SHOBHA DIKSHIT, J. ( 1 ) THE Committee of Management of Swami Vivekanand Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, unnao has approached this Court being aggrieved by the Impugned order dated 5. 11. 1982 passed by opposite party No. I, District Inspector of Schools. Unnao who did not approve the order dated 29. 7.-1982 passed by the Principal, terminating the services of the respondent No. 2 and instead directed the Manager to provide another opportunity to said employee Sri Moti Lal Singh to improve himself by permitting him to join the post again. It was further provided that by way of punishment, the employee shall not be entitled to salary from the period his services were terminated till he Joins the post. The employee was also directed to furnish within one month the certificate of his educational qualifications before the appointing authority. The order has been challenged primarily on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools has passed the impugned order without jurisdiction and authority of law. therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. ( 2 ) THE question which falls for consideration of this Court is whether the Principal of an aided institution who is the appointing authority of a Class IV employee can validly terminate his services, specially during probation period or not and if so, wbether the same required approval of. District Inspector of Schools under the relevant provisions of U. P. Intermediate Education act and the Regulations framed thereunder or not? ( 3 ) THE facts, in the backdrop of which the aforesaid questions have arisen, in brief, are as follows : Swami Vivekanand Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Unnao (hereinafter referred to as the institution) is a recognised Institution by the U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate education and imparts education upto High School. This institution is run by the society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act and the scheme of administration framed by it has duly been recognised and approved in accordance with the provisions of Intermediate Education act as amended from time to time. The Principal is the appointing authority of Class IV employees as per Regulation 100 of the Regulations framed under Section 16g of U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the same are contained in Chapter III of the aforesaid regulations. The Principal is the appointing authority of Class IV employees as per Regulation 100 of the Regulations framed under Section 16g of U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the same are contained in Chapter III of the aforesaid regulations. Opposite Party No. 2 Moti Lal Singh was appointed on a Class IV post of Mali by the Principal vide appointment letter dated 25. 7. 1981 on probation of one year. A copy of the appointment letter has been annexed as Annexure-2 to this writ petition. In pursuance of the said appointment letter, opposite party No. 2 joined his duties with effect from 1. 8. 1981. Soon after joining the said post, complaints were made against the respondent No. 2. It is alleged that on 11. 2. 1982, Vijai Pal Singh. Assistant Teacher had reported that opposite party No. 2 while being drunk misbehaved with him on 10. 2. 1982. On receiving the said complaint, memo was issued to the employee and thereafter warning was also issued to him. During the period of probation, respondents work was not found satisfactory. He was issued warnings from time to time. The complaints were primarily with regard to his habit of getting drunk during duty hours, coming late and not discharging his duties as a Mali. A show cause notice was also issued to him on 8. 7. 1982 calling upon him to show cause as to why he had remained absent from duty from 24. 6. 1982 till 1. 7. 1982 and has not looked after the garden of the Institution. He was also asked specifically as to why he remained intoxicated during duty hours and he misbehaves with other employees of the Institution. Respondent No. 2 submitted a reply denying everything but his explanation was not accepted. While all these complaints were pending and were being looked into, respondent again misbehaved on 13. 7. 1982 with Rajendra Bahadur Singh, office clerk and assaulted him being in drunken state. Sri Rajendra Bahadur Singh was a clerk who used to maintain the attendance register of the employees. The respondent also failed to furnish the certificate of his educational qualifications for which the management was unable to record his date of birth. Before the period of probation of the respondent No. 2 could come to an end after one year, the appointing authority of the Institution, the Principal vide orders dated 29. 7. The respondent also failed to furnish the certificate of his educational qualifications for which the management was unable to record his date of birth. Before the period of probation of the respondent No. 2 could come to an end after one year, the appointing authority of the Institution, the Principal vide orders dated 29. 7. 1982, intimated opposite party No. 2 that his services are no more required after 31. 7. 1982. A true copy of this order is annexed as Annexure-6 to this writ petition. . Being aggrieved by the said order of termination of services, the respondent No. 2 preferred a representation before the committee of Management which was considered on 28. 9. 1982 and the Committee of management endorsed the action of the Principal of termination of services of the respondent no. 2. It appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid representation before the Committee of Management, respondent No. 2 also made some representation before the District Inspector of schools and the District Inspector of Schools vide his letter dated 8. 