Judgment These applications have been filed for quashing of the proceedings in R.C. No. 12/EOW/86 and investigations in R.C. No. 13/EOW/86, R.C. No. 14/EOW/86 and R.C. No. 15/EOW/86 dated 17th December, 1986 under Section 420/468/471 of the I.P.C. and Section 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This application in R.C. No. 12/EOW/86 is taken up together with other applications being of the same nature and against the same person. 2. On 18.12.1986, the Deputy Manager of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. lodged a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of investigation, Economic Offence Wing, 234/14, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta by writing a letter against the petitioner Pawan Kumar Ruia and others under Section 120B read with Sections 420/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 stating inter alia, as follows:- During the period from January 1984 to June 1984, Charles Solomon, the then Calcutta Branch Manager misused his official position and power and committed fraud, conspiracy and cheating in a pre-planned manner thereby cheating the said Bank with a view to secure personal gain wrongfully and dishonestly in the following manner:- i) Issuance of unauthorized overdrafts Rs.1,00,41,745/- ii) Unauthorized credit extended through clearing cheques outstanding account Rs.27,492 lakhs iii) Drawing against clearing Rs.39,20,965/ iv) Illegal book transfers Rs.2,21,08,000/- v) Other surreptitious and unauthorized Nil vi) Total loss Rs.5,01,054,90/- 3. In the year 1983, 41 Public limited Companies had been floated and the capital issue was in a questionable manner. Pawan Kumar Ruia, Chartered Accountant hatched up a plan to utilize the facilities of the Bank to dupe the Government into believing that the companies floated had genuine base of promoters and in the process cheated the Government as well which can be found from the facts mentioned below:- 1. The accused P.K. Ruia was the common Chartered Accountant of all the companies which were floated. The registered offices of the companies were shown to be same in a group. When demands were made by the Bank for payment of its dues most of the letters were returned with the remark 'Not known'. All the companies which received the said letters replied in same voice, in same words. 2. It would appear on proper scrutiny that most of the Directors were more or less the same common persons. 3. When demands were made by the Bank for payment of its dues most of the letters were returned with the remark 'Not known'. All the companies which received the said letters replied in same voice, in same words. 2. It would appear on proper scrutiny that most of the Directors were more or less the same common persons. 3. The so-called promoters utilised initially many Savings Bank and Current Accounts opened by them in the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. in all cases the basis of allotment was from the date of closure of the subscription. The allotments were made immediately and the said companies withdrew the subscription on the very same day, Mr. Solomon, acting as banker to the issue did not even bother to claim for or realise the Bank's Commission and expenses and charges and thereby caused a total loss of Rs.5,01,054,90/- in the year 1983 as such the Bank was duty bound to institute various suits to realise its dues. 4. The Ruia's group of companies and the companies promoted by him were involved in many book transfers. Such transaction ran into crores of rupees in a single day, although the amount standing to their credit was a few hundred rupees only. Rupees 1,52,78,656/- were involved on March 19, 1985 relating to 52 accounts, 164 debit instruments and 91 credit instruments. By taking recourse to unauthorized overdrafts, which were settled by cross transfers on the day, the accused defrauded the Government, Government agencies and the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. The employees of Ruia were appointed as Directors in most of the said companies and Ruia was appointed as auditor in most of the cases. Although the Directors made declarations to the Stock Exchange that the brokerage was paid by cheques, operations of the account did not reveal so. On verification of DD's, TT's and MT's received at and remitted from Calcutta mainly through the Account of Ruia Group Companies. The DD's received towards payments of deposits made with some of the companies by Mr. Solomon by forging signatures which suggested that benami investments were held by him as well. The Ruia Group of companies with the help of Mr. Solomon successfully opened hundred accounts at Delhi. 5. Unauthorized overdraft facilities were extended to a number of parties by Mr. The DD's received towards payments of deposits made with some of the companies by Mr. Solomon by forging signatures which suggested that benami investments were held by him as well. The Ruia Group of companies with the help of Mr. Solomon successfully opened hundred accounts at Delhi. 5. Unauthorized overdraft facilities were extended to a number of parties by Mr. Solomon end overdraft were allowed in the current account ledger where either no interest was charged or inadequate interest was charged. The Ruia Group of companies had subscribed for Rs.2.21 crores without spending a single paise. Similar overdrafts were allowed to other Ruia companies to the tune of Rs.175 lakhs. 