Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. The petitioner is intending to contest in the election to the Managing Committee of the second respondent Co-operative Bank. The election is scheduled to take place on 28.6.1998 in terms of Ext. P1 notification. The petitioner filed his no minationpaper. His nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer, the first respondent on the reason that there was a default committed by two debtors to the society in repaying the loan amount for which the petitioner was a surety. Therefore, the petitioner also comes as a defaulter and he was disqualified in terms of R.44(1)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. It is in the above circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the said rejection of nomination and seeking a direction to accept his nomination for election. 2. It is an admitted case before me by the respondents that the petitioner was not a principal debtor to the second respondent society. It also an admitted case that the petitioner was only a surety for two principal debtors who had availed of loan, undertaking to repay it in instalments. It is also an admitted case that the said principal debtors had defaulted in paying the instalments and finally, they were liable to pay off the total amount with interest. The petitioner had guaranteed the liability due from them, is also an admitted fact. No notice was issued to the petitioner, intimating such default, is also admitted. 3. In the light of the above facts, the only thing to be considered is whether the petitioner will stand disqualified for being elected or appointed as a member to the Managing Committee of the Co-operative Bank in terms of R.44(1)(c) of the Cooperative Societies Rules. As per R.44(1)(c), no member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28ifhe: "(c)(i) is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he has stood surety, for such period, as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months or is a defaulter to the society or to any other society". (emphasis supplied) To be disqualified, a member of the society shall be 'in default to the society'. (emphasis supplied) To be disqualified, a member of the society shall be 'in default to the society'. A person is in default means he is a defaulter. The liability of the petitioner is arising out of the guarantee or surety in respect of two principal debtors. Therefore, any of such persons shall also be a defaulter. The principal debtor has the facility to pay back the money in instalments. Even if one instalment is defaulted by the principal debtor, he is a defaulter. But the surety has no facility to pay off the amount in instalments. The surety has to repay the total amount due from the principal debtors in lumpsum. The surety will not be informed regularly by the society regarding the amount remitted or about the default committed by the principal debtor, unless a notice is given on him to clear off the entire debt. Therefore, a surety can be said to be a defaulter, according to the petitioner, only when he is informed about the default in respect of any loan to which he had guaranteed as surety. In this case, there is no notice. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be in default to the society, he contends. 4. In support of his contentions, the petitioner has been relying on the decisions reported in Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLT 190) and Ravi v. Kottayam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. (1993 (1) KLT 644). The former one was pronounced by a Division Bench. That was in respect of an instance of disqualification of an elected member, which is the same as in the case of candidates. At that time, the first proviso under sub-r.2(a) of R.44 was not in the statute book. In the above circumstances, it was held as follows: "Moreover, the appellant was only a surety. He was not told prior to the notice, Ext. P1 that he was in default or that the principal debtor had defaulted. As the liability of the surety is coextensive with that of the debtor, when the debtor was not liable, the surety's liability ended. The surety cannot be disqualified under R.44(1) solely on the ground that the debtor was not discharged with his debt, unless this surety was informed of the default and there wasa demand from the surety also. This should precede any action under R.44(1) of the Co-operative Societies Rules. The surety cannot be disqualified under R.44(1) solely on the ground that the debtor was not discharged with his debt, unless this surety was informed of the default and there wasa demand from the surety also. This should precede any action under R.44(1) of the Co-operative Societies Rules. As no such notice was issued to the appellant, lie was not a defaulter on that account as well". Thus, before styling a surety as the defaulter, even in the absence of provisions for notice, there shall be a notice on such surety to pay off the dues. Otherwise, he cannot be termed as a defaulter. That is the essence of that decision. It was after the pronouncement of the said decision, the proviso was inserted on 27.6.1989, under sub-r.2(a) of R.44. Therefore, that proviso has effect with respect to the disqualification of the member of the Board of Management of a co-operative society. In the case of disqualification arising out of the alleged default by the sureties, for being eligible to be elected, even now, there is no such provision. The Division Bench was considering the situation when there was no provision as the new proviso added to sub-r.2 of R.44. So far as R.44(1) is concerned, there is no such provision even now. So, the situation remains to be the same. As was dealt with in the decision in Abdul Rasheed's case, though with reference to the disqualification of an existing member. Therefore, the petitioner contends that the dictum in Abdul Rasheed's case shall, consequently apply to a surety seeking election to whom no notice had been sent by the society concerned, informing about the default of the principal debtor. 