Shri Sukdeb Roy, the petitioner herein, a Grade I officer of Tripura Judicial Service was superannuated with effect from 30.4.1992. He was then the Registrar of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench. Before his retirement in the year of 1991, the High Court, while disposing of Civil RuleNo.42 of 1981 (1991 (2) GLJ 471) filed by Shri BK Goswami, another Judicial Officer, observed as follows : “The post of Legal Remembrancer and Secretary, Law Department, Registrar of High Court and Secretary, Legislative Assembly are ordinarily to be manned by Senior District Judges. We find that earlier the pay scale of these 3 posts was the . same. However, in recent years, the pay scales of Legal Remembrancer and Secretary, Law Department, Secretary, Legislative Assembly have been enhanced without at the same time enhancing the pay scale of Registrar, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the High Court. It is, therefore, necessary that these 3 posts should carry the same pay scale and that should be the same as the pay scale of the Selection Grade District Judges.” 2. The Govt in pursuance of the aforesaid judgment dated 22.11.1991 enhanced the pay scale of the Registrar of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench to the scale of Rs.5,900-200/2-6,700/- vide notification dated 15.12.1993 (Annexure 1). In this notification, the pay scale of the Selection Grade District Judges was also stepped up. The notification reads as follows : “THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT :: AGARTALA BENCH : AGARTALA NOTIFICATION In pursuance of the judgment dated 22.11.1991 of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench in Civil Rule No.42 of 1981 (Sri Benoy Krishna Goswami vs. The State of Tripura & others), the Governor of Tripura has been pleased to enhance the pay scale of the Registrar of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench, in the scale of Rs.5,900-200/2-6,700/- and the pay scale of Selection Grade District Judges appointed in accordance with the Rule 15 (ii) of the Tripura Judicial Service Rules, 1974 in the pay scale of Rs.5,900-200/2-6,700/-vide memorandum No. F.4 (6) - FIN (PC)/88, dated 9th December, 1993 isssued by the Under Secretary, Finance Department, Govt of Tripura. Sd/- 15.12.93. Reistrar, Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench, Agartala,” 3. Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was deprived of the benefit of the enhanced scale as the notification was issued subsequent to his retirement. Sd/- 15.12.93. Reistrar, Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench, Agartala,” 3. Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was deprived of the benefit of the enhanced scale as the notification was issued subsequent to his retirement. According to the learned counsel, it is a case of discrimination between the petitioner and the other officers of the same rank and status and, as such, this Court should issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to extend the benefit of said scale to the petitioner for the period between 20.3.1990 and 30.4.1992 when he was posted as Registrar of the High Court. 4. To counter the aforesaid argument, Shri S. Deb, learned senior counsel for the State pointed out that the enhanced pay scale was given to the officers on service and the petitioner being a retired officer is not entitled to the aforesaid scale obviously for a period prior to the date of issue of the notification. 5. The language employed in Annexure. 1 although has a reference to the judgment dated 22.11.1991, does not incorporate any clause about the date of its enforcement. When a Govt notification does not provide the date of its commence­ment/enforcement, the normal rules of interpretation would apply and its enforcement has to be construed as intended from the date when the notification was issued. Therefore, it can be concluded that the notification (Annexure 1) has come into operation with effect from 15.12.1993 i.e. the date when it was issued. 6. Now, the question arises whether this Court has the powers to vary the date of its enforcement to predate its birth in the given circumstances of this case. It is, therefore, necessary to comprehend the scope and powers of this writ Court to interfere with the cut off date. Before I delve deeper into the question, it is necessary to mention here that classification made amongst a homogeneous group of employees without any rational could be unsettled by a Court only to achieve the objective and not otherwise. 7. Shri B. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, put much emphasis in the decision rendered by Supreme Court in DS Nakara vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 . 7. Shri B. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, put much emphasis in the decision rendered by Supreme Court in DS Nakara vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 . In Nakara, the Supreme Court dealt with the question whether the date of retirement is a relevant consideration for eligibility when a revised formula for computation of pension is ushered in and whether the division of pensioners into two groups made in introducing the date of effect would attract the provisions of the Article 14 of the Constitution. 