6. It has revealed from enquiry made by the Head Office of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. that for the purpose of defrauding the Bank as well as the Government agencies at large no proper documents have been obtained by Mr. Solomon to secure the loans and credit facilities and no prior approval of sanction was obtained from the regional manager and other higher authorities of the Bank. 7. The petitioner has come for quashing of the proceedings in RC/12/EOW/86 and investigations in RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 all dated 17th December, 1986 on the following grounds :- 1. That the complaints were lodged with the sole purpose of putting the petitioner to unnecessary harassment as he refused to intervene on behalf of the then incumbent Board of Directors of the said Bank during their family dispute leading to different take over bids to assume control over the affairs of the said Bank. 2. The said Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. had filed several money suits against the companies on similar allegations to recover brokerage at the rate of 1½% on the entire public issue. In every case the defendant-company had denied that the plaintiff was entitled to any brokerage as it was payable only on successful application forms bearing the Bank's seal in the Brokers column. The said Tamlinad Mercantile Bank Ltd. entered into compromise with all the defendant-companies in respect of Civil Suits and thereupon all the said Civil Suits were dismissed on compromise or for non-prosecution. 3. The said Tamlinad Mercantile Bank Ltd. entered into compromise with all the defendant-companies in respect of Civil Suits and thereupon all the said Civil Suits were dismissed on compromise or for non-prosecution. 3. The disputes raised by the complainant Bank are of civil nature and that is why the Bank had filed Civil Suits for recovery of its alleged dues and the criminal case had been filed in the hope that criminal action may cause the defendant-companies in the suit to settle their illegal claims. 4. That the allegations made in the complaint is that the companies were all fictitious companies but as a matter of fact these companies were registered companies and were quoted on the Stock Exchanges. 5. The petitioner had never any connection with any of the companies mentioned in the F.I.R. except in the capacities of auditor of some of the companies. 6. The Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. has issued a letter dated 2.6.1997 to the petitioner stating therein that "we confirm that we never had any nor have any claim whatsoever against you". 7. That by another letter the Bank informed on 30.5.1997 to the C.B.I. stating therein that the Bank has entered into compromise with all the companies separately against whom Civil Suits were pending and all the Civil Suits filed against various companies, firms, individuals relating to the above complaints are being dismissed for non-prosecution and all misunderstandings have been clarified and all allegations made by the respective parties against each other also stands withdrawn and as such no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matters with you any further and the same be treated as closed. 8. That the accused persons are not 'Public Servant' within the meaning of Section 21 I.P.C., 1860 and the investigation by the C.B.I. is without jurisdiction. 9. That they are entitled to come before the Revisional Court for quashing as the factual and all legal points can be raised at any stage of the proceeding particularly at the pre-trial stage as per direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 17.3.98 vide Annexure-'E'. 8. Sri Balai Ch. 9. That they are entitled to come before the Revisional Court for quashing as the factual and all legal points can be raised at any stage of the proceeding particularly at the pre-trial stage as per direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 17.3.98 vide Annexure-'E'. 8. Sri Balai Ch. Roy, the learned Lawyer appearing on behalf of the petitioner P.K. Ruia has submitted before me that this case against, the petitioner has been filed due to misunderstanding and this can, be clearly gathered from the statement of the Manager of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd., made in his letter dated 2.6.1997 (Annexure-'B') which reads as follows :- “To Dr. P.K. Ruia 5, Russel Street, Calcutta-700 071 Dear Sir, We hereby acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 29.5.97. We confirm that we never had nor have any claim whatsoever against you. Similarly you don't have any claim whatsoever against us. All misunderstandings have since been clarified. The allegations, made against you stands withdrawn. As a professional we accept your continued patronage to our Bank. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd. Illegible) Manager Regd. Office, 57, V.E. Road, Tuticon-628002.” 9. It, therefore, appears that the cases against the petitioner were filed due to misunderstandings and the said misunderstanding have been subsequently clarified. Had there been no misunderstanding when the cases were filed against the petitioner, the complainant could not have filed the cases against the accused Ruia. It also clearly shows that subsequently the Bank realised its mistake which was due to misunderstanding and so it was found fit by the said Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. to withdraw the allegations made against the accused petitioner Pawan Kumar Ruia. Thus, it is amply clear that cases were instituted against the petitioner under wrong impression on wrong facts and wrong interpretation of law and that is why when this fact subsequently came to the knowledge of the Bank it realised its mistake in filing such cases against the petitioner P.K. Ruia and that is why it withdraw all allegations against the petitioner. This fact alone is sufficient to quash the proceedings and investigations. Not only the Back withdrew all its allegations but went one step further in saying that "the Bank had nor have any claim whatsoever against the petitioner P.K. Ruia". This fact alone is sufficient to quash the proceedings and investigations. Not only the Back withdrew all its allegations but went one step further in saying that "the Bank had nor have any claim whatsoever against the petitioner P.K. Ruia". In the circumstance, it could be very well said that the prosecution has no case at all against the petitioner and this was realized by the complainant subsequently. It can be also very well said that the complaint could not have lodged the complaints if there was no misunderstanding or if there was any misunderstanding after its immediate clarification. 