JUDGMENT : M.H. Kardi, J. The petitioners, by filing this group of petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('Code' for short), have prayed to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the complaints filed by respondent No.1, Lloyd Steel Industries Limited, before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.9, at Ahmedabad, which are registered as Criminal Case Nos. 2490/97, 2931/97, 2932/97, 2962/97, 2963/97, 2994/97 to 2996/97, 3478/97 to 3480/97, 3660/97, 3533/97 to 3566/97, and the process issued against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('Act' for short). 2. As common questions of law and facts are involved in this group of Special Criminal Applications, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Petitioner No.1 is a Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner No. 2 in Special Criminal Application No.978 of 1997 is the Managing Director of petitioner No.1-Company. Petitioner No.1-Company has been carrying on business for manufacturing steel tubes from HR/CR coils purchased from various Companies manufacturing such Coils including respondent No.1. As averred in Special Criminal Application No.978 of 1997, petitioner No.1-company, inter alia, purchased on credit such steel coils from respondent no. 1 as per the following details. Bill No. Date Amount 20419 1.3.97 Rs. 1,66,345.50 20444 1.3.97 Rs. 2,81,496.00 20452 2.3.97 Rs. 2,82,684.50 20472 2.3.97 Rs. 2,49,955.00 Total Rs. 9,80,481.00 Against the aforesaid goods supplied to the petitioner-company by respondent No.1, a post-dated cheque was given to respondent no. 1 in the first week of March 1997 drawn on the Bank of Baroda, Ashram Road Branch, Ahmedabad, dated May 5, 1997, bearing No.89918 for Rs. 9,80,481.00. It is averred that the manufacturing activities of petitioner No.1-company came to a grinding halt in the month of April 1997 and faced with that situation, petitioners addressed a letter to respondent No.1 on May 1, 1997 requesting respondent No.1 that, in view of the financial crunch, the said post-dated cheque given to respondent No.1 should not be deposited. It is further averred that the said notice was sent by various modes, viz., registered post A.D., hand delivery, courier service, which was not accepted by respondent No.1. It is further averred that the said notice was sent by various modes, viz., registered post A.D., hand delivery, courier service, which was not accepted by respondent No.1. The petitioners also sent the said letter through FAX to respondent No.1 from the office of petitioner No.1-company. Petitioner No.1-company has also informed respondent No.1 not to deposit the cheque by telephonic message on May 5, 1997. Despite this specific intimation, respondent No.1 deposited cheque dated May 5, 1997 and sent for clearance to the Bank of Baroda, which returned with endorsement "exceeds arrangement". It is averred that on May 7, 1997, a notice was given on behalf of respondent No.1 to petitioner No.1-company under Section 138(b) of the Act, which was replied to by petitioner No.1-company on May 22, 1997. As no payment was made in spite of receipt of statutory notice by the petitioners, criminal complaint came to be filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.9, Ahmedabad, against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court no. 9, Ahmedabad, after due verification of the complaint, issued process against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 4. On identical fact-situation, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.9, Ahmedabad, has issued process against the petitioners in other Criminal Cases which are subject matter of challenge in Special Criminal Applications Nos. 1015 of 1997 to 1028 of 1997. 5. The following tabular form shows the details about number, date, amount of cheques, date of deposit, cheque dishonoured date, date of notice, date of receipt of notice, date of filing of the complaints, date of issuance of summons, number of corresponding numbers of Special Criminal Applications. Cheque No. & Date Amount Date of deposit and dishonour date Notice sent on and received on Case filed on Case Cri. No. Spl Cri. Cheque No. & Date Amount Date of deposit and dishonour date Notice sent on and received on Case filed on Case Cri. No. Spl Cri. Appln No. 89918 5.5.97 9.80,481.00 5.5.97 6.5.97 8.5.97 9.5.97 4.6.97 2490/97 978/97 89922 8.5.97 5,10,766.50 8.5.97 9.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 25.6.97 2931/97 1019/97 89924 9.5.97 6,54,764.00 9.5.97 12.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 25.6.97 2932/97 1018/97 89751 10.5.97 6,55,873.00 10.5.97 13.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 25.6.97 2962/97 1021/97 89952 12.5.97 17,85,979.00 12.5.97 14.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 25.6.97 2963/97 1016/97 89953 13.5.97 14,69.296.00 13.5.97 15.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 1.7.97 2996/97 1020/97 89954 14.5.97 10,30,488.50 14.5.97 16.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 1.7.97 2994/97 1015/97 89955 15.5.97 9,30,791.50 15.5.97 17.5.97 21.5.97 23.5.97 1.7.97 2995/97 1017/97 89956 17.5.97 23,91,685.50 17.5.97 20.5.97 28.5.97 31.5.97 10.7.97 3479/97 1027/97 89957 19.5.97 5,74,720.00 19.5.97 21.5.97 28.5.97 31.5.97 10.7.97 3478/97 1026/97 89958 21.5.97 2,78,643.00 21.5.97 23.5.97 28.5.97 31.5.97 10.7.97 3480/97 1028/97 89960 26.5.97 2,39,572.50 26.5.97 28.5.97 11.6.97 12.6.97 21.7.97 3660/97 1101/97 89961 27.5.97 7,14,439.50 27.5.97 29.5.97 4.6.97 6.6.97 15.7.97 3536/97 1022/97 89962 28.5.97 7,14,597.50 28.5.97 30.5.97 4.6.97 6.6.97 15.7.97 3533/97 1023/97 89963 29.5.97 4,73,599.00 29.5.97 31.5.97 4.6.97 6.6.97 15.7.97 3535/97 1024/97 89964 29.5.97 7,10,397.00 29.5.97 31.5.97 4.6.97 6.6.97 15.7.97 3534/97 1025/97 6. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Mihir Thakore, appearing for the petitioners, has raised the following contentions: (1) The provisions of Section 138 of the Act will not be attracted in the present case, as the petitioners had intimated respondent No.1 on 1/3-5-1997 not to deposit cheques, which were issued to respondent No.1, because of drastic reversal of financial condition, and the manufacturing activities of petitioner no. 1-Company had come to a grinding halt in March 1997. (2) Assuming that respondent no. 1 did file complaints under Section 138 of the Act, the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance and issued summons to the petitioners for the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act, as the provisions of Section 138 of the Act were not attracted. (3) (deleted as per the order of the Court dated 4.9.98) (4) Sections 138 to 141 of the Act are penal provisions and there is no justification to treat the said penal provision as not requiring the element of mens rea in it. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and it is a sound rule of construction to construe any provision creating any offence to include mens rea. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence and it is a sound rule of construction to construe any provision creating any offence to include mens rea. (5) The object for which the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988, enacts provisions of Sections 138 to 141 in the Negotiable Instruments Act is to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers. Therefore, mens rea ought to be read into this offence. (6) Petitioner No.1 has undergone severe financial crisis which resulted, ultimately, into becoming sick and unable to discharge its liabilities and, eventually, it was declared to be 'sick' by the BIFR and, therefore, no ill-intention can be attributed in the inability on the part of the Company to pay the aforesaid cheques. In view of the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, ("SICA" for short), the criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant are not maintainable and, on that ground also, the complaints require to be quashed. (7) Each of the instrument given to the complainant was post-dated cheque and, therefore, would never become cheque till the date mentioned in the instrument. It is further contended that notices were served on the complainant before the instruments had become cheques and, hence, after receipt of notices, the said instruments could never be treated as cheques and deposited by the complainant. It is, therefore, contended that, after issuance of notices, instrument had become dead, before they became cheques, and, therefore, no. committed by the petitioners. 7. Learned advocate for respondent No.1, in reply to the arguments of learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, has submitted that the post-dated cheques were deposited after the due dates and, therefore, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would be attracted when the same were dishonoured. committed by the petitioners. 7. Learned advocate for respondent No.1, in reply to the arguments of learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, has submitted that the post-dated cheques were deposited after the due dates and, therefore, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would be attracted when the same were dishonoured. The learned advocate for respondent No.1 has further submitted that advance intimation by petitioner No.1-company not to deposit the cheques will not exonerate the petitioners from liability under Section 138 of the Act in view of the decision in the case of M/s. Modi Cements Limited v. Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi, reported in JT 1998(2) SC p.198. The learned advocate for respondent No.1 has further submitted that the points raised by the petitioners involve disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into in the present proceedings, and such disputed question of fact can be decided at the trial. The learned advocate for respondent No.1 also submitted that the petitioners have alternative remedy to approach the learned Metropolitan Magistrate by making applications for discharge/dropping of proceedings against them, as per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Mathew v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2206. It is further submitted by the learned advocate for respondent No.1 that the additional materials, which the petitioner wants to place before this Court in the present proceedings, cannot be looked into, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court p.1379. It is further submitted by the learned advocate for respondent No.1 that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mustaq Ahmad v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2982, in a case where the complaint and the documents annexed thereto clearly make out a prima facie case for the alleged offences, the High Court cannot proceed to consider the version of the accused given out in their petition filed under Section 482 of the Code vis-a-vis that of the complaint and enter into debatable area of deciding which of the version is true. It is further submitted that the Supreme Court has held that, if there are two versions, one set out in the complaint and other in the petition for quashing, the High Court cannot venture to enter into the debatable area of deciding which of the version was true - a course wholly impermissible under the scope of a petition under Section 482 of the Code. Re: Contentions (1) & (2) 8. The submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that, as the petitioners by their letter dated 1-3/5/1997 had intimated respondent No.1 not to deposit the cheques in question and, in spite of that intimation, if the cheques are deposited and dishonoured, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would not be attracted, is devoid of any merit. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of M/s. Modi Cements Limited, reported in JT 1998 (2) Supreme Court 198, has ruled that, once the cheque is issued and on presentation is dishonoured, penal provision is attracted and stopping of payment will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act. It is further ruled that by giving instructions to the Bank to stop payment immediately after issuing a cheque against a debt or liability the drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was committed. After considering various Sections and the object of the Act, the Supreme Court has ruled as under: "We are unable to subscribe to the view that Section 138 of the Act draws presumption of dishonesty against drawer of the cheque if he without sufficient funds to his credit in his bank account to honour the cheque issues the same and, therefore, amounts to an offence under Section 138 of the Act. Section 138 of the Act is a penal provision wherein if a person draws a cheque on an account maintained by him with the Banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, on the ground either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The distinction between the deeming provision and the presumption is well discernible. Section 138 is attracted, when cheque is dishonoured." 9. In view of the judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the petitioners cannot escape the liability of offence under Section 138 of the Act on the ground that they had intimated respondent No.1 by their letters not to deposit post-dated cheques. Whether or not the petitioner-company had issued letters for stopping of payment because of financial crunch, involves a disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into in the present proceedings which are initiated under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code. In my view, it requires detailed enquiry which can be gone into at the trial. It is borne out from the record of the case that, in spite of receipt of statutory notice, the petitioner-company had not paid amount of the cheques drawn in favour of respondent No.2 and, therefore, prima facie, provisions of Section 138 of the Act are attracted. At the stage of issuing of process or quashing of the complaint, the court is not required to consider the defence of the accused persons. 10. The submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, without application of mind, issued summons and/or process against the petitioners under Section 138 of the Act, is also devoid of any merit. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has applied his judicial mind and, after being satisfied as to whether prima facie case is made out under that provision, he issued process against the petitioners. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate has applied his judicial mind and, after being satisfied as to whether prima facie case is made out under that provision, he issued process against the petitioners. Reading of the complaint carefully, in my view, it does show prima facie ingredients of provisions of Section 138 of the Act. The drawer of the cheques, undoubtedly, gets an opportunity under Section 139 of the Act to rebut the presumption at the trial. It is for this reason that I am of the considered opinion that the complaints filed by respondent No.1 could not be quashed by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers at the threshold. It is required to be stated that, when the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has issued summons or process to the accused persons, they can appear before the same Magistrate and can plead that the process issued and the proceedings initiated against them be dropped. The accused can file application for discharging/dropping of proceedings as per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Mathew v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2206. 11. The submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that the cheques in question were not drawn towards debt or other liability and, therefore, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would not be attracted, is devoid of any merit. The petitioner-company had purchased HR/CR coil from respondent No.1 and issued post-dated cheques towards price of those goods. If a person draws a cheque in favour of another person, presumption arises that, the said cheque is issued against debt or other liability. Admittedly, there was business relation between the petitioners and respondent No.1 and towards purchase and supply of H.R./C.R. coils, the petitioner-company had issued post-dated cheques to respondent No.1, which came to be presented for encashment in the Bank, and, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner-company to plead that the cheques in question were not issued towards debt or other liability. Even