8. Let us advert to the decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following words : “ If it appears to be indisputable, as it does to us that the pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision permit a homogeneous class to be divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision, and would such classification be founded on some rational principle? The classification has to be based, as is well settled, on some rational principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind it for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that date simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to Govt servants then who retired earlier cannot be worse off than those who retired later. Therefore, this revision which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory.” 9. In MC Dhingra vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2963 , the question before the Supreme Court was whether a decision of Govt in prescribing 31st March, 1992 as cut-off date for extending the benefit of tagging the previous, service rendered in the State Govt for the purpose of computation of pension to the denial of employees who had retired prior to 31st March, 1992 would be violative of Constitutional provision. The Supreme Court held that cut-off date is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the classification was made amongst employees situated on similar circumstances. 10. In Krishna Kumar vs. Union of India & others, (1990) 4 SCC 207 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss the ratio in Nakara (supra). In para 32 of this judgment, the Supreme Court held that in the case of Nakara it was never held that both the pension retirees and the PF retirees formed a homogeneous class and that any further classification among them would be violative of Article 14. It was further observed that the ratio decidendi in Nakara was not that the State's obligation towards its PF retirees must be the same as that toward the pension retirees. The observation of the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar wherein the decision in Nakara was distinguished, is applicable in this case. The officers who have already retired and the officers who are still in service cannot be grouped into a homogeneous class and treated as equal for the purpose of service benefits whether it relates to pay scale or retiral benefits. Distinguishing the decision of Nakara, the Supreme Court has again upheld the ratio of Krishna Kumar in a recent decision in State of UP & another vs. Jogendra Singh & another, AIR 1998 SC 658 . 11. To augment the case of the petitioner, reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 215; Smti Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of India & another, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Govinda Naik G. Kalaghatagi vs. West Patent Press Co Ltd, AIR 1980 Karnataka 95; Jagannath vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 1979 SC 1145 ; fill Maharajahiraja Mahab Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & others vs. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 ; Regional Manager vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 SC 1766 ; Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334 and Shri Monoranjan Chakraborty & others vs. State of Tripura & others (1990) 1 GLR 147 (1990 (1) GLJ 287). 12. 12. After careful consideration of the above citations it would appear that the law laid down by Supreme Court lead to the conclusion that when a classification is made amongst a homogeneous class of employees without any rational, such classification, which has no nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, has to be dubbed and denounced as arbitrary and unreasonable. 13. Shri S. Deb, learned senior counsel for the respondents, however, relied upon the decisions in State of Rajasthan vs. Sevanivatra Karmachari Hitkari Samiti, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 177; Commander Head Quarter vs. Capt Biplabendra Chand, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 208 ; Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd vs. Union of India, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 223 , Rabindranath Mukhopadhya vs. Coal India Ltd & others, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 252 and State of Haryana vs. Rai Chand Jain & others reported in (1997) 5 SCC 166 . 14. In Sevanivatra Karmachari Hitkari, while dealing with a case of retiral benefit to the service employees only, the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to introduce different retiral benefit scheme for Govt servant on the basis of the date of retirement. In Capt Viplabendra Chand (supra) the Supreme Court, in para 4 observed that in DS Nakara (supra) discrimination has been prohibited between pensioners forming a single class and governed by the same rules. Distinguishing thus, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal holding that the respondents could not be made retrospectively eligible for pension as it was not a case of discrimination made among pensioners. Thus, it would appear that the Supreme Court in all the above cases without any reservation laid own the law that a classification made in respect of employees retired or serving, who cannot otherwise be grouped into a homogeneous class is permisible if it is done in good faith. To further illucidate, we may refer to the observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Sitatam Sugar (supra) quoted below : “52. To further illucidate, we may refer to the observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Sitatam Sugar (supra) quoted below : “52. The true position, therefore, is that any act of the repository of power, whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it.” In Rabindranath (supra), in para 3, the Supreme Court did not find any unreasonable classification in introducing the cut-off date ie. 1.1.1997 for the purpose of encashment of LTC with a prospective effect thereby depriving the existing employees from the benefit of encashment of leave travel concession. According to the Supreme Court interfere, this was not a case of unreasonable classification where the Court should interfere. In Rai Chand Jain, the payment of back wages for a restricted period of 38 months was considered not to be arbitrary. In para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court made it clear that it is for the Govt to decide as a part of the executive policy as to from which date the arrears would be granted to the employees. 