JUDGMENT : Pasayat, J. - In the second journey of the petitioner to this Court, this is the third hearing. This matter has been heard afresh on being remanded by the Apex Court. In the earlier writ application, i.e. OJC No. 3512 of 1987 disposed of on January 11, 1990, the petitioner, an erstwhile employee of the Talcher Unit of Fertilizer Corporation of India (for short, the 'FC1') had assailed the order directing his removal by way of dismissal in a disciplinary proceeding initiated against him under Rule 23 of the Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1972 (for short, the 'Rules'). After delineating the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters of disciplinary action it was observed that departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their conclusion is based, adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter that can be permitted to be canvassed before High Court in a proceeding under Article 226. The scope for interference was limited to cases of total absence of evidence. While exercising power under Article 226, adequacy or otherwise of penalty imposed, if any, is not open to be examined. It was observed that the position was slightly different in the petitioner's case because of two aspects; the first related to existence of a forum for review as provided under Rule 35. The reviewing authority, it was noticed, has jurisdiction to consider the adequacy, existence or otherwise of material in justification of penalty imposed. There is no fetter in its power to make in-depth analysis and evaluation of evidence. The petitioner W.S., therefore, permitted to make a motion before the reviewing authority by a representative. The time limit within which the review application was to be made was fixed. Secondly, it was noticed that notwithstanding the deletion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution in a given case, a charged official is entitled to an opportunity to make submission relating to the nature of penalty imposable. Necessity for affording of an opportunity relating to penalty was highlighted with reference to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Ors Vs. E. Bashyan. Undisputedly the petitioner made a representation. Necessity for affording of an opportunity relating to penalty was highlighted with reference to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India (UOI) and Ors Vs. E. Bashyan. Undisputedly the petitioner made a representation. The direction in the earlier case was that since the petitioner was aware of charged allegations and offence thereon, it was open to him to make representation relating to the desirability, quantum and nature of penalty to be imposed, if any. The appropriate authority was: directed to deal with and dispose of the representation in accordance with law. The disciplinary authority by the impugned order (Annexure-8) rejected the representation. Apart from discussing the evidence recorded in respect, of each charge, a specific finding was given in respect of the challenge of the petitioner that there was violation of principles of natural justice. The reviewing authority was of the view that such allegations were already agitated before this Court, and have been considered, and there was no direction given to the Board for consideration of such contention. Further it was concluded that the petitioner had been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself, including the facility of defence assistant and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. There was also no violation of Rules 24 and 25 of the Rules as alleged by the petitioner. There is no provision in the Rules for supply of copy of the enquiry report to the charged officer before imposition of penalty. The same was supplied along with the order of imposition of penalty and the same had been assailed in an appeal before the appellate authority. With these observations, it was concluded that there was no denial of reasonable opportunity. 2. In the earlier judgment dated September 17, 1992 while disposing of the writ application it was observed that even if under the Regulations second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is not necessary, yet other substantive right of the delinquent officer to justify his innocence before the disciplinary authority is a part of natural justice of which he cannot be deprived. The reviewing authority rejected the plea of the petitioner primarily on the ground that the rules did not prescribe supply of copy of enquiry report before imposition of penalty. According to it the supply along with the order imposing penalty was sufficient. The reviewing authority rejected the plea of the petitioner primarily on the ground that the rules did not prescribe supply of copy of enquiry report before imposition of penalty. According to it the supply along with the order imposing penalty was sufficient. The view was held to be indefensible, the order of removal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity to the petitioner to make submission with regard to the enquiry report, a copy of which had already been served on him and thereafter to dispose of the proceeding in accordance with law. 3. The matter was carried before the Apex Court by the opposite parties. By order dated January 31, 1996, the Apex Court held that the order of removal was passed on April 16, 1987 which is much before the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, and therefore, the order of the disciplinary authority cannot be held to be vitiated on account of non-supply of the copy of enquiry report to the petitioner before passing of the said order. Accordingly, this Court's order was set aside. It was urged before the Apex Court by present petitioner that apart from the ground relating to non-furnishing of the copy of the enquiry report, other points were urged which were not considered by this Court. One of the contentions was that the reviewing authority had misinterpreted and misconstrued the earlier judgment of this Court, and had not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the petitioner relating to the violation of principles of natural justice. 