not the all of so many other factors including merits of the complained offence, to be taken into consideration before cancelling a F.I.R. at the initial or even a latter stage. (15). It was next urged by Mr. Rathore that pendency of investigation into a cognizable offence against a person causes constant invasion to his right to live in mental peace and such a right of the petitioner has already been and is still being unjustifiably and illegally invaded by keeping the investigation pending for the last more than four year under political pressures of the respondent. It was submitted that this court being the guardian and custodian of the rights of the citizen to life and liberty should interfere in the matter in exercise of its inherent powers in order to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to secure justice to the petitioner. The long life of the pendency of the investigation of this case demands serious consideration of the thought-provoking argument advanced by Mr. Rathore. (16). The long life of the pendency of the investigation of this case demands serious consideration of the thought-provoking argument advanced by Mr. Rathore. (16). Inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of law/court and to secure justice for the aggrieved party is, as held by the Apex Court in the case of India Bank vs. Satyam Fibers (Ind) Pvt. Ltd. (3) ``resident in all courts specially cou- rts of superior jurisdictions. It does not spring from legislation but from the nature and constitution of courts/tribunals themselves. It is wide enough to reach injustice wherever it is found (Bihari Lal Jaiswal vs. C.I.T. (4) but at the same time is limited in its operational length and breadth in as much as such powers are to be sparingly exercised with great care and circumspection in exceptionally rarest of rare cases (See State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. K.P.S. Gill (5), State of Maharashtra vs. Ishwar Peeraji Kalpatru (6), State of H.P. vs. Prithi Chand (7), State of Orissa vs. Banshidhar (8) and a lot of others). (17). Way back in the case of Khwaja Nazir Ahmed vs. King Emperor (9) their Lordships of the Privy Council had observed that the police has a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence and such right of the police till it continues to be exercised within legally permissible limits can not be interfered with or controlled by the Judiciary. It was stressed that the role of the police and that of the courts are not overlapping but supplementary to each other. Where the role of the police ends, the role of the courts begins. The police have full control over the proceedings of the investigation and neither the Magistrate nor the High Court has any power to interfere with such proceedings, though the Magistrate does have very important ancillary role to play throughout the investigation yet he cannot impinge upon the jurisdiction of the police by compelling them to change their opinion and to submit a charge-sheet so as to accord with his opening. Indian Courts have all along sub- scribed to such a view and it has been held that save and subject to the duties assigned to the Magistracy during the pendency of investigation of a case by the police, investigation and final step of submitting charge-sheet or a final negative report is to be taken by the police and by no body else (See Abhinandans case (10), Union of India vs. Sushil Kumar Modi (11), Vineet Narains case (12) and the case reported at (JT 1997 (4) 428) (13). But in the course of the long journey from Nazir Ahmeds case to the cases of Sushil Kumar Modi and Vineet Narain (supra) necessity to improve over the dictum from the point of the police as well as from that of the accused, particularly in the field of arrest and detention, continued to be felt at Legislative as well as Judicial levels. A study of the development of the criminal procedural law may remaned one that initially the Legislature had expected of the police to complete the investigation of a case, wherein the liberty of a citizen has been curtailed in accordance with the procedure laid down or prescribed by law, within a period of 24 hours of his arrest (Sec. 57 Cr.P.C.). However, if the investigation of the case is not completed within the period of twe- nty four hours and it appears to the Magistrate that there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded he may authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. It may be appreciated that the fixation of the time limits for the detention of the accused with reference to the completion of `the investigation of the case against him exhibits Legislatures anxiety to respect the right to liberty of a citizen who is presumed to be innocent unless the contrary is proved. It impliedly means that the police was expected, any presumed, to have come into possession of such evidence in corroboration to the accusation made against the person being accused or suspected to have committed a cognizable offence, as justified the curtail- ment of his personal liberty. It impliedly means that the police was expected, any presumed, to have come into possession of such evidence in corroboration to the accusation made against the person being accused or suspected to have committed a cognizable offence, as justified the curtail- ment of his personal liberty. It is, therefore, logical to hold that to deprive a person of his personal liberty on accusation of his committing some cognizable offence the pre-condition to his arrest is the collection of some evidence to corroborate the accusation made against him. In this behalf the words ``reasonable suspicion occurring in the phraseology of Sec. 41 Cr.P.C., which empowers the police to arrest a person without warrants from the Magistrate, are required to be understood in right perspective in the facts and circumstances of a given case. Further, the power of the police to arrest a person u/S. 151 in order to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence for the purposes of Chapter XI