JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Heard advocates for the petitioner and the respondent. 2.This revision is filed by the tenant challenging the order of the Appellate Court i.e. the District Judge, Latur dated 15-3-90. 3.The landlord had filed eviction proceedings against the tenant on the ground that tenant has been using the premises in contravention of the rent deed and using the same for the purpose other than for which the premises were leased and has committed breach of the terms of the rent deed and was liable to be evicted. According to the landlord, when the premises were leased to the tenant, he has specifically agreed in the rent deed by Clause - 5 not to store explosives, kerosene, petrol and fodder, which is not permissible under the Insurance Companies Rates. However, the tenant in contravention of this Clause, started selling fire crackers in the premises on Diwali of 1980 and therefore he committed breach of rent note. 4.On the other hand, it is the case of the tenant that eventhough the rent note was executed on 1st November, 1978, the suit premises were in possession of the tenant since before 10/15 years where the father of the tenant was carrying on business of explosives. Therefore, according to the tenant, the landlord has firstly acquised in the so called breach. Secondly, according to him, the rent note was only for a period of one year and since breach is alleged to have been committed after one year, there was no agreement in force as between the landlord and the tenant to bind the tenant not to keep or store explosives in the suit premises. Thirdly, according to the tenant if at all the landlord wanted to bring his case under section 15(2)(b) it was necessary for the landlord to plead as to the purpose for which the house was originally leased out and thereafter to point out and show that the tenant had used premises for a purpose other than for which it was leased. Consequently, according to the tenant, the landlord has failed to prove all the 3 requirements and hence Appellate Court order is liable to set aside. 5.Mr. Bora for the landlord relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 1994(3) Bom.C.R. 447 : 1994 Supplement (I) Supreme Court Cases 504 (Dashrath Baburao Sangale and others v. Kashinath Bhaskar Datta)1. Consequently, according to the tenant, the landlord has failed to prove all the 3 requirements and hence Appellate Court order is liable to set aside. 5.Mr. Bora for the landlord relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court reported in 1994(3) Bom.C.R. 447 : 1994 Supplement (I) Supreme Court Cases 504 (Dashrath Baburao Sangale and others v. Kashinath Bhaskar Datta)1. Secondly on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1979(4) Supreme Court Cases 734 (Merwanji Nanabhoy Merchant v. Union of India and others)2, and thirdly judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 212 (Srinavas Kasherlal v. Vithal Shivagir Gosavi)3. On the other hand, the Counsel for the tenant relied upon the full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in A.I.R. 1952 Madras 413 (Daxshinamoorthy v. Thulja Bai and another)4. I will consider these rulings at appropriate stage. 6.Section 15(2)(ii)(b) is very clear. It provides that if landlord can evict the tenant, if he proves that the tenant has after commencement of the Hyderabad Rent Control Act, used the house for a purpose of other than for which it was leased. The wordings of sub-section (ii)(b) clearly shows that the landlord will have to prove two things; first that the house was leased out for a particular purpose and secondly, that it was used not for that purpose but for some other purpose for which it was not leased. In the rent note, there is no mention that the tenant will use the suit premises for a particular purpose; the rent note also does not mention that the tenant will carry on a particular business at suit premises (admittedly the suit premises are a shop not used for residence by the tenant) and therefore, the question would be whether a landlord can succeed under section 15(2)(ii)(b). In the absence of any agreement between parties regarding specific user of the suit premises. 7.Secondly, the rent note is executed on 1st November, 1978. It is for a period of one year from 1-11-78 to 30-10-79. There are no allegations of the landlord that the tenant committed breach of this rent note during the period of aforesaid one year period but the breach is alleged subsequent to the period of the rent note i.e. after the expiry of the period of one year. It is for a period of one year from 1-11-78 to 30-10-79. There are no allegations of the landlord that the tenant committed breach of this rent note during the period of aforesaid one year period but the breach is alleged subsequent to the period of the rent note i.e. after the expiry of the period of one year. Therefore, question would be whether the tenant is bound by the terms of the rent note after the expiry of the period. The question is whether the tenant was carrying on the business of selling fire crackers right from the time of his father that is 10/15 years before the execution of the rent note and whether the landlord had acquised in the breach committed by the tenant, and the last question would be whether the eviction can be ordered only on breach of Clause 5 regarding storing of explosives, kerosene etc. in the suit premises. 8.In the first judgment of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Baburao Sangale v. Kashimath Bhaskar Datta, the tenanted premises were taken by the tenant for doing the business of sugarcane crushing with the help of Ox. The landlord sought to evict the tenant on the ground of change of user and according to him, the tenant was carrying on business of selling clothes and readymade clothes instead of the sugarcane crushing business. The trial Court, Appellate Court and the High Court upheld the landlords case and when the matter went to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court also upheld all the orders passed by these Courts and did not disturb the findings. 