10. The learned Lawyer for the petitioner has further contended that the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. not only withdrew all its allegations against the petitioner through its letter dated 2.6.97 but it also desired not to proceed with the cases any more as it had nor has any claim against the petitioner, P.K. Ruia and as the cases were initiated due to misunderstandings and in this connection the Bank, through its Manager requested the C.B.I. not to proceed with the cases RC/12/EOW/86; RC/13/EOW/86; RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 of 1986 dated 17.12.86. The Manager of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. wrote the following letter to the C.B.I. on 30.5.97 :- "To Central Bureau of Investigation, C.G.O. Complex, M.S.O. Building of Block, A Wing, IInd Floor, Salt Lake City, Calcutta-700 064 Dear Sir, Ref:- Complaints dated 16.12.86 registered into RC/12/EOW/86, RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 of 1986 dated 17.12.1986. The Bank has entered into compromise with all the companies separately against whom Civil Suits were pending and all the Civil Suits filed against various companies, firms, individuals relating to the above complaints are being dismissed for non-prosecution. All misunderstandings have been clarified. All allegations made by the respective parties against each other also stand withdrawn. In view of the aforesaid, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matters with you any further and the same be treated as closed. We thank for your co-operation. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd. Illegible) Manager." 11. All misunderstandings have been clarified. All allegations made by the respective parties against each other also stand withdrawn. In view of the aforesaid, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matters with you any further and the same be treated as closed. We thank for your co-operation. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, (Sd. Illegible) Manager." 11. It, therefore, appears that the Bank does not want to proceed any further with respect to the complaints dated 17.12.86 registered into RC/12/EOW/86, RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 of 1986 as all the misunderstandings of the Bank in filing the above complaints have been subsequently clarified and as it entered into compromise with all the companies against whom Civil Suits were pending and as all the Civil Suits filed against various companies, firms, individuals relating to the above complaints were allowed to be dismissed for non-prosecution. The Bank further finds that it would serve no useful purpose in pursuing the matters any further and desired, that the same be treated as closed and by keeping those purposes in mind it wrote to the C.B.I. not to proceed any further in those matters. The learned Lawyer appearing for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that it would be in the circumstances a futile attempt to proceed any further with those cases which were started on mere misunderstandings and which got clarified subsequently. 12. He further submitted that when the matter was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by handing over the letters to the Hon'ble Supreme Court on July 21, 1997 the Beach orally asked the Counsel of the C.B.I. to take instruction on the said aspect of the matter and the Supreme Court by its Judgment and Order dated March 17, 1998 had been pleased to dismiss the Special Leave Petition with the observation that “the Special Leave Petition is dismissed leaving it open to the petitioner to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him at the appropriate stage of the proceedings and in particular at the pre-trial stage vide Annexure “D”. It was further submitted that in view of the liberty given to the petitioner to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him, the present application has been filed for quashing or the proceedings or RC/12/EOW/86 and investigation of the other three cases. 13. Sri Balai Ch. It was further submitted that in view of the liberty given to the petitioner to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him, the present application has been filed for quashing or the proceedings or RC/12/EOW/86 and investigation of the other three cases. 13. Sri Balai Ch. Roy, the learned Lawyer appearing on behalf of the petitioner has further submitted that the entire dispute was of civil nature and the Bank by its letter dated 30th May, 1997 addressed to the C.B.I. and by its letter dated June 2, 1997 addressed to the petitioner has stated that the claim of the Bank has been settled which is also indicative of the fact that the matter was entirely of civil nature i.e., for loss of brokerage and commission and the Bank realizing it filed several suits for realization of the amount and compromised them with the respective companies and allowed them to be dismissed for non-prosecution. 