4. In support of the writ application, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the authorities have misconstrued the directions given in the earlier writ application. The reviewing authority had not considered various contentions raised regarding violation of principles of natural justice in its proper perspective. Stand of the Corporation and its functionaries on the other hand is that there has been no violation of the Principles of natural justice. In any event, according to them, on a reading of the earlier judgment in its entirety, it is crystal clear, that the Court closed the matter so far as factual findings are concerned, but permitted the petitioner to file a representation relating to adequacy or otherwise of the penalty imposed. In any event, according to them, on a reading of the earlier judgment in its entirety, it is crystal clear, that the Court closed the matter so far as factual findings are concerned, but permitted the petitioner to file a representation relating to adequacy or otherwise of the penalty imposed. The said aspect has been considered by the reviewing authority. As aforestated, the Apex Court has found no substance in the plea taken by the present petitioner about alleged violation of principles of natural justice and had practically closed the matter. 5. Stand of the Corporation that the Apex Court has closed the matter so far as the findings recorded by the reviewing authority regarding principles of natural justice is concerned is not correct. On the contrary the Apex Court has observed as follows : "A perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that before the High Court two contentions were urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. One was that the reviewing authority had misinterpreted and misconstrued the earlier judgment of the High Court and had not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the respondent relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice in its proper perspective and the other contention was regarding non-supply of the copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer. No clear finding has been recorded by the High Court on the first contention and the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court by accepting the second contention. Since the view of the High Court on the second contention cannot be sustained, we consider it appropriate that the High Court considers the submissions of the petitioner on the first contention that the reviewing authority has not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the petitioner relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice. Since the view of the High Court on the second contention cannot be sustained, we consider it appropriate that the High Court considers the submissions of the petitioner on the first contention that the reviewing authority has not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the petitioner relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment dated September 17, 1992 passed by the High Court in OJC No. 4057 of 1990 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the contention of the petitioner that the reviewing authority has not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the petitioner relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice in its proper perspective...." This Court had in fact been directed for consideration of the contentions of the petitioner that the reviewing authority had not applied its mind to the contentions raised by the petitioner relating to violation of principles of natural justice in its proper perspective. The direction given by this Court was as follows : "On consideration of rival submissions, we find that the stand of the Corporation is prevaricating. From the order passed by the reviewing authority (Annexure-8 to the writ application), it is clear that question of adequacy of penalty alone was not considered by it. The entire materials in support of the order of punishment have been analysed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the direction in the judgment was construed to be limited to adequacy or otherwise of the penalty. So far as the real purport of the judgment is concerned, we find that the petitioner was permitted to avail a statutorily prescribed forum of review. No fetters were laid down and in fact it was observed that the petitioner was free to ventilate his grievance as regards desirability, quantum and nature of the penalty to be imposed, if any...." The contention in this regard by the learned counsel for Corporation and its functionaries fails. 6. Now the question is whether the petitioner's grievances have been properly appreciated by the reviewing authority. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to various paragraphs of the review petition, copy of which has been annexed to the writ application. 6. Now the question is whether the petitioner's grievances have been properly appreciated by the reviewing authority. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to various paragraphs of the review petition, copy of which has been annexed to the writ application. At pages 16 and 17 with reference to charges 2 and 4, it was submitted that during the relevant period no evidence has come on record that the charged officer was given the charge of supervising the work of the coal preparation plant building and all indications go to show that Sri Jayagopalan directly was in charge of the supervision being the concerned Assistant Engineer. Similarly at page 28 of the review petition with reference to charge No. 1, it has been stated that there is no evidence that either the old or new agreement was given to the petitioner not even the work order was given to him. Therefore, it was for the superiors to decide under which agreement the work measured was to be passed and paid and the petitioner had no role to play in the further actions. At page 31 with reference to charge No. 2 it was stated that mere association at the time of taking sample and giving the certificate in the printed form cannot make him responsible for the specification when he was not in charge of execution/supervision and there is no material to that effect. At page 37 in respect of all the: charges it was stated that the findings were contrary to the evidence on record both oral and documentary. At page 53 with reference