is different in purpose and extent from those under Section 41 for the purposes of Chapter XII. Sec. 151 merely authorises arrest of a person in the circumstances mentioned in that provision and there would be no detention or extension of detention of the arrested person unless the provisions contained in Chapter XII are brought in operation. The arrest shall have to be dealt with as per provisions contained in Ss. 55(2), 56, 57, 58 and 59 of Chapter XI. But once the provisions contained in Sec. 167, occurring in Chapter XII, stand attracted the detention of the arrested person beyond the initial period of 24 hours shall be governed by the mandate contained in that provisions. As stated above, in the case of a person arrested for a cognizable offence the Police was expected to complete the investigation within twenty four hours of his arrest, as existence of reasonable suspicion of such person having committed the cognizable offence (and such suspicion was necessarily to be made on the basis of some evidence or incriminating circumstances coming against him in possession of the police arresting him) was a condition precedent to his arrest. However, looking to the realities in life, including the relevant evidence in support of the guilt of the ac- cused hidden in mystery and police officers practical difficulties to unearth such hidden or non-available evidence within a short period of twenty four hours, the Legislature, in its wisdom, empowered a Judicial Magistrate to authorise the detention of the accused for a period not exceeding 15 days in the whole with a view to enable the police officer to complete the investigation. The words ``making the investigation occurring in the language of Sec. 167 (1) support such a view. With the passage of time, advancement of new techniques, methods, weapons used in the commission of cognizable offences and adoption of such new and scientific methods by the perpetrators of such crimes for destroying evidence of their guilt or burying such evidence in the womb of mystery the genuine difficulty of the investigating officer to complete investigation, within the period of 15 days in the whole, was realised and drastic changes in the concept of arrest and detention of the accused were made while enacting the present Code. By adding provisions (a) (a) and (b) and re-numbering the old proviso (c) in Sub-section (2), by substituting old Sub-section (4) by the new one and further adding new Sub-sec- tions (5) and (6) to Section 167 the Legislature though seems to have thought it proper to enlarge the total period of detention of an accused from the original 15 days maximum to ninety days maximum (without enlarging or extending the period of police custody remand beyond fifteen days in all) in the changed scenerio of crime and punishment and the conditions prevalent in our developing polity and economy, yet, at the same time, the Legislature was vigileent enough to see that the extended period of detention of the accused beyond 15 days is necessarily utilised for completing the investigation of the case against him. In this behalf the newly inserted provisions of Sub-section (5) and (6) of Section 167 may be referred to Sub-section (5) mandates that if in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuance of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. Sub- section (6) confers power upon the Sessions Judge of vacating the order of the Magistrate stopping investigation of a case and to allow further investigation. But the moot point for consideration is that the concept of limitation for completing the investigation into a cognizable offence was introduced in the system of administration of criminal justice in India. (18). It may be appreciated that though Sub-section (5) speaks of completion of investigation in a case triable by Magistrate as a summons case yet some State Govts. have thought it proper to make necessary amendments in the relevant pro- visions contained in section 167 to cope with and suit their administrative demands and exigencies. (18). It may be appreciated that though Sub-section (5) speaks of completion of investigation in a case triable by Magistrate as a summons case yet some State Govts. have thought it proper to make necessary amendments in the relevant pro- visions contained in section 167 to cope with and suit their administrative demands and exigencies. Whereas the State of Punjab substituted the words ``15 days occurring in the language of Sub-section (2) of Sec. 167 by the words ``thirty days by Sec. 2 of the President Act 1 of 1984 (effective from 23.6.1984) the West Bengal State Legislature by its Act 24 of 1988 made significant changes in Sub-section (5) so as to make the same read as under : ``(5) If, in respect (i) any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months or, (ii) any case exclusively tribal by a Court of Sessions or a case under Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the investigation is not concluded within a period of three years, or (iii) any case other than those mentioned in clause (i) and (ii), the investigation is not concluded within a period of two years, from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the periods mentioned in this Sub-section is necessary. (19). It is true that no such amendment, as has been made by the Punjab and West Bengal States, has been made in Sub-section (5) of Sec. 167 by the Government of Rajasthan but that by itself cannot be a good ground not to apply to a case the principle underlying the change brought about by the West Bengal Govt. if the interest of justice so demand in the peculiar facts and circumstances of such a case. It is particularly so when the significant changes brought about in other relevant provisions in the Code are taken note of and considered in right perspective. In this behalf a brief reference to the amendments made in Sections 173, 309 and addition of Section 468 of the Code may be referred to. (20). It is particularly so when the significant changes brought about in other