5. The latter decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner was in respect of a surety, whose nomination was rejected on the ground that the principal debtor had not discharged his debt. In that decision, referring to Abdul Rasheed's case, it was held that, "In this case, it is nobody's case that the principal debtor failed to pay his debt and therefore, the petitioner's liability arose. Therefore, in my opinion, even if the debt of the principal debtor remained undischarged, the petitioner cannot be held to be a defaulter". The petitioner in that case was almost in the same circumstance as the petitioner in this case. Therefore, in my opinion, even if the debt of the principal debtor remained undischarged, the petitioner cannot be held to be a defaulter". The petitioner in that case was almost in the same circumstance as the petitioner in this case. The court further held as follows: "This has been made clear by this Courtm Abdul Rasheed v. State of Kerala (1988 (1)KLT 190) where it was held that a guarantor or surety cannot be disqualified under clause (c) of Sub R.1 of R.44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules solely on the ground that the debtor has not discharged his debt unless the surety was informed of the default and there was a demand from the surety also. In this case, there is no such demand. Therefore the petitioner who had no notice that his principal debtor had defaulted and that he was called upon to pay, cannot be disqualified under clause (c) sub-rule (1) of R.44." Therefore, the petitioner contends that the rejection of the petitioner's nomination "on the ground of default of the principal debtor, without informing that fact to the petitioner, is illegal. 6. Counsel for the second respondent society attempted to distinguish the Division Bench decision in Abdul Rasheed's case contending that to disqualify an elected officer because there is a proviso to sub¬r.2(a) of R.44 making it clear that before ordering disqualification, there shall be notice and expiry of a prescribed period. Such a provision is absent in R.44(1)(c), dealing with candidates seeking election. Therefore, wherever there is default by the principal debtor, there arise default by the surety as well as the surety need not be notified separately, before his nomination being rejected on the ground of such disqualification. When there was no such provision even in sub-r.(2), a Division Bench of this Court held that a surety cannot be styled as a defaulter, unless he is notified of the default of the principal debtor. Inspite of the introduction of the proviso to R.2(a), the same situation prevails in the case of disqualification arising under R.44(1)(c). When there is no provision in R.44(1), as contended by the society, regarding the notice, the decision in Abdul Rasheed's case still holds the field to cover such a situation. Unless the surety is informed of his default, he cannot be said to be default or he cannot be said to be a defaulter. When there is no provision in R.44(1), as contended by the society, regarding the notice, the decision in Abdul Rasheed's case still holds the field to cover such a situation. Unless the surety is informed of his default, he cannot be said to be default or he cannot be said to be a defaulter. Therefore,4he contention of the counsel for the second respondent cannot be accepted. 7. Counsel for the society further contends, based on the decision of this Court in Narayana Pillai v. Joint Registrar (1993(1) KLT 218) that the proviso to sub-r.2(a). cannot have any application to sub-r.1 (c) and therefore, there arise no question of any notice being issued. On the other hand, a notice is required only when the guarantor, who is on the Board of Directors is to be regarded as a defaulter. This is another facet of the same contention as urged by the petitioner, which had been dealt with in the previous paragraphs. What is decided in Narayana Pillai's case was that "whether notice contemplated under the proviso to R.44(2)(a) is mandatory in a case where a member of the society seeks election to become a member of the Managing Committee." Obviously, the answer was No'. What the Division Bench decided in Abdul Rasheed's case was about a notice regarding the default. There arise no question of any time being given to such a defaulter for paying the amount. So, the notice, as contemplated in the proviso to sub-r.2(a) does not have any application to the disqualification arising out of R.44(1)(c). But a notice intimating him about the default by the principal debtor is still necessary as held by the Division Bench in Abdul Rasheed's case. 8. Moreover, the definition of the words, 'default' and 'defaulter' as contained in R.2(d) and (e) of the Rules also makes it clear that the petitioner is neither a defaulter, nor a person in default. The meaning of the word 'default' is failure of or defect or unable to do something which one is duty bound. The defaulter as per dictionary meaning is one who fails to settle an ordinary debt. The meaning of the word 'default' is failure of or defect or unable to do something which one is duty bound. The defaulter as per dictionary meaning is one who fails to settle an ordinary debt. The definition of the word default as per the said Rule is "failure on the part of any person, to repay to the financing bank or to any other society a loan or any other amount due to it within the time fixed for repayment." Admittedly, no loan amount is due from the petitioner. The loan had been availed of by the principal debtor. As the society can of course demand from the petitioner, being a guarantor or surety, the amount due from the principal debtor, that will be only "other amount due" mentioned in the said definition clause. Before it became due, the petitioner has to be notified that such an amount is due from him. Therefore, before styling the petitioner as a defaulter, he shall be notified that some amount is due from him. Admittedly no such notice has been issued to the petitioner. Otherwise he should have been a'defaulter' which means "any person against whom a decree has been obtained". In such case, perhaps no notice is necessary to even as held by this Court in Abdul Rasheed's case, as one stood notified by the decree passed against him. Admittedly the petitioner does not come within the term'defaulter' as defined in R.2(e). 9. Therefore, the rejection of the petitioners nomination on the ground that he was a defaulter in terms of R.44(1)(c) is illegal. On the basis of the interim order to accept his nomination paper, it i s stated that his nomination paper has been accepted. Naturally, the petitioner will be allowed to contest in the election. The Original Petition stands allowed. No costs.