to charge No. 1 similar submission was made. At pages 62-63 with reference to charge No. 4 it was submitted; that there was no documentary or oral evidence and the allegations contained have not been proved at all. At page 75, it was submitted that the date of completion of 120 Nos. of pocket cutting of charges has neither been mentioned nor corroborated by any body. The charges 1, 2 and 4 are based on pure supposition rather than on any evidence. To similar effect was the submission in page 91. At page 75, it was submitted that the date of completion of 120 Nos. of pocket cutting of charges has neither been mentioned nor corroborated by any body. The charges 1, 2 and 4 are based on pure supposition rather than on any evidence. To similar effect was the submission in page 91. At page 3 of the review petition regarding principles of natural justice it was stated as follows: "An enquiry was conducted into the said charges in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and on completion of the said enquiry in spite of the fact that the final bill was yet to be paid and consequently no loss was caused to the Corporation ...." To similar effect is the submission at page 22 with reference to charges 1 and 4. At page 23 with reference to all the charges it was stated as follows: "The findings in respect of the charges are wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and perverse." Submission at page 32 in respect of charge 2 is on similar lines. At page 37, petitioner took a positive stand that there was denial of adequate opportunity to defend his case which amounts to denial of the principles of natural justice, and at pages 40 and 41 the following submissions were made in respect of all the charges: "It is not the volume of cross-examination made by a delinquent officer in absence of his D. A., but the value or quality of the questions put in cross-examination and its relevance. Because the petitioner was not capable of conducting his defence he needed the assistance of another which having been allowed, to hold the bulk of enquiry and examine 9 (nine) out of total 11 (eleven) prosecution witnesses and ask the delinquent to cross-examine, itself amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend and violation of the principles of natural justice. On a bare perusal of the statements of the only defence witness and the defence statement of the petitioner recorded at Delhi on October 18, 1985 and October 19, 1985 fully establish the fact that because of the absence of the defence Assistant the charged officer has been totally denied of adequate opportunity to defend his case and the principles of natural justice have been butchered. Thus the petitioner was denied of adequate opportunity to defend his case and he was thereby highly prejudiced, which violates principles of natural justice. Hence, the entire proceeding culminating in the termination order is liable to be set aside" Similar plea was taken at page 43. Page 44 is very relevant as it relates to all the charges. The following submissions were made : "Unfortunately the enquiring officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority have not at all looked into nor applied their mind to material evidence on record and have come to conclusions contrary to evidence on record on conjuncture and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The Disciplinary Authority has not at all discussed the evidence and simply accepted the findings of the enquiring officer. Shri P. K. Jayagopalan, who was admittedly the Engineer in charge of execution/supervision of all the three items of work under the three charges said to have been established was left untouched, so also the Chief Engineer who ultimately approved and passed the payments made for the works. The petitioner has been made a victim of the circumstances in gross violation of the principles of natural justice." 7. We find that the reviewing authority has not dealt with these aspects in the impugned order. It is true that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied as a straight jacket formula, but it is settled position in law as has been observed by the Apex Court in Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar I978 II LLJ 84 (SC) that disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and minimum requirements of the rules of natural justice are to be observed. It is fundamental requirement that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence. In paragraph 18 of the judgment in Nand Kishore's case (supra) it was observed as follows : "Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallised by judicial decisions. The first of these principles is that disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character, therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e., evidentiary material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt, of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. As pointed out by this Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel, 'the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished', applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules." In H. C. Goel 's case (supra) to which reference has been made, it was observed as follows at paragraph 23 : "In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority, which deals with the question, but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent. This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because in our opinion, the finding dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence." 8. On scanning the conclusions, we find that the specific stand taken by the petitioner have not been dealt with, more particularly in respect of the aspects relating to principles of natural justice. We, therefore, set aside the order and remit the matter back to the reviewing authority for fresh decision taking into consideration the contentions raised by the petitioner on various Tactual aspects, including the plea relating to non-observance of the principles of natural justice. Since the matter is pending for nearly two decades, the reviewing authority will do well to dispose of the same within three months from today. The writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Final Result : Allowed