JUDGMENT P.K. PALLI, J.—This revision petition has been filed by petitioner/ landlord laying challenge to the order dated September 29, 199 passed by the Rent Controller, Shimla whereby the petition filed by him on the ground of non-payment of rent was allowed and in view of his act and conduct in refusing to accept the rent, he was not entitled to interest and costs. The tenants/respondents were, however, granted a statutory period of 30 days to deposit this amount and on such deposit being made, the ground shall not be available for seeking eviction of the respondents/tenants. The second ground of sub-letting was held not to have been proved by the landlord/petitioner. 2. Feeling aggrieved against the order passed by the Rent Controller, the landlord filed an appeal under Section 24 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 which stands dismissed by the appellate authority and the order passed by the Rent Controller stands affirmed. Parties, hereinafter in this judgment, shall be referred to as landlord and tenants. 3. Mr. K.D. Sood with Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing I for the landlord, contends that the impugned judgment and order should be [ set aside as the Courts have not taken care of the provisions contained in Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Act with respect to the tender of rent. It is sought to be urged that having found that the tenants have not paid rent from August 1990 till date, neither any statutory interest has been allowed nor costs have been granted to him. The argument in a nutshell is that once the tenant is found to be in arrears of rent, it is the statutory duty of the Rent Controller to determine interest as well as costs which have to be granted to the landlord and on failure of the tenant to tender that amount, eviction of the tenant has to follow. In further support of the arguments, reliance is being placed on 1993 (1) S.L.J. 651, (Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood) where the expression "amount due" and its meaning have been explained by the Honble Supreme Court of India. - . 4. Mr. In further support of the arguments, reliance is being placed on 1993 (1) S.L.J. 651, (Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood) where the expression "amount due" and its meaning have been explained by the Honble Supreme Court of India. - . 4. Mr. Sood further proceeds to contend that the landlord in the present case has successfully proved subletting by the tenants in favour of Respondent No. 3 who is in exclusive possession of the shop and is running business there and the Courts have gone wrong in deciding the issue of subletting against the landlord. 5. It is also contended that the partnership deed being relied upon by the respondents/tenants, is a camouflage and an attempt on their part to avoid eviction and to deprive the landlord of a valuable right which has accrued to him. 6. It is further sought to be contended that Respondent No. 1 is widow of the deceased tenant Vijay Gautam and is in active service in the Electricity Board at Shimla and is not carrying out any business activity in the shop in question. Respondent No. 2, who is son of late Vijay Gautam, tenant, is a minor and was studying at the relevant time when the sub-lease was created. It is, thus, being urged that both of them being completely out of possession, a strong presumption of subletting is available to the landlord and the findings recorded by the Courts below are not based on correct appreciation of evidence and are liable to be set aside, 7. In support of the second contention, I have been taken through the statements of the parties and their witnesses as well as the partnership deeds Ext. RW-1/A and Ext. RX, application seeking permission of the authorities concerned moved by Respondent No. 1 (Ext. RW-3/B) and the grant of permission Ext. RW-2/A. In further support of arguments, reliance is being placed on 1986 Shim. L.C. 22, (Hem Raj v. Basta Singh and another); (1994) 5 SCC 444, (Dewan Chand Bhalla v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Bfio/7; and Civil Revision No. 178 of 1991 (Satsang Sabha, Akhara Bazar Kullu v. Smt Kartar Kaur) decided on September 30, 1996 by this Court. 8. Ms Devyani Sharma with Mr. L.C. 22, (Hem Raj v. Basta Singh and another); (1994) 5 SCC 444, (Dewan Chand Bhalla v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Bfio/7; and Civil Revision No. 178 of 1991 (Satsang Sabha, Akhara Bazar Kullu v. Smt Kartar Kaur) decided on September 30, 1996 by this Court. 8. Ms Devyani Sharma with Mr. Ramakant Sharma, appearing for the tenants, in reply to the arguments advanced by Mr, K.D. Sood, contends that the amount found due by the Rent Controller has been paid by the tenants. Rather the amount deposited by them is far in excess than the one which was held to be paid. Since the landlord had refused to accept the rent and has made a false claim of arrears, he was not held entitled to interest and costs and, thus, the tenants could not be said not to have deposited the rent due within the meaning of the relevant provisions contained in the Act and the arguments raised by Mr. Sood are unfounded. 9. It is further being argued by Ms. Devyani Sharma that if the Money Order sent by the tenants is refused by the landlord, no fault could be found with the tenants and in support of this argument, reliance is being placed on a Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court reported in 1981 (1) R.C.R. 30, (Raj Kumar Prasad v. Uchit Narain Singh). It is, thus, sought to be urged that the landlord cannot be permitted to derive benefit out of his own wrong and the Rent Controller as well as appellate authority have returned specific findings that in view of the act and conduct as projected during the proceedings, the landlord is not entitled to this relief. It is also being said in reply that the provisions contained in Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Act have no relevance and would apply only in the given situation as envisaged by the language of these provisions. It is further being argued that the tenants have deposited Rs. 8,100/- vide challan dated October 20, 1994 whereas, per order of the Rent Controller, they were required to deposit an amount of Rs. 5,184/-only and adding the