B. PANIGRAHI, J. ( 1 ) IN this reference, a Division Bench of this court wanted specific observation as to whether section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as code) empowers to grant anticipatory bail by any High Court or Court of Sessions within the country irrespective of the place of commission of an offence. Subsequently, a batch of application under section 438 of the Code had been filed for grant of anticipatory bail. Therefore, all these matters were taken up together for consideration since they raised a common question of law looking to different views taken by this High Court in two Division Bench Judgments and also by a Full Bench Judgment of the Patna High Court. Therefore, they referred to a larger Bench since the view of the Hon'ble Judges was not uniform. ( 2 ) THE factual matrix giving rise to the application for anticipatory bail in C. R. M. 152 of 1998 deserves brief narration. ( 3 ) THE petitioner herein is a business man in an Iron Factory having its branch outside this state and he has been dealing with business as Iron Merchant. On 12th September, 1997 at about 2-30 P. M. in the afternoon, few persons visited the residence of the petitioner while he was away in his business activities, disclosing themselves being Police Official and they required the petitioner's attendance in connection with a Criminal Case. Subsequently, the petitioner ascertained the reasons as to why those persons required his presence. Thereupon the petitioner went to Allahabad and got a copy of FIR lodged by one B. C. Kohli, Senior Manager, Punjab and Sind Bank, Allahabad Branch with the assistance of a local advocate. It has been, inter alia, stated that a Bank Draft which was presented for encashment at the said branch was forged and that is why, the case being C. R. M. No. 429/97 under sections 420/467/468/471/120b of the Indian Penal Code was registered in the Civil Line Police Station. Two persons in the said case were taken into custody. From the narration of the FIR, it is somehow not spelt-out that the present petitioner was included in the FIR. Therefore, his presence in the above case seems to be unwarranted, uncalled for and illegal. The petitioner herein has, therefore, prayed for grant of anticipatory bail. Two persons in the said case were taken into custody. From the narration of the FIR, it is somehow not spelt-out that the present petitioner was included in the FIR. Therefore, his presence in the above case seems to be unwarranted, uncalled for and illegal. The petitioner herein has, therefore, prayed for grant of anticipatory bail. ( 4 ) THE reference made by a Division Bench of this court was however, placed before a Three Judges' Bench but it seems that they were not unanimous in their opinion and they requested the Hon'ble The Chief Justice to be placed before still a larger Bench. That is how, the matter has appeared before this Bench. ( 5 ) MR. Susanta Banerjee with Mr. D. K. Singh has argued at length on behalf of the petitioner. Since one set of argument will cover the case of other petitioners, it was deemed unnecessary to ask the other learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners to advance their arguments on the same questions. It has been contended with much emphasis by Mr. Banerjee that it shall not be legitimate to place restrictions in so far as the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of anticipatory bail in connection with a case started in a court outside the jurisdiction of this court is concerned. It has been vehemently argued that sections 70, 78, 80 and 81 of the Code confers the power of a court to release on bail of an accused who has been arrested in connection with a case outside jurisdiction of this court. If such application could be entertained for bail and in appropriate case, the court can pass an order of release of an arrested person on bail, there is no earthly reason why appropriated orders on an application for anticipatory bail cannot be passed. While granting such bail it is required only to find out whether the applicant has any reason to believe that he is likely to be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. The ground of apprehension must be based on reasonable and plausible causes. It may be kept in mind that while considering for grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court or the Court of Sessions must apply its mind to the question and decide whether the case has been made out for grant of such prayer. The ground of apprehension must be based on reasonable and plausible causes. It may be kept in mind that while considering for grant of anticipatory bail, the High Court or the Court of Sessions must apply its mind to the question and decide whether the case has been made out for grant of such prayer. In previous occasion this court by a Division Bench Judgment reported in 1975 Criminal Law Journal, 1249 in the case of Govind Prasad v. State of West Bengal and also in the case of Vinod Ranjan Sinha v Gurudev Singh (1981 (II) CHN) 44 held that the court is competent to pass an order of an anticipatory bail to a person residing within its territorial jurisdiction in respect of offences alleged to have been committed outside such jurisdiction. Therefore, in view of the above observation, many applications for anticipatory bail have been filed by different petitioners. Therefore, those applications have been placed for consideration and for appropriate orders by this court. ( 6 ) MR. Banerjee has further pointed out that the court should not close its eyes to the reality because in large number of cases, false and vexious allegations are made only to harass the applicants who reside outside the jurisdiction of the court within which the alleged offence stated to have taken place. Therefore, keeping in view of the above exigencies in mind, the court should advert to the situation in appropriate case and mitigate the miseries, harassment and torture meted to the applicants. ( 7 ) MR. Saifullah, the learned Public Prosecutor has seriously objected to entertainment of the anticipatory bail application in this court on the mere ground of domicilty or having residence inasmuch as such plea may lead to disastrous results. The learned Public prosecutor has further contended that offences are required to be enquired into and tried in a court having territorial jurisdiction over the locality in which the crime is alleged to have been committed. Even if the accused is far beyond from the place of crime, he has to be brought back