after issuance of statutory notice, the petitioner-company had not paid the amount. When the cheque is issued, the drawer is bound to make provision for sufficient fund in his account, so that the cheque may be honoured. Not keeping sufficient funds available in the bank account will attract the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. Even after issuance of statutory notice, the petitioner-company had not paid the amount. When the cheque is issued, the drawer is bound to make provision for sufficient fund in his account, so that the cheque may be honoured. Not keeping sufficient funds available in the bank account will attract the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. In my view, the post-dated cheques were issued by the petitioners to respondent No.1 towards debt and other liability. Re: Contention No.3: 12.(deleted as per the order of the Court dated 4.9.1998) Re: Contentions (4) & (5) 13. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners submitted that, to constitute criminal offence, an element of mens rea is necessary, unless it is excluded by a statute. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the decision of Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court p.43. The Supreme Court, in the above decision, has held as under: "Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Doubtless a statute may exclude the element of mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded means rea. The mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil is by itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. The nature of the mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof." 14. The nature of the mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof." 14. Relying on the above observations of the Supreme Court, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that the Act does not exclude element of mens rea and, as per the say of the petitioners, since petitioner No.1-Company was in financial crisis, and their manufacturing activity had come to a grinding halt, they had intimated respondent No.1 not to deposit the cheques and, therefore, it should be held that there was no ill-intention or mens rea in issuance of cheques and stoppage of payment because of non-availability of funds in the accounts of petitioner No.1-Company and in absence of mens rea, no offence was committed by the petitioners under Sections 138 and 141 of the Act. 15. Section 138 of the Act excludes mens rea by creating strict liability and this is explicit from the words 'such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence'. The returning of the cheque by the bank either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the drawer of the cheque is insufficient or the amount covered by the cheque is in excess of the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement with the bank are the two necessary conditions creating strict liability. Section 140 of the Act in clear terms excludes the defence that the drawer had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in section 138. The exclusion of mens rea as a necessary ingredient of the offence under section 138 is thus clear and explicit. 16. In the case of B.Mohan Krishna v. Union of India, reported in 1996 CRI. L.J. 636, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has ruled as under: "Section 138 creates strict liability. When the two requirements constituting the offence, as specified in the section, are present, then the drawer of the cheque shall be deemed to have committed the offence. Section 140 in clear terms excludes the defence that the drawer had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in Section 138. Section 140 in clear terms excludes the defence that the drawer had no reason to believe, when he issued the cheque, that it may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in Section 138. The exclusion of mens rea as a necessary ingredient of the offence under Section 138 is thus clear and explicit. There is no room for any ambiguity or doubt as regards the intention of the legislature in creating the offence in question. A statue creating an offence excluding mens rea cannot be said to be arbitrary falling within the inhibition of Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 17. The Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988, was enacted in the public interest. Its objective is to 'enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in certain cases while at the same time providing adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers'. As the evil practise of issuing cheques in settlement of liabilities without there being adequate amount in the accounts became rampant, the Union Parliament thought it fit to curb the same effectively by enacting a stringent law while at the same time taking care to safeguard the interests of honest drawers. An honest drawer can always avert the threat of prosecution by paying the amount due within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice from the payee on holder in due course in case the cheque issued by him was dishonoured on either of the grounds specified in Section 138. 