9.Admittedly, this case does not apply to the facts of the present case because, the tenant has changed the user of the suit premises, however it is to be noted that the landlord has specifically alleged leasing out the premises for one purpose and its user by the tenant for other purposes. 10.The other judgment of the Supreme Court relied by Mr. Bora is Merwanji Nanabhoy v. Union of India. In this case the landlord sought eviction on the ground of breach of essential terms of the lease deed viz. the tenant was to keep the premises in as good condition as the same were at the time of leasing excluding reasonable wear and tear. Bora is Merwanji Nanabhoy v. Union of India. In this case the landlord sought eviction on the ground of breach of essential terms of the lease deed viz. the tenant was to keep the premises in as good condition as the same were at the time of leasing excluding reasonable wear and tear. The courts below gave a finding in favour of the landlord but the High Court held that the aforesaid Clause was merely a covenant for careful and reasonable use of the property and a breach thereto entitled the landlord to claim damages and not eviction. The Supreme Court however, reversed all the findings of the High Court and ordered eviction. The facts of this case are not at all applicable to the present case. 11.The third case of Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Bora in Srinavas Kasherlal v. Vithal Shivagir Gosavi. It was held by Supreme Court that long user of the premises for the purpose other than the purpose of lease was not bar to file application under section 13(i)(a) and decree for eviction can be granted. This case may support the case of Mr. Bora that even if the tenant proves acquisance by the landlord that may not come in way of landlord. However, for reasons on the following points, this judgment cannot be held to the landlord. 12.A common factor that is found in all the three cases referred to above is that the landlord had come with a specific case regarding letting out of premises for a particular purpose and user of the premises by the tenant for a different purpose. In the instant case, however, the landlord is totally silent regarding the purpose for which or the business for which the tenanted premises were to be used by the tenant. The rent note on which the landlord has based his claim, is totally silent in this regard, and neither the purpose of letting out the premises nor the business to be carried out by the tenant is mentioned in the rent note. Consequently, the landlord does not fulfil the necessary requirement of section 15(2)(ii)(b) that he had let out the premises for a particular purpose and that the tenant has used the premises for some other or different purpose. The lower Appellate Court however, did not consider this material aspect and gave a finding in favour of the landlord. Consequently, the landlord does not fulfil the necessary requirement of section 15(2)(ii)(b) that he had let out the premises for a particular purpose and that the tenant has used the premises for some other or different purpose. The lower Appellate Court however, did not consider this material aspect and gave a finding in favour of the landlord. 13.It was argued by Mr. Bora that even if rent note is silent regarding the purpose for which the suit premises were to be used by the tenant, the rent did not under any circumstances, authorised or permitted the tenant to store explosives and since the tenant has started selling the fire crackers, he has committed breach of the agreement and was liable to be evicted from the suit premises. It is true that there is a specific condition in the rent note preventing the tenant from using the suit premises, storing explosives or inflamable articles. However, Hyderabad Rent Control Act initially empowers the landlord to evict the tenant only on account of pure and simple breach of the terms of the rent deed. The breach of the agreement has to be with reference to the object and purpose for which the premises are leased out and eviction is therefore permitted under section 15(2)(ii)(b). The breach simplicitor of the lease deed is not made a ground for eviction and therefore, even if the landlord succeeds in proving that the tenant committed breach of Clause 5 of the lease deed regarding storing of explosives and he cannot succeed in evicting the tenant. The lower Appellate Court however, laid stress on breach of Clause 5 of the lease deed but did not try to find out whether the breach was with reference to the purpose for which the premises were leased out. 14.If this contention of the tenant is accepted and it is liable to be accepted, it will result in dismissal of the landlord's application for eviction, however, considering the fact that the landlord has been prosecuting his case for a considerable time i.e. since 1983, it would be appropriate to give opportunity to the landlord to amend his application regarding the purpose for which the house was let out to the tenant and to plead its breach by the tenant or its user contrary to the said purpose. 15.Similarly, during the argument, Counsel for the tenant pointed out that tenant was in possession of the document viz. fire crackers licence and he was also in possession of evidence to show that his father was doing some business of selling fire crackers in the suit premises. But admittedly this documentary evidence or other evidence was not tendered before the trial Court. 16.Therefore, to enable both the parties to amend their pleadings and to adduce evidence, it is necessary to remand the matter to the lower Court. Hence order. 17.Civil Revision Application is allowed and the orders of both the lower courts are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Rent Controller with liberty to both the parties to amend their respective pleadings and to adduce evidence on the additional amended pleadings only. Parties to appear before the trial Court on 23rd February, 1998 and file their applications for amendment within 4 weeks thereafter and the Rent Controller is directed to decide the petition within three months thereof. Matter remanded. *****