Judgment Banerjee, J. This is an application under Article 226 of the challenging the order dated 28.11.97 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench dismissed the miscellaneous application. The fact of the case in short is that pursuant to the Cabinet Secretariate D.O. No. 6/20/95-D.O.-TI-3129 dated 20.5.97, the petitioner Dr. B.C. Pati, Senior Medical officer, G.C., S.S.B., Barasat is promoted To the post Divisional Medical Officer, in the pay scale of Rs.3,000/- 5,000/- in S.S.B., with effect from the dated of assumption of change of the post. On promotion to the post of Divisional Medical Officer, the petitioner was directly posted at Divisional Headhunters of North Assam Division. This order was passed on 11th June, 1997. Thereafter on 27th June, 1997, the petitioner was communicated with a decision by the Commandant that the order dated 11th June, 1997 have been kept in abeyance. From the order dated 15th July, 1997 issued by the Assistant Director (EA-I) if the Directorate of Central of Security, Office of the Director that the petitioner Dr. B.C. Pati. SMO, GC, Barasat on promotion to DMO who was posted earlier on 23rd May, 1997 at Divisional Headquarters, N.A. Division, has been transferred to divisional Headquarters, N & N Division. Against the said order, the petitioner moved the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Central Administrative Tribunal passed an order on 29th July, 1997 wherein the Tribunal passed an order to the following effect:- “We direct by way of interim measure that the impugned order as Annexure-G to the petitioner be stayed in respect of the petitioner on condition that the petitioner shall forgo his promotion as DMO subject to the petition.” 2. On 21st November, 1997, the Commandant, GC, SSB, Barasat, passed the following order :- "In pursuance of SSB dt.-Order No. 4/SSB/A-4/97(1)-2804-33 dated 15.7.97 and subsequent correspondence on the subject Dr. B.C. Pati, SMO is hereby relieved on transfer of Divisional Headquarters, M & M Division w.e.f. 21.11.97 (AN)." 3. Under such circumstances the petitioner moved the Central Administrative Tribunal and the interim order which was initially granted by the CAT but rejected without giving any reason whatsoever. Excepting that the Tribunal was of the view that the interim order granted by the Tribunal was extended upto 12.11.97 and that accordingly on 28.11.97 when the matter was heard, the said order lapsed. Excepting that the Tribunal was of the view that the interim order granted by the Tribunal was extended upto 12.11.97 and that accordingly on 28.11.97 when the matter was heard, the said order lapsed. The Tribunal has forgotten the cardinal legal principle that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. When the interim order was extended up to 12.11.97 and if the matter could not be heard by the Tribunal on or before that date and it was heard on 28.11.97. Technically extension could not be made when the Tribunal has initially passed an interim order in that event, nothing prevented the Tribunal from passing a fresh interim order. These things frequently happened before the Court and the Court following the salutary principle that for the lapses on the part of the Court, the litigants could not suffer had passed appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of this case, none can take advantage of his own wrong and accordingly, if there was any mistake or lapse on the part of the Court for that reasons a litigant cannot be compelled to suffer. Accordingly, the approach of the Tribunal in our view was contrary to the legal principle and/or the practice and procedure which has followed by the Court. The Supreme Court in owners and parties interested in (I) M.V. "Vali Peri" v. Fernando Dopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206 have held that rules of procedure not to be construed literally but should be construed pragmatically so as to advance Justice Procedural law is intended to facilitate not to obstruct the course at Justice. The Supreme Court in the case of (2) Chinnammal v. P. Arunmughom, 1990 (1) SCC 513 held that the procedural law is designed to facilitate Justice and it should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishment and penalty. The laws of procedure should he so construed as to render Justice wherever reasonably possible. 4. In view of the above mentioned principle laid down by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal in our view, was wrong in treating the application for interim order as Infructuous in the facts and circumstances or this case since the point at issue is very simple parties submitted before this Court that the main issue be decided by this Court in the interest of all concerns. 5. 5. Admittedly a decision was taken by the Cabinet Section of the Government which was taken on 22nd May, 1997 communicated on 11th June, 1997 and that from the Telex it appears that the promotion of posting of the petitioner was kept in abeyance. The order of the Cabinet Secretariat dated 20.5.97 by the older dated 11th June, 1997 which was kept in abeyance had not been cancelled revoked altered or modified. When an order is kept in abeyance it is a duty on the part of the Authority, who has kept in abeyance, to take a decision whether to keep the order alive or to set aside the order. The word "abeyance" means a condition of being undetermined or in state or suspension or inactivity. 6. Accordingly, when an order is passed keeping the order in abeyance in that event, a duty to cast upon the authority to pass the final order whether to set aside the order or to give effect to the order or to pass a fresh order setting aside the said order, but to the instant case that has not been done. The Cabinet Sectt. Do, dated 20th May, 1997 communicated by the Memo dated 11th June, 1997 has not been touched and remained as it is. But thereafter the authority had pissed various orders from time to time and a decision or the Cabinet Secretariat cannot be altered by Assistant Director or any other authorities and in any event the order dated 11.6.97 which was kept in abeyance subsequently had not been revoked or cancelled. Without cancelling or revoking the earlier order, the subsequent order could not be passed. 7. True transfer and posting are practically within the domain of the administration and the Court have a limited of interference and thereto in rarest of rare cases. Without cancelling or revoking the earlier order, the subsequent order could not be passed. 7. True transfer and posting are practically within the domain of the administration and the Court have a limited of interference and thereto in rarest of rare cases. Taking advantage or this legal position the respondent could not be allowed to act whimsically, arbitrarily for violating all norms or course, there are cases where taking advantage of their legal situation things are done arbitrarily by means of pick and choose and act of favouritism may be there but Court having regard to the principles laid down in this behalf did not interfere but if the things goes on in this way and if the authority thinks that the public servant are their domestic servant they can place an, body any where according to their whims and caprice in the garb 'in the interest of public service time will come when the Court will take up the matter seriously. Anything and everything cannot be done under the public service. 8. In the instant case when an order was kept in abeyance that order must be treated to be kept in suspension and that thing has to be settled first whether to alive the order or to set aside the order, but that has not been done and accordingly, the orders passed on 15th July, 1997 and 21.11.97 are set aside and the respondents are directed to take a final decision in respect of the decision communicated by the order dated 11th June, 1997 which was kept in abeyance for more than one year. Further, an order of promotion and consequent posting cannot be allowed to be kept in abeyance for an indefinite period of time which would cause serious loss and injury to the employee concerned. Accordingly the respondents are decision to take a final decision in the matter or pass an appropriate order on the matter of giving effect to and/or passing any other order in respect of the order which was kept in abeyance within a period of two months from the date of the communication of this order. Mitra, J.: I agree.