JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 23.2.1993 (impugned) passed by the then District Judge, Ajmer in Civil Execution No. 11/1991 in respect of execution of decree dated 3.5.1933 passed in Civil Suit No. 9/1929 obtained by the petitioner decree holder against the non-petitioners-judgment debtor-defendants. The said suit was filed by the father of the petitioner Dewan Syed Ali Rasul Ali Khan for the relief of permanent perpetual injunction in respect of determination of the rights of Dewan as regards the offerings made by the pilgrims of the Dargaha Sharif, Ajmer of Khawaja Moinuddin Chisti Sahab as regards entitlement of the petitioner to receive offerings made to the holy shrine and in respect of its division in equal shares between the Dewan and Khadims of the Dargah Sharif. The Additional District Judge of the erstwhile State of Ajmer-Merwara had decreed the plaintiffs' suit for grant of permanent-perpetual injunction and the decree was drawn up vide order dated 3.5.1933. In the meanwhile, the Khadims who were entrusted with the responsibility of taking care of the offerings made by the pilgrims of the holy shrine had started disbursement of the said offerings in fair proportion of 50 per cent each to the then Dewan of the said shrine and thereafter to the petitioner w.e.f. 1975 to 1991. The petitioner had obviously not taken steps for execution of the decree dated 3.5.1933 earlier since compliance of the said order/decree was being done by the non-petitioners-Judgment-debtors for the period 1975 to 1991 and the dispute arose thereafter between the parties as on 17.8.1991 when the execution application was presented before the trial Court by the petitioner. In view of the dispute having arisen between the parties as regards the distribution of offerings in terms of the decree dated 3.5.1933 to the extent of 50% of petitioner's share in the offerings as Diwan of Holy Shrine before the learned District Judge, Ajmer on 16/17.8.1991 for due execution of the decree in accordance with law. In view of the dispute having arisen between the parties as regards the distribution of offerings in terms of the decree dated 3.5.1933 to the extent of 50% of petitioner's share in the offerings as Diwan of Holy Shrine before the learned District Judge, Ajmer on 16/17.8.1991 for due execution of the decree in accordance with law. The question which cropped up for discussion before the learned District Judge, Ajmer was as to whether the District Judge Ajmer was competent enough to execute the decree particularly when the impugned-decree was passed by the Additional District Judge, of the erstwhile State of Ajmer-Merwara and on merger of the said State with the State of Rajasthan, whether the jurisdiction did not automatically stood vested with the District Judge, Ajmer being successor in office of the erstwhile Merwar-Ajmer State. 2. In the Execution Petition, it was specifically stated that the petitioner-decree holder is the present Sajada Nashin since 1975 and after the death of his father Late Shri Dewan Syed Ilamuddin Ali Khan II Sajada Nashin Hazrat Khawaja Sahib by virtue of being son and successor is competent to execute the aforesaid decree passed in Civil Suit No. 9/1929 vide which it was adjudicated that Sajada Nashin is entitled for 50% of offerings being made by the pilgrims at the holy Dargah Sharif of Khawaja Sahib and he will be competent to give contract for disbursement of the same amongst the persons authorised and competent to receive the same in accordance with the terms of Decree. Since the dispute arose as regards the offerings after the Urs of 1991, the earlier understanding and consent between the parties could not continue and, therefore, the petitioner had given a contract after inviting tenders in accordance with law to Shri Arif Ali Khan son of Shri Mohammed Ajar Khan and Shri Wahid Mohammed Khan son of Shri Zafar Mohammed Khan both residents of Ajmer accepting their tenders but when obstruction was created by the Judgment-debtors even in the entrance of Dargah of the aforesaid Contractors and in recovery of the amount of offerings, ultimately it was the petitioner who had to suffer and hence he moved the execution application for execution of the decree. It was also prayed therein that a Receiver may also be appointed for collecting, recovering, managing and distributing the amount of offerings during the pendency of execution application, but in view of the obstruction created by the Judgment-debtors-non-petitioners, the execution of the decree has not seen light of the day till date. In the aforesaid Execution Petition dated 17.8.1991, the petitioner had also sought the relief from the Executing Court for appointment of a Receiver who may be duly authorised for collecting, recovering, managing and fair distribution of the amount of offerings made by the pilgrims visiting the holy Dargah Sharif at Ajmer from time to time. It is pertinent to mention in this context that along with aforesaid execution petition simultaneously another execution application dated 16/17.8.1991 was also moved by the decree-holder i.e. the present petitioner that in the event of Executing Court's entertaining any reasonable doubt regarding competence of the said Court as regards its jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide the said application, it may be sent to the equivalent and competent Court of ADJ No. 1 or ADJ No. 2, Ajmer for its effective and final adjudication