before the court having local jurisdiction to try the same. It is not that the presence of the accused within jurisdiction of a particular court would provide jurisdiction to any court where he may prefer to be present or deliberately chooses as his place of stay. It is not that the presence of the accused within jurisdiction of a particular court would provide jurisdiction to any court where he may prefer to be present or deliberately chooses as his place of stay. It seems abanduntly manifest that on a larger principle of criminal administration of justice the court having jurisdiction to enquire and try the offence should alone be competent to entertain such application. The jurisdiction for grant of bail or anticipatory bail is within the periphery of place of investigation unless a statute expressly provides otherwise. Therefore, it is axiomatic that the court having territorial jurisdiction ordinarily should seige the jurisdiction to entertain the application for anticipatory bail. ( 8 ) MR. Saifullah has, however, invited our attention that in case of an accused who is alleged to have committed an offence within the State of Bihar would be permitted to file an application and this court or in the court of Sessions on the ground of domicilty and, such prayer, if granted, the prosecuting agency may not be fettered by such an order as the High Court of Bihar in its Full Bench Judgment, reported in AIR 1986 Pat. page 194 in the case of Syed Zafrul Hassan v. State, has significantly held that no anticipatory bail could be granted to a person for an offence committed, other than the court within whose jurisdiction the offence was allegedly committed. We find there is absolutely no substance in the said contention inasmuch as even if a wrong order was passed, it is open to a person/authority either to file an application for review or to take steps for getting it reversed by filing appropriate proceedings in the higher courts. Without taking recourse to the above process, no person can be allowed to defy the order passed by the High Court or the Court of Sessions. It is legally impermissible for a court to assume jurisdiction and pass order which lacked such territorial jurisdiction. ( 9 ) WE find in some other states, by state amendment, the jurisdiction of the High Court as well as the Court of Sessions for grant of an anticipatory bail has been taken away. It is legally impermissible for a court to assume jurisdiction and pass order which lacked such territorial jurisdiction. ( 9 ) WE find in some other states, by state amendment, the jurisdiction of the High Court as well as the Court of Sessions for grant of an anticipatory bail has been taken away. In case, any offence alleged to have been committed in those State, and an anticipatory bail application are entertained in any State other than where the offence was allegedly committed, then, it would lead to a disastrous consequence. Therefore, the court while passing such order should be careful and circumspect in entertaining the application for anticipatory bail on the ground of domicilty or temporary residence. The concept of territorial or geographical limit are inherent in the justice system, particularly, in the sphere of jurisprudence, these aspects can be noticed from the provision of Article 214. "there shall be High Court for each State" ( 10 ) THEREFORE, from the above provision it throws abandunt light the High Court of each State shall exercise all its powers within the State without encroaching upon or interfering with the jurisdiction of the other High Courts. Section 438 of the Code reads as follows :"when any person has reason to belief that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the court or the Court of Sessions for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail : provided that the mere fact that a person has applied to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section shall not, in the absence of any order by that court, be a bar to the apprehension of such person in custody, by an officer-in-charge of a police station. (b) The High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, shall dispose of an application for a direction under this sub-section within thirty days of the date of such application. (c) If any person is arrested and detained in custody by an officer-in-charge of a Police Station before the disposal of the application of such person for a direction under this sub-section, the release of such person on bail by a court having jurisdiction pending such disposal, shall be subject to the provisions of section 437. (c) If any person is arrested and detained in custody by an officer-in-charge of a Police Station before the disposal of the application of such person for a direction under this sub-section, the release of such person on bail by a court having jurisdiction pending such disposal, shall be subject to the provisions of section 437. (1a) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in this Act or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority. " ( 11 ) IT may be noted here that the legislature amended the provision on the ground that as a result of long standing pendency of the anticipatory bail applications in different courts, the investigating agency was neither able to apprehend the persons accused of offence nor proceed to complete the investigation. Therefore, by such legislative mandate, it has asked the courts to conclude the cases where the anticipatory bail has been sought as far as possible within a period of one month. It has to be seriously considered whether the legislature by its amendment could pass such amendment by directing the court to dispose of the cases within one month. Even assuming such amendment is valid then, the courts may be tempted to dispose of the case with all promptitude and expedition. The provision of time limit of one month in the amended provision can only be treated, as directory with a view to conclude the application for anticipatory bail without any unreasonable delay. In the statute, it has been further indicated that even assuming a person submitted an application for anticipatory bail, but by such application it would not detract the investigating officer to apprehend the person so desired or to detain such person in custody by an officer-in-charge of Police Station. Therefore, in our view, when there is a provision, in the section, which does not preclude the officer-in-charge of the Police Station to proceed with further investigation of the case or to