ORDER S. Marimuthu, J. 1. This petition has been filed for a judicial review of the order of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkanchery in framing charge against the petitioner under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter called as", "the Act", in C.C. No. 399 of 1991 2. The facts, as placed by the counsel for the petitioner, are as follows: The Food Inspector, Wadakkanchery visited the shop of one Raju who is the only accused in the original complaint filed by the Food Inspector. He was later on examined in the trial court as P.W. 1 on 17th November 1989. After disclosing his identity, he purchased 6 packets of coriander powder each weighing 100 gms. from the provision shop of Raju, the accused in . the original complaint. After following the formalities as enjoined in the Act, a portion of the sample was sent to the test and report of the Analyst. As per the report of the Analyst, the edible powder does not contain the standard as prescribed in the Act. Therefore, he filed a complaint before the Magistrate against Raju. 3. When P.W. 1, the Food Inspector was examined in the court, through him, Ext. D-1 was marked. Ext. D-1 dated 3rd April 1.990 is a licence issued to the present petitioner for running a flour mill upto 31st March 1990 in Ollukkara Panchayath, Kalathode Desom at Ward No. II. After the examination of the witness on the complainant's side, Raju, the accused in the complaint submitted himself for examination as D.W. 1. Through D.W.1, Exts. D-2 and D-3 were marked. Ext. D-2 dated 14th November 1989 is a, cash voucher issued by the proprietor of Kuttanchery, (probably, it may be the name of the shop) High Road, Trissur. Ext. D-3 is a xerox copy of the label found in the sample packets seized by P.W.I from the provision shop of the accused Raju. That label contains the following: "Quality Chilly Powder, Kairali Food Packers, Thrissur 1," On the basis of Exts. D-1 to D-3, during the course of trial, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner has been incriminated in the criminal proceeding by the Magistrate's order dated 16th March 1994. In pursuance of the order dated 16th March 1994, summons was issued to the petitioner herein and she then appeared before the Magistrate. D-1 to D-3, during the course of trial, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner has been incriminated in the criminal proceeding by the Magistrate's order dated 16th March 1994. In pursuance of the order dated 16th March 1994, summons was issued to the petitioner herein and she then appeared before the Magistrate. On her appearance, charge was framed against her on 28th September 1994 under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which the petitioner denied. Thereafter, the petitioner has come up before this Court for the judicial review of the charge framed by the court below against her with a contention that the charge framed by the court below is erroneous, as no evidence has been let in by the complainant to implicate her under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. When that be so, the learned Magistrate could not have invoked S.20A of the Act. In support of the above contention learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Roy Chacko, would place before me the material papers and the Exhibits marked in this case. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. S. U. Nazar, on the other hand, would contend that though the Food Inspector, P.W.I, made an attempt to implicate the present petitioner, at the initial stage of laying the complaint, he could not succeed, for he could not collect sufficient materials at that stage. However, during the course of trial, when evidence has come into light implicating the petitioner, the Magistrate has rightly invoked S.20 of the Act. When the contentions of both the learned counsel and the learned Public Prosecutor are in opposite directions, now, the materials available on record need a thorough scrutiny. 