in accordance with law. The respondents-judgment debtors were duly noticed by the Executing Court and their objections were also invited as regards the maintainability of the execution application by the Executing Court. This fact is borne out from the perusal of order-sheets that the matter was fixed and shown from time to time on 14.1.1992, 22.1.1992, 7.2.1992,18.4.1992, 24.4.1992,13.5.1992, 20.5.1992, 29.5.1992, 18.7.1992, 29.7.1992, 13.9.1992, 26.9.1992 & 17.10.1992 but the matter could not be heard and finally decided. On 22.10.1992 instead of pouncing the order for which the matter was fixed, the order-sheet was drawn up by the Executing Court to the effect that since the aforesaid application dated 16/17.8.1991 could not be disposed of and is pending adjudication as such, the said application was fixed for orders on 29.10.1992. Even on the said date no final order could be passed by the learned Presiding Officer and the matter was again adjourned for 20.2.1993 when the arguments were heard by the Executing Court and the matter was again fixed for pronouncement of orders on 23.2.1993. On the said date the impugned-order was pronounced and the execution application itself was dismissed without passing any order on the application dated 17.8.1991 against which, the present revision petition has been preferred before this Court. 3. On the said date the impugned-order was pronounced and the execution application itself was dismissed without passing any order on the application dated 17.8.1991 against which, the present revision petition has been preferred before this Court. 3. I have heard learned counsel of the parties at length and examined the relevant record and the legal position on the subject. Prima facie, I am of the considered view that there was no necessity or justification for the District Judge, Ajmer to have observed in the impugned-order that it has no competence or jurisdiction to decide the execution proceedings arising out of the impugned-decree in view of the provisions of Order 21 Rules 5 & 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates, as under : "5. Where a decree is to be sent for execution to another Court, the Court which passed such decree shall send the decree directly to such other Court whether or not such other Court is situated in the same State, but the Court to which the decree is sent for execution shall, if it has no jurisdiction to execute the decree, sent it to the Court having such jurisdiction. 6. The Court sending a decree for execution shall send- (a) a copy of the decree; (b) a certificate setting forth that satisfaction of the decree has not been obtained by execution within the jurisdiction of the Court by which it was passed, or, where the decree has been executed in part, the extent to which satisfaction has been obtained and what part of the decree remains unsatisfied; and (c) a copy of any order for the execution of the decree or, if no such order has been made, a certificate to that effect." 4. Further, from the perusal of Rule 8 of Order 21, CPC, it is abundantly clear that immediately on receipt of the aforesaid documents as stipulated in accordance with law as per the requirements of Rule 6, the decree or the order may, if the Court to which it is sent is the District Judge, be executed by such Court or to be transferred for execution to any subordinate Court which is of equivalent competent jurisdiction to decide and adjudicate the matter in dispute for the purpose of executing the decree finally. Hence, it is thus obvious from the aforesaid provisions that the scope as regards the competence, jurisdiction and powers of the Executing Court is limited and confined only to the execution of decree after inviting objections from the judgment-debtors and, thereafter, finally adjudicating and deciding the controversy between the parties and not to prolong the same for any unjustifiable reason as has been done by the Courts below in the instant case. As a matter of fact, no further clarification was required since the provisions of law are itself clear and make it obligatory for the competent Court i.e. the District Judge, Ajmer who was himself competent enough to decide the execution proceedings finally or should have entrusted the same to the equivalent competent Court of either ADJ No. l or ADJ No. 2, Ajmer in accordance with fair exercise of judicial discretion particularly when, he himself came to the conclusion that ADJ No. 1, Ajmer had the jurisdiction to decide the execution proceedings finally in accordance with law. 5. Before parting with the case, I would like to make reference to the provisions of Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908, which stipulates, as under : "37. The expression "Court which passed a decree" or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include. (a) where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance, and (b) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. Explanation : The Court of first instance does not cease to have jurisdiction to execute a decree merely on the ground that after the institution of the suit wherein the decree was passed or after the passing of the decree, any area has been transferred from the jurisdiction of that Court to the jurisdiction of any other Court; but in every such case, such other Court shall also have jurisdiction to execute the decree, if at the time of making the application for execution of the decree it would