relevant provisions in the Code are taken note of and considered in right perspective. In this behalf a brief reference to the amendments made in Sections 173, 309 and addition of Section 468 of the Code may be referred to. (20). Normally the submission of a report u/S. 173 Cr.P.C. to the Magistrate is the end of investigation by the police in that case. It may sometimes happen that after submitting the report u/S. 173(2) Cr.P.C. the police may come upon some material evidence having a bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The police officer should be legally competent to collect and send to the Magistrate such material evidence. But a strict view of the interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 173 by some courts to the effect that once a police report has been submitted by the police in a case, the police cannot investigate the case anymore and collect further evidence for or against the accused came in the way of the investigating agency. With a view to remove such confusion it has now been statutorily provided by insertion of Sub-sec. (8) in Section 173 that notwithstanding the fact that a Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence on a police report u/S. 173 (2) the police is competent to carry on further investigations on discovery of fresh facts. Though this newly inserted provisions though empowers the Magistrate to order further investigation by the police (see UPSC vs. Papiah (14) yet not of his own after taking cognizance of the offence (see Randhir Singh Rana vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (15). It, however, does not empower the police to request the Magis- trate to postpone the taking of cognizance of the offence and not to proceed with the inquiry or trial of the case. It simply enables the police to collect further evidence in a case, wherein the facts so demand or justify, and send the same to the Magistrate. The newly inserted provisions of Sec. 173(8) are required to be understood in a way that neither any hindrance is caused to the progress of the case being inquired into/tried by the Magistrate on the basis of the police report already submitted u/S. 173 (2) nor enlarges power of the police to carry on investigation for indefinite period. The newly inserted provisions of Sec. 173(8) are required to be understood in a way that neither any hindrance is caused to the progress of the case being inquired into/tried by the Magistrate on the basis of the police report already submitted u/S. 173 (2) nor enlarges power of the police to carry on investigation for indefinite period. Though the Magistrate may order further inves- tigation u/S. 173(8) (though not of his own and after taking cognizance of offence in the case) yet police gets no power to delay the progress and disposal of the case being inquired into and tried by the Magistrate on the basis of the police report already submitted before him u/S. 173(2) Cr.P.C. Collection of some further evidence in the case and not postponement of the inquiry/trial of the case is the object behind insertion of Sec. 173(8). (21). Section 309 comes into play after the act of taking cognizance of offence in a case has been done and the court has commenced inquiry or trial, as the case may be. The provisions contained in this section lay great emphasis on holding the proceedings of inquiry or trial as expeditiously as possible, in particular when the examination of the witnesses has once begun. No doubt Sub- section (1) empowers the court to grant adjournments in the course of recording the statements of the witnesses but that has to be done for reasons to be recorded. Sub-section (2) speaks of postponement of the commencement of the inquiry or trial or postponement or adjournment of such inquiry or trial, if the inquiry or trial has already com- menced and remand of the accused, if he is in custody, to be given, but all that has to be done after taking cognizance of the offence in a case. If the court has not taken cognizance of the offence this provisions would not come into play and would not justify the remand of an accused beyond the period contemplated by Section 167. (22). A combined reading of sections 167 and 309 would thus go to show that whereas the former deals with the custody of the accused, either in police custody or in magisterial custody, during the preinquiry or pre trial period, the later deals with his custody during the period of inquiry or trial. (22). A combined reading of sections 167 and 309 would thus go to show that whereas the former deals with the custody of the accused, either in police custody or in magisterial custody, during the preinquiry or pre trial period, the later deals with his custody during the period of inquiry or trial. It would, therefore, necessarily follow that an accused cannot be detained in custody under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 beyond the period prescribed by Sec. 167 without the taking of cognizance of an offence in a case notwithstanding the fact that the commencement of inquiry or trial in such a case has to be postponed or adjourned for some reasons to be recorded in writing. (23). I may pause here for a while to avail of this opportunity to point out at a wholly unwarranted, unjustified and wrong practice being adopted and followed by the Magistracy in the State of Rajasthan of requiring the accused, who have been released on bail during the pendency of investigation into the offences alleged to have been committed by them but in which case a police report has not been submitted for years to-gether, to attend to the court of the Magistrate concerned weekly or fortnightly or after some longer period. Cases have come to the notice of this court wherein the accused, in sufficiently large numbers in majority of the cases, were noticed to have been attending the court for years to-gether though no police reports were submitted in such cases for those long years. It also came to the notice of this court that if during the painful long period of waiting for the receipt of the police report an accused could not appear on the date fixed, his bail was cancelled and his and his sureties bonds forfeited and proceedings u/S. 446 Cr.P.C. initiated against him and his sureties. Such a practice is not only wholly unwarranted and unjustified but also runs counter to the very doctrine of prosecutions and punishments. `Prosecution means initiation or starting of proceedings of a cri- minal nature against a person before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statue, which creates the offence and regulates the punishment. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Maj. Gen. `Prosecution means initiation or starting of proceedings of a cri- minal nature against a person before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statue, which creates the offence and regulates the punishment. As observed by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Maj. Gen. Madal Lal Yadav (16) with reference to the definition of the term ``commence given colling. a criminal prosecution is commenced. (1) When information is laid before Magistrate charging commission of crime, and a warrant is issued, or (2) when grand jury has returned and indictment. In that sense of the matter the prosecution of an accused may well be considered to have started in his case with the grant of his remand to police or judicial custody u/Section 167 or the grant of bail to him after his detention in custody. He cannot be detained in custody during the pre-inquiry or pre-trial period beyond the maximum period prescribed by Section 167 and thereafter under Section 309 without taking cognizance of an offence against him though commencement of inquiry or trial might have been postponed. A requirement, made under an order of a court, to attend the court on some specified date or dates, without taking cognizance of the offence against him, would amount to no less than a prosecution if it is considered from the point of view of his right to liberty and freedom. An obligation so created would disturb his right to follow his other pursuits. (24). A combined reading of the provisions contained in Ss. 167/209 and 309 Cr.P.C. goes to show that while S. 167 provides for detention of the accused for a total period of ninety days for the gravest offence during the pendency of the investigation S. 209 provides for detention during pendency of the committal proceedings and S. 309 (2) provides for detention during pendency of trial or inquiry. Without commencement of inquiry or trial within the maximum period of detention of the accused, as permitted u/S. 167, he cannot be determined in custody u/S. 309 Cr.P.C. It may be noted that the stress under S. 167 is on the completion of investigation within the maximum period of detention of the accused. In S. 309 the stress is on expeditious completion of the trial against him. In S. 309 the stress is on expeditious completion of the trial against him. It may further be noted that the newly inserted Sub-Section (5) and (6) in Section 167 lay stress on early completion of the investigation in a case triable by the Magistrate as a summons case and fixes the maximum period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested for completion of investigation unless the continuation of the investigation is extended by the Magistrate for some special reason. Sub-section (6) vests such power of extending the period of investigation beyond six months in the Sessions Judge also. Both these Sub-sections of Section 167 clearly indicate the anxiety of the Legislature that investigation in the cases triable by the Magistrate as summons cases be completeed by the Police within a specified period. Offences triable as summons cases are ordinarily minor offences and, exceptions apart, bailable. Thus these two Sub-sections do not have as much rele- vance to the custody of the accused as they have to the early completion of the investigation of the case. They further indicate that looking to the condition of pendency of investigations by the police in cases involving minor offences the Legislature thought it fit and proper to fix a time limit for completion of the investigation. The concept of limitation for completion of the investigations into offences is thus seen to have been introduced, perhaps for the first time, by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The enlargement of the scope of this concept to investigations into other offences which may not be triable as summons case is not wholly irrelevant to the expeditious, smooth and effective system of dispensation of criminal justice particularly when the changing needs of the society so demand and the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case so warrant. The amendment made by the State of West Bengal in this behalf may usefully be again referred to. The merits of such a view may be examined with reference to the provisions contained in Chapter XXXVI prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. (25). Section 468 which bars the jurisdiction of the court of take cognizance of certain offences after the specified periods of limitation runs as under :- ``Sec. 468. The merits of such a view may be examined with reference to the provisions contained in Chapter XXXVI prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. (25). Section 468 which bars the jurisdiction of the court of take cognizance of certain offences after the specified periods of limitation runs as under :- ``Sec. 468. BAR TO TAKING COGNIZANCE AFTER LAPSE OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION:- (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only: (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to off- ences which may be tried to-gether, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. (26). It may be noted that limitation has been prescribed for the first time for launching criminal prosecutions in regard to the offences specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 468. In order to appreciate such prescription