18. In the larger public interest, a law imposing penal liability without proof of guilty mind passes muster; the constitutionality of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which imposes liability with out mens rea was upheld in A.P.G. & S.M. Asscn. v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 2346 . In special situations of strict liability, the English law principle that 'intention to do a breach of a statute need not be shown; the breach in fact is enough' was accepted by the Supreme Court in P.K. Tejani v. M.R. Dange, AIR 1974 SC 228 at 234, a case concerning the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained with reference to the language employed. It is a settled rule of interpretation that the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained with reference to the language employed. The exception to this rule arises only in cases where the explicit language of the statute leads to perverse or absurd results. 19. Once a cheque is issued and it is returned dishonoured on the grounds stated in Section 138 of the Act, presumption drawn under Section 139 arises and it excludes element of mens rea. The contentions (4) and (5) of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that mens rea ought to be read into this offence, in my view, are devoid of merit. Re: Contention (6) 20. It is strenuously urged by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that the petitioner-company had undergone severe financial crisis which resulted, ultimately, into becoming sick and unable to discharge its liability and, eventually, it is declared to be a 'sick unit' by the B.I.F.R. and, therefore, no ill-intention could be attributed on the part of the petitioner-company on its inability to pay. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that, in view of the provisions of the SICA, the criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant are not maintainable and, on that ground also, the complaint are required to be quashed. This submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners is also devoid of any merit. 21. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 22 of the SICA, which reads as under: "22. This submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners is also devoid of any merit. 21. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 22 of the SICA, which reads as under: "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.- (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956( 1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. (2) to (5) x x x x " 22. The Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the provisions of Section 22 of the SICA in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and others v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and others, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2027. After examining the various provisions and Regulations of the SICA, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "The suspension of proceedings specified in Section 22 of the Act should be confined to matters included, in pre-package state of affairs only, (in the sanctioned scheme) and not post-package matters like the instant one, which should be outside the pale or area of the 'sanctioned scheme'." It is, further, held as under: "But, in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediment, that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken in, by Section 22 of the Act. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken in, by Section 22 of the Act. So, we are of the view that though the language of Section 22 of the Act is of wide import regarding suspension of legal proceedings from the moment an inquiry is started, till after the implementation of the scheme or the disposal of an appeal under Section 25 of the Act, it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in Section 22(1) of the Act can apply only such of those dues reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme." 23. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of B.Mohan Krishna v. Union of India and others, reported in 1996 Cri. L.J. 636, had also an occasion to decide whether Section 22 of the SICA would bar the criminal proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the above referred decision, held as under: "What the section contemplates is that none of the things mentioned therein can be allowed to take place without the consent of the Board or the appellate authority despite and provisions to the contrary in the Companies Act, 1956. Its sphere of operation is confined to proceedings for the winding up of an industrial company. It does not in any way bar prosecution of a company or any of its employees under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act or any other penal law." 24. Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Vijay Mills Company Limited, Ahmedabad and others v. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 1990 (1) GLR p.557, wherein, it is held that Section 22 of the SICA only prohibits action of recovery of money arising out of civil liability and it does not debar launching of criminal prosecution, where the company has committed offence. Therefore, the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that, in view of the provisions of the SICA, the present complaints are not maintainable and are liable to be quashed, is devoid of any merit. Re: Contention (7) 25. Therefore, the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that, in view of the provisions of the SICA, the present complaints are not maintainable and are liable to be quashed, is devoid of any merit. Re: Contention (7) 25. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has submitted that all the instruments delivered to the complainant were post-dated cheques and such instruments would not become cheques till the date mentioned therein. It is submitted that, before the instruments became cheques, notices were served on the complainant and, hence, after receipt of notice, instrument could never be treated as cheques. It is further submitted that, after issuance of notices, instruments, which were merely bills of exchange, had become dead and, therefore also, the said instruments could not have been deposited as 'cheques' by the complainant. The contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners that the "post-dated cheques" before the date of maturity, in view of the notice served on the complainant not to deposit the same, became dead and, therefore, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would not be attracted, is, in my view, devoid of any merit. There were business relations between the petitioner-company and respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 used to supply H.R. and C.R. coils to the petitioner-company and, in consideration of those supplies, the petitioner-company issued post-dated cheques in favour of respondent No.1. In my view, therefore, the said post-dated cheques were issued towards debt, and the petitioner-company could not have stopped payment of the cheques in question by issuance of notice/instruction. It is the case of the petitioner-company that, in spite of issuance of notice, which was served upon respondent No.1 by registered post A.D., by hand-delivery and telephonically, and by FAX, respondent No.1 did not accept the said notice and had deposited the cheques in its Bank. Whether notices have been refused by respondent No.1 or not requires detailed enquiry at the trial. At this stage, this court is not required to appreciate the version of defence and to decide whether or not, because of financial difficulty, the petitioner-company served notices on respondent No.1 not to deposit the said cheques. 26. The Supreme Court, in the case of Anil Kumar Sawhny v. Gulshan Rai, reported in 1993 (3) Crimes 1064, has elaborately dealt with the nature of a post-dated cheque in connection with Section 138 of the Act. 26. The Supreme Court, in the case of Anil Kumar Sawhny v. Gulshan Rai, reported in 1993 (3) Crimes 1064, has elaborately dealt with the nature of a post-dated cheque in connection with Section 138 of the Act. The facts before the Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Sawhny (supra) were that two cheques dated February 15,1991, for Rs. 1 lakh each, one cheque dated April 15, 1991 for Rs. 1,50,000/- and another cheque dated May 15, 1991 for Rs. 1,50,000/- were returned by the banks with the endorsement "not arranged for - no funds". Thereafter, notices under section 138 of the Act were issued and the drawer having failed to make the payment, the drawee filed complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, at Karnal. The main contention raised by respondent No.2 was that the cheques in dispute were drawn in March 1990 and when those were written and made, the dates written on those cheques, which were post-dated cheques, are not the dates when the cheques were drawn. According to the respondent, since the cheques were drawn in March 1990 and those were presented before the bankers in the year 1991, the cheques had been presented to the bank beyond the period of six months from the date on which those were drawn and as such no offence was made out under section 138(a) of the Act. While deciding the above rival contentions, the Supreme Court observed that when a post dated cheque is written or drawn it is only a bill of exchange and it becomes a cheque when it is payable on demand. The post-dated cheque is not payable till the date which is shown on the face of the document. It will only become cheque on the date shown on it and prior to that, it remains a bill of exchange under Section 5 of the Act. As a bill of exchange a post-dated cheque remains negotiable but it will not become a 'cheque' till the date when it becomes 'payable on demand'. The Supreme Court in paragraph 10, has observed as under: "10. Even otherwise we agree with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. section 138 has to be construed with reference to the context. The Supreme Court in paragraph 10, has observed as under: "10. Even otherwise we agree with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. section 138 has to be construed with reference to the context. If the object of bringing Section 138 of the Act on the statue has to be fulfilled then the only interpretation which can be given to clause (a) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act is that a post-dated cheque shall be deemed to have been drawn on the date it bears." 27. In my view, as per the principles laid down in Anil Kumar Sawhny (supra), even in the case of post-dated cheque, from the date it bears, it becomes a cheque and the provisions of Section 138(a) of the Act would squarely be attracted. 28. Interpretation of Section 138 of the Act to discover the liability arising from dishonouring of a post-dated cheque has to be with due regard to the said character of post-dated cheque and the scope of clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 cannot be considered in isolation. The statute has to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act to make it consistent with them. The very object of the provision is to enhance the acceptability of cheque by making the drawer liable for penalty in case the cheque bounces for the reason mentioned in the said section. If a post-dated cheque is considered to be drawn on the date of its delivery, the drawer of such a cheque can defeat section 138 of the Act by showing a date beyond six months of its delivery. In the circumstances an interpretation which will bring about such a result cannot be adopted. The object of the section is to make drawer of the cheque subject to penalty when the cheque bounces on the ground mentioned in the Section. The rigour of the section itself reveals the intention of the legislature. Enough safeguards are provided in the section itself to protect honest drawers. 