JUDGMENT 1. - The present Contempt Petition was filed before this Court making the grievance that the respondents had not complied with the order dated 25-9-89 passed in revision petition, wherein this Court passed the following order:- "I direct the respondents to determine in the light of the certificate issued by the Deputy Director whether the petitioner has actually worker as per the certificate and if he has worked then he should be given the wages on the post on which he had worked. If the respondents feel that the certificate issued by the Deputy Director is bad and not correct then the action should be taken against the Deputy Director. The respondents shall pay salary and wages of L.D.C. of that period during which the petitioner has performed the duties of the post of L.D.C. Same will also apply to other revisions." 2. Inspite of the fact that the petitioner had been making repeated representations, the order was not complied with and being aggrieved he filed the instant contempt petition on 29-4-92. As this Court came to the conclusion that the petition was not within the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the "Contempt Act") an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the "Limitation Act") was filed by the petitioner with a prayer that the delay of 405 days be condoned. 3. Notice was issued on this application and meanwhile the notice of contempt petition was, also, issued. The respondents have stated that they have done the needful and complied with the order dated 25.9.1989 but the petitioner is not satisfied and presses for punishing the non-parties for wilful defiance of the order of this Court. 4. The legal issue which arises in this petition and is required to be adjudicated by this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be resorted to in the contempt proceedings particularly in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt Act. 5. In case of Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tabago, AIR 1936 SC 141 , the Privy Council has observed that the proceedings under the Contempt Act are quasi-judicial in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases. 5. In case of Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tabago, AIR 1936 SC 141 , the Privy Council has observed that the proceedings under the Contempt Act are quasi-judicial in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases. In case of Sukhdeo Singh v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice Teja Singh and Hon'ble justice the Par Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 SC 186 , the Supreme Court has taken the same view. A Full Bench of Punjab High Court in the case of Sher Singh v. R.P. Kapoor, AIR 1968 Punjab 217 , has held that the contempt proceedings are by all means, a quasi criminal and the respondents are entitled to the benefit of doubt. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of (4) B. Yegnanaryaniah, AIR 1974 Madras 313, has held that the contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the case against the respondents must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 6. In the case of Himi Rustom G. Pardiawala v. Sub-Inspector Baig & others, AIR 1941 Lahore 196 , it war observed as under:- "The Court may have its suspicions but is cannot act upon them. These proceedings, though not criminal, are of a quasi-judicial nature and ...where there is any reasonable doubt, the respondents are entitled to the benefit of such doubt." 7. In the case of Sri Baradakanta Mishra v. the Registrar of High Court and others, AIR 1974 SC 710 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "The Court being the guardian of peoples' right, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt" (Vide R. v. Bray, (1907)2 QB 36 "). 8. To sum up the legal propositions it is clear that the contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and all the principles of criminal jurisprudence are applicable. The only departure which is permissible is that the procedure applicable in the criminal law is not to be strictly followed and all that is necessary is that a fair procedure is adopted, the contemner should be aware of the charge against him and he should be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It is in this back-drop the issue involved is examined. 9. It is in this back-drop the issue involved is examined. 9. Section 20 of the Contempt Act reads as under:- "Limitation for Action for Contempt:-No Court shall initiate and proceeding for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." (Emphasis added). 10. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid provisions of law that the Contempt Act provides for initiation of proceedings and not for institution of proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brad Kanta Mishra (supra) has held that the terminus ad quen for the period of limitation in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act deals with filing of a suit, appeal of application within the prescribed period and it certainly does not deal with the taking of cognizance of a matter by the Courts. As it does not deal with the initiation of the proceedings, it cannot be said that it applies to the contempt proceedings and in view of this the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Contempt Act is absolute. Section 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act via Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable to contempt proceedings. 11. The issue of application of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was considered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Dinesh Bhai Parakh v. Kripala Cooperative Housing Society, Ahmedabad and others, AIR 1980 Gujarat 194 , wherein the Court has held that the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation for initiating the proceedings under the Contempt Act. Section 20 of the Contempt Act fills up the lacuna and prescribes a period of limitation. The Court observed as under:- "... Section 20 as such does not contemplate the institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the ..... Act. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a Court on its own motion or otherwise. The Court observed as under:- "... Section 20 as such does not contemplate the institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the ..... Act. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a Court on its own motion or otherwise. The fetters which Section 20 places on the jurisdiction of the Court is that the Court shall not initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the Court in such proceeding, the question of condoning the delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation. Section 20 does not contemplate such situation. When the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning the delay does not arise." 12. Since Section 20 of the Contempt Act provides for a condition precedent for exercising the jurisdiction of a Court. Thus, it becomes mandatory that before the Court exercises its jurisdiction, the said condition precedent should be fulfilled and if the Court is satisfied that the condition precedent has been fulfilled only then it can initiate the contempt proceedings, otherwise not. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation as it would otherwise defeat the provisions of law. (Vide State of Kerala v. P.K. Ramcha,idranan, 1997 (8) JT 189 ). The natural corollary of this would be that after the period, as prescribed by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, lapses, the jurisdiction of the Court automatically evaporates and in that situation the question of condonation of delay or applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not arise. 13. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Gulab Singh and others v. Principal Ramjilal, AIR 1975 Allahabad 366 , has held that the period within which the proceedings for contempt are to be initiated, is prescribed by the Contempt Act and not by Limitation Act the question of applying the provisions of the Limitation Act does not arise. The statute cannot be interpreted as to make a statutory provision nugatory. 14. The statute cannot be interpreted as to make a statutory provision nugatory. 14. A Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, 1984 Cr.L.J. 301 , has held that within the said period of limitation not only that the petition should be presented before the Court but the Court should take cognizance of it, as the terminus ad quen in contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance in contempt cases. 15. There may be a case where the contempt may be in respect of a continuous wrong. But in that case the continued non-compliance of the order may save the limitation as the offence continues unless its requirement is carried out and it is complied with. (Vide State of Bihar v. Deo Karan Nensi, AIR 1973 SC 908 ). The same view has been taken by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kishan Singh v. T. Anjaiya, Chief Minister and others, 1985 Cr.L.J.1428 , wherein the reliance had been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brad Kanta Mishra (supra); Purshottam Das Goyal v. Hon'ble Justice B.S. Dhillon, AIR 1978 SC 1014 ; Sukhdeo Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1954 SC 186 ; and R.L. Kapoor v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 858 . 16. In the instant case as the respondents were directed to decide the claim of the petitioner within a prescribed period and it was not done within the said period, the wrong committed by the respondents cannot be of a continuous nature and the petitioner failed to get the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Contempt Act within the prescribed limitation and as observed above, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not attracted in contempt proceedings. 17. Consequently, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The contempt notices stand discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. *******