15. Keeping in mind the above principles of law, I would now like to examine whether the impugned notification (Annexure I) suffers from the vices of arbitrariness. If the decision to make the notification effective prospectively was taken in good faith without any unreasonable classification, this Court will obviously have no powers to interfere with the same. 16. The petitioner retired from service on 30.4.1992 and this notification was brought into force with effect from 15.12.1993 with a view to extend the benefit of enhanced scale to the officers on service. The retired officers, including the petitioner, under no circumstances, can be equated with the officers on service in order to form a homogeneous group. The petitioner on his retirement had been paid all amount payable to him under the rules. His status stood determined as a retired employee long before the decision to enhance the pay scale was taken. I find no reason to disqualify the decision as not being taken in good faith. Therefore, under no circumstances, the denial of the benefit of enhanced pay to the petitioner can be treated as a case of discrimination. His status stood determined as a retired employee long before the decision to enhance the pay scale was taken. I find no reason to disqualify the decision as not being taken in good faith. Therefore, under no circumstances, the denial of the benefit of enhanced pay to the petitioner can be treated as a case of discrimination. 17. The observation of the Division Bench which is the only basis of petitioner's claim, inspire the Govt to take a decision to enhance the pay scale of the Registrar, but the said observation being declaratory in nature, option was left to the executive to determine as to whether the scale to be enhanced or not, and if so, from when. Para 12 of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court (1992) 1 GLR 128 (1991 (2) GLJ 471) shows that the writ was dismissed subject to observation made in paragraph 5 to 11. The High Court dealt with the pay matter of the Registrar in paragraph 9. It was no an issue in that case. The refusal of the writ of Mandamus and dismissal of the said writ petition also characterise that the observation made in paragraph 9 was a wish expressed by the Court without casting any obligation on the State Govt. Therefore, the date of enforcement of the impugned notification (Annexure 1), being a policy decision of the State Govt, cannot be unsettled by this Court in order to extend the benefit to an officer already retired. 18. It was further argued by the Mr. Das, learned senior counsel, that Shri D. Purkayastha, the then Registrar, was given the benefit of enhanced scale with effect from 1.5.1992 ie from before the date of enforcement of the impugned notification, by an order of the Chief Justice. According to him, this Court can in exercise of its writ jurisdiction direct the respondents to extend the same relief to the petitioner. But, it would appear that the Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 229 of the Constitution, has given the benefit to Shri D. Purkayastha with effect from an earlier date. This power exercised by the Chief Justice under Article 229 being executive in nature cannot impel this Court to follow-suit. But, it would appear that the Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 229 of the Constitution, has given the benefit to Shri D. Purkayastha with effect from an earlier date. This power exercised by the Chief Justice under Article 229 being executive in nature cannot impel this Court to follow-suit. If the Chief Justice, with the approval of the Governor, had extended the benefit to Shri D. Purkayastha, who was then a serving officer posted as Registrar, such extension of the benefit to him is distinguishable on the face of it. Therefore, this notification (Annexure 2) cannot form the basis for issue of a writ of Mandamus by this Court. 19. The petitioner also claimed the benefit of outfit allowance @ Rs.200/-given to the Registrar of the High Court vide notification dated 27th April, 1993 (Annexure 3) with prospective effect. Applying the same analogy which has been worked out above in respect of the notification (Annexure I), I am of the opinion that the benefit of outfit allowance given to the officers on service also cannot be conceded to the petitioner who had retired long before 27th April, 1993. 20. The Govt vide notification dated 25th April, 1994 (Annexure 4) amended the Tripura Judicial Service Rules, whereby waitage of 3 years towards qualifying service for computation of pension was permitted. This notification issued on 25th April, 1994 was brought into force from the 1st day of January, 1994. This is also a matter which squarely falls within the domain of executive decision. It was brought into force form the first day of the calender year. Although the notification was given retrospective effect by a few months, the petitioner could not show that it was so done with a view to cover the case of any officers who had retired during the period between 1.1.1994 and 25th April, 1994. There being no such instance, the introduction of this date cannot be discriminatory to the petitioner. In respect of both the notifications, Annexure 3 and 4, the cut-off dates have been fixed by the executive in exercise of their discretionary powers. In the given circumstances of this case, there being no vice of malice or malafide, the irrestible conclusion that follows is that the petition deserves no consideration and has to be dismissed. 21. In the result, the civil rule is dismissed. In the given circumstances of this case, there being no vice of malice or malafide, the irrestible conclusion that follows is that the petition deserves no consideration and has to be dismissed. 21. In the result, the civil rule is dismissed. The parties are to bear their respective costs.