rent of the month of September, it would come to Rs. 5,292/-. It is further being argued that the tenants have deposited Rs. 8,100/- vide challan dated October 20, 1994 whereas, per order of the Rent Controller, they were required to deposit an amount of Rs. 5,184/-only and adding the rent of the month of September, it would come to Rs. 5,292/-. It is being argued that in case it is found that the landlord is entitled to the interest as well as costs, the amount, so determined, can be added to the rent held due and the deposit, so made, would still be in excess which should be adjusted in future arrears of rent, found if any. Learned Counsel, however, makes it clear that this may not be accepted a concession on her part. 10. Coming to the reply on the question of sub-letting, Mrs. Devyani has brought to my notice the petition for eviction filed by the landlord and has drawn my attention to paragraphs 16 and 18 where the grounds for eviction have been detailed. My attention has also been brought to the corresponding paragraphs of the reply given by the tenants. I have also been taken through the evidence placed on record by the parties and it is sought to be argued that the landlord never laid by challenge to the partnership and he was estopped by his acquiescence to argue that this partnership is a camouflage to defeat the rights of the landlord. 11. It is also being argued .that there is no parting with possession by the tenants and the legal control vests with them. It is sought to be argued that there is a legal and valid partnership entered between the respondents and earlier, between Respondent No. 3, the alleged sub-lessee, and the deceased tenant Vijay Gautam. Both these deeds are said to be registered partnership deeds and have been read in extenso so as to bring home the point that there is no subletting by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Respondent No. 3 and there exists a genuine partnership between them. Reliance is placed on AIR 1984 SC 1447, (Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi): AIR 1987 SC 242, (A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam); (1979) 8 ILR (H. Series) 1, (Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas); 1996 (1) Vol. 48 R.C.R. 40, (Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Swaran Lata (Smt). 12. Reliance is placed on AIR 1984 SC 1447, (Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi): AIR 1987 SC 242, (A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharmalingam); (1979) 8 ILR (H. Series) 1, (Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas); 1996 (1) Vol. 48 R.C.R. 40, (Dev Kumar (died) through LRs. v. Swaran Lata (Smt). 12. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties at length, on careful perusal of the pleadings, record as well as the case law, I find that this revision petition calls for no interference by this Court and the impugned judgment and order are just and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Notice may first be taken of certain admitted facts which have a direct bearing on the controversy being raised in this revision. The landlord, as per his own statement, purchased the shop in question somewhere in the year 1986-87 and at that time only Vijay Gautam was the tenant in occupation of the shop at the rent of Rs. 108/- per month. Vijay Gautam, admittedly, died on June 26,1991 and the present petition seeking ejectment of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who are the widow and minor son of Vijay Gautam, was filed on July 7, 1992. It is at this stage that it would be relevant to have a look at the eviction petition where in para 16 it is stated by the landlord that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have sublet the entire premises to Respondent No. 3 who is in exclusive possession and control of the shop in question. In para 18 it is said that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have, without the written consent of the landlord, transferred their right under the lease and have sublet the entire premises to Respondent No. 3, Harbhajan Singh. The said subletting and transfer of right took place in the month of January 1989 and since then the subtenant is in exclusive possession and is independently using the shop in question. In this very ground, it has been further pleaded that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to pay arrears of rent despite repeated requests and demand from April 1, 1988 to June 30, 1992 and an amount of Rs. 5,508/- has fallen due from them and to this amount is to be added interest for which a claim of Rs. 1,074.06. 14. In the reply filed jointly by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to pay arrears of rent despite repeated requests and demand from April 1, 1988 to June 30, 1992 and an amount of Rs. 5,508/- has fallen due from them and to this amount is to be added interest for which a claim of Rs. 1,074.06. 14. In the reply filed jointly by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the averments have been denied as incorrect and it is pleaded that business is being carried on in the shop in question in partnership and that Respondent No. 3 is not in exclusive possession of the premises. In reply to para 16, it has been particularly stated that neither Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have sublet the premises to Respondent No. 3 nor he is in exclusive possession and occupation of the shop nor any rent is being charged from him by them. Averments contained in para 18 of the petition have also been specifically denied. In respect to subletting and exclusive possession of Respondent No. 3, it is said that his capacity is that of partner. He has no concern either with the tenancy or their other rights under the lease. It is stated that they are in effective and actual control of the premises. In respect to arrears of rent, it is said that the petition contains false allegations and the respondents have been tendering rent to the landlord several times but the landlord had, out of mala fide intention, refused to accept it. Reference has also been made to the fact that the landlord has received Rs. 4,800 as rent for the period with effect from July 1, 1986 to July, 1990 at the rate of Rs. 1,200 per annum. 