detain a person in Police custody, even after filing of such anticipatory bail application in the court, there appears to have no further necessity of such amendment for concluding the anticipatory bail application within thirty days. ( 12 ) SECTION 438 is placed betweet section 437 and 439 of the Code. ( 12 ) SECTION 438 is placed betweet section 437 and 439 of the Code. Section 437 provides for grant of bail by the Magistrate exercising territorial jurisdiction in non-bailable offence. Similarly, the section 439 empowers the High Court as well as Court of Sessions regarding granting bail in non-bailable offence. As a matter of fact, the High Court and the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction over the area of commission of the crime are vested with the powers to entertain application for bail under section 439. The manner of exercise of power/under section 438 has to be considered keeping in view of section 437 and 439, there could be no doubt that the word "high Court" or the "court of Sessions" refers only the High Court or the Court of Sessions of the Geographical limits of the courts where the offences is allegedly committed. ( 13 ) SECTION 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages where the enquiry or the trial shall be held. It is quoted here below : section 177 : "ordinary place of enquiry and trial of offence ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court then whose local jurisdiction, it was committed. " ( 14 ) THEREFORE, it can be said with emphasis that the jurisdiction for trial and enquiry by Criminal Courts should be locale of the Commission of the crime and not the residence of the accused nor the place where he might choose to reside and be found. ( 15 ) SECTION 76 of the Code confers the investigating agencies the power to produce the person arrested before the court without delay or by any other person executing a warrant of arrest (Subject to the provision of section 71 as to security ). The Police Officer or any person authorised under the Act bring the persons arrested before the court which he is required by law to produce such person provided such delay shall not in any case, exceed 24 hours excluding the time for journey from the place of arrest to the place of sitting of the Magistrate. On a careful consideration of the provision of sub-section (2) of section 167 of Cr. P. C. , apart from the Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction, any other Magistrate before whom the person arrested is produced could authorise the detention of such person not exceeding fifteen days. On a careful consideration of the provision of sub-section (2) of section 167 of Cr. P. C. , apart from the Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction, any other Magistrate before whom the person arrested is produced could authorise the detention of such person not exceeding fifteen days. The Magistrate having no territorial jurisdiction may order the accused to be produced before the Magistrate having competent jurisdiction. "167 (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole ; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. " ( 16 ) THE above provision throws sufficient light that offence which is required to be tried in a court having geographical jurisdiction and not at any other place. Even assuming a person accused of an offence was apprehended at a place away from the place of incident, he should be brought back before the court having jurisdiction to try the same. Thus, it should be borne in mind that there could be no presumption that the person seeking an anticipatory bail can carry jurisdiction with him to the place where he preferred to stay. Thus, we are of the firm view that on wider principle that the Criminal Courts having territorial jurisdiction either to hold enquiry or trial of the offence can seige jurisdiction equally for anticipatory bail. The Public Prosecutor has invited our attention to the second proviso of section 438 of the Code which reads as follows :"provided that where the apprehended accusation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years, no final order shall be made on such application without giving the State not less than seven days notice to present its case. " ( 17 ) THEREFORE, he has indicated in view of the amendment that he may not have any power to ask the investigating agency of the other state to assist nor can he ask the Public Prosecutor of the court where the offence alleged to have been committed for giving useful assistance to the court in which the application for anticipatory bail has been filed. Thus, it should be considered from common parlance that usually the accused person should be directed to file an anticipatory bail application in the court having territorial jurisdiction within whose jurisdiction the offence alleged to have been committed. We find sufficient force in the aforesaid submission. From the provision, it appears that no final order can be passed without hearing the Public Prosecutor of a court having competent territorial jurisdiction. Sometimes it may be impractical to call for the record from other courts before hearing the Public Prosecutor. ( 18 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned advocate has however, strongly placed reliance in Vinod Ranjan Sinha's case. On careful consideration of the judgment, we find that the Division Bench did not consider the application of 178 of the Code, so also the provision of 167 (2) and the Division Bench only looking to the facts situation of that case directed to grant anticipatory bail. In Vinod Ranjan Sinha's case no broader principle for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail has been laid down. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance in the case of Govind Prosad v. State of West Bengal 1975 Cri. LJ 1249," which shall be dealt with in course of the discussion later on. ( 19 ) THE apex court in the case of Balchand v. State of M. P. AIR 1977 Supreme Court 366 has held as follows :"to begin with section 438 of the Code applies only to non-bailable offences. Secondly, the only authorities which are empowered under this section to grant bail are the Court of Session or the High Court. In view of the fact that an order for anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy available in special cases, this power has been conferred on the higher echelons of judicial service, namely the Court of Session or the High Court. In view of the fact that an order for anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy available in special cases, this power has been conferred on the higher echelons of judicial service, namely the Court of Session or the High Court. Another important consideration which follows from the interpretation of section 438 of the Code is that this section does not contain any guidelines for passing an order of anticipatory bail. We might however, mention here that the term 'anticipatory bail' is really a misnomer, because what the section contemplates is not anticipatory bail, but merely an order releasing an accused on bail in the event of his arrest. It is manifest that there can be no question of bail, unless a person is under detention or custody. In these circumstances therefore, there can be no question of a person being released on bail if he has not been arrested or places in police custody. Section 438 of the Code expressly prescribes that any order passed under that section would be effective only after the accused has been arrested. The object which is sought to be achieved by section 438 of the Code is that the moment a person is arrested. If he has already obtained an order from the Sessions Judge or the High Court, he would be released immediately without having to undergo the regours of jail even for a few days which would necessarily be taken up if he has to apply for bail after arrest. " ( 20 ) IN a recent judgment reported in Judgment Today, 1997 (7) SC651 in the case of State Rep. by the C. B. I. v. Anil Sharma has however held that the underling principle for consideration of application for anticipatory bail is different from regular bail. In some cases, the grant of anticipatory bail unnecessarily intrudes into the sphere of investigation whereby investigating agency is however, being prevented from getting material from the suspected person. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows :"we find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation orientated than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have concealed. In a case like this effective interrogation of suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insultated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogated in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves a offenders. " ( 21 ) IN another judgment reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 144 in the case of State of Assam and another v. R. K. Krishna Kumar and others, it has been held as under :"we do not think it necessary to decide whether Bombay High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the applications filed by the respondents. All the same, the question of granting anticipatory bail to any person who is allegedly connected with the offences in question must for all practical purposes be considered by the High Court of Guwahati within whose territorial jurisdiction such activities should have been perpetrated. In view of the conceded position that appellants were not heard by the High Court we set aside the impugned orders on that ground alone. The applications are to be disposed of after hearing the appellants also. For that purpose we order that the applications for anticipatory bail filed by the respondents would stand transferred to the High Court of Guwahati where those applications would be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and appropriate orders be passed thereon. We request the Chief Justice of High Court of Guwahati to allot these cases to a Division Bench to hear the applications, preferably on 4. 11. 1997. We request the Chief Justice of High Court of Guwahati to allot these cases to a Division Bench to hear the applications, preferably on 4. 11. 1997. " (underline supplied for emphasis)IN order to avoid conflicting decisions and opinions, we think it necessary that all future petitions for anticipatory bail made by any one in common or related matters referring to such activities committed within the territorial limits of Guwahati High Court shall be heard only by the same Division Bench, we further direct that no such application for anticipatory bail shall be entertained by any court other than the Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati indicated above. " (underline supplied for emphasis) ( 22 ) IN Govind Prasad's case the Division Bench of this court has quite reasonably come to the conclusion that the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced after arrest has power either to grant or refuse bail under the new Code as the Magistrate has jurisdiction over the place of arrest to pass an order for granting or refusing bail. The relevant provisions of the new Code for bail are wide enough and any narrow interpretation thereof would not only be retrograded but also de hors the intention of the legislation. It has been held in the case of Govind Prasad v. State of West Bengal as follows :"for a proper consideration of the point at issue ascertaining the animus imponentis or the intention of the law maker, we will have to consider the provision of the statute in the first instance. The relevant provisions of the new Code are wide enough pinpointing a marked departure from those of the old Code. Section 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 provides for the pursuit of offender into other jurisdiction and the same corresponds to section 58 of Act N of 1898. The next relevant provision viz. section 50 is a new and material one. Sub-section (1) of section 50 requires a Police Officer or other person arresting any person without warrant to communicate to him forthwith "full particulars of the offences for which he is arrested on other grounds for such arrest. " This section which has a distinct tradition has been inserted on the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Bill of 1970 and for good reasons viz. " This section which has a distinct tradition has been inserted on the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Bill of 1970 and for good reasons viz. to bring the letter in conformity with the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. Dr. Durgadas Basu in his commentaries on the New Code of Criminal Procedure has deserved that "the object of the safeguard is to enable the person arrested to move for habeas corpus to obtain his release. " The provisions of section 56, which are the same as in the old code may next be considered. It is as follows, "a police officer making an arrest without warrant shall, without unnecessary delay and subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, take