14. Sri Balai Ch. Roy further submitted that quashing of a complaint for cheating is justified even in those cases where an act constitutes both Civil and Criminal wrong and the civil wrong gets compromised and compromise decree is passed as it amounts to compounding of the offence of cheating. In this connection he has drawn my attention to a decision as reported in (1) 1996 (5) Supreme Court Cases 591, Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SID (X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta wherein Their Lordships held as follows:- "In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a matter or civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the companies concerned. Eves if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the Banks, for all interest and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. It is also to be notice that a long time has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such F.I.Rs. It is also to be notice that a long time has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such F.I.Rs. were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to institute any case against the alleged erring officials despite allegations made against them in the F.I.Rs. Considering that the investigations had not been completed till 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the investigations and further investigations are still pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been satisfied and the suits instituted by the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think that the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of this case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Article 136 of the Consideration. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals." 15. In the instant matters too, as it appears, the Bank filed a number of suits against the companies and got them compromised and allowed them to be dismissed for non-prosecution. It further appears that even where an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted such offence is compoundable offence and the compromise of the offence Courts and their non-prosecution amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. The instant cases were instituted in the year 1986 and still in out of four cases investigation is proceeding in three cases after a lapse of about more than 10 years and the case in which charge sheet has been recently filed also cannot be disposed of in the near future. Considering the above facts and the circumstances of this case and also considering the fact that the cases were instituted due to misunderstandings and the Bank has no claim against the petitioner it is futile to allow the proceedings to continue any more. 16. It is worth to note that if the offence of cheating goes away the offence under Section 468 I.P.C. also goes away as Section 468 deals with forgery for purpose of cheating. If the purpose goes away the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating also goes away and it cannot stand. 16. It is worth to note that if the offence of cheating goes away the offence under Section 468 I.P.C. also goes away as Section 468 deals with forgery for purpose of cheating. If the purpose goes away the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating also goes away and it cannot stand. Section 468 I.P.C. reads as follows:- "Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine." 17. Thus, it is clear that one of the important ingredients of Section 468 is the use of forged documents for the purpose of cheating and if the purpose of forgery goes away there cannot be an offence under Section 468 I.P.C. 18. It has been rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is no allegation against the accused petitioner Ruia, that he used as genuine any document which he knew or had reasons to believe to be a forged document. There is also no allegation in the F.I.R. that he forged any document for the purpose of cheating. In the F.I.R. whatever the allegation of forgery, is, that is against accused Solomon and not against the present petitioner, Ruia. It is worth to note that the criminal cases against Mr. Ruia were initiated due to misunderstandings and when the misunderstandings got removed the Bank desired not to proceed with the matters as that would not serve any purpose. In this view of the matter also no case under Section 471 I.P.C. or under any Section of any Act is made out. 19. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that no document has been referred to in the F.I.R. or in the charge sheet as the outcome of forgery and to constitute an offence of forgery the document or documents have to be referred to in the F.I.R. in view of the decision of Supreme Court as held in (2) 1989 (4) Supreme Court Cases page 89, State of U.P. through C.B.I. SPE, Lucknow v. R.K. Srivastava and Another. In the said decision Their Lordships held as follows:- "In our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that the allegations made in the F.I.R. do not constitute any offence of cheating, nor do they constitute any offence of forgery. It is true that it has been alleged that the said sum of Rs.54,600/- was withdrawn on the basis credit entries made in the books of accounts of the Bank and connected credit and debit vouchers were also prepared and passed by the respondent and the other accused. When the said sum of Rs.54,600/- had been allowed to be withdrawn by the said Sri Sharwant Singh and his wife, necessary entries had to be made in the books of accounts, but it is not understandable how these entries can be characterized as false entries. No document has been referred to as outcome of forgery." (para 5). 