15. From the pleadings stated above, it may be noticed that the landlord has stated that the subletting and transfer of rights by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Respondent No. 3 took place in January 1989 and ever since then Respondent No. 3 is in exclusive possession and is independently using the shop. The landlord has, thus, admitted Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to be his tenants, and, in my view, rightly as they would inherit the tenancy rights from their predecessor-in-interest Vijay Gautam, but the fact that these respondents have sublet the premises to Respondent No. 3 in January 1989 is totally incorrect. The landlord has, thus, admitted Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to be his tenants, and, in my view, rightly as they would inherit the tenancy rights from their predecessor-in-interest Vijay Gautam, but the fact that these respondents have sublet the premises to Respondent No. 3 in January 1989 is totally incorrect. Admittedly, Vijay Gautam was alive in January 1989 and has died on June 26, 1991. 16. It is, thus, to be seen that it is not the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who are tenants and have sublet their rights in the tenancy to Respondent No. 3 and if sub-tenancy is said to have been created in January 1989, then it has to be attributed to Vijay Gautam who was then the tenant and not the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is at this stage that notice may be taken of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A!R 1987 SC 242, (A.S. Sulochana v. Dharmalingam) where circumstances, if not identical, but were somewhat similar. 17. In this judgment, their Lordships were examining the provisions contained in Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960) where provision of subletting under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of that Act is permie-tria with the provisions of the Himachal Act and the ejectment of the tenants was sought on the ground of subletting without written consent of the landlord. The landlord and the tenant both had died and the litigation was between their heirs. While interpreting the provisions, it was held that a landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant on the ground that he has created sub-tenancy without written consent of the landlord, has to prove that the tenant against whom the petition has been filed, has sublet the premises and it is his ejectment that is being sought on that ground. If the premises had been sublet by the predecessor of the tenant, the tenant against whom the present Us has been filed, who is successor-in-interest, cannot be said to have violated the provisions. To quote, "The flouting of the law, the sin under the Rent Act must be the sin of the tenant sought to be evicted, and not that of his father or pred-ecessor-in-interest." The Rent Controller in the present case has taken the relevant extract from this judgment and it has been reproduced in para 14 of the impugned order. 18. Mr. 18. Mr. K.D. Sood has brought to my notice the definition of tenant as appearing in Section 2(j) of the Act and it is sought to be argued that a tenant would include the heirs of the tenant in the event of his death. It is, thus, sought to be urged that once the premises have been sub-let in January 1989, the violation of the mandate of the statute continues and on that ground Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to be evicted as Respondent No. 3 was still continuing in possession of the shop and is running the business there. 19. In the light of the observations of the Honble Supreme Court, I am unable to agree with the arguments being advanced by Mr. Sood and it is held that even if it is assumed that the tenant incurred disability by inducting Respondent No. 3 as his sub-tenant in January 1989, no eviction order can be passed against the successors-in-interest of the deceased tenant Vijay Gautam, who in the present case are Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. his widow and son. This is one way to look at the matter. 20. It may be noticed that the first partnership deed was entered into between Vijay Gautam and Harbhajan Singh, Respondent No. 3. This partnership deed is Ext. RW-1/A and is dated December 31, 1988. RW-6/A is the certificate of its registration. A close scrutiny of this deed clearly indicates the investment of the capital, profits and losses to be shared equally, makes a provision for proper books of accounts and its custody, taking into account capital, assets, liabilities as well as profits and losses which would be signed by each partner and would be binding. It is specifically stated in para 12 that tenancy rights in respect of the premises, where partnership business is being carried out, shall always be that of the first party, i.e. Vijay Gautam and the partnership firm or the second party shall have no right, title or interest qua the tenancy right during the partnership business and after the partnership is determined. This deed, in my view, does not even remotely suggest that it is camouflage I or was brought on the scene to cover subletting in order to deprive the landlord I from the valuable right of eviction on the ground of subletting. This deed, in my view, does not even remotely suggest that it is camouflage I or was brought on the scene to cover subletting in order to deprive the landlord I from the valuable right of eviction on the ground of subletting. It may be further I noticed that Vijay Gautam, as noticed above, died on June 26, 1991 and within two days of his death, a fresh partnership deed between Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand, and Respondent No. 3 on the other, was brought on the scene and the same is Ext. RX on record. 21. As the first deed of partnership came to an end on the death of Vijay Gautam and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who came to occupy the premises as legal heirs, lost no time despite the death to enter into fresh partnership deed in continuation of the earlier one and in this deed also the clause \n respect of the tenancy rights has been identically reproduced in para 3. The profits and losses are to be shared in the ratio of 25% of Respondent No. 1, 25% of Respondent No, 2 and 50% of respondent No. 3. Nothing has been brought to my notice by the learned Counsel appearing for the landlord that any wording or language contained in this document (Ext. RX) can lead to an inference of subletting. 