10. 1982 made some enquiry from the Committee of Management with regard to the termination of the services of the said employee. The Manager of the Committee of Management in response to the said letter communicated to the District Inspector of Schools that the Principal of the Institution had terminated the services of the respondent No. 2 and his representation was also considered by the committee of Management and on finding that his performance and conduct was not satisfactory during the probation period, therefore, his services were rightly terminated by the Principal. The committee of Management along with this letter forwarded copies of various letters, warnings, complaints, etc. which were received by it, to the District Inspector of Schools. The service book, attendance register etc. were also sent. The District Inspector of Schools on receiving the same passed the impugned order dated 5. 11. 1982 disapproving the order of termination passed by the Principal and directed the Management to give an opportunity to the respondent to improve himself by permitting him to Join the duties on the post in question. were also sent. The District Inspector of Schools on receiving the same passed the impugned order dated 5. 11. 1982 disapproving the order of termination passed by the Principal and directed the Management to give an opportunity to the respondent to improve himself by permitting him to Join the duties on the post in question. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, making the order of termination ineffective, the present writ petition has been filed, by the Committee of management, inter alia, on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools had acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order as the Principal is the appointing authority who alone can pass the order of termination for which the approval of District Inspector of Schools is not at all required under law. The respondent was since not found suitable during the probation period hence his services were rightly terminated and the order is of termination simplicitor and not punitive in nature. The interference by the District Inspector of Schools is alleged to be unwarranted in law. ( 5 ) THE writ petition has been resisted by the opposite parties, Counter-affidavit has been filed. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that even in a case of a probationer, the services could not be terminated without holding an enquiry into the conduct of the probationer. ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties. ( 7 ) THE impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools has acted without jurisdiction by passing the said order. Principal being the appointing authority of the respondent validly and legally passed the termination order too, hence the District Inspector of Schools had no jurisdiction to either Interfere with the order of termination or set it aside. In any event, the district Inspector of Schools could not have directed the Committee of Management to permit the respondent No. 2 to resume his duties on the post in question. It has further been contended that even otherwise, the order of termination does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity for which the District Inspector of Schools should have interfered with the same either in facts or in law. It has further been contended that even otherwise, the order of termination does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity for which the District Inspector of Schools should have interfered with the same either in facts or in law. It has further been contended that respondent No. 2 was admittedly on probation and. therefore, the appointing authority was perfectly justified in law to terminate his services on finding him unsuitable. !n support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on regulations 25 and 100 of the Regulations framed under Section 16g of the U. P. Intermediate education Act as contained in Chapter III of the Regulations. These Regulations read as here under : "25. The services of a temporary employee (other than a probationer) or of a probationer during the term of his probation, may be terminated at any time by giving him one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof. ^^100- fyfid] ftlesa iqlrdky;k/;{k Hkh lfeefyr gsa dslecu/k esa izcu/k lfefr rfkk prqfkz Js. kh dezpkjh dslecu/k esa vkpk;z@iz/kkuk/;kid fu;qfdr izkf/kdkjhgksxka fyfidksa] ftlesa iqlrdky;k/;{k Hkh lfeefyr gs] rfkk prqfkz Js. kh dezpkfj;ksa dh fu;qfdr ifjoh{kk ftldh vof/k ,d o"kz gksxh LFkkuh;dj. k ,oa lsok fu;evkfn ds lecu/k esa vko;d ifjorzuksa lfgr ij ds fofu;e1] 4 ls 8] 10] 11] 15] 24 ls 26] 30] 32 ls 34] 36 ls 38] 40 ls 43] 45 ls 52] 54] 66] 67] 70 ls 73 rfkk 76 ls82 ds izko/kku lhkh ykxw gksaxs] fdurq prqfkz Js. khdezpkfj;ksa ds lecu/k esa fofu;e 77 ls 82 ds izko/kkurhkh ykxw gksaxs] tc bl lecu/k esa jkt; ljdkj }kjkvko;d funszk fuxzr fd;s tk;asxsa bu dezpkfj;ksa dslecu/k esa fofue; 9] 12] 13] 14] 16 ls 20] 27] 28] 54] 55 ls 65 rfkk 97 ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gksaxsa** ( 8 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid Regulations, it has been contended that the services of the respondent have been terminated by passing an order of termination simplicltor and the same is not punitive. In lieu of one months notice, the salary was also deposited in the pay account of the respondent No. 2. Since it is not a case of punishment, therefore, neither any appeal or representation would lie to the District Inspector of Schools and in these circumstances, it has been submitted that the District Inspector of Schools has acted without Jurisdiction. In lieu of one months notice, the salary was also deposited in the pay account of the respondent No. 2. Since it is not a case of punishment, therefore, neither any appeal or representation would lie to the District Inspector of Schools and in these circumstances, it has been submitted that the District Inspector of Schools has acted without Jurisdiction. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Janta Vidyalaya Society, Deoria and another v. Deputy Director of education. VII Region, Gorakhpur and others, 1983 UPLBEC 622, wherein it has been held that regulation 25 framed under Section 16g of the Act confers power on the appointing authority to terminate the services of a Class IV employee during the probation period by giving him one months notice or salary in lieu thereof, and since in the present case, the respondents services have been terminated within the period of probation of one year by passing an order of termination simplicitor and one months salary was duly deposited in his account in lieu of notice, hence the order being wholly in accordance with law did not warrant any interference. ( 9 ) IT cannot be disputed that the appointing authority of Class IV employees is Principal and he has the power of dismissing or terminating the services of such an employee. It is also not disputed that the respondent No. 2 was appointed on probation vide orders dated 25. 7. 1981 wherein it was clearly provided that be shall be on probation for one year. Therefore, the probation period would have come to an end on 31. 7. 1982. The services, therefore, have been terminated within the period of probation. The only question which has to be examined is as to whether in the case of a probationer, the services could be terminated without holding a regular/detailed departmental enquiry or not and in the event, this procedure was not followed, the order of termination is rendered punitive to be dealt with under Regulation 31 of the aforesaid Regulations. The only question which has to be examined is as to whether in the case of a probationer, the services could be terminated without holding a regular/detailed departmental enquiry or not and in the event, this procedure was not followed, the order of termination is rendered punitive to be dealt with under Regulation 31 of the aforesaid Regulations. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that since the order of termination is punitive, therefore, the District Inspector of Schools under regulation 44a (2) is entitled to either enhance or reduce the punishment and it is under these powers that the District Inspector of Schools did not approve the order of termination and directed the Management to provide another opportunity to the respondent to improve himself by joining the post. The punishment of termination was reduced to forfeiture of salary for the period from the date of termination to the date of rejoining. According to the learned counsel, even the services of a probationer could not be terminated without holding a regular departmental enquiry. In support of the same, reliance has been placed on the decision of a Full Bench of this court in the case of Managing Committee, Sohan Lal Higher Secondary School. Rajendra nagar, Lucknow v. Shiv Dutt Gupta, 1972 ALJ 465. The case relates to a teacher, whereas this court is dealing with a Class IV employee. ( 10 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions and hold that once it is not disputed that the respondent No. 2. a Class IV employee was on probation and his services have been terminated within the period of probation, by passing the order of termination simplicitor. It is certainly not a case of punishment and the order is, therefore, not punitive. Thus, the District inspector of Schools had no authority to pass the impugned order exercising powers under regulation 44 treating the impugned order to be an order of punishment. Besides that. Regulation 44a (1) and (2) have to be read along with Section 16g (3) (a ). Section 16g (3) (a) is applicable only on Principals, Head Masters and teachers only. Besides that. Regulation 44a (1) and (2) have to be read along with Section 16g (3) (a ). Section 16g (3) (a) is applicable only on Principals, Head Masters and teachers only. The same reads as hereunder : "no Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. " therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the District Inspector of schools was within his rights to reduce the punishment is wholly without Jurisdiction. The contention that it makes no difference whether the respondent was an unconfirmed Class IV employee or a probationer because in the instant case, the respondent admittedly was on probation as a Class IV employee is also not tenable in law as the provisions of Section 16g (3) (a) as also Regulation 44a (1) and (2) are not applicable in the facts of the present case. In fact. Regulation 44a is not applicable in the facts of the present case, firstly because the respondent is not a Principal. Headmaster or teacher and secondly, his services have been terminated by an order of termination simplicitor and is not a punishment. ( 11 ) IN the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order is liable to be quashed being illegal in violation of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations as also has been passed without jurisdiction. ( 12 ) WRIT Petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 5. 11. 1982 is hereby set aside. No order as to costs. The interim order stands discharged. .