JUDGMENT The Court: The writ petitioner has challenged the vires of section 10(1B) introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the principal Act”) by the West Bengal Act No. 33 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Amendment Act”). Section 10(1B) provides as follows :– “(1-B) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, where in a conciliation proceeding of an industrial dispute relating to an individual workman, no settlement is arrived at within a period of sixty days from the date of raising of the dispute, the party raising the dispute may apply to the Conciliation Officer in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed, for a certificate about the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. (b) The Conciliation Officer shall, on receipt of the application under clause (a), issue a certificate within seven days from the date of receipt in such manner, in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. A copy of the certificate shall also be sent to the appropriate Government for information. (c) The party may, within a period of sixty days from the receipt of such certificate or where such certificate has not been issued within seven days as aforesaid, within a period of sixty days commencing from the day immediately after the expiry of seven days as aforesaid file an application in such form and in such manner and with such particulars of demands as may be prescribed, to such Labour Courts or Tribunal as aforesaid, file an application in such form and in such manner and with such particulars of demands as may be prescribed, to such Labour Courts or Tribunal as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification. Different Labour Courts or Tribunals may be specified for different areas or different classes of industries. (d) The Labour Court or Tribunal specified under clause (c) shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of an application under clause (c), give a hearing to the parties and frame the specific issues in dispute, and shall thereafter proceed to adjudicate on the issues so framed as if it were an industrial dispute referred to in subsection (1).” 2. According to the writ petitioner, the said amendment was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because it treated the employers similarly situated in different ways. According to the writ petitioner, the said amendment was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India because it treated the employers similarly situated in different ways. According to the writ petitioner, an employer whose case could not be settled within 60 days would loss the right to have his case considered by the Government under section 12(5) of the Principal Act. 3. The second submission of the writ petitioner is that the said Amendment Act was in conflict with the Central Act as it was contrary to the provisions of section 1(1B). 4. The third and final submission of the writ petitioner is that the said amendment would create an anomalous situation, particularly, in cases where the appropriate Government was the Central Government and the employer had employees in States apart from West Bengal. Those employees who were in West Bengal would be entitled to the benefit of section 10(1B), whereas the others who were outside West Bengal would be deprived of that benefit. 5. The issue has been raised by the writ petitioner in the context of a dispute raised by the respondent no. 4 workman. The respondent no. 4 raised the dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The Assistant Labour Commissioner issued a Notice on 6th November, 1997 asking for the writ petitioner's comments. After expiry of a period of 60 days when no settlement was arrived at between the parties, an application was made by the respondent no.4 workman on 13th April, 1998 for issuance of a certificate that conciliation proceedings were pending. The Conciliation Officer issued a certificate. This was filed before the Second Labour Court which issued notice to the writ petitioner to appear before it. 6. It may be stated at this stage that the merits of the respondent no, 4’s application before the Conciliation Officer or the validity of the certificate or the assumption of jurisdiction by the Labour Court on the basis of such certificate under section 10(1B) is not the subject matter of this writ application. 7. The Advocate General who had been given notice in the matter, as the said Amendment Act had been challenged., appeared through Counsel and submitted that the State Government was competent to introduce section 10(1B) under Article 146 of the Constitution, read with Schedule 7, List II, Item 22 thereof. 7. The Advocate General who had been given notice in the matter, as the said Amendment Act had been challenged., appeared through Counsel and submitted that the State Government was competent to introduce section 10(1B) under Article 146 of the Constitution, read with Schedule 7, List II, Item 22 thereof. It was also submitted that there was no conflict between the said Amendment Act and the Principal Act. The object of the said Amendment Act was merely to curtail the time before the Conciliation Officer, so that the individual workman was not deprived of an expeditious resolution of any dispute that may be raised by him. It is further submitted that merely because a Conciliation Officer may in abuse of his powers under section 10(1B) deliberately keep the conciliation proceedings pending, this would not make the power itself bad. It is also stated that if there was an employer in respect of which the appropriate Government was the Central Government, in so far as its employees within the State are concerned, the State Government could provide for them. The mere fact that this might entail an additional benefit being granted to those employees who are within the State compared to the employees in other States would not make the section conferring such benefit unconstitutional. 8. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent-workman that there was no possibility of any discrimination. The rights which the employer claims to have been deprived of upon automatic reference to the Labour Court etc, under section 10(1B) could be enforced or, at least, agitated before the Tribunal, Labour Court etc.. The employer was not precluded from raising any issue, such as, the existence of the industrial dispute, or whether the workman was an workman within the meaning of the Principal Act or not. It is also submitted that the concept of reference by a worker of a dispute directly to the Tribunal was not foreign to the Principal Act. Under section 33A(b) of the principal Act a workman was entitled in the circumstances therein mentioned to raise a dispute before the Tribunal/Labour Court etc.. 9. Having considered the submissions of the parties, I am of the view that the submission of the respondents must be upheld. It is well settled that the constitutionality of a statutory provision will not depend upon the possibility of abuse of the power conferred by the provision. 9. Having considered the submissions of the parties, I am of the view that the submission of the respondents must be upheld. It is well settled that the constitutionality of a statutory provision will not depend upon the possibility of abuse of the power conferred by the provision. Section 10(1B), as it stands, does not discriminate between employer and employee at all. It assumes that where conciliation proceedings are not settled within the time limited, there is, so to speak, a deemed failure. This is equally applicable to all employers who are parties to the conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer. 10. A submission was made by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner that it would be possible for a Union to raise several “individual disputes” thereby harassing an employer viz. Individual disputes in respect of a matter which was in fact a collective dispute. 11. The State Amendment itself docs not envisage the possibility. It makes it clear that it is applicable only in respect of "an Industrial Dispute relating to an individual workman". This connotes a dispute which is peculiar to the special circumstance of the individual workman. It does not envisage nor does it provide for a collective dispute being turned into separate individual disputes. 12. The competence of the State Government to enact legislation with regard to labour matters and Industrial Disputes cannot be disputed in view of the provisions of Item No. 22 of the Concurrent List of the 7th Schedule read with Article 246 of the Constitution of India. The State amendment is not in conflict with the object of the principal Act which have been re-stated at the time of the amendment of Principal Act in 1982 viz. to ensure speedier resolution of Industrial Disputes. The State Amendment is also not with conflict with the provisions of section 10(1) of the Principal Act. They occupied different fields. Section 10(1) envisages the situation where the State Government is required to form an opinion whether an Industrial Dispute exists or not and the power of the State Government to take action there on after forming the necessary opinion that it does. The State amendment operates in an area when the Industrial dispute already exists. The power of the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) is not in any way curtailed by section 10(1B). 13. The State amendment operates in an area when the Industrial dispute already exists. The power of the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) is not in any way curtailed by section 10(1B). 13. Besides under section 12(5) there is no provision for any party to be heard before the appropriate Government decides whether or not to make a reference. In the circumstances there is no question of any party being deprived of any right. Even assuming the same to be so, there is not discrimination inherent in such deprivation. Particular protection has been given to individual workman or at least to disputes relating to the grievances of on individual workman. This is also in keeping with the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa reported in AIR 1988 SC 548. 14. There is no substance also in the final submission of the writ petitioner that the State amendment might create a distinction between the employees of an organisation which might be operating on a national basis. The question is whether a State is competent to legislate with regard to all or any employees within the State. The answer to the question is in the affirmative. The fact that other States may not extend similar benefits to employees of the same organisation does not make the exercise of power by the State Government an unconstitutional one. 15. The writ application is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. As already observed this decision will not preclude the petitioner from challenging the proceeding taken under section 10(1B) if it is otherwise so entitled and in accordance with law. 16. All parties concerned to act on a xeroxed signed copy of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Appeal dismissed.