20. Sri Balai Ch. Roy has, therefore, submitted that document or documents have to be referred to in the F.I.R. as the outcome of forgery which has not been done in the instant cases filed against the accused P.K. Ruia. He also submitted that even in the charge sheet those documents have not been referred to as the outcome of forgery and a general statement was made that they had forged relevant Bank instruments and the same were utilised as genuine in terms of the conspiracy. Sri Roy has further contended that in the F.I.R. or even in the charge sheet it has been not shown as to which documents has been forged, and it is also not mentioned therein as to whose signatures have been forged and who forged those signatures and used them and as such no offence of forgery can be found even prima facie on such vague allegations. Sri Roy has rightly submitted that the offence of cheating and forgery have not been established and where the offence of cheating and forgery cannot be made out no offence can be made out under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 of the I.P.C. Sri Roy has also submitted that the accused Pawan Kumar Ruia was not an employee of the Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. and as such the documents of the Bank were not in his custody, or within his reach and as such the question of falsification of accounts by the accused Ruia does not arise at all to which Sri Talukdar, appearing for the C.B.I. concedes. It is, therefore, clear that the prosecution has failed to establish the offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 or 477 of the I.P.C. against P.K. Ruia in any of the four cases filed against him. Where the main offence does not stand charge of conspiracy could also not stand. There is also no specific allegation of conspiracy against the petitioner. 21. Sri Roy also contended that following the arrest of the petitioner on 29th November, 1994 in connection with the four cases information had been sent against the petitioner to the Income-Tax Department by Officers of the C.B.I., Calcutta and the Income-Tax Department had carried out a search and seize operation against the petitioner in November 1995 but the raid had yielded nothing in relation to the complaints mentioned in the four complaints lodged by Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. Moreover, the Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, Special Range 4, Calcutta had conformed that the petitioner Ruia had no outstanding Income-Tax dues. In connection with the assessment of the companies the Income-Tax has been paid, as submitted by Sri Balai Ch. Roy, and some of those assessment orders have been annexed to the supplementary affidavit collectively marked with letter 'E'. It, therefore, appears that the allegations that the Income-Tax Department has been cheated also falls flat to ground. 22. It has been contended by Sri Balai Ch. Roy, Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner is not an employee of the said Bank or Companies and is not a public servant and the submission of Sri Talukdar appearing for the C.B.I. that the petitioner is a public servant and as such the provisions of the Preventions of Corruption Act apply, is not correct. Roy, Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner is not an employee of the said Bank or Companies and is not a public servant and the submission of Sri Talukdar appearing for the C.B.I. that the petitioner is a public servant and as such the provisions of the Preventions of Corruption Act apply, is not correct. In this connection both of them have drawn my attention to the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 Section 46A of the said Act reads as fellows :- "Every Chairman, director, auditor, liquidator, manger and any other employees of banking company shall be deemed to be a public servant for the purposes of Chapter-IX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 23. From the above it is amply clear that only such Officers or persons shall be public servant within the medaling of Section 46A of the said Act if the said Officer is chairman, director, auditor, liquidator, manager and any other employee of banking company and if offences relate to Chapter-IX of the Indian Penal Code which included Sections 161 to 165A of the I.P.C. all repealed and which presently includes Sections 166 to 171 of the I.P.C. None of the Sections 166 to 171 of the I.P.C. are attracted to the facts of the present case and no allegation has also been made under Sections 166 to 171 I.P.C. against the petitioner, P.K. Ruia. It, therefore, appears that Sri Balai Ch. Roy has rightly contended that the accused P.K. Ruia is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 46A the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Sri Talukdar subsequently conceded that he is not pressing the point specifically in view of the fact that charge sheet under the Prevention of Corruption Act has not been submitted against P.K. Ruia in case being RC No. 12/EOW/86. 24. Sri Talukdar subsequently conceded that he is not pressing the point specifically in view of the fact that charge sheet under the Prevention of Corruption Act has not been submitted against P.K. Ruia in case being RC No. 12/EOW/86. 24. In view of the discussions made above it is amply clear that the prosecution has failed to establish even prima facie case against the petitioner Pawan Kumar Ruia in RC No. 12/EOW/86, RC No. 13/EOW/86, RC No. 14/EOW/86 and RC No. 15/EOW/86 all dated 17th December, 1986 under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471, 419, 467, 477A of the I.P.C. or under Section 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and as such the proceedings of RC No. 12/EOW/86 and investigation and further proceedings in case No. 13/EOW/86, 14/EOW/86 and 15/EOW/86 against the petitioner P.K. Ruia are required to be quashed. 25. Sri Talukdar appearing on behalf of the C.B.I. submitted that the accused Pawan Kumar Ruia filed a Special Leave Petition as indicated on page 64 annexure 'D' of the Revisional application being S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2585 of 1995 before the Supreme Court directed against the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.94 passed by the Special Bench of this High Court in Criminal Revision No. 2237 of 1995. The three Judge’s Beach of the Supreme Court passed the following order:- "The Special Leave Petition is dismissed leaving it open to the petitioner to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him at the appropriate stage at the proceedings and in particular at the pre-trial stage." 