29. Offences under Section 138 of the Act would be committed only when a cheque drawn for payment of any debt or liability is returned by the bank unpaid and drawer fails to make payment of the said amount within 15 days of notice of dishonour. Enough safeguards are provided in the section itself to protect honest drawers. 29. Offences under Section 138 of the Act would be committed only when a cheque drawn for payment of any debt or liability is returned by the bank unpaid and drawer fails to make payment of the said amount within 15 days of notice of dishonour. One of the elements to be satisfied is the cheque should have been returned unpaid. It goes without saying such return of the cheque by the drawee could only be on presentation; that is when he is capable of presenting the same for encashment. In the case of post-dated cheque as noted early, the same can be presented only on or after the date of the cheque. The question as to when a post dated cheque can be considered to have been drawn for the purpose of Section 138 of the Act cannot be dealt with independently of the right to present the same. In relation to the drawer and drawee post-dated cheque becomes operative only from the date of the cheque when alone the same is intended to be honoured. 30. The rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of an accused is not of rigid or universal application. It must be considered along with other well established rules of interpretation. When it is seen that the scheme and object of the Act are likely to be defeated by the strict interpretation, Courts must endeavour to resort to that interpretation which furthers the object of legislation. It is well recognised that a statutory provision must be construed, if possible, to avoid absurdity and mischief. In the case of P.K. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam, reported in 1981 (4) SCC 173 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "It is now well-settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction (vide Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner). The Court may also in such a case read into the statutory provision a condition which, though not expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic assumption underlying the statutory provision." 31. The Court may also in such a case read into the statutory provision a condition which, though not expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic assumption underlying the statutory provision." 31. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the complaints under Section 138 of the Act cannot be thrown out at the threshold on the ground that, because of issuance of notice, 'post-dated cheques' which were only bills of exchange, before they became cheques, could not have been deposited in the Bank and, therefore, the provisions of Section 138 of the Act would not be attracted. The petitioner-company, by its unilateral act, cannot prevent the bills of exchange becoming cheques by giving notice not to deposit the cheques or instructing 'stop payment'. Such an interpretation would frustrate the object of the Act. Acceptance of the proposition that, before the due date of the post-dated cheques, if the drawer gives intimation to the drawee not to present the cheques, the provisions of Section 138 will not be attracted, would result into making Section 138 a dead letter, for, by giving instructions to the drawee not to present cheques after issuing cheques against the due or liability, the drawer can easily get rid of the penal consequences notwithstanding the fact that a deemed offence was committed. Once the cheque is issued by the drawer, a presumption under Section 139 must follow and merely because the drawer issues notice to the drawee or to the Bank for stoppage of the payment, it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act by the drawee or the holder of a cheque in due course. The object of the provision of the Act cannot be allowed to be defeated by such ingenuous action of the petitioner-company. 32. The learned advocate for respondent No.1 has strenuously urged that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has issued summons against the petitioners and they have got alternative remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate by filing appropriate applications for discharge or dropping of proceedings as per the decision in the case of K.K. Mathew v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 2206. In my view, the submission of the learned advocate for respondent No.1 deserves consideration. In my view, the submission of the learned advocate for respondent No.1 deserves consideration. The Supreme Court, in the case of K.K. Mathew (supra), has laid down that it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued and the Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused can be tried. It is his judicial discretion and no specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings. Order of process is interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint, on the very face of it, does not disclose offence against the accused. As per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Mathew (supra), the petitioners have got alternative remedy to approach the learned Magistrate to drop the proceedings or to recall the process issued against them. 33. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, in this connection, has argued that, as per the decision in the case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Limited and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 128, the petitioners, without approaching the trial magistrate, can file application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, read with section 482 of the Code, in the High Court for quashing the complaint or the process issued by the Magistrate. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has mainly relied on paragraph 28 of the Pepsi Foods case, wherein, it is observed as under: "Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused." In the present case, if the allegations made in the complaint do disclose the ingredients of offences under Section 138 of the Act, and the Magistrate has applied his judicial mind and issued process, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that issuance of process is bad. The fact that the cheques of huge amount came to be dishonoured, prima facie discloses commission of offence under Section 138 of the Act. With regard to role played by petitioners Nos. 3 to 6, there are specific allegations in the complaints. Therefore, in my considered view, it cannot be said that the process issued by the learned Magistrate is bad or illegal. If the complaint discloses ingredients of offences under Section 138 of the Act, in my opinion, the learned Magistrate was justified in issuing process against the petitioners. In the case of Pepsi Foods Limited (supra), there was no allegation nor a whisper against the petitioners who had approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition for quashing process against them. In the case of Pepsi Foods Limited (supra), the allegations in the complaint merely show that the appellants had given their brand name to "Residency Foods Beverages Ltd". The complaint did not show what was the role of the appellants in the manufacture of the beverage which is said to be adulterated. The only allegation was that the appellants are the manufacturer of bottle. There was no averment as to how the complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured the alleged bottle or its contents. The complaint did not show what was the role of the appellants in the manufacture of the beverage which is said to be adulterated. The only allegation was that the appellants are the manufacturer of bottle. There was no averment as to how the complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured the alleged bottle or its contents. The preliminary evidence on which the first respondent relied in issuing summon to the appellants also did not show as to how it could be said that the appellants were manufacturers of either the bottle or the beverage or both. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court, in the case of Pepsi Foods Limited, quashed the process. 34. The Supreme Court, in the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, has laid down the principle that exercise of power to quash the complaint/FIR under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, with the sole purpose either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. One of such guideline is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or making out a case against the accused. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, disclose ingredients of Section 138 of the Act, and the learned Magistrate, after satisfying himself, has issued the process. The drawer of the cheque would get an opportunity to rebut the presumption at the trial. Therefore, in my view, the complaint cannot be quashed when prima facie case is made out. 35. These are the only contentions raised before me by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners and the learned advocate for respondent No.1. 35.1 The observations made in the judgment against the petitioners, arrived at tentatively for the purpose of deciding this applications, which relate quashing of the proceedings and those observations will not come in the way of the petitioners during the trial of the criminal proceedings, which have been lodged against the petitioners. 35.1 The observations made in the judgment against the petitioners, arrived at tentatively for the purpose of deciding this applications, which relate quashing of the proceedings and those observations will not come in the way of the petitioners during the trial of the criminal proceedings, which have been lodged against the petitioners. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall decide the complaints on merits without being influenced by the above observations. (added as per the order of the Court dated 4.9.1998) 36. As a result of foregoing discussion, I do not find any merit in this group of applications. Hence, these applications are rejected. Rule is discharged. Interim relief is vacated. ORAL ORDER 37. After pronouncement of the judgment, the learned advocate for the petitioners prayed to extend interim relief which was granted earlier so as to enable the petitioners to approach the higher forum challenging the judgment of this Court. 38. The prayer for extension of interim relief is granted, and the interim relief is extended upto August 1, 1998.