have jurisdiction to try the said suit." 6. My observations are also fortified from the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the matter of Smt. Laxmi Nagappa Hegde v. The Karnataka Bank Ltd., Sirsi & Ors., AIR 1988 Karnataka 44 wherein, the similar controversy had arisen before the Karnataka High Court and wherein the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court has observed as under : "In view of the Explanation to Section 37 there would be two Courts which would come within the meaning of the words "the Court which passed the decree" in Section 37. One would be the Court that actually passed the decree and the second would be the Court which has been established newly having jurisdiction over a part of the territory over which also the Court which actually passed decree had originally the jurisdiction. The new Court thus established having jurisdiction over a portion of the territory will have to be also deemed as a Court that passed the decree. Therefore, such a Court also would have jurisdiction to execute the decree without that decree being transferred to it by the Court which originally and actually passed the decree. Section 38 cannot be read in isolation. It only says that the decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The phrase "by the Court to which it is sent for execution" would mean the Court situate beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. But if it is read along with Section 37, Explanation the new established Court for part of the territory will have to be deemed as a Court that passed the decree. Section 39(3) makes it clear that the transferee Court must be also a competent Court. But if it is read along with Section 37, Explanation the new established Court for part of the territory will have to be deemed as a Court that passed the decree. Section 39(3) makes it clear that the transferee Court must be also a competent Court. It does not in any way come in conflict with Section 37 Explanation." 7. As a result of above discussion, I accordingly direct that the impugned-order dated 23.2.1993 passed by the District Judge, Ajmer is not tenable in the eyes of law and is accordingly quashed and set-aside. It is accordingly directed that the District Judge, Ajmer shall decide the execution proceedings arising out of decree dated 3.5.1933 passed in Civil Suit No. 9/1929 by the Additional District Judge of the erstwhile State of Ajmer-Merwara himself or assign the same to ADJ No. 1, Ajmer or ADJ No. 2, Ajmer who shall decide the same finally in accordance with law. It is further directed that in case the respondent-judgment debtors have raised any objection other than the objections pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Court the same shall also be heard and finally decided by the Executing Court to which the matter is entrusted by the learned District Judge, Ajmer simultaneously. It is further directed that since the matter has been pending adjudication since 17.8.1991 and the dispute pertains to the disbursement of offerings made by the pilgrims who may be visiting holy Dargah Shariff from time to time, the ADJ No. 1, Ajmer will act as a Receiver in the matter in accordance with the provisions of Order 40 Rules 1 to 4 CPC. The said Receiver shall be fully authorised to keep the proper maintenance of all the accounts of offerings made to the holy shrine of Dargarh Shariff at Ajmer by opening an account in any Nationalized bank at Ajmer and the said account shall be opened and operated in the name of the Receiver appointed by this Court for maintaining accounts in respect of the offerings made in Dargarh Sharif by the pilgrims visiting from time to time. The Receiver is further directed to get a complete inventory prepared as regards the offerings made to the holy shrine from the year 1991 to date by the respective Khadims as well as other authorised persons of Dargaha Sharif who have been collecting the said offerings from Dargaha Sharif. The Receiver is further directed to get a complete inventory prepared as regards the offerings made to the holy shrine from the year 1991 to date by the respective Khadims as well as other authorised persons of Dargaha Sharif who have been collecting the said offerings from Dargaha Sharif. It is further directed that the Receiver shall make disbursement of the amount of offerings made to the holy shrine by the pilgrims visiting from time to time to the petitioner who is presently Dewan of Dargaha Sharif as well as to other respective Khadims strictly in terms and in accordance with the decree dated 3.5.1993. The Receiver is directed to function immediately and not later than four weeks from the date of submission of the certified copy of the order of this Court. The Receiver shall be at liberty to defray necessary expenses to be incurred by him and his staff so deputed for compliance of the aforesaid directions of this Court from time to time out of the amount received by the Management of Dargah Sharif and is directed to maintain proper account of the same on record. The Executing Court is further directed to expeditiously deal with and decide the matter after inviting objections from the parties concerned, deal with the said objections if any and decide the same in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 8. With the above observations, the revision petition is allowed and stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.Revision allowed. *******