26. According to Sri Talukdar in the circumstance and in view of the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the petitioner cannot come for quashing of the proceedings and or investigations under Section 482 before this Court and he can only raise the matter before the learned Magistrate. 27. Sri Balai Ch. Roy, appearing on behalf of the petitioner on the other hand submitted that the direction as contained in the order of the Supreme Court is not only to raise all legal and factual pleas available but to raise the same at any appropriate stage and in particular at the pre-trial stage. 27. Sri Balai Ch. Roy, appearing on behalf of the petitioner on the other hand submitted that the direction as contained in the order of the Supreme Court is not only to raise all legal and factual pleas available but to raise the same at any appropriate stage and in particular at the pre-trial stage. Pre-trial stage means the stage before framing of charge and includes the initial stage of lodging of F.I.R. or filing complaint and an accused can very well raise the question of quashing the said complaint of F.I.R. at its initial stage i.e., immediately after it is lodged or instituted. An accused may come before the High Court for its quashing or for quashing the investigation if it had begun during the pre-trial stage. According to Sri Balai Ch. Roy at any appropriate stage means at any stage of investigation or proceeding which the accused considers appropriate from the time of institution of the F.I.R. or lodging of the complaint to any stage including the stage of appeal or revision. He also submitted that the Supreme Court has held that the law laid down in the decision of the (3) State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604 has been correctly laid down. In view of the above decision it is apparent that the F.I.R. or the charge sheet if considered in its entirety and accepted to be true do not make out an offence, further investigation of cognizance upon the result of such investigation as the case may be should be quashed as it is the requirement of the ends of Justice. Sri Balai Ch. Roy also submitted that a Court proceeding ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution and in a lame prosecution it would be justified in quashing the proceeding in the interest of Justice. I do not see any reason to disagree with his submissions made above. The accused has been given the right by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him at the appropriate stage of the proceedings and in particular at the pre-trial stage and accordingly such pleas are being taken at this stage of quashing the proceedings and the investigations and nothing is wrong in it. The accused has been given the right by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to raise all legal and factual pleas available to him at the appropriate stage of the proceedings and in particular at the pre-trial stage and accordingly such pleas are being taken at this stage of quashing the proceedings and the investigations and nothing is wrong in it. It appears to me that the accused is within his right to raise his pleas available to him at this stage in the light of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 17.3.98. 28. It was also rightly contended by Sri Balai Ch. Roy appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the Special Bench Judgment of (4) Pawan Kumar Ruia v. S.P. C.B.I. reported in 1995 C. Cr. L.R. (Cal) 1, has no binding effect in view of the order of the Supreme Court that the petitioner is entitled to raise all the questions of fact and law at the pre-trial stage which includes the stage of filing the F.I.R. and the stage of investigation. He further submitted that on such leave the petitioner moved at this pre-trial stage and even points decided earlier by this Hon'ble Court is subject to the observations of the Supreme Court, permitting all questions of fact and law to be urged at the pre-trial stage and accordingly the petitioner has done so and also raised other points which were not available to him earlier. The initiation of the Criminal cases against Pawan Kumar Ruia on misunderstandings their subsequent clarification and withdrawal of allegations in the said Criminal cases as their continuation would serve no useful purpose in the light of the letters written by the Manager of the Mercantile Bank Limited not only to the petitioner-accused Pawan Kumar Ruia but also to the C.B.I.; the compromise entered into by the said Bank with the respective companies; the cases basically being of civil nature and allowing these Civil cases to be dismissed for non-prosecution resulting in compromise of the offence of cheating making the other offences under Section 468 and other Sections of the I.P.C. to die a natural death; the absence of allegations against the accused-petitioner of forgery of any documents and their using as genuine and the absence of referring those documents specifically as outcome of forger, in the F.I.R. or charge sheet; non-submission of charge sheet under any section of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the failure of the prosecution to show the accused as public servant, all make the continuation of the Criminal cases against the accused-petitioner meaningless and as such all the four revisional applications are allowed and the proceeding in Tr. No. 245 of 1995, arising out of RC/12/EOW/86, and the investigations in RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 against the petitioner Pawan Kr. Ruia who is facing the pinch of the Criminal cases since long, i.e., since 1986, are hereby quashed.