for limitation in right perspective it would be worthwhile to take note of the views of the Joint committee for introducing such provisions in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. The relevant part of the report of the Committee reads as under :- ``At present there is no period of limitation for criminal prosecutions and a court cannot throw out a complaint or a police report solely on the ground of delay although inordinate delay may be a good ground for entertaining doubt about the truth of prosecution story. Period of limitation has been prescribed such periods in the Code as recommended by the Law Commission. Period of limitation has been prescribed such periods in the Code as recommended by the Law Commission. Among the grounds in favour of prescribing the limitation may be mentioned the following: (i) As time passes the testimony of witnesses becomes weaker and weaker because of lapse of memory and evidence becomes more and more uncertain with the result that the danger of error becomes greater ; (ii) For the purpose of peace and repose it is necessary that an offender should not be kept under continuous apprehension that he may be prosecuted at any time particularly because with the multifarious laws creating new offences many persons at some time or the other commit some crime or the other. People will have no peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for petty offences. (iii) The deterrent effect of punishment is impaired if prosecutions is not lau- nched and punishment is not inflicted before the offence has been wiped off the memory of the persons concerned. (iv) The sense of social retribution which is one of the purposes of criminal law looses its edge after the expiry of long period; (v) The period of limitation would put pressure on the organs of criminal pro- secution to make every effort to ensure the detection and punishment of crime quickly. (27).It may thus be appreciated that the concept of limitation in the matter of criminal prosecutions and punishments is no longer foreign to the administration of criminal justice. Investigation into a criminal offence by the police, whether the investigation leads to initiation of prosecution of a person in a court of law or not, is the integral part of the process of prosecution of the offender. It keeps the offender under continuous apprehension of being prosecuted and such continued apprehension may not only disturb his mental peace but, in a sense, violates his very right to live in peace. The right to live a life free from indefinitely continued apprehension of being prosecuted is not less than the essence and integral part of ones right to life and liberty. (28). Way back in Hussain Ara Khatoons case (17) the Apex Court declared that the right to speedy trial was an essential and integral part of right to life and liberty contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (28). Way back in Hussain Ara Khatoons case (17) the Apex Court declared that the right to speedy trial was an essential and integral part of right to life and liberty contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This declaration of law made by the Apex Court highlights the very spirit of and object behind Sec. 309 Cr.P.C. In view of the concept of limitation having been introduced by the Legisla- ture by amending Sub-section (2) of Sec. 167 and inserting Sub-section (5) and (6) in Sec.167 and adding Sec. 468 and other sections in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and by West Bengals State giving statutory recognition to such concept there are good reasons to hold that speedy investigation of an offence by the police should also be considered as an integral and essential part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. (29). ``The progress of any society, observed Dr. Justice A.S. Anand of the Supreme Court in his inaugural address delivered on 23.11.96 at the Department of law, University of Bombay ``is dependent upon proper application of law to its needs and since the society to-day realises more than ever before its right and obli- gations, the judiciary has to mould and shape the law to deal with such rights and obligations. The mere declaration of human rights or the existence of a particular piece of Legislation cannot solve the problem of the society at large unless the courts interpret and apply the law to ensure its benefit to the society and see that the rights and dues guaranteed by the Constitution are made available to the mass- es of the country. The learned Judge further observed that ``in human affairs, there is a constant recurring cycle of change and experiment. A society changes as the norms acceptable to the society undergo a change. Old ideologies and old systems give place to new sets of ideologies and new systems which in their turn are replaced by different ideologies and different systems. The Judges have to be alive to this reality and while discharging their duties have to develop and expound the law on those lines while acting within the bounds and limits set out for them in the Constitution. (30). The Judges have to be alive to this reality and while discharging their duties have to develop and expound the law on those lines while acting within the bounds and limits set out for them in the Constitution. (30). Delivering his presendial address on Human Right Day (10th day of December 1996) the learned Judge emphasised that: ``The Courts have to respond to the challenges to maintain the abiding faith of the society which it has reposed in them as the courts, essentially, exist for the society. (31) The views expressed by the learned Judge are, to my mind, in tune with the judicial pronouncement made by the Apex Court in the case of Madhu Kishwar vs. State of Bihar (18), wherein the latest trend in judicial thinking on the necessity of bringing in a change in the outlook of courts to suit societys requirement was pronounced in the following words: - ``Law is a living organism and its utility depends on its vitality and ability