or send the person arrested before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, or before the officer in charge of a police station". The words "subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail" are significant and proper meaning and effect is to be given to the same. It is pertinent in this context to refer to the observations of S. R. Das, J. , delivering the judgment of the court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh reported in AIR 1953 SC 10 at p. 15 = (1953 Cri LJ 180 at p. 185) that "there can be no manner of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested persons should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. " We respectfully agree and apply the same to the facts of the present case. The position is only made clearer by the provisions relating to arrest without warrant. A reference in this context may also be made to the case of Nagendra, ILR 51 Cal 402 = (25 Cri LJ 732) which is a case under the old Act and also the relevant provisions of sections 436 (1) and 437 (1) corresponding to sections 496 and 497 of the old Code Dr. A reference in this context may also be made to the case of Nagendra, ILR 51 Cal 402 = (25 Cri LJ 732) which is a case under the old Act and also the relevant provisions of sections 436 (1) and 437 (1) corresponding to sections 496 and 497 of the old Code Dr. Durgadas Basu in his commentaries on the New Code of Criminal Procedure has observed that "the safeguard embodied in sections 56-57 was embodied by the makers of our Constitution in Article 22 (2) in order to guarantee it against legislative encroachment with liberalisation on important points. " We agree with the same and we hold that the words "subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail" clearly make the provision of Chapter XXXIII of Act 2 of 1974 applicable to such cases and bring the position on a par with that enjoined under section 81 of the said Code. The other relevant provision in this connection is that in section 57 which provides that the person arrested is not to be detained for more than 24 hours in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under section 167. It is pertinent now to refer to the provisions of Chapter VI. The provision relating to arrest without warrant may now be considered and the same lifts the cloud, if any, and makes the position clearer. A reference may also be made to the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 78 which was engrafted at the instance of the Joint Committee on the Bill of 1970 and was consequential upon the insertion of the second proviso to section 81 (1) of the Code, lays down that "the court issuing a warrant under sub-section (1) shall forward, along with the warrant, the substance of the information against the person to enable the court acting under section 81 to decide whether bail should or should not be granted to the person. " The power to grant bail therefore is unequivocally envisaged in the provisions of section 78 read with section 81 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. " The power to grant bail therefore is unequivocally envisaged in the provisions of section 78 read with section 81 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. It is pertinent in this context to refer to the second proviso to section 81 which is as follows :"provided further that if the offence is a non-bailable one, it shall be lawful for the Chief Judicial Magistrate (subject to the provisions) of section 437) or the Sessions Judge, of the District in which the arrest is made on consideration of the information and the documents referred to in sub-section (2) of section 78, to release such person on bail. " The only bar therefore is under section 437 (1) which, however, does not apply to the present case involving offences under sections 406/408/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code and the same also does not apply to the High Court. The obvementioned provisions therefore is a marked departure from that contained in section 86 of the old Code (Act v of 1898 ). The relevant recommendation of the Joint Committee in this context are pertinent being a proper interpretation and are as follows : "under the present provision (old section 86) where a warrant of arrest is sent to a place outside the local jurisdiction of Magistrate, for execution, the arrested person has necessarily to be transported in custody to the Magistrate issuing the warrant before he can claim to be released on bail? this results in considerable hardship and inconvenience to persons arrested far away from court issuing the warrant of arrest. To remove such hardship and inconvenience, the Committee has amended these clauses conferring power on the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place of arrest to release the person on bail (new 2nd proviso to section 81 (1), subject to the other provisions of the Code relating to bail (section 437 ). To enable such Magistrate to consider whether bail should be granted, it has further been provided (section 78 (2) ? that the Magistrate issuing a warrant a should also forward along with the warrant the substance of the information together with relevant documents". To enable such Magistrate to consider whether bail should be granted, it has further been provided (section 78 (2) ? that the Magistrate issuing a warrant a should also forward along with the warrant the substance of the information together with relevant documents". Even under the old Code where the relevant provisions are prima facie more circumscribed, the courts interpreted the words "appear to be the person intended by the court" more expansively and a reference in this context may be made to the case of In Re: Sagarmai Khemraj, AIR 1940 Bom 397 (42 Cri LJ 205) and Kham Chand Tarachand Samtani v. The State, (1970) 74 Cal WN 753 = (1971 Cri LJ 149 ). In the Bombay case, the warrant issued having been found to be not sufficiently definite the accused was directed to be released and in the Calcutta case it was observed that "while the executing Magistrate is not certainly a rubber stamp, bound to execute any and every warrant coming from outside the local limits of his jurisdiction, he is nonetheless bound by the condition as imposed in the said section. " The new provisions engrafted in Act 2 of 1974 have, however; thrown the flood-gates open and made the position distinctly wider. The imprimatur of judicial decision may now be considered. The learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer, appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal referred to two cases in support of his contention. He referred in the first instance to an unreported decision dated the 13-7-1973 by S. P. Mitra, C. J. and A. K. De, J, in the case of Madanlal v. The State, Criminal Misc. Case No. 957 of 1973 (Cal ). The said decision, however, does not lend assurance to the contention of the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer in this behalf. In the first place the decision is in July, 1973, under the old Code viz. , the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the provisions whereof are markedly different from those of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: and secondly the point now raised by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer does not appear to have been even raised and considered in the said judgment. The Division Bench proceeded apparently on merits and ultimately disposed of the Rule with the following observations. The Division Bench proceeded apparently on merits and ultimately disposed of the Rule with the following observations. "we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, on the 7th July, 1973, directing that the accused be sent to court lock-up and the A. C. R. F. is to arrange escort party and cause production of the accused before the Betiah Court nor we do find any reason for granting him bail. " Their Lordships thereafter proceeded to modify the order of the court below by some directions as prayed for on behalf of the petitioner but there is no reference to the point at issue in this case. The other case referred to by Mr. Rajesh Chandra Ghosh is the case of State v. Sajjan Singh, reported in 1953 Cri LJ 1525 = (AIR 1953 Pepsu 146) Chief Justice Teja Singh while observing that there is no provision in the Code for anticipatory bail further held that the word "court" appearing in section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 means the court which has jurisdiction to try the cases for the offence alleged to have been committed by him. Apart from the fact that the context is different, it should not be overlooked that the observations are made on the basis of the provisions of the old Code and the same is markedly different from the wider provisions of the new Code of 1973. Mr. Prasun Chandra Ghosh, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioner, however, referred to the case of State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, reported in AIR 1953 SC 10 and relied on the observations made by Mr. Justice S. R. Das at p. 15 that "there can be no manner of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provisions that the arrests persons should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. " We respectfully agree with the same. Mr. " We respectfully agree with the same. Mr. Ghosh next referred to the fact that earlier, in the case instituted by Sri Paul Oswal, Director of the company against the present accused-petitioner, substantially on the same facts, when a warrant of arrest was issued by the Ludhiana Court, the then Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, by his order dated the 25th April, 1973, had granted bail to the accused in that case directing him to appear before the Ludhiana Court in due course. The Rule obtained from the High Court for a cancellation of the bail so granted by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, was ultimately discharged by Mr. Justice A. K. Basu and Mr. Justice N. C. Mukherjee on the 14th June, 1973. Mr. Prasun Chandra Ghosh accordingly submitted that this is a precedent pat on the point in support of his submissions. There are several decisions both reported and unreported on the point in favour of granting bail even under the old Code and without multiplying such cases, a reference may be made to the case of Gulam Mohammad Azimuddin v. State, reported in AIR 1959 Madhya Pradesh 147 = (1959) Cri LJ 600) wherein the Indore Bench observed at page 149 that-"but though the Magistrate had no power to grant bail to the petitioner, the Sessions Judge could and this court can release the petitioners on bail to appear before the City Magistrate of Ujjain and in the meantime direct the Madras Police Officer to produce warrants of the Trivellore Court, Madras State, for the arrest of the petitioners. " It was further observed by Mr. Justice P. V. Dixit at page 150 that-"it is now well settled that the powers of the High Court and the Sessions Court under section 498 are in no way controlled by section 497, Criminal Procedure Code, and it is open both to the High Court or to the Court of Sessions to Admit a person to bail on good and sufficient cause in any case. "the relevant provisions in the new Code are much wider bringing clearly to light the right to grant bail in such cases. The imprimatur of judicial decisions therefore, lends assurance to the findings arrived at by us based on the provisions of the statute. "the relevant provisions in the new Code are much wider bringing clearly to light the right to grant bail in such cases. The imprimatur of judicial decisions therefore, lends assurance to the findings arrived at by us based on the provisions of the statute. On an anxious consideration ultimately of the provisions of the statute and of the decision on the point, we hold that the preliminary objection raised by the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer, relating to the absence of jurisdiction of the Calcutta Court to grant bail, is not sustainable and the same accordingly fails. " ( 23 ) MR. Banerjee has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 1992 Cri. LJ p. 3442 in the case of T. Madhusudan v. Superintendent of Police and another which has been held as under by Kerala High Court :"as regards grant of anticipatory bail the place where a person apprehends arrest is a sure test for determining jurisdiction of 'the' High Court or 'the' Court of Session as they case may be. If the applicant can satisfy the court that his apprehension (that he would be arrested at a place within the territorial limits of a particular court) is based on reasonable grounds, the High Court of the Sessions Court having jurisdiction over that place has authority to exercise powers under section 438 of Cr. PC A person can be arrested at any place whether that a place is within or outside the place where the offence has been committed. If release from arrest is necessary, the place where arrest is made has some significance for such