22. Though the word "subletting" is not defined in the statute and the Court is left to draw inferences from certain facts and circumstances brought on the record by the parties, yet one thing that has to be kept in view by the Court is that there is a transfer of exclusive possession and that the said transfer of possession is for consideration. Interestingly, both these grounds are completely missing in the present case and no reliable evidence has been placed on record from the side of the landlord from where an inference of subletting can be drawn. 23. The wife of Vijay Gautam was in service at the time of his death. His son, Respondent No. 2, was minor and was studying in the 7th standard at that time. Respondent No. 1, in the given situation, moved an application seeking 4no objection1 from the authorities concerned that permission may be granted to her to look after the shop before and after the duty hours. His son, Respondent No. 2, was minor and was studying in the 7th standard at that time. Respondent No. 1, in the given situation, moved an application seeking 4no objection1 from the authorities concerned that permission may be granted to her to look after the shop before and after the duty hours. This application was moved on May 14, 1992 and is Ext. RW-3/B on record. After processing, the request made by Respondent No. 1 was allowed vide Ext. RW-3/A and she was permitted to look after the shop in the morning and evening hours. 24. It may be seen that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as legal heirs of deceased Vijay Gautam, inherited the tenancy rights immediately on his death and were holding the possession of the shop in question in that capacity when a fresh partnership deed by them was entered upon with Respondent No. 3. Judging from any angle, subletting cannot be even remotely attributed to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as is sought to be projected in the ejectment petition by the landlord. From the evidence noticed above, subletting cannot be attributed even to Vijay Gautam, predecessor-in-interest of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, as I am of the clear view that a genuine partnership existed between Vijay Gautam and Harbhajan Singh, Respondent No. 3. 25. I have gone through the case law cited by Mr. K.D. Sood and this judgment need not be burdened with the observations made therein as I find that it is not even remotely applicable in the present case on the present and admitted facts. The case law which has been cited is to the effect that once a tenant has incurred a disability entailing his eviction, he cannot resist grant of the eviction petition on the ground of having lost the allotted residence by surrender made by him either before or after filing of the ejectment petition. These judgments are, thus, found to be hardly relevant for resolving the present controversy. 26. In order to deal with the arguments raised by Mr. Sood on the ground of tender, it may be noticed that the claim as put forth by the landlord was that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to pay the arrears of rent from April 1, 1988 till June 30, 1992 at the rate of Rs. 108 per month. In order to deal with the arguments raised by Mr. Sood on the ground of tender, it may be noticed that the claim as put forth by the landlord was that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to pay the arrears of rent from April 1, 1988 till June 30, 1992 at the rate of Rs. 108 per month. To this claim was added interest at the rate of 9%. 27. A perusal of the reply as well as the evidence placed on record, reveals that the tenants tendered the arrears of rent but the landlord refused to accept in one way or the other. While dealing with this point, it has been noticed by the Rent Controller that a receipt Ext. R-1 has been placed on record by the tenants wherein rent for the period from July 1986 to July 1990 stands paid. Surprisingly, the landlord while appearing as his own witness, has admitted this receipt during his cross-examination. It, thus, clearly makes the claim made by the landlord as false as he claimed non-payment of rent with effect from April 1988. The tenants have been found to be in arrears of rent from August 1990. Notice may also be taken of the Money Orders Ext. R-3 to Ext. R-5, sent by the tenants and refused by the landlord. It would, thus, reveal that it was the landlord who was not accepting the rent and no fault could be found with the tenants for ordering their ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent. The tenants, as directed by the Rent Controller, have deposited the rent determined against them rather in excess. It was in the given situation that the landlord was held not entitled to costs and interest and in my opinion, rightly so. I am in complete agreement with the findings and reasoning given by the Courts below in this respect. 28. Lastly, it may be observed that this Court is not a Court of appeal. It was in the given situation that the landlord was held not entitled to costs and interest and in my opinion, rightly so. I am in complete agreement with the findings and reasoning given by the Courts below in this respect. 28. Lastly, it may be observed that this Court is not a Court of appeal. Though power of revision under the rent legislation is, no doubt, wider than the revisional power as given under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, still it is to be confined in order to judge the illegality or impropriety of the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the statute and this power is to be further exercised when it is found that there is either perversity in the approach of the Courts below or the evidence has been misinterpreted or misconstrued. If the authorities have based the judgment on the basis of the material placed on record and no case is made out within the four corners narrated, this Court shall not interfere with the findings so recorded. 29. In this view of the matter, this revision, being wholly devoid of merit, is ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs. Revision dismissed. -