to serve as sustaining pillar of society. Contours of law in an evolving society must co- nstantly keep changing as civilization and culture advances. The customs and mores must undergo change with the march of time. Justice to the individual is one of the highest interest of the democratic state. Judiciary cannot protect interest of the common man unless it would re-define the protection of the constitution and the Common Law. If law is to adopt itself to the needs of the changing society it must be flexible and adoptable. (32). Such being the development of the judicial process in our country time is perhaps ripe to record departure from the British view of judicial process that ``Judges ought to remember that their office is.....to interpret law, and not to make law propounded and expressed by Sir Francis and applied and established by Jer- emy Bentham but later on departed from by Lord Reid, Lord Denning, Lord Wilberforce and others when Lord Reid said on Judge As Law Maker that there was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law.....they only declare it. Those with a taste of fairy tales seem to have thought that in some Alladins case there is hidden the Common Law in all its splendour and that on Judges appointment there descend upon him knowledge of the magic word ``open Sesame Bad decisions are given when the Judges muddle the pass word and the wrong door opens. But we do not believe in fairy tales any more. (33). In Murbury vs. Medison (19) Supreme Court observed that ``it (the Judicial Review) is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret the rule.....A law repugnant to the constitution is void. Courts as well as other departments are bound by that instrument. (34). Speaking on the Nature of Judicial Process Benjamin Cardozo J. observed that he (the Judge) legislate only between gap. He fills the open spaces in the law. How far he may go without travelling beyond the walls of the interestices cannot be stated out for him on a chart. He must learn it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and proportion that comes with years of habitude in the perform- ance of an art. (35). In this context a reference to the case of Smt. Nilabati Bahera vs. State of Orissa & Ors (20) may also be made. Therein the Apex Court observed that the courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspiration of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. Courts take into account not only the interest of the parties concerned but also the interest of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public body or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 21 are concerned. (36). Courts take into account not only the interest of the parties concerned but also the interest of the public as a whole with a view to ensure that public body or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where fundamental rights of a citizen under Article 21 are concerned. (36). Continuous apprehension for indefinite time of being prosecuted is no less than a specie of mental torture: Quoting the words of Adriana P. Burtow with approval in D.K. Basu vs. West Bengal (21) the Apex Court observed that Torture is a wound in the soul so painful that sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so intangible that there is no way to heal it....torture is an anguish squeezing in your chest...... Cold as ice and heavy as a stone, paralysing as sleep and dark as abyss. Torture is despair and fear and hate. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself. (37). Mental torture caused by continuous apprehension resulting from the pendency of investigation into an offence for indefinite period, howsoever, indirect and remote it may be, has its own effect on the health, morality, confidence and thinking of a person and thus disturbs his right to live a peaceful life. Therefore, continuing the investigation of the offence against him for indefinite period would be violative to his fundamental right to life and liberty and should attract judicial disfavour. Prescription of a period of limitation for completion of investigation into the offences (not covered by Sub-section(5) of Sec. 167) on the lines made by the State of West Bengal would not, to my mind, be adverse to judicial process, instead, it would satisfy the much needed demand of the constitutional and relevant statutory provisions for giving expeditious and effective system of administration of criminal justice to the people. (38). Almost two decades have rolled by when the Apex Court had expressed its anguish on similar State of affairs in the case of Nimeon Sangma vs. Govt. of Meghalya (22) and required the State Govt. to take a policy decision in such matters. That was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in respect of an alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial process. of Meghalya (22) and required the State Govt. to take a policy decision in such matters. That was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in respect of an alleged illegal detention of a large number of persons under guise of the judicial process. In para 4 of the report their Lordships observed that: ``The Criminal Procedure Code in Ss. 167, 209 and 309 has emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigations and trials. It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have been such considerable delay in investigations by the fact that a citizen has been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an offence. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the Constitution especially under Art. 21 as interpreted by this Court. (39). In para 5 their Lordships further observed that: ``We must emphatically record our view that there has been a self-condemnation in the statement put in by the State Government in that in quite a number of cases which are not of a serious character and even in those which involve serious offences, investigations have been pending for nearly two years. There are cases where persons have been in custody for five years-a situation too ghastly for a civi- lized country like ours. We, therefore, draw the attention of the State Government to take a policy decision with a view to ensure that accused persons, too indigent to set in motion the judicial process, do not suffer incarceration silently. The Government will do well to comply with the spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure especially in the matter of persons sought to be bound over for good behaviour, persons against whom summons cases are pending and persons who have been in custody for more than six months. May be this will involve a mass release from jails, but Government has to pay homage in substance and reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. See also para 52 of Vineets case (23). (40). May be this will involve a mass release from jails, but Government has to pay homage in substance and reality to the provisions of the Constitution and the Code. See also para 52 of Vineets case (23). (40). Coming now to the merits of the instant case, it may be recalled that on the basis of the F.I.R. dated 18.2.1993, routed through the Governor of the State of Rajasthan, a case for offence u/S. 468 IPC was registered at police station Neem Ka Thana as back as on 20th May 1993. After investigation of the case Ramji Lal Addl. S.P. proposed on 10.8.93 for the submission of a negative report in the case on and on 12.10.93 the SP Sikar approved the report of the Addl. S.P. and directed that final report No. 140/93 be submitted in the case. The S.H.O. accordingly closed the case on 20.10.93. The investigation during the meanwhile, appears to have been transferred to S.P. (C.I.D.) who, on 10.6.94, directed re-investigation of the case. On 20.6.94 the SHO accordingly deputed Sanwar Mal ASI to investigate the case. On 18.9.94 Sanwar Mal ASI reported the SHO that the original Sale-deed was not avai- lable and, therefore, the sale- deed in the record of the Tehsil SHO proposed for submission of a negative report in the case. On 19.12.94 A.I.G. (Police) (Crimes) called for a report from the S.P. Sikhar and the S.P. Sikhar directed the cannot be compared. On 5.10.94 Surat Singh S.H.O. to do the needful. On 27.12.94 SHO Surat Singh submitted the report to the effect that no further investigation was to be done in the case and that the negative report was to be submitted in the case. However, on 4.2.95 the Addl. I.G.P. (CB) transferred the investigation to the Addl. S.P. (CB) Range, Cell Jaipur and Surender Singh S.I. was made the Investigating Officer of the case. On 20.4.1995 the petitioner filed a civil suit against the respondent in the same matter. On 30.5.1995 Surender Singh S.I. also recommended for submitting a negative report in the case but on 17.6.95 the SP ordered that further investigations be made in the case. On 23.10.95 the Investigating Officer again recommended for submission of the negative report but the S.P. changed the Investigating Officer and asked the new Investigating Officer, Nirmal Kumar Sharma, to further investigate the case and submit his report. On 23.10.95 the Investigating Officer again recommended for submission of the negative report but the S.P. changed the Investigating Officer and asked the new Investigating Officer, Nirmal Kumar Sharma, to further investigate the case and submit his report. The amended factual report has not been submitted as yet. That is how the present case, registered on 20.5.93, has still been pending investigation into the offence u/S. 468 IPC for the last almost five years, though during all these long five years as many as five investigating officers of the ranks of Addl. S.P. and below investigated and re-investigated it and all of them, without exception, recommended the submission of a negative report in the case. (41). The pendency of the investigation in the manner it has been and with the results it has yielded for not less than four times not only makes mockery of the Govt. machinery and amounts to abuse of the process of law but also the continuous apprehension of being prosecuted at any indefinite point of time causes great injustice to the petitioners right to live in peace. Therefore, with a view to prevent such abuse of the process of law and in order to secure justice to the petitioner it is expedient in the interest of justice that the investigation pending in this case into the offence u/S. 468 IPC against the petitioner be terminated and dropped. (42). As discussed above, it has repeatedly come to the notice of this court that in majority of the cases, whether triable by the Magistrate as summons case or warrant case or by the Sessions Judge as a sessions case and wherein the accused had been arrested but released on bail, the accused continue to attend the courts of the Magistrates for years and years together with no commencement of inquiry or trial as investigations are not completed by the police and reports, be it positive or negative, is not submitted during those long years. At times it also happens that whenever an accused fails to attend the weekly, fortnightly or monthly, as the case may be, date of attendance in the court his bail bonds are forfeited and proceedings u/S. 446 Cr.P.C. for realization of the forfeited amounts initiated and commenced. Thus goes the prevalent practice in Magistrates courts to add to the miseries of the ill-starred litigants. Thus goes the prevalent practice in Magistrates courts to add to the miseries of the ill-starred litigants. On the face of it such a practice, besides causing avoidable hardship to such litigants and great damage to the very system of administration of criminal justice gets no sanction from Section 309 Cr.P.C. or any other provision in the Code. Criminal courts are not meant to function as source of harassment to the litigant public but to dispense criminal justice to them. Therefore, the sooner such a deprecable and deplorable, unwarranted and unjustified practice is given up is the better. Section 483 Cr.P.C. read with Article 227, conferring