release. " ( 24 ) BUT the reasonings of the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Syed Zafrul Hassan v. State appears to be more reasonable and convincing and therefore, we hereby agree to the views of the Full Bench decision in Syed Zafrul Hassan case rather than the views taken in the case of T. Madhusudan v. Superintendent of Police and anr. similarly, we are unable to agree with the view of the Division Bench Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1991 Cri. LJ p. 950 in the case of Capt. Satish Kr. Sharma v. Delhi Administration. ( 25 ) IN a single Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court reported in Crimes 1983 (3) in the case of Bimal Kr. similarly, we are unable to agree with the view of the Division Bench Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1991 Cri. LJ p. 950 in the case of Capt. Satish Kr. Sharma v. Delhi Administration. ( 25 ) IN a single Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court reported in Crimes 1983 (3) in the case of Bimal Kr. Jain v. State held that when an accused is required in a Police Station, the High Court of the Court of Sessions of any other state cannot grant blanket anticipatory bail but the production of the accused could be deferred till he presents himself before the investing officer who may pass a suitable direction. In another Kerala case reported in AIR 1995 Cri. LJ 1316 in the case of C. T. Mathew v. Govt. of India, Home dept. It has been held as follows :"the anticipatory bail is a pre-arrest legal process closely linked with an offence or crime. If arrest is sought to be prevented, the place where the arrest is effected given reasons nexus for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 438. The High Court or the Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction the arrest is sought to be effected can naturally have jurisdiction to decide whether it thinks fit to get anticipatory bail. The arrest is made reference to a crime at the behest of the police or the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction, the offence is alleged to have been committed. Thus the court within whose jurisdiction the offence is alleged to have been committed in court competent to grant anticipatory bail. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court or Sessions Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed will ensure beyond the territorial limits of the court as the arrest sought to be made is with reference to that specific crime or offence and the police can pursue the offender beyond its jurisdiction to enforce the arrest. In granting anticipatory bail in a State where the applicant is sought to be arrested the High Court naturally has to restrict the relief and direct that in the event of the applicant's arrest in that State he will be released on certain conditions but the High Court will not extend relief to arrests made beyond that State. In this view, residence of the accused may not be a relevant factor to fix jurisdiction for grant of anticipatory bail. In this view, residence of the accused may not be a relevant factor to fix jurisdiction for grant of anticipatory bail. When section 438 postulates freedom from arrest, it is the place of arrest and the commission of offence for which arrest is made that should provide the answer to identify the court which can grant relief. Accordingly, the High Court of the State within which the offence is committed or the arrest is sought to be made can grant anticipatory bail under section 438 but while in the former case the bail will ensure also to arrest made beyond the State, in the latter case the High Court will have to restrict the relief of anticipatory bail to arrests made within that State. The mere residence of the offender within the State will not by itself give jurisdiction to the High Court of that State to grant anticipatory bail under section 438. " ( 26 ) IN Karnataka High Court by a single Bench decision reported in 1984 Cri. LJ 757 in the case of L. R. Naidu v. State of Karnataka has no doubt held that place of offence is not material while considering the prayer for bail and he can move before the court where he ordinarily resides even though the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction of that court but we are unable to agree with the views of the learned single Judge inasmuch as we are inclined more to accept the views of the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court. ( 27 ) THE concept of the anticipatory bail had however been crept in the new code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 prior to it, there was no provision for anticipatory bail, while considering the scope and ambit of section 438 of the Code, it seems that the provision empowers to grant anticipatory bail with the Court of Session or the High Court. The expression, anticipatory bail is truly speaking a misnomer and the section contemplated is not anticipatory bail but merely an order releasing an accused on bail in the event of his arrest. The expression, anticipatory bail is truly speaking a misnomer and the section contemplated is not anticipatory bail but merely an order releasing an accused on bail in the event of his arrest. But in view of the discussion made above, we are of the view that where any person has reason to believe that he is likely to be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may either approach to the High Court or Court of Sessions for a direction that in the event of arrest he shall be released on bail. Therefore, on a plain reading of the provision, it speaks that the person allegedly accused of an offence must satisfy the court to which he approached that there are strong reason that he may likely be arrested in non-bailable offences. In support of such belief, he must place sufficient material so that the court would be in a position to form its opinion whether to grant or refuse anticipatory bail. In case, either the High Court or the Court of Sessions on reference of material produced before it that there is likelihood of a person being arrested in a non-bailable offence, it could grant anticipatory bail directing such person to be released on execution of bond or by imposing any other condition which the arresting officer deemed fit, just and proper. After such person being released on anticipatory bail by the arresting officer, the accused person within reasonable time but in no case beyond 24 hours of arrest shall appear before the court within the jurisdiction of which he ordinarily