5. Admittedly, P.W.I visited the shop of Raju (A-1) on 17th November 1989 and purchased 6 packets of coriander powder and for the inspection and purchase, he prepared Ext. P-4 seizure mahazar. Ext. P-4, as a matter of fact, does not contain that accused Raju disclosed the name of the manufacturer, dealer or distributor from whom, he purchased coriander powder. However, to the address found on those packets, 'Quality Chilly Powder, Kairaly Food Packers, Thrissur-1', P.W. 1 sent Ext. P-13 notice under S.11(1)(a), as if that address was furnished by accused Raja under S.14A of the Act. But as a matter of fact, that address found in Ext. D-3 was not furnished by the accused Raju. However, to the address found on those packets, 'Quality Chilly Powder, Kairaly Food Packers, Thrissur-1', P.W. 1 sent Ext. P-13 notice under S.11(1)(a), as if that address was furnished by accused Raja under S.14A of the Act. But as a matter of fact, that address found in Ext. D-3 was not furnished by the accused Raju. That can be evidently seen in his version when he was examined as D.W. 1. According to the version as D.W. 1, he purchased the sample packets of coriander powder from Kuttanchery (shop), High Road, Thrissur-1. P.W. I has not sent any notice to Kuttanchery, High Road, Thrissur-1, as found in Ext. D-2. It is also the definite version of P.W. 1, Food Inspector, that he does not know whether the present petitioner is a proprietrix of Kuttanchery. So the above facts are so clear that P.W. 1 has already invoked the provisions enjoined in S.14A and S.11(1)(a) of the Act. But he could not succeed. When that be the position, now the point is whether the Magistrate can exercise his powers under S.20A of the Act relying upon Exts. D-1 to D-3. When the complainant, Food Inspector, has lost his core in bringing the manufacturer, a dealer or a distributor or the present petitioner as a coaccused along with the accused, Raju, it is surprising to note that as to how the court acted on S.20A on the same materials placed by P.W. 1 or accused Raju. Whether the Magistrate has acted within the ambit of S.20A or not warrants consideration here S.20A reads as follows: "20A. Power of Court to implead manufacturer etc. Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s.(3) of S.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in S.20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S.20." The above section would evince that only in cases where f the Magistrate is satisfied during trial that there is evidence to implicate the manufacturer, dealer, etc., then he can proceed under S.14 and 20. From the evidence of D.W. 1, accused Raju, it is quite obvious that he did not know as to who is the proprietor of Ext. D-2. That denial of the accused Raju as D.W. 1 is sufficient to conclude that he did not know the owner of the said shop. In the absence of evidence during trial to implicate the petitioner as owner of Kuttanchery, High Road, Thrissur, I do not understand why the learned Magistrate invoked S.20A of the Act against the petitioner. As I have pointed out above, the case of the complainant, the Food Inspector, was sailed in one direction in respect of identifying the manufacturer of the coriander powder purchased from the shop of accused Raju and quite against the attempt of the Food Inspector; the contention of the accused Raju went in another direction in fixing the identify of the manufacturer from whom the coriander powder was purchased by accused Raju. The accused Raju, no doubt, as it is seen on the record, has made an attempt before the trial court to absolve his criminal liability by producing Exts. D-2 and D-3. But Exts. D-2 and D-3 do not, at all, bring the present petitioner as a coaccused under S.20A of the Act. In this context, once again, I would like to express that it is the definite case of accused Raju that he purchased coriander powder only under Ext. D-2, out of which the sample was purchased by P.W. 1. Ext. D-2 contains the signature of the proprietor. The admitted signature of the present petitioner is found in the affidavit filed in support of the stay petition filed in this case, and I, for satisfying myself, further more, compared her admitted signature in the affidavit with the signature found in Ext. D-2. Not only myself, but a man of ordinary prudence also could take an immediate decision that the signature found in Ext. D-2 is entirely different one from the admitted signature of the petitioner. In this juncture also, the view of the learned Magistrate relying upon Ext. D-2 for incriminating the present petitioner is totally erroneous. D-2. Not only myself, but a man of ordinary prudence also could take an immediate decision that the signature found in Ext. D-2 is entirely different one from the admitted signature of the petitioner. In this juncture also, the view of the learned Magistrate relying upon Ext. D-2 for incriminating the present petitioner is totally erroneous. On account of the above detailed discussion and my review of the charge framed by the learned Magistrate against the petitioner needs an interference by this Court and accordingly, the charge framed against the petitioner by the Magistrate in C.C. No. 399 of 1991 dated 28th September 1994 stands quashed and the petitioner is set at liberty. The Magistrate can continue criminal prosecution against the accused Raju. The Crl. M.C. is allowed.