supervisory jurisdiction upon this court on the functioning of the Magistracy in the State, casts a duty upon it to check and discourage such a wrong practice to protect the rights of the litigants against unmerited. undeserved and unjustified harassment by issuing suit- able instructions/directions. (43). The peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, wherein investigation into an offence triable by a Magistrate has been and is being kept pending for the last about five years and similar instances might not possibly be lacking in some other cases, require this court to issue some appropriate and mea- ningful directions to the Investigating Agencies with regard to completion of investigations into cases triable as warrant cases by the Magistrates and as Sessions cases by the Sessions Judges to remain in force and to be followed by them until the State Legislature comes out with suitable legislation/amendment of the relevant provisions in the Cr.P.C. in that behalf. (44). In the result this petition succeeds and is hereby accepted. Consequently the investigation of the case registered for offence u/S. 468 IPC at Police Station Neem Ka Thana, Distt. Sikar on the basis of F.I.R. No. 157 of 1993 dated 20.10.93 is hereby quashed and closed. (45). In view of the discussion made hereinabove and with a view to securing expeditious, proper and less cumbersome and trouble some practice and procedure to be followed by the courts of the Magistrates for the disposal of criminal cases the following instructions/directions are issued for strict observance by them: ``1. (45). In view of the discussion made hereinabove and with a view to securing expeditious, proper and less cumbersome and trouble some practice and procedure to be followed by the courts of the Magistrates for the disposal of criminal cases the following instructions/directions are issued for strict observance by them: ``1. In all cases triablee by the Magistrates as summons cases wherein the investigation is noticed not to have been concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrates shall make an order stopping further investigation into such offences unless the officer making the investigation has already moved an application, containing special reasons, in the office of the Magistrate and pending for his decision. If any such application is pending for his orders the Magistrate concerned shall pass appropriate orders on such applications subject to limitation prescribed by Sec. 468 Cr.P.C. without any loss of time. 2. In all cases triable by the Magistrate as a warrant case, wherein the investigation has not been concluded within a period of two years from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance before the Magistrate, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making investigation by moving an application in writing within a period of one month from the date of this order, satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice conti- nuance of investigation beyond the aforesaid period of two years is necessary, in which case the Magistrate shall make appropriate orders on such application subject to the provisions of Sec. 468 Cr.P.C. 3. In all cases exclusively triable by a court of Sessions or case under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, wherein the investigation has not been concluded within a period of three years from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance before the Magistrate, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making investigation satisfies the Magistrate by an application in writing, that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the afore-mentioned period of three years is necessary in which case the Magistrate shall pass appropriate orders on such application. The above instructions/directions/requirements shall remain in force till the State Legislature makes appropriate and suitable amendment, expectantly on the lines adopted by State of West Bengal and as referred to above, in Section 167 Cr.P.C. for speedy and expeditious completion of investigation into offences triable by Magistrate as warrant-case and triable by Sessions Judge as a Sessions case. 4. The personal attendance in court of the accused, who has been arrested and released on bail during the period prescribed by and under Sec. 167 (2), Cr.P.C. shall not, be insisted upon during the period/or extended period of continuation of the investigation of the case against him save as mentioned in instruction/direction No. (5) herein below. 5. After putting in appearance by the accused, subsequent to his release on bail, on the date mentioned in his bail order/bail bond for putting in appearance before the concerned court, if a report u/S. 173 Cr.P.C. is not submitted in that case on that date a date not before the expiry of three months shall be fixed for his next appearance and if on or by the next date so fixed a police report u/Sec. 173 (2) Cr.P.C. is not submitted in the court against him, his personal attendance shall not be insisted upon any more until the receipt of a police report u/Sec. 173(2) Cr.P.C. against him. 6. Proceedings initiated u/S. 446 Cr.P.C. against an accused/his sureties for his absence on a date fixed after his release on bail but before receipt of police report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. against him shall be terminated and closed in terms of this order. No such proceedings shall henceforth be initiated during the afore-mentioned period. 7. Copy of this order, shall forthwith be sent to the court of each and every Magistrate in the State. (46). Copies of this order shall also be forwarded to the Director General Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur, Secretary/Home Commissioner, Home Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur and the Director Prosecution, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jai- pur for information and for issuing necessary directions to the Investigating Officers/prosecutions in terms of this order.