resides. Either the Magistrate, Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Court of Sessions upon consideration of the material placed by the arresting officer and on hearing the Public Prosecutor of the locality in which the offences alleged to have been committed shall pass an appropriate order regarding regular bail under section 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The exercise of jurisdiction of anticipatory bail by any other court namely the High Court or the Court of Sessions beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction is limited to the extent of consideration of a bail for the transitional period but it has no jurisdiction to transgress into the limits of the local jurisdiction of the court within which offence is alleged to have been committed. With the above observation, the reference of the Division Bench has been answered. ( 28 ) WE carefully consider the merit of the application filed by the applicant Sailesh Jaiswal. It is true that in the Charge-sheet the name of the applicant does not find place. But we are not in a position to know as to the contents of the FIR lodged by B. C. Kohli. The applicant was said to have obtained information through an advocate from Allahabad. We failed to understand as to why he did not prefer to file an application for grant of bail within the jurisdiction of Allahabad Court where the offence was allegedly committed. Therefore, in the above situation, we carefully considered the merit of the application filed by the appellant Sailesh Jaiswal. It is true that in the Charge-Sheet the name of the applicant does not find place. But we are not aware as to the contents of the FIR lodged by B. C. Kohli. Therefore, in the above situation we are not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under section 438. ( 29 ) ACCORDINGLY, the application has been rejected. V. K. Gupta, J.- I agree. N. A. Chowdhury, J.- I agree. P. S. Mishra, CJ.-I have perused the judgment of B. Panigrahi, J. ( 30 ) I am in respectful agreement with the view that the exercise of jurisdiction of anticipatory bail by High Court or the Court of Sessions beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction is limited to the extent of a bail for the transitional period and it cannot have jurisdiction to transgress into the limits of the local jurisdiction of any other High Court or the Court of Sessions which is not under its superintendence and control, within whose jurisdiction alleged offence has been committed. ( 31 ) B. Panigrahi, J. has taken all legitimate aspects into account for the above conclusion. When read in isolation section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows : (1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. (2) When the High Court or the Court Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including- (a) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (b) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer; (c) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the court; (d) Such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an Officer-in-Charge of a police station on such accusation and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the court under sub-section (1 ). " -gives impression that a resident within the territorial jurisdiction of any Court of Sessions and of the High Court apprehending arrest can make application for anticipatory bail. That, however, does not appear to be the intention of the legislature. A mentioning of the Court of Sessions and the High Court in section 438 of the Code cannot be read as any Court of Sessions or any High Court whether having jurisdiction or not having jurisdiction. ( 32 ) AN application for bail in anticipation of arrest can be sought for only in non-bailable offences. Accusation of non-bailable offence must then be found in a case that is registered for investigation by the Officer-in-charge of a police station or under the orders of any superior officer by the Officer-in-charge of a police station having territorial jurisdiction. ( 32 ) AN application for bail in anticipation of arrest can be sought for only in non-bailable offences. Accusation of non-bailable offence must then be found in a case that is registered for investigation by the Officer-in-charge of a police station or under the orders of any superior officer by the Officer-in-charge of a police station having territorial jurisdiction. No case can be registered by the police as contemplated under section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless the same is in respect of an offence in respect of which the police station concerned has jurisdiction. ( 33 ) SECTION 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which contains the provision for application for bail by the person who believes that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence has defined 'high Court' to mean 'in relation to any State, the High Court for that State; in relation to a Union territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court for a State has been extended by law that High Court; and in relation to any other Union territory, the highest court of criminal appeal for that territory, other than the Supreme Court of India and 'police station' to mean any post or place declared generally or specially be the State Government, to be a Police Station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. Dealing with the jurisdiction, the Code has elaborately provided all classes of Criminal Courts besides High Court and the courts constituted under any law and territorial divisions. Even coursory glance to such provision in Chapter II of the Code makes it abundantly clear that a judicial Magistrate's jurisdiction extends to the local area of a Police Station or more than one Police Stations so determined in accordance with the provisions therein; that of the sessions divisions over that of the judicial Magistrate and that of the High Cour of the State or States upon all courts in the State or States. Ordinary criminal jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court is described in Clause 22 of the Letters Patent of 1865 as the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction and also in respect of such persons both within the limits of Bengal Division of Fort William - (now the State of West Bengal) and beyond such limits as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